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Intrastate armed conflict has long been considered as one of the greatest threats
to human security worldwide (King and Murray, 2001). Since 1989, more than
one million people have been killed as a result of direct combat between govern-
ments and rebel groups (Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015). This number does
not even begin to account for the numerous other types of violence typically as-
sociated with internal conflict, or for the vast indirect cost such violence bears
for human development (Sköns, 2005). Armed conflict is not only about death,
but is “a breeding ground for mass human rights violations,” including torture,
sexual violence, or forced migration (Amnesty International, 2016). It also has
tremendous detrimental effects on various development issues such as maternal
health, infant mortality, or access to safe water (Gates, Hegre, Nygård, et al.,
2012). In 2014 alone, more than 100,000 people were killed in armed conflicts
worldwide, which represents the highest battle-related death count in any year
since the end of the Cold War (Gates, Nygård, et al., 2016).
As a remedy to this problem, scholars and practitioners alike have proposed
the purposeful design and reform of formal state institutions. If intrastate armed
conflict occurs because groups experience political exclusion and violently rebel
to address this grievance, the argument goes, then reforming formal state insti-
tutions so that post-conflict politics are more inclusive, democratic, and respon-
sive to society’s needs should have a pacifying effect. Based on this belief, there
has been an impressive growth of global financial assistance to post-conflict in-
stitutional reform in recent years. In 2012, for instance, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) allocated more than 17 bil-
lion USD of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to support governance and
peace in developing countries. This is the highest amount of assistance pro-
vided to any ODA sector that year (Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, 2014). This empirical development has also been accompa-
nied by a growing number of academic studies that analyze the institutional
causes of peace after war (e.g. Ansorg and Kurtenbach, 2017; Cammett and
Malesky, 2012; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007; Hegre and Nygård, 2015; Schneider
1
and Wiesehomeier, 2008; Walter, 2015; Wolff, 2011; Zürcher et al., 2013).
In this dissertation, I argue that this literature needs improvement. Firstly,
the theoretical and empirical peace and conflict literature has thus far focused
on studying the patterns and effects of permanent state structures, or has not
sufficiently distinguished short-term institutions put in place for an interim pe-
riod and long-term structures that come without sunset clauses (cf. Schmidt
and Galyan, 2017). To name just one example, the statistical literature on
post-conflict power-sharing governments regularly pools into one data set both
interim power-sharing arrangements, such as the one endorsed by the signa-
tory parties to Liberia’s 2003 peace agreement, and long-term designs of joint
rule, such as following Bosnia’s 1995 accord (e.g. Cammett and Malesky, 2012;
Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Pospieszna and Schneider, 2013). It is however rea-
sonable to expect that both types of institutions come with different effects on
peace, or induce distinct causal mechanisms (cf. Binningsbø, 2013).
Secondly, the peace and conflict literature that explicitly focuses on the role
of interim governments after intrastate armed conflict faces its own theoretical
and methodological limitations. These include a reliance on findings derived
from under-theorized and non-comparative case studies, as well as a strict focus
on the specific concepts of power-sharing and international interim government
as explanations for long-term political developments in war-torn societies. By
this means, the literature still follows a typology of interim governments that
was introduced more than 20 years ago by Shain and Linz (1995) in their sem-
inal work on the topic, Between States: Interim Governments and Democratic
Transitions. Scholarship may, however, omit other important explanatory vari-
ables or causal processes that link interim governments to peace after armed
conflict. This is not least because Shain and Linz originally developed their
typology as part of the transitology paradigm in democratization research, and
hence not with a specific focus on situations in which interim governments follow
large-scale conflict (cf. Chapter 2).
As a result, it is still unclear why some interim governments that convene
to end intrastate armed conflict are followed by stable peace, while others are
not. This is the focus of this dissertation – and it is one of high empirical rele-
vance. This relevance not least stems from the strong belief that international
policy-makers have recently and repeatedly expressed in the peace-conducive
potential of interim governments. For instance, then-United States Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton stressed in 2012 the necessity to form an interim gov-
ernment in Syria, in order to stop the fighting that had erupted in 2011 (cf.
The Telegraph, 2012). This call has often been supported by German Foreign
Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier (cf. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2015).
Also in the Central African Republic (CAR), an interim government headed by
Catherine Samba-Panza assumed power in January 2014. The US Department
of State (2014) has expressed strong support for this interim government and
has argued that its institutions were the best way to ensure “that the democratic
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transition process [was] rooted in a broad-based national consultation with all
of the Central African Republic’s people.” And in Afghanistan, observers have
recently termed the rule of an interim government “the only choice left” for
peace (Koskinas, 2014).
This belief among policy-makers that interim governments are part of their
institutional “toolkit” to promote peace after armed conflict is also one reason
for why such governments have become regular features of war-torn societies
in the past 25 years. Examples of interim governments range from the early
post-Cold War cases of Cambodia or Namibia, where then unprecedented inter-
national involvement charged the United Nations (UN) with organizing national
elections, through numerous power-sharing interim institutions created in the
1990s and 2000s in places such as Burundi, Sudan, or Côte d’Ivoire, to UN
interim administrations in Kosovo and East Timor at the turn of the century.
More recently, the topic has been pushed back to the top of the international
agenda after interim governments convened in Ukraine (cf. Strasheim, 2016) and
South Sudan. But the empirical record of many of these interim governments in
promoting peace is mixed at best. As I will show in Chapter 4, out of 62 interim
governments analyzed in this dissertation, 35 (or 56.5 percent) were followed by
a relapse to intrastate armed conflict in the post-interim period. This variation
is the primary puzzle driving the analysis of this dissertation that is guided by
the research question:
Research Question: After intrastate armed conflict, what properties of in-
terim governments increase the stability of post-interim peace?
The argument that I will make and evaluate in the following chapters of this
dissertation goes as follows. Empirically, the appointment of interim govern-
ments has been at the core of an impressive number of peace processes since
the end of the Cold War. These interim governments vary with regard to the
institutional designs they are ascribed with. For instance, some interim govern-
ments offer cabinet posts to representatives of all warring parties, while others
function without such power-sharing deals. Interim governments also come with
diverging degrees of political authority assumed by international actors. These
variations have informed an array of previous research on the topic that closely
links to the aforementioned typology by Shain and Linz (e.g. Croissant, 2008;
Jarstad, 2010; Rothchild, 2007; Sisk and Stefes, 2005). However, interim gov-
ernments also vary with regard to the reform processes they realize in order to
induce transitions to post-conflict peace, meaning in how they help to change
the rules governing a society from those of war to those of peace (cf. Jarstad
and Sisk, 2008; Lyons, 2005). For instance, interim governments may differ
with regard to how successfully they disarm and demobilize the warring parties,
or to how they allow for unarmed actors to assume power in political processes
(cf. Paris, 2004). These issues have been neglected by past research as specific
explanatory variables for how interim governments add to peace.
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I will show that by focusing predominantly on the institutional designs of
interim governments, past research has only weak explanatory power in how
such governments promote long-term peace after war. This is not least because
their institutional designs are temporary and should thus fail to address the
warring parties’ concerns and uncertainties about marginalization, or their costs
of remobilizing for armed combat in the long run. The focus on institutional
designs also has weak explanatory power because it fails to explain how interim
governments are truly instruments to induce a transition to peace, rather than
bodies that merely keep the relevant warring parties satisfied in power and that
delay an actual resolution of the conflict to a later point in time.
I therefore complement the predominant institutional design approach by in-
corporating two further sub-fields of peace and conflict research into my frame-
work. Both address features of reform processes in interim governments. Firstly,
by borrowing from studies concerned with the role of non-state actors in war and
peace, I hold that as long as the parallel war-time institutions of warring par-
ties persist throughout an interim period, parties retain the financial resources,
popular legitimacy, military infrastructure, and war-time mindsets to remobi-
lize in the post-interim period. Interim governments that implement reforms to
integrate such parallel institutions should thus increase the stability of peace.
Secondly, by borrowing from studies concerned with the role of unarmed actors
in war and peace, I argue that as long as interim governments fail to strengthen
an unarmed domestic audience that would punish warring parties remobilizing
for combat, violence also becomes more likely. Interim governments that allow
for the participation of unarmed actors in reform processes – such as civil society
or political parties without a history of armed insurgency – should also increase
the stability of post-interim peace.
The rest of this introductory chapter is structured as follows: I first turn to
defining the central concepts used in this study. In section 1.1.1, I formulate a
definition of interim governments that links to past research on the topic, and
in section 1.1.2 I repeat this exercise for my dependent variable, the stability of
post-interim peace. In conducting this task, I concentrate on theoretical defini-
tions of my concepts, while I discuss their operationalization in Chapter 4. I also
focus on defining these two key concepts, while I discuss the conceptualizations
of other relevant terms “on the go” throughout the remaining chapters. I end
this introduction in section 1.2 with presenting the structure of my dissertation
and summarizing the content of each individual chapter.
1.1 Defining Central Concepts
1.1.1 Interim Governments after Armed Conflict
I define interim governments as the formal state institutions exercising exec-
utive and legislative authority between the demise of an old regime and first
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elections. This definition consists of several elements that require further dis-
cussion. Firstly, by institutions I mean “the patterns of interaction that govern
and constrain the relationships among individuals” (North et al., 2009b, p. 59).
I emphasize in this regard formal institutions as opposed to informal norms and
rules (on informal rules in transitional regimes, see Grzymala-Busse, 2010).
Secondly, in the context of intrastate armed conflict, I understand the demise
of an old regime as its irregular overthrow through military victory, international
intervention, or negotiated peace agreements (cf. Kreutz, 2010). For instance,
the 2011 National Transitional Council of Libya (NTCL) convened as the coun-
try’s interim government after rebels ousted the regime of Muammar Ghaddafi,
while the 2001-04 Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) was installed after a US-
led intervention induced the fall of the Taleban regime that had been at war
with the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA). The
National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) was negotiated by the
warring parties in the 2003 Accra Peace Agreement.
Thirdly, using elections as a right-censoring point of interim governments has
been disputed in the literature. My definition follows recent comparative studies
on interim governments in peace and conflict research (e.g. Jarstad, 2010; Lyons,
2005; Strasheim and Fjelde, 2014). These studies have pointed out that elections
are empirically the most frequent trigger to end interim periods and transfer
power to a permanent regime (Schmidt and Galyan, 2017). Also Shain and Linz
(1995, p. 8) define interim government as institutions promising “to facilitate
the country’s transition to a democratic political order in free and contested
elections.” However, Guttieri and Piombo (2007) have more recently argued
that because intrastate conflict destroys much of the political infrastructure of
sovereign states, the creation of a de jure and de facto sovereign and permanent
government is substantively more decisive than the mere realization of a single
public vote in the aftermath of war.
While Guttieri and Piombo (2007) raise a valid point, their definition of in-
terim governments as bodies ruling between the fall of an ancien régime and the
creation of a sovereign government bears both theoretical and methodological
problems for comparative research designs – their own edited volume consists
largely of single or small-n comparative case studies. In terms of theory, arguing
for the installation of a sovereign government to judge whether an interim period
has ended or not disregards the issue of weak statehood after war. By definition,
weak states are characterized by a lack of popular legitimacy toward political
authorities, who are perceived as either incapable or unwilling to provide basic
public services for the population (Holsti, 1996; Ohlson and Söderberg-Kovacs,
2011). As a result, if a government cannot or does not intend to provide such
services after the end of armed conflict, international engagement that limits
this government’s sovereignty – for instance by deploying peacekeepers that
provide for the security of civilians (cf. Bellamy and Williams, 2011; Hultman
et al., 2013) – may both be necessary and desirable also after elections have
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transferred power away from an interim government.1
In terms of methodology, the need to disambiguate interim government ter-
mination more clearly than proposed by Guttieri and Piombo (2007) also goes
hand in hand with measurement issues. While the case studies in the authors’
edited volume make a “thick” conceptualization of such termination feasible,
the mixed-method research design of this dissertation warrants a more narrow
definition (cf. Coppedge, 1999). An election date thus provides a clear cut-off
point for when a case enters a post-interim period (cf. Chapter 4).
1.1.2 The Stability of Post-Interim Peace
I define my dependent variable as the sustained absence of intrastate armed
conflict after the termination of interim government. This concept also consists
of several elements that require further discussion. Firstly, I concentrate on
the absence of violence in the post-interim period, which is due to a number of
theoretical and methodological considerations that I discuss in Chapter 3 and
Chapter 4.2 Secondly, and linking to what may be the central dividing line in
peace and conflict research as a whole (cf. Wæver, 2004), my definition incorpo-
rates a negative conceptualization of peace. This means that I understand peace
conceptually as the absence of direct, physical, inter-group violence (Galtung,
1969). Empirically – and in line with the vast majority of statistical peace and
conflict research – I understand it as the absence of a very particular form of
such violence: intrastate armed conflict. By intrastate or internal armed con-
flict I mean armed combat within the boundaries of a sovereign state, fought
between the government of this state and at least one rebel group (Kalyvas,
2006; Sambanis, 2004). I refer to intrastate conflicts of large scale as civil wars
(cf. Chapter 4). I also understand a government as the conflict actor controlling
the national capital of a state and a rebel group as a formally organized oppo-
sition movement that uses armed force to challenge the government’s authority
(Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2015a).
Limiting my research to studying peace as the absence of this particular
type of violence comes with advantages and disadvantages, and the negative
peace concept has thus been subject to both criticism and defense in the aca-
demic debate. From within the statistical peace and conflict literature, this
negative conceptualization – that typically operationalizes armed conflict and
peace through counting battle-related deaths (cf. Chapter 4) – has been argued
to conflate the concept of violence with the concept of conflict. Prominently,
Kalyvas (2006) has reasoned that violence (and battle-related deaths as a result
of such violence) may be endogenous to armed conflict. This means that vio-
lence and deaths may be unrelated to the actual causes of conflict and rather
1Likewise, since war-torn countries often belong to the most aid-dependent states in the
world long after violence has subsided, it is often difficult to judge at what point a government
truly is sovereign (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2013).
2I add a control variable capturing violence in the interim period in my robustness checks.
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the result of an inherent escalation process in which violence causes more vio-
lence. In addition, assessing peace as the absence of battle-related deaths has
been argued to merge different versions of peace into one. For instance, it may
conflate phases in which parties disarm, demobilize, and actively implement a
peace agreement with phases in which they take time to regroup for combat
(Florea, 2012).
From outside of statistical peace and conflict research, qualitative studies
have promoted the positive peace concept and in that have formulated two spe-
cific points of critique regarding the understanding of peace as the mere absence
of intrastate conflict (e.g. Paffenholz, 2010; Simons and Zanker, 2012; Wæver,
2004). Firstly, scholars have reasoned that the absence of direct, physical vio-
lence should not be sufficient to classify a society as peaceful. They have argued
that peace encompasses also the additional prevalence of “desirable” features
such as social justice, democracy, the rule of law, or economic equality (cf. Gal-
tung, 1969). Secondly, scholars have argued that particularly in post-conflict
societies, the absence of intrastate conflict does not necessarily mean the ab-
sence of all other forms of violence. Instead, many societies emerging out of
armed conflict typically experience profound levels of organized crime, domestic
violence, or state repression (Kurtenbach and Wulf, 2012; Westendorf, 2015).
For instance, as traumatized soldiers acculturated to the use of violence return
home to their families after war, many societies see a rise in post-war domestic
violence (cf. Manjoo and McRaith, 2011).
While part of the critique of the negative peace concept is warranted – I
discuss this aspect further in Chapter 9 – conceptualizing and measuring peace
as the absence of intrastate conflict comes with key advantages for this research
design. Firstly, it is reasonable to focus on intrastate armed conflict as one
particular type of violence, because we know that other types are accounted for
by different explanatory variables or causal mechanisms (cf. Eck and Hultman,
2007).3 Secondly, any conceptualization of peace that does not only entail the
absence of intrastate armed conflict but also the presence of any “desirable”
societal features also includes the absence of any potential source of intrastate
conflict as a definitional element. As a result, the statistical assessment of posi-
tive peace is inherently problematic. This is because an inclusion of factors that
can potentially stir or mitigate conflict in a concept of peace renders analyzing
a correlation between peace and such causes impossible. Furthermore, defin-
ing peace through notions of justice, democracy, or equality would also blur
the lines separating these concepts and thus decrease their theoretical utility in
comparative political science research (Gerring, 1999).
Particularly the conceptualization of post-interim peace through the inclu-
sion of democracy in such definition would entail methodological problems for
the purpose of this dissertation. The reader could rightfully point out that a
3I test this proposition by modeling the effect of properties of interim government on
hazards of non-state conflict and one-sided violence against civilians in Chapter 9.
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negative peace concept ignores the inherent idea of interim governments. This
is because such governments are not only put in place to reduce battle death
counts, but also to organize the elections terminating their rule and thus to
forward democratic reforms early on in a peace process. In other words, interim
governments convene to prepare war-torn societies for a situation where peace
is stable enough to exercise democracy (cf. Paris, 2004; Sisk, 2008). However,
since terminating in elections is among the conceptual cornerstones of interim
government, and since elections are also an accepted minimum criterion for
defining and measuring democracy, any analysis of the relationship between
interim government and some form of “democratic peace” would inevitably be
biased.
1.2 Structure of the Dissertation
Following this introduction, the dissertation is organized in nine additional chap-
ters. In Chapter 2, I review previous research on interim governments. This
review will show in detail the argument I formulated above, in that even though
the study of institutions in the broader peace and conflict literature has forged
ahead in terms of methodological and theoretical advances in the past decade,
this has not resulted in a better understanding of interim governments. This
is because the broader literature has concentrated on permanent institutional
structures, or has not distinguished between short- and long-term institutions
in its research designs. Studies focusing on interim governments at the same
time suffer from their own theoretical and methodological shortcomings. To
underline this argument, I begin Chapter 2 by briefly reviewing how the con-
cept of interim government was introduced to political science research in the
tradition of democratization studies. This review centers on the seminal work
by Shain and Linz (1995) and their typology of interim governments that still
informs most research to date. Next, I review the study of interim government
in peace and conflict research. I show that scholarship in this tradition has
particularly focused on examining the power-sharing and international models
of the Shain and Linz (1995) typology and is thus linked to the broader debates
on consociationalism and international interventions after war.
Based on this discussion, I close Chapter 2 by identifying three shortcomings
that I address in this dissertation. Firstly, I mitigate the more general neglect
of interim governments in the broader study of the institutional causes of peace
by zooming in on the particularities of such institutions. This will allow me
to identify more concrete causal mechanisms and ultimately also help policy-
makers to make more informed decisions in designing transitions from war to
peace. Secondly, I address the methodological shortcoming that studies focus-
ing on interim government often base their inferences on under-theorized and
non-comparative case studies. This is problematic because results are difficult
to generalize across a larger number of cases. Such research designs also insuffi-
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ciently deal with the question of what types of interim governments are selected
in which situations. I thus advance previous research by using a mixed-method
research design that combines statistical analysis with comparative case studies.
Thirdly, I address the theoretical shortcoming that studies focusing on interim
government have predominantly analyzed institutional designs as explanatory
variables. This may omit other important explanations in how interim govern-
ments add to peace. As discussed above, I thus complement the predominant
institutional design approach by incorporating features of reform processes in
interim governments into my framework.
In Chapter 3, I begin to address these shortcomings by developing a theo-
retical framework on the effects of interim governments on post-interim peace.
This framework builds on bargaining theory and the mechanism of commit-
ment problems. I first present the standard bargaining model of armed conflict
and discuss why credible commitment problems help to understand bargaining
breakdowns and the resumption of armed combat. I then formulate three causal
mechanisms on how interim governments can mitigate commitment problems
and thus increase the stability of peace. These mechanisms are (1) to decrease
the warring parties’ future uncertainty concerning their political, economic, or
physical survival, (2) to increase their costs of defection, and (3) to help parties
send costly signals by creating domestic audience costs.
From this model, I derive four hypotheses. Following past research, I hy-
pothesize that (H1) power-sharing interim governments increase the stability
of peace by decreasing future uncertainty and that (H2) international interim
governments do so by raising the costs of defection. I then demonstrate the
weakness of this institutional design approach that fails to take into account
how the temporality of such designs can exacerbate, rather than mitigate com-
mitment problems. I thus formulate two further hypotheses, arguing that (H3)
more advanced processes of integrating the warring parties’ parallel political
and military institutions into the authority of an interim governments raise the
costs of defection and increase the stability of peace. Finally, I hold that (H4)
more advanced opportunities of participation for unarmed actors in interim gov-
ernments create audience costs and increase the stability of peace. In sum, I
expect to find more profound empirical support for the two latter hypotheses.
In Chapter 4, I test my hypotheses using survival analysis. This chapter is
the first of five empirical chapters that as a whole form a mixed-method research
design combining statistical analysis and within- and between-case analysis in
qualitative case studies.4 I first present a novel data set on the properties of
all interim governments that followed intrastate conflict between 1989 and 2012
and then discuss my sampling strategy, data sources, and coding rules. Next,
4Mixed-method research is becoming increasingly popular in the social sciences. It is
considered a “standard to be emulated” (Goemans and Spaniel, 2013) and the best way to
induce a complete understanding of an under-researched phenomenon (Ahram, 2013). This is
also because it allows for both the “exploration of general relationships and explanations and
the specific explanations of individual cases and groups of cases” (Lieberman, 2005, p. 436).
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I investigate the relationship between the hypothesized properties of interim
government and stable post-interim peace by fitting a series of Cox Propor-
tional Hazards (PH) models. In sum, my findings lend support to the argument
that reform processes in interim governments are better explanations for stable
post-interim peace than such governments’ institutional designs. While the co-
efficients for power-sharing and international interim government are either not
statistically significant or not very robust, the integration of parallel institutions
as well as the participation of unarmed actors are both valid predictors of the
hazard of armed conflict in the post-interim period.
Following my statistical analysis, Chapters 5 to 9 form the qualitative anal-
ysis of how properties of interim governments are linked to stable post-interim
peace. In Chapter 5, I discuss the limitations of my statistical analysis, as
well as my case selection strategy and qualitative research design. I select cases
according to a most-similar system design and by using statistical matching
techniques. This strategy results in (1) Nepal’s 2006-08 interim government,
(2) Angola’s 1991-92 interim government, and (3) Cambodia’s 1991-93 interim
government as cases under analysis. I use a mix of process-tracing and com-
parative between-case analysis in order to study the causal mechanisms that
account for the outcome in each case, and to investigate why post-interim peace
lasted in Nepal, but not in Cambodia and Angola. For all cases, I rely on a
mix of primary and secondary sources, including academic studies, newspaper
articles, policy reports, and gray literature. My analysis of Nepal’s interim gov-
ernment additionally builds on 30 semi-structured interviews carried out during
empirical fieldwork in September and October 2015. Chapter 5 thus ends with
a discussion of fieldwork methods and techniques.
The three following chapters are dedicated to within-case analyses of Nepal
(Chapter 6), Angola (Chapter 7), and Cambodia (Chapter 8). Each chapter
starts with a brief historical overview of the countries in order to situate the rule
of the respective interim government in the peace process. These overviews focus
specifically on the dynamics that led to each civil war (rather than portraying
broader historical processes) as well as on introducing the relevant warring par-
ties. I then outline the role of commitment problems and discuss the strengths
and weaknesses of the bargaining argument in each case. Subsequently, the
main part of the within-case analyses attends to all hypothesized properties of
interim government sequentially and analyzes whether or not a property set into
motion the theorized process of steps and actions that led to post-interim peace
or the absence thereof. In this analysis, I also attend to possible alternative
mechanisms and explanatory variables.
Chapter 9 is devoted to a comparison of the three case studies in order
to draw inferences that move beyond the within-case level. This chapter also
allows me to reflect on conceptual and methodological fallacies with regard to
my dependent variable, fit new Cox PH models to study variables and variable
interactions that my within-case analyses suggested, and discuss the limitations
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of the bargaining theory argument. In sum, I find that also in my case stud-
ies, reforms implemented by interim governments are a better explanation for
long-term peace than the institutional designs of such governments. This is
particularly true for whether or not interim governments integrate the parallel
political and military institutions of warring parties, such as by implementing
disarmament and demobilization programs. I also find that mechanisms con-
cerning the warring parties’ raised costs of defection provide the most powerful
causal link to peace, and that it is fruitful to relax the unitary actor assump-
tion of bargaining theory. Such reformulation of theory allows to consider how
interim governments alter cohesion within warring parties to raise their costs of
defection, and thus expands explanations of how interim governments mitigate
commitment problems to avoid armed conflict.
Finally, Chapter 10 concludes this dissertation by summarizing its main
findings as well as its theoretical, methodological, and empirical contributions
to the peace and conflict literature. The chapter also formulates a number of
policy recommendations for international actors concerned with the design of
interim periods following intrastate armed conflict. It ends by identifying several
implications for future academic research on interim governments in specific, and





What do we know about interim governments and peace in war-torn societies?
This chapter reviews theoretical explanations, empirical results, and method-
ological issues in the existing literature on interim governments. My review aims
to demonstrate in more detail my argument from Chapter 1: While peace and
conflict research in general, and its scholarship on post-conflict institutions in
particular, have recently forged ahead in terms of methodological and theoretical
advances, the growing number of studies has not resulted in a better understand-
ing of interim governments due to two reasons. Firstly, the broader post-conflict
institutions literature insufficiently acknowledges the specific causal mechanisms
of interim governments, as it either focuses on permanent institutional structures
or does not separate short- and long-term institutions in its research designs.
That this represents a shortcoming becomes visible by looking at studies that
are specifically interested in instances of interim rule, because such studies use
similar explanatory variables but formulate causal mechanisms that at times
contradict those of the broader literature. However, and this is the second rea-
son for why the recent scholarly trend has not resulted in a better understanding
of interim rule, those works focusing on interim government largely base their
evidence on non-comparative case studies difficult to generalize. They also focus
exclusively on institutional designs on interim rule at the expense of addressing
the role of reforms in such governments, and may thus overlook key variables
and causal mechanisms in how interim governments contribute to peace.
This chapter proceeds in three steps. Section 2.1 briefly discusses how the
concept interim government was introduced to comparative political science in
the tradition of democratization studies, as well as how this debate relates to
studying interim governments in societies marked by armed conflict.5 In section
2.2, I review the study of interim government in peace and conflict research and
reflect on the relationship between this scholarship and the broader debates
of the discipline – particularly works on consociationalism and international
5I present democratization research and the peace and conflict literature as separate liter-
atures in this dissertation, albeit the lines between the fields are at times blurred.
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intervention – identifying both similarities and differences. The final section 2.3
concludes by outlining three shortcomings of past research.
2.1 Interim Governments and Democratization
The concept of interim governments was introduced to comparative political
science research in the seminal work Between States: Interim Governments and
Democratic Transitions published by Shain and Linz (1995). In Between States,
the authors situate their work in the tradition of the transitology paradigm
that – together with modernization theory – has been said to have both “domi-
nated and distorted” the study of how authoritarian regimes democratize (Gans-
Morse, 2004, p. 321). Hence, the transitology paradigm – that emerged as an
answer to modernization theory’s focus on macro-level and structural explana-
tions – is just one of several theoretical approaches to explain why and how
democratic regimes arise, consolidate, or collapse.6
Tracing back to Rustow (1970)’s seminal piece Transitions to Democracy:
Toward a Dynamic Model, the transitology paradigm shifted the angle of ex-
planation from macro-level conditions at the center of modernization theory to
micro-level and elite-oriented perspectives, thereby opening the “black box” of
the democratization process by breaking it into a number of consecutive steps
(Schedler, 2001). In specific, the literature argues that the ideal type democra-
tization process proceeds in three steps: a political struggle that results in the
demise of authoritarian rule, followed by the transition to democracy, and the
consolidation of such democracy that becomes the only “game in town” (Linz
and Stepan, 1996; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986).7
Its focus on the interactions of elites is the trademark of the transitology
paradigm: “[Nearly] all detailed descriptions of particular transitions and most
efforts to theorize them focus on the interests, choices, and strategies of elite
political actors” (Geddes, 1999, p. 3), who are typically classified into four
ideal type groups. Hardliners of an outgoing, non-democratic regime prefer to
6In brief, modernization theory analyzes the structural conditions conducive to democ-
racy, holding that explanatory variables such as industrialization and economic development
are necessary conditions to sustain democratic rule. This relationship is often paraphrased
by Lipset’s influential thesis: “The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances it sus-
tains democracy” (Lipset, 1959, p. 79). Modernization theory has faced much criticism also
outside the transitology paradigm, such as concerning its portrayal of the nature of male-
female relations during democratization and its Euro-centric conflating of modernization with
westernization (e.g. Jaquette, 1982). Also within modernization theory, Lipset’s thesis is not
undisputed, and some have noted the different effects of economic growth and modernization
on democratization and on democratic consolidation (Przeworski, Alvarez, et al., 2000).
7Also the transitology paradigm has faced harsh critique, particularly from area studies
that criticize its overemphasis of elite behavior and its approach to develop generalizable
ideal types of transformation processes (Gans-Morse, 2004). Newer works in the comparative
democratization literature have argued it has actually been democratic transitions not guided
by elites but by the broader masses that have produced the most stable democratic regimes
(McFaul, 2002). As one of the paradigm’s most prominent critics, Carothers (2002) also
called for The End of the Transition Paradigm by pointing out that in the empirical reality,
transitions often do not end in democratic consolidation.
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Figure 2.1: Interim Governments in Democratization Research





































Central claim: interim government models vary in their effect on democratic
consolidation – power-sharing transitions are often seen as most promising.
Notes: Illustration based on the figure presented by Croissant (2008) and the typologies
by Shain and Linz (1995), Huntington (1993), and Doyle (2002).
sustain the status quo and their control over power; while regime Liberaliz-
ers negotiate with the opposition to assure their political survival in a future
democratic regime. Opposition Moderates and Radicals do not necessarily have
distinct interests, but are divided by strategy and risk aversion: Radicals are
resolved to use violence to achieve their goals (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986;
Przeworski, 1992). Democratic transitions in which Liberalizers retain a high
degree of control are termed top-down reform processes (Linz, 1978), transi-
tions through transaction (Share and Mainwaring, 1986), or transformations
(Huntington, 1993). Transitions controlled by Moderates are labeled bottom-
up ruptures (Linz, 1978), transitions through collapse (Share and Mainwaring,
1986), or replacements (Huntington, 1993). In an intermediate type – tran-
sitions through extrication (Share and Mainwaring, 1986) or transplacements
(Huntington, 1993) – Liberalizers negotiate their exit with Moderates in a pact.
Huntington (1993) also considers external intervention as a fourth mode of tran-
sition (cf. Levitsky and Way, 2005; Whitehead, 2001).
How does Between States fit into this debate and what does it tell us about
how the type of interim government impacts democratic consolidation? When
it was published, Shain and Linz (1995)’s volume added to the debate by intro-
ducing a typology that relates a type of interim government to each mode of
transition (cf. Figure 2.1). Firstly, if an old regime is defeated in a replacement,
opposition forces rule in a revolutionary interim government – track (1) in Fig-
ure 2.1 – such as in Libya after Muammar Gaddafi was ousted in 2011. Secondly,
power-sharing interim governments come into being in a transition through ex-
trication – track (2) – such as after Nepal’s civil war in 2006 (cf. Chapter 6).
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Thirdly, in international interim governments (3) “the international commu-
nity, through the aegis of the United Nations, directs and monitors the process
of democratic change” (Shain and Linz, 1995, p. 5). This was the case with
the 1991-93 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) (cf.
Chapter 8 and Croissant, 2007). And fourthly, an incumbent caretaker interim
government reflects a transition managed by Liberalizers (4), such as in Angola,
where the 1991-92 interim period was ruled by the incumbent Movimento Popu-
lar de Libertação de Angola or People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola
(MPLA) while insurgents of the União Nacional para a Independência Total
de Angola or National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)
remained outside power (cf. Chapter 7).
All in all, the central thesis of the literature is that negotiated pacts – result-
ing in power-sharing interim governments – offer the best prospects for demo-
cratic consolidation, because such pacts make a positive-sum outcome for all
sides feasible (cf. Figure 2.1). In contrast, revolutionary upheavals create win-
ners and losers and turn interim politics into a zero-sum game (Friedheim, 1993;
Huntington, 1993; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986) – at least in the short run.
Long-term effects of power-sharing transitions on democratic consolidation are
seen more critically, as they have been found to “tempt elites to extend their
agreements beyond the period of early uncertainty and reinforce a pattern of
collusion between political parties that generates corruption and citizen disil-
lusionment” (Schmitter, 2010, p. 23). Bosnia, where long-term power-sharing
institutions that are in place since 1995 have also been described as “faking
democracy” (Chandler, 2000) is a case in point (cf. below). Concerning other
types of transitions, Linz and Stepan (1996, p. 57) point out that revolutionary
interim governments often tend to only carry the prefix “interim” on paper,
and while claiming to “act in the name of the people” they are really often
postponing elections to extend their rule. Valenzuela (1990) similarly diagnoses
that while revolutionary interim government has the merit to generate an insti-
tutional tabula rasa on which new political, military and economic institutions
can be built upon, it often entails the risk that not everyone who fills a power
vacuum is committed to democracy.
From the perspective of peace and conflict research, one remarkable con-
clusion of the transitology paradigm is that this research agenda regards all
interim government models as either unlikely to occur or to succeed (in terms
of democratic consolidation) if interim rule is preceded by intrastate conflict.
Shain and Linz (1995) expect a history of internal conflict to significantly reduce
the chances of a caretaker interim government to convene because a regime’s
participation in armed combat turns legitimate caretaker rule into a remote
option. They similarly argue that power-sharing interim government is an un-
likely option if the time before its creation is marked by widespread violence.8
8This is not undisputed, and Ottaway and Lacina (2003, p. 82) have reflected on the
advantages of caretaker interim government after violent conflict. They reason that after such
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Equally, Valenzuela (1990, p. 76) holds that revolutionary interim government
can only successfully pave the way to democracy if a regime collapses “swiftly in
the absence of civil war or much internal violence.” While international interim
government is regarded as the most likely option where “deep-seated historical
rivalries are so profound, so violent, and so seemingly irresolvable” that domes-
tic interim rule is nonviable (Shain and Berat, 1995, p. 63), studies are divided
on the degree of regime destruction that renders such rule successful (Croissant,
2008; Paris, 2004). While this discussion relates more generally to questions con-
cerning the link between armed conflict and democratization that are outside
the focus of this dissertation (cf. Gates, Hegre, Jones, et al., 2006; Jarstad and
Sisk, 2008; Ohlson and Söderberg-Kovacs, 2011; Vreeland, 2008), the present
debate nevertheless begs the question: if interim governments are seemingly
nonviable to promote democracy after civil war, can they be instruments for
peacebuilding and conflict resolution?
2.2 Interim Governments and Peace
Interim governments are regular institutional features in societies marked by
intrastate armed conflict; and thus they have naturally been picked up by peace
and conflict research. This political science sub-discipline has traditionally ana-
lyzed three fundamental and often interlinked research questions on the causes
and consequences of conflict onset (or why some states experience conflict while
others do not), conflict duration (or why some conflicts last longer than oth-
ers), and conflict resolution (or why some conflicts are followed by stable peace
while violence recurs, or never subsides, in other cases). Early studies of the
sub-discipline were thereby chiefly interested in explaining the onset, duration,
and resolution of interstate armed conflicts (e.g. Hensel, 1996; Powell, 1994; Tir
and Diehl, 1998). That this empirical phenomenon has however vanished from
the global scene has given rise to analyses of the onset, duration, and resolution
of intrastate armed conflict.9
In answering if interim governments are instruments for conflict resolution
and can play a role for stable peace in the post-interim period, existing studies
within peace and conflict research are in agreement that interim governments
do have long-term effects, but studies are divided by what those effects may
be. I quoted Manning (2007, p. 54) in Chapter 1, who has phrased this idea by
saying that while interim governments are short in duration, they “cast a long
shadow into the future” by “affecting who gets early access to the levers of the
state” and “by influencing the expectations and strategies of those elites as they
conflict, building new institutions requires time and money, for instance because years of war
result in a lack of education in a large percentage of the population, meaning that replacing
regime personnel is often impossible – thus caretaker rule may be an efficient option.
9In 2014, only one of 40 armed conflicts recorded by the UCDP was fought between two
states (the conflict between India and Pakistan), while the remaining 39 conflicts were fought
within the borders of sovereign states (Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015).
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Notes: The y-axis depicts the number of journal articles mentioning “interim government”
(or related terms) at least once, grouped by calendar year. My search term grouped the
terms “interim government,” “transitional government,” “transitional administration,”
“interim administration,” “international administration,” “United Nations administra-
tion,” and “UN administration.”
seek to hold onto power over the transition to permanent governing arrange-
ments.” Shain and Berat (1995, p. 68) argue that “a well-designed international
interim government arrangement may have a long-term impact in securing not
only the creation of democratic institutions that may minimize violence but also
in ameliorating structural and socioeconomic defects inherited from the previ-
ous regime.” In the same vein, Hughes (1996, p. 72) writes on the legacy of
the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and on the
“effect of the transition period on Cambodia’s long-term political development.”
Similarly, Croissant (2008, p. 659) argues that interim governments come with
“long-term achievements in terms of sustainable peace-building and durable de-
mocratization” that are yet difficult to achieve. Rothchild (2007) instead holds
more critically that interim structures that enhance prospects of peace in the
short term can be potential sources of instability or conflict in the long run;
and also Donini (2007, p. 45) notes on interim government in Afghanistan that
“short-term gain may turn into long-term pain.”
Why are some interim governments then followed by stable peace in the
aftermath of war while others are not, and how do interim governments lead
to long-term peace? In answering this question, existing research in the peace
and conflict realm narrows the focus of the democratization debate and focuses
on the power-sharing and international interim government models of the Shain
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and Linz (1995) typology (although there is a small literature on “victor’s peace”
that links to revolutionary interim rule, see Piccolino, 2015). In what follows
I will now first discuss the concept of power-sharing in the broader peace and
conflict literature, then situate the interim government-specific literature in this
debate, and I then repeat this exercise for the concept of international interven-
tions and international interim government. Generally, this discussion will show
that the broader literature insufficiently acknowledges the specifies of interim
governments, and that few comparative studies exist that do.
This general lack of research on interim governments is also reflected in
Figure 2.2. For this plot, I web-scraped data from Google Scholar to search
for those articles that mention “interim government” (or related terms) at least
once within their title, abstract, or full text, which constitutes a very liberal
interpretation of articles being written “about” the topic interim government.
I concentrated my search on those articles published in the five journals with
the highest 2013 impact factor in political science and international relations .10
I then aggregated all counts by journal name and year of publication. This
exercise shows that interim governments have thus far been rather neglected by
the literature – with typically only four or less articles per year even mentioning
“interim governments” at all, while exceptional peaks exist in 1993 and 2004.
These peaks, further demonstrating my point above, are driven by either single-
case analyses of political developments in South Africa and Western Sahara (e.g.
Durch, 1993; Shapiro, 1993; Wyk and Radloff, 1993) or by more conceptual
accounts on the consequences of international interim government in weak and
war-torn states (e.g. Fearon and Laitin, 2004; Kelley, 2004; Krasner, 2004).
2.2.1 Power-Sharing Interim Government
Peace and conflict research has ascribed most attention to the question if power-
sharing interim government is a viable instrument to resolve the underlying
incompatibility of armed conflict and bring durable peace in the aftermath of
war. In recent years, a number of single case studies and small- to medium-n
comparisons have been published on this topic (e.g. Jarstad, 2010; Lemarchand,
2007; Lyons, 2005; Papagianni, 2008; Rothchild, 2007; Schmidt and Galyan,
2017; Sisk and Stefes, 2005; Strasheim and Fjelde, 2014). Power-sharing interim
governments can be defined as institutions that, between the demise of an old
regime and first elections, offer warring party representatives seats in a cabinet
or legislative (cf. Chapter 3 and Walter, 2002). But power-sharing institutions
are not necessarily ascribed with sunset clauses that regulate their termination.
For instance, Bosnia’s Dayton Peace Agreement called for permanent power-
sharing structures following all elections and regulated:
“The House of Representatives shall comprise 42 Members, two-
10These are International Organization, International Security, Journal of Peace Research,
Journal of Conflict Resolution, and World Politics.
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thirds elected from the territory of the Federation, one-third from the
territory of the Republika Srpska. ... The Presidency of Bosnia and
Hercegovina ... shall consist of three Members: one Bosniac and one
Croat, each directly elected from the territory of the Federation, and
one Serb directly elected from the territory of the Republika Srpska”
(United Nations, 1995).
Studies on power-sharing interim government are thus only part of a broader
debate that is not limited to pacted deals as short-term arrangements (e.g. Cam-
mett and Malesky, 2012; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007; Mukherjee, 2006; Ottmann
and Vüllers, 2014). In this regard, the concept of power-sharing is inherently
linked to the study of consociationalism as introduced by Arendt Lijphart (Li-
jphart, 1977; Lijphart, 1999; Lijphart, 2007). Concerned with explaining the
quality of democracy in divided societies, Lijphart framed the idea that ethnic-
ity (or any other form of identity) should be politically accommodated in state
institutions in order to make democracy viable in societies characterized by
antagonistic sentiments between identity groups. He suggested measures such
as implementing grand coalition cabinets, veto and autonomy rights to protect
minority interests, or allocating votes and civil service appointments through
the principle of proportionality. Although the study of power-sharing in peace
and conflict research directly descends from Lijphart’s work, the concepts of
power-sharing and consociationalism are not identical, not least because both
research agendas come with distinct explanatory interests (Jarstad and Sisk,
2008): while Lijphart was interested in how consociationalism can increase the
quality of democracy in divided societies, peace and conflict research treats
power-sharing as a mechanism to sustain peace where democracy seems impos-
sible (but see Hartzell and Hoddie, 2015).11
Consociationalism after Civil War Why should power-sharing lead to
peace after war? The main theoretical argument of the broader peace and con-
flict literature builds on rationalist explanations and hypothesizes that power-
sharing addresses the security dilemma and commitment problems of warring
parties (cf. Chapter 3). Thus, in the context of intrastate conflicts, the in-
stitutional environment of a weak state, mutual fear and mistrust, as well as
existing military organizations and the uncontrolled spread of weapons result
in a high degree of physical and political insecurity. This makes warring parties
unwilling to demobilize and peacefully resolve their incompatibilities, because
they fear being attacked by their enemy. Power-sharing is expected to miti-
gate this dilemma by decreasing such uncertainties, because by allocating seats
11Furthermore, O’Leary (2005) reasons that consociationalism is only one of many ways
how groups can share power – other forms include, for instance, to alternate government –
and Boogards (2013) refers to Hartzell and Hoddie (2003)’s influential typology of political,
military, territorial and economic power-sharing between warring parties in post-conflict so-
cieties and argues that Lijphart neither considered warring parties as actors to share power,
nor did he reflect on the allocation of posts in the national military.
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to all warring parties engaged in war, it assures those parties that they will
not be ambushed and marginalized, but instead obtain long-term influence over
decision-making processes (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Walter, 2002). As Mat-
tes and Savun (2009, p. 739) phrase it, power-sharing reduces parties’ “fear
regarding future actions of the opponent by imposing constraints on the oppo-
nent’s ability to renege on the deal” – thus the “whole trick of consociational
democracy” is the long-term accommodation of fear (Fearon, 1995a, p. 14).
Empirically, the relationship between power-sharing and peace has in recent
years been predominantly tested by statistical analyses that make use of peace
agreement cases as samples for their study (most prominently by Hartzell and
Hoddie, 2003; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007). Most studies implement survival
models and increasingly use sophisticated mixed-method research designs (e.g.
Cammett and Malesky, 2012) and methods to account for selection bias (e.g.
Hartzell and Hoddie, 2015). This debate is complemented by a substantial
body of case studies, primarily on Africa (e.g. Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010;
Lemarchand, 2007; Mehler, 2009; Simons, Zanker, et al., 2013; Tull and Mehler,
2005).12 In sum, empirical results are inconclusive. For instance, Jarstad and
Nilsson (2008) find that power-sharing in political institutions is unrelated to
peace; Mattes and Savun (2009) and Walter (2002) find a statistically significant
and positive coefficient for power-sharing institutions in for their samples; and
Tull and Mehler (2005) find detrimental effects of power-sharing, because the
inclusion of warring parties in joint government generates new rebel movements
by rewarding the use of violence with political office.
Why are empirical results on power-sharing inconclusive? In her review
of the literature, Binningsbø (2013) argues that ambivalent findings stem to a
large extent from methodological issues and are often caused by distinct units of
analysis, sampling strategies, or operationalizations.13 She also briefly responds
to the difference between power-sharing in interim governments and permanent
deals of joint rule and the problems of pooling both types of power-sharing into
joint data sets, but does not dive further into the issue:
“Since every researcher provides her own conceptualization of power
sharing, there is an unlimited number of ... understandings I could
discuss here. ... In particular, it is important to keep in mind the
difference between long-term power sharing institutions and short-
term power sharing arrangements” (Binningsbø, 2013, p. 97).
12Mukherjee (2006) criticizes the focus on power-sharing after peace agreements, arguing
that a comprehensive theory on the effects of power-sharing should examine how victories
condition the impact of joint rule and showing that power-sharing after victory is most likely
to lead to peace. But the focus on peace agreements can also be considered a hard test for
the effect of power-sharing, because peace after negotiated settlements is found to be inher-
ently unstable: in contrast to decisive victories, accords leave warring parties with sufficient
resources to attack each other, thus creating a situation in which parties have difficulties to
commit to disarmament (Licklider, 1995; Mason and Fett, 1996; Walter, 2002).
13For instance, while Walter (2002) employs a narrow operationalization of power-sharing
and allows for a positive coding only if parties are offered positions at the level of cabinet or
above, Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) also include proportional electoral systems.
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Power-Sharing Interim Government What are the differences between
long- and short-term power-sharing that Binningsbø (2013) mentions? In terms
of theory, the studies quoted above draw the causal story between power-sharing
and peace as one in which long-term power-sharing enables parties to “look down
the road” and be assured of their future role in post-war politics – but can power-
sharing interim government offer such forward-looking guarantees to the same
extent or in the same way as long-term deals? In other words, does power-
sharing interim government have different effects than long-term arrangements
have, or does it work via distinct causal mechanisms?
Some studies focusing on power-sharing interim government stay in line with
the rationalist argumentation of the broader literature. Notably, Jarstad (2010,
p. 46) argues for the immediate effect of power-sharing interim government on
the uncertainty and need for physical and political protection of warring par-
ties by settling their “immediate dispute for political power.” Manning (2007)
changes the focus from the immediate to the long-term, arguing that it is pos-
sible to expect that even though power-sharing interim governments terminate,
they have a long-term impact on reducing future uncertainty for warring parties.
She argues that it is not the offer of constant representation that is important,
but that power-sharing interim government grants parties two particular ad-
vantages that will be of use to them further down the road. Firstly, it offers
them an incumbent benefit of name recognition for the elections terminating
interim government. Secondly, because interim governments are usually the
bodies that design permanent laws for post-interim politics, power-sharing also
offers all warring parties the benefit to strategically design post-interim struc-
tures according to their own desires. To this end, even if post-interim politics
may not run on a system of fixed quotas, former power-sharers can still expect
to dominate political competition. Manning (2007)’s view on power-sharing in-
terim government thus differs from Przeworski (1991)’s idea that transitions fall
under a Rawlsian veil of ignorance, meaning that elites know little about their
future role in a political system and thus design institutions with strong checks
and balances and maximum political leverage for minorities.
Others have considered causal stories diverging from the broader debate.
A first noteworthy idea is that power-sharing interim rule resembles a “school
in democracy” (Jarstad, 2010, p. 46) where warring parties learn to commu-
nicate and assure each other that they are willing to solve disputes verbally
through political institutions instead of violently and on the battlefield. Leav-
ing the question aside how unelected interim governments can teach democracy,
a system “in which parties loose elections” (Przeworski, 1991, p. 10), this mech-
anism resolutely demarcates the concept of power-sharing interim government
from permanent joint governance. While power-sharing has been regarded as
a driver for democracy by some in the broader political science literature (cf.
section 2.1 and Norris, 2008), the debate on consociational politics after armed
conflict has often denounced power-sharing as profoundly undemocratic. This
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is because guarantees for inclusion in decision-making processes contradict the
uncertain and competitive nature of democracy (Jarstad and Sisk, 2008; Jung,
2012; Roeder and Rothchild, 2005; Sisk and Stefes, 2005).14
A final causal mechanism proposed by scholarship on power-sharing interim
government is that power-sharing interim government adds to peace by grad-
ually embracing an unarmed opposition in politics. Permanent power-sharing
institutions are often criticized precisely for bringing the exact opposite and ex-
cluding societal voices other than the warring parties from governance in the long
run (Jung, 2012; Papagianni, 2007a; Schneckener, 2002). Therefore, Papagianni
(2007a, 29f.) argues: “Power-sharing arrangements should be transitional,” be-
cause “[transitional] periods should create space for the continuation of talks
and for the emergence of new political actors.” Equally, Paris (2004) holds that
peace processes should begin with a period of institution-building during interim
rule before elections are held, because interim periods offer political parties and
civil society organizations without a history of armed insurgency the chance to
organize, compete, or watch over the electoral process. Also Söderberg-Kovacs
(2008, p. 154) reasons that one strategy to bring unarmed non-signatory parties
into politics is to create power-sharing interim governments that include warring
parties only for the interim period while a post-interim system also encompasses
parties without a background in armed struggle (cf. Papagianni, 2009).
In terms of empirical results, scholarship focusing on power-sharing interim
government shares its inconclusive results with the broader literature. For in-
stance, Lyons (2005) and Papagianni (2008) find that power-sharing interim
government contributes to peace in their case studies by reducing the risks of
one party becoming dominant and endangering the security of the other par-
ties. Jarstad (2010) does not detect any relationship between power-sharing
interim government and post-electoral peace in societies after war. Analyzing
power-sharing interim government in the DRC and in Burundi, Curtis (2007)
concludes that power-sharing interim governments that were “overloaded” with
antagonistic elites were even detrimental to peace and made effective decisions-
making impossible. Similarly, Croissant (2007, p. 233) reasons that including all
warring parties in Cambodia’s power-sharing Supreme National Council (SNC)
during the interim period impeded prospects for peace and democracy because
it “led to double, sometimes even triple structures” of governance. One prob-
lematic aspect with regard to these results is that they are largely based on
small-n research designs and thus it is difficult to generalize from these findings.
14Proposing a practical solution to this problem, Sisk (2008, p. 196) imagines a sequential
model that first accommodates belligerents in power-sharing interim government, while post-
interim institutions overcome quotas, reward moderation, and denote a “much more fluid form
of democracy.” Empirical evidence shows some support for the positive effect of power-sharing
on post-conflict democracy, but as Hartzell and Hoddie (2015) note, there is still too little
empirical research on the topic and the results of existing studies are problematic due to
operational issues of regime type data sets that include measures for political violence (Gates,
Hegre, Jones, et al., 2006; Vreeland, 2008).
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2.2.2 International Interim Government
A second major focus of the peace and conflict literature when it comes to
interim governments is the study of Shain and Linz (1995)’s international in-
terim government model. This literature encompasses a vast number of case
studies or conceptual work dealing with the UN’s role in administrating the
interim periods of Namibia, Cambodia, Kosovo, East Timor, and Bosnia (e.g.
Caplan, 2005; Caplan, 2006; Chesterman, 2005b; Chopra, 2000; Chopra, 2002;
Croissant, 2007; Doyle, 2002; Fearon and Laitin, 2004; Gorjao, 2002; Harland,
2004; Lemay-Hébert, 2011; Ratner, 2005; Wilde, 2001). Similar to the studies
on power-sharing interim government, this scholarship speaks to a broader re-
search agenda in peace and conflict research that investigates the more general
question of the role of international actors in peace processes.
International Interventions after Civil War How does the intervention
of international actors, most notably the UN and its peacekeeping operations,
impact chances of sustainable peace after war? International intervention in
and after intrastate conflict is not a phenomenon of the post-Cold War period,
as external actors supported warring parties engaged in intrastate warfare al-
ready before 1989, for instance by providing financial support (Harbom and
Wallensteen, 2005). However, the deployment of UN peacekeeping missions has
exploded since the fall of the Berlin wall, and more peacekeepers were sent to
mitigate intrastate conflicts between 1989 and 1993 than in the foregoing four
decades all taken together (Fortna and Howard, 2008). The academic interest
in such interventions has risen in response to this empirical trend, and although
international involvement in war-torn states includes a variety of actions from
mediation to foreign aid, much attention has been attributed to the effects of
peacekeeping operations (e.g. Bellamy and Williams, 2011; Doyle and Samba-
nis, 2000; Doyle and Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2008a; Fortna, 2008b; Hultman
et al., 2013; Karim and Beardsley, 2016; Richmond, 2004). One overarching
question driving this debate is if and how peacekeeping can keep peace after
armed conflict has terminated.
Similar to the power-sharing debate, the main theoretical argument of the
broader peace and conflict literature builds on rationalist explanations and hy-
pothesizes that international interventions address three causal mechanisms:
credible commitment problems, anarchy, and cost and benefit equations of
warring parties (cf. Chapter 3). Prominently, Walter (2002) has coined the
term third-party security guarantee and holds that international intervention
increases chances for peace because once warring parties know that peacekeep-
ers will enforce their compliance, their ability to commit to disarming their
troops increases. Similarly, Doyle and Sambanis (2006, p. 780) reason that in a
security dilemma after war, peacekeepers represent a neutral authority that re-
duces the anarchic institutional environment of war-torn states where all other
institutions have collapsed. Mattes and Savun (2009) hold that peacekeepers are
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a cost-increasing mechanism for warring parties, as they physically constraint
soldiers: peacekeepers can stand in the way of parties attacking one another
meaning that parties spend valuable resources to fight peacekeepers that they
could otherwise use fighting their enemy. If peacekeepers come under attack
themselves, they may use force for self-defense (cf. Salverda, 2013).
Empirically, there exists a strong consensus in the statistical debate on the
issue that “peacekeeping works,” (Fortna, 2004a, p. 288). All other things being
equal and adhering to selection bias, peacekeeping is positively correlated with
the likelihood and stability of peace after war. Most studies thereby separate di-
verse types of peacekeeping to study variation in effects, and a common strategy
is to distinguish observer missions that are unarmed and small in size; traditional
peacekeeping operations that are staffed only with lightly armed units; and mul-
tidimensional peacekeeping mission that supplement traditional missions with
civilian components (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2004b). Particularly
multidimensional peacekeeping missions are found to strongly and positively
correlated with the likelihood of peace after armed conflict (Doyle and Samba-
nis, 2000), even though peacekeepers tend to be sent to the most severe cases of
war (Fortna and Howard, 2008). Hegre, Hultman, et al. (2011), by simulating
the effect of peacekeeping operations between 2010 and 2035, even find that
multidimensional peacekeeping can reduce the global incidence armed conflict
by 65 percent. This statistical euphoria is not echoed to the same extent in qual-
itative research. Particularly multidimensional operations regularly come under
fire for seeking to remodel war-torn societies in the Global South after Western
ideas of democracy and ignoring these societies’ own cultural and institutional
heritage (cf. below and Heathershaw, 2008; Richmond, 2004; Richmond, 2009).
Newer studies have also increasingly attended to sexual violence by peacekeep-
ers (Karim and Beardsley, 2016; Simić, 2010) and unintended consequences of
expatriate social habits (Autessere, 2014).
With her work situated in the statistical peacekeeping literature, Fortna also
considers differences between multidimensional peacekeeping and UN adminis-
trations as a form of international interim government, although she does not
integrate this variance into her empirical analysis.15 In specific, she argues
“This breakdown of mission types does not distinguish missions that
temporarily take over the administration of the country ... from
other types of peacekeeping. These transitional administration mis-
sions may have rather different effects than missions that oversee
national administration of the state only during the transition to
peace” (Fortna, 2008b, p. 43).
15Similarly, Chesterman (2005b, p. 5) conceptualizes international interim government as a
“less common type” of peacekeeping operation, in which transitions to peace are “pursued by
assuming some or all of the powers of the state on a temporary basis.”
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International Interim Government What are the differences between “reg-
ular” peacekeeping and international interim government that Fortna (2008b)
refers to? Conceptually, scholarship on international interim government shares
with the broader debate its differentiation of degrees of international involve-
ment. When the concept of the international interim government model was
first introduced by Shain and Linz (1995), the authors could not possibly have
foreseen the scope of intrusive authority of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK) and United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UN-
TAET).16 This empirical development is what makes employing the interna-
tional interim government model as a framework for analysis in the way that it
was put forward by Shain and Linz (1995) problematic, for two reasons.
Firstly, Shain and Berat (1995, p. 64) regard international interim gov-
ernment as an unsuitable institution for failed states “where no modern civil
institutions remain functioning” and instead consider it necessary that “state
institutions have remained largely intact” and a regime “has not been totally
delegitimized.” This perspective is yet in contrast both to the situations where
international interim government has occurred empirically – East Timor and
Kosovo experienced a formal “administrative vacuum” after Serb and Indone-
sian state personnel had fled (Bull, 2008) – and to findings of more recent
studies. For instance, Croissant (2008, 663f.) concludes after comparing inter-
national interim government in Cambodia and East Timor that the theory put
forward by Shain and Linz (1995) suggests “that this model was better suited
for Cambodia than for East Timor” because “in East Timor, state institutions
and the incumbent regime were swept away after the Indonesian military had
withdrawn.” However, at closer inspection, he finds that conditions “were more
conducive to a successful outcome of democratization through international in-
terim government in East Timor than in Cambodia.” More generally, authors
have found the “direct international administration of war-torn territories” to
be better suited for societies “where no functioning governmental institutions
exist and have to be created from scratch” (Paris, 2004, p. 206). Secondly,
most interim governments put in place in the aftermath of intrastate conflict
today see some degree of international engagement (Guttieri and Piombo, 2007;
Ottaway and Lacina, 2003).
Based on these developments, more recent works differentiate three types of
international interim government after war (cf. Figure 2.1). Firstly, under su-
pervisory authority, international actors assume full legislative, administrative,
and executive powers (as exercised by UNTAET); secondly, under executive au-
thority, international actors have full executive authority but share other powers
with domestic elites (as exercised by the 1996-98 United Nations Transitional
Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) in
16Only later in the year of publishing Between States, Bosnia’s Dayton Agreement was
signed and represented a new climax in post-conflict international engagement by awarding
the OHR with the authority to remove from office any domestic politician who violated the
terms of Dayton and to run Bosnia “like a feudal fiefdom” (Chandler, 2007).
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Croatia); and thirdly, under administrative authority, international actors over-
see the bureaucracy for the time of interim rule (as exercised by UNTAC in
Cambodia, cf. Chapter 8 and Doyle, 2001).
Beside these conceptual advances, the debate on international interim gov-
ernment is little theory-driven and typically focuses on producing policy-relevant
“lessons learned” from the few cases at hand. The results it presents are often
extremely critical – particularly of the supervisory model – and thereby link to
the broader qualitative debate on international interventions (e.g. Barnett and
Zürcher, 2009; Bull, 2008; Caplan, 2005; Chesterman, 2005b; Chopra, 2000;
Gorjao, 2002; Lemay-Hébert, 2011). The vast majority of the studies have
often heatedly dismissed international interim rule for being “undemocratic”
(Chesterman, 2005b, p. 205), “illegitimate” (Harland, 2004, p. 15), or of “neo-
colonial” nature (Peterson, 2007). The labeling of UNTAET as “The UN’s
Kingdom of East Timor” (Chopra, 2000), of international administration in
Kosovo as “UNMIKistan” (King and Mason, 2006, p. 16), or Chandler (2000)’s
scorning of international authority in Bosnia as “a parody of democracy” are
examples of the emotional tone the debate has taken at times.17
One central empirical finding of the debate is that international interim
government is more likely to lead to (positive) peace if it promotes local own-
ership, referring to the extent by which domestic parties are in control over the
design and conduct of the political process (Donais, 2009). In a causal mech-
anism between international interim government and peace, local ownership is
regarded as vital not only because it increases the legitimacy of international
interim government by ingraining its reforms in a society, but is also seen as
creating long-term domestic governance capacity if domestic staff is trained by
international personnel (Hansen and Sharon Wiharta, 2007). Neglecting local
ownership in international interim government is consequently perceived as hav-
ing profound negative effects on a peace process. For instance, Croissant (2008,
p. 662) concludes for East Timor that a “major shortcoming was UNTAET’s
quasi-feudalist exercise of political authority and its failure to include local peo-
ple in the political process.” Narten (2008) shows that the late realization of local
ownership and transfer of authority from UNMIK to domestic elites in Kosovo
not only increased popular doubts on the legitimacy of the peace process. It
also turned domestic elites into spoilers of the peace process who increasingly as-
sumed confrontational positions towards the international authorities. Finally,
Donini (2007) argues that during Afghanistan’s interim government, the igno-
rance towards local perspectives lead to a “perception gap” and the inability of
interim government officials to understand how security concerns and feelings
17Notably, there have been a few arguments for the viability of international interim govern-
ment that comes with the financial resources, knowledge, and influence to rebuild institutions
and may thus translate into effective decision-making and implementation of policies (Papa-
gianni, 2009; Rotberg, 2002). Caplan (2005) recognizes reasons for why domestic input in
interim rule should be limited under some circumstances, for instance to ensure that interna-
tional actors are not prone to public pressures that compromise their neutrality.
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Table 2.1: Shortcomings of Previous Research
Research gap Shortcoming Strategy
The peace and conflict
literature neglects in-
terim governments in
theories that focus on
long-term institutions
and by pooling both
institutional types in
one data set.
This is a shortcoming,
because we may expect
that both institutional
types run via distinct
causal pathways to pro-
mote peace after war.
In this dissertation, I fo-
cus on the particulari-
ties of interim govern-
ments to advance our
theoretical and empir-
ical understanding of
how such bodies add to
peace after war.
The literature that fo-
cuses on the effects
of interim governments
is mostly comprised of
under-theorized single
case studies, but lacks
theory-driven, compar-
ative research designs.
This is a shortcoming as
this methodological ap-
proach makes it difficult
to generalize findings,
identify causal mecha-
nisms that work across
cultural contexts or ac-
count for selection bias.
In this dissertation, I
use a mixed-method ap-





case studies from differ-
ent world regions.
The literature that






rather than the reforms
interim governments
implement.
This is a shortcoming
as this theoretical ap-
proach to understand
why some interim gov-
ernments lead to peace
while others do not may
omit key variables that
help to explain the sta-
bility of peace after war.
In this dissertation, I
complement the exist-
ing “institutional de-
sign” approaches to in-
terim governments with
a focus on reform prac-
tices & show that it
is the latter that come
with the strongest ex-
planatory power.
of marginalization in the periphery added to ongoing violence.
2.3 Shortcomings of Past Research
To summarize the foregoing sections, more than 20 years after Shain and Linz
(1995)’s seminal volume, the literature has arrived at a significantly better un-
derstanding of the role of interim governments for peace after war, but several
interrelated shortcomings still exist. These shortcomings and the strategies
of how I address them in this dissertation are also summarized in Table 2.1.
Firstly, I have more generally demonstrated above as well as in Chapter 1 that
the broader debate within peace and conflict research to some extent concep-
tually acknowledges the profound differences between short-term, interim in-
stitutional configurations and long-term deals (e.g. Binningsbø, 2013; Fortna,
2008b). However, it then vastly neglects such differences in its empirical anal-
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yses, for instance by pooling together interim versions of power-sharing and
long-term deals in one data set (e.g. Cammett and Malesky, 2012; Hartzell and
Hoddie, 2007; Pospieszna and Schneider, 2013). This runs into danger of con-
flating different causal mechanisms. This dissertation thus advances existing
research by zooming in on the particularities of interim governments. Eventu-
ally, this will not least help policy-makers to make more informed decisions in
designing transitions from war to peace (cf. Chapter 10).
Secondly and methodologically, I have also demonstrated that while there
has been a growing amount of scholarship dealing specifically with interim gov-
ernments as instruments for the promotion of long-term peace, this literature
still predominantly exists of qualitative, under-theorized, and often single-n case
study research design. This state of the art is problematic because the results
derived from non-comparative case study research designs are difficult to gen-
eralize across a larger number of cases, and case study research designs have
also insufficiently dealt with the question of what types of interim governments
are selected in which situations. Notably, in reviewing the edited volume by
Shain and Linz (1995), Heydemann (1997, p. 986) raises doubts that interim
governments can independently impact democratic consolidation because they
are likely determined “by the contexts that created them.” Wilde (2001, p. 606)
also notes that we must “question why [the international interim government
model] is deployed selectively, and ask how such selectivity affects the institu-
tion’s realization of its own objectives.”
These remarks on the endogeneity of institutional designs are increasingly
addressed by statistical peace and conflict research that studies if institutions
are an epiphenomenon and merely reflect existing social cleavages – thereby
having only a limited effect on peace (Fortna, 2003b; Reynal-Querol, 2005;
Schneider and Wiesehomeier, 2008) – or if we can be “institutional optimists”
in the sense that institutions do function independently from their contexts. For
the study of interim government, this issue of endogeneity means that there may
be factors that lead to the creation of specific properties of interim government,
and that these factors are also correlated with post-interim peace, which would
make interim government an epiphenomenon in the peace process. I address
this shortcoming of previous research by introducing a mixed-method research
design that combines statistical analysis with qualitative case studies in order
to allow for not only discovering more particularized observations and causal
processes but also for a more sound generalization of my results. I also run
several logistic regression and ordered logistic regression models in Chapter 4
and Chapter 9, as well as Cox PH models on subsets of my original analysis, to
assess the selectivity of interim governments.
Thirdly and conceptually, the study of interim government in the peace and
conflict literature can be also be advanced by considering properties of interim
government other than their institutional designs. As I have argued in Chap-
ter 1, this approach may omit or overlook important variables and mechanisms
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that help to explain the stability of peace after armed conflict. I address this
shortcoming by developing a bargaining theory framework that in a first step in-
corporates the existing institutional design approach in a model on how interim
governments mitigate credible commitment problems among warring parties.
In a second step, I then demonstrate how a focus on the institutional designs
of interim governments has weak explanatory power for how interim rule adds
to peace in the long run and may miss out on important causal mechanisms.
In a third step, this framework thus complements the previous focus on the
institutional designs of interim government with an analysis of what reforms
these interim governments implement to induce transitions from armed conflict




This chapter develops a bargaining theoretical framework to explain how prop-
erties of interim government increase the stability of post-interim peace. To
recall, I have shown in Chapter 2 that many accounts of the comparative and
quantitative peace and conflict literature have thus far neglected the specific
causal mechanisms linking interim governments to peace, while the literature
that deals explicitly with the role of interim governments after war faces its
own conceptual and methodological limitations. In this chapter, I address the
shortcomings of previous research by proceeding in three steps. Section 3.1 out-
lines the core assumptions of bargaining theory and presents an argument for
why it is theoretically and empirically fruitful to focus on credible commitment
problems as an explanation for post-interim peace (or the absence thereof). The
section ends with identifying three concrete causal mechanisms on how interim
governments can be instruments to mitigate commitment problems and increase
the stability of peace. Section 3.2 derives four hypotheses from this argument.
The first two hypotheses follow existing research on interim governments and
concern these governments’ institutional designs. Next, I show with the help
of bargaining theory why a strict focus on such designs may be insufficient to
explain how interim governments mitigate commitment problems in the long
run. I build on research on non-state and unarmed actors in war and peace to
develop two additional hypotheses on reform features of interim government. I
summarize the theoretical framework in section 3.3.
3.1 The Bargaining Theory of War
As part of game theory, bargaining models are concerned with strategic situ-
ations in which two players must reach an agreement on how to distribute a
good. While each player prefers to reach a deal rather than abstain from doing
so, each also prefers the agreement that most favors her respective interests.
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The Underlying Assumptions of Conflict Bargaining Modeling the so-
cial situation of war this way, the bargaining theory of war – based on the work
by Fearon (1995b) and Powell (2006) – builds on three underlying assumptions
about players and their choice of actions. Firstly, in order to understand why
a player chooses a particular action given her set of possibilities, the bargaining
theory of war assumes that players are rational actors (cf. Becker, 1996; Kalyvas,
2006). This means that an individual has complete and transitive preferences –
if she, when presented with two options X and Y , prefers X to Y and Y to Z,
she also prefers X to Z. It also means that an individual can outweigh costs and
benefits when selecting her course of action, as well as choose the action that
maximizes her utility. Not only do structural conditions (such as institutions)
thereby affect her expected utility of a particular action, but so do decisions of
other individuals in the bargaining situation.18
Secondly, on the organizational level, bargaining theory follows a unitary ac-
tor assumption. By organizations I mean bodies that consist of individuals who
pursue “a mix of common and individual goals through partially coordinated
behavior” (North et al., 2009a, p. 15), such as rebel groups engaged in intrastate
armed conflict. Treating organizations as unitary, rational actors means that
bargaining theory regards players as monolithic entities that try to maximize
their interest, while it disregards any internal cleavages that may occur, for
instance between rebel leaders and rank-and-file soldiers. Some models have
criticized and loosened this assumption by allowing for distinct types of unitary
actors. For instance, Fearon (1994) studies the role of audience costs in inter-
national disputes and argues that because democracies face stronger domestic
audiences than authoritarian regimes, the former are less likely to back down
from a threat and thus are able to credibly signal their true intentions. This
loosens the unitary actor assumption because it envisions a state as “run by an
agent on behalf of a principle (the ‘audience’) rather than a unitary state with
a perfectly secure leadership” (Fearon, 1995b, p. 396).
Thirdly, bargaining theory models interactions between actors as two-player
games. This is also because “although n-player games are not necessarily any
more difficult to analyze formally, it is often harder to specify a substantively
convincing or ‘natural’ bargaining protocol,” such as the sequence of moves
(Powell, 2002, p. 14). This assumption has not been without criticism, and Lake
(2010, p. 9) has argued referring to the Iraq war that “this analytic simplification
[masks] important dynamics” in conflict, for instance if multiple domestic and
international audiences – including minorities within the state or regional rivals
– hear the same signal but interpret it in different ways.
18For instance, an ethnic minority’s utility for declaring independence from a state will
always also depend on what action it expects the government of that state to follow, such
as whether the latter will accept its declaration without further action or whether it will use
violence in order to prevent its loss of territory.
32
Bargaining Model of War Based on these assumptions, the bargaining
model of war thus examines strategic interactions of states in international war,
or of governments and rebel groups in internal conflict, usually as two-player,
sequential, zero-sum games (cf. Findley, 2013). This means that one player
chooses her action before the other one chooses hers, implying that the second
player is informed of the choice of the first one. It also means that one player’s
gain of utility is the other one’s loss. To illustrate, in the modeled situations,
two players – I focus now on a government G and a rebel group R – are at
dispute over a continuously divisible issue (such as cabinet seats or territory),
represented in Figure 3.1 by the interval [0; 1]. Both prefer the outcome that
most favors their respective interest, such as receiving all seats or controlling all
territory. Thus, R’s ideal point is at 1 (R gets all land or seats), while G’s ideal
point is at 0 (G gets all land or seats), meaning also that R’s and G’s prefer-
ences are strictly opposed. The status quo or current division of seats or land is
denoted at q (R has very few seats or very little land), and the expected division
of the issue through conflict is denoted at p (thus, R would get a much better
share of seats or land). If R is currently growing stronger – for instance because
it receives external support – it has incentives to challenge G’s authority over
the status quo, because its expected capabilities to prevail in armed conflict do
not reflect the current division of the issue at stake (cf. Lake, 2010).
But war is costly. Firstly, fighting entails intrinsic costs, in that it requires
the large-scale mobilization of military troops and the acquisition of heavy
weapons, entails the human costs of battle-related deaths on both sides, and
the act of fighting itself comes with no inherent benefits but represents only a
means to achieve future payoffs. This means that both warring parties should
prefer to receive such payoffs without having to pay the costs of war. Secondly,
fighting is also costly because it entails exogenous costs, for instance because it
destroys resources – arable land becomes unusable due to land mines, oil fields
burn down, and skilled, educated workers flee the country – and thus the “share
of the pie” that both players receive after violence has started is always smaller
than it was before the onset of war (Powell, 2006). In Figure 3.1, these costs of
armed conflict are denoted as CR for R and CG for G. As long as these costs
of fighting are positive, they have to be calculated into what can be achieved
through war, and thus a bargaining range must exist around p that includes
a set of possible divisions of the issue at stake – for instance, the number of
cabinet seats allocated to R – that both players prefer to war.
Given that, in theory, there always exists at least one ex ante peaceful bar-
gain that both players would prefer to war – even if the costs of war were
minimal and approaching zero – war is an inefficient or pareto-inferior outcome
of the bargaining situation (Fearon, 1995b). Thus, the fact that internal conflict
is still a frequently occurring empirical phenomenon represents a puzzle: Why
were parties in Ukraine, Syria, or Afghanistan recently unable to arrive at this
mutually beneficial peaceful bargain? Bargaining theory explains this puzzle by
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Figure 3.1: Bargaining Range
p  CR p+ CG0 pq 1
Bargains G prefers to war
Bargains R prefers to war
Bargaining range
Notes: Based on conflict bargaining models by Fearon (1995b) and Lake (2010).
referring to two types of bargaining failures: Private information (and incentives
to misrepresent it) and credible commitment problems.19 Firstly, in games with
imperfect or private information, war breaks out because parties either overesti-
mate their own chances of winning in war and thus disagree over relative power,
or they lack information about the enemy’s resolve to fight. This could be be-
cause they have incentives to misrepresent private information by exaggerating
or concealing their true capability to fight – a government may, for instance,
want to deter future challengers (Fearon, 1995b). Powell (2006, p. 172) yet is
skeptical of informational accounts and argues that they often lead to “bizarre
historical readings” of cases; and Fearon (2004) agrees, arguing that fighting it-
self (particularly in very long civil wars) helps parties to reveal their capabilities.
It is difficult to imagine, for instance, that Bashar Al-Assad has in 2016 doubts
about the Syrian opposition’s willingness to fight in order to reach its goals.
And Walter (2009) has in this regard argued that in post-war societies, military
victories disclose more information than negotiated settlements and thus lead to
fewer repeated civil wars; but she argues that this explanation is less convincing
than that military victories also solve commitment problems. Analyses of civil
war termination are thus dominated by the discussion of credible commitment
problems (but see below and Moon and Souva, 2016).
Credible Commitment Problems Commitment problems mean that two
players are unable to settle on an efficient ex ante peaceful bargain because
they cannot commit to uphold the deal in future, leading to three types of
situations that all represent large and rapid shifts in the distribution of power
(Powell, 2006). Firstly, commitment problems can lead to preventive war that
occurs if one party is growing stronger relative to the other and will thus have
incentives to demand a more favorable division of the object at stake in future.
Knowing this, the best strategy of the party growing weaker is to initiate war as
early as possible, rather than to wait until power has shifted even more in favor
19Fearon (1995b) also discusses the indivisibility of stakes as a third type of bargaining
failure, but dismisses this mechanism as not being a convincing explanation as it is often
other mechanisms that prevent parties from arriving at a bargain. Powell (2006) agrees and
notes that issue indivisibility should really be regarded as one form of commitment problems.
I thus refrain from discussing this mechanism in further detail.
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of the stronger-growing adversary (Fearon, 1995b).20 Secondly, commitment
problems may lead to preemptive attacks that occur if, for instance, military
technology creates first-strike advantages that eliminate or weaken an opponent,
so that neither party can credibly commit not to make use of such advantage
as neither wants to be eliminated (Fearon, 1995b). And thirdly, commitment
problems may arise over disputes concerning objects that affect both parties’
future bargaining power. For instance, it is more difficult for parties to commit to
a deal if a territory is strategically located so that controlling it vastly increases
a party’s bargaining position, or because it comes with the resources necessary
to attack or defend – such as Sierra Leone’s diamond mines the Revolutionary
United Front (RUF) used to finance its fight against the state.
In peace and conflict research, Fearon (1995b) and Powell (2006) were con-
cerned with explaining the onset of armed conflict, while Walter (2002) was
the first to introduce commitment problems to the study of conflict resolution
in the aftermath of civil war (cf. Chapter 2). In brief, her argument is that
peaceful settlements after internal conflict break down and war recurs if parties
are unable to commit to the terms of a deal they previously struck, because the
weak institutional structure of war-torn states resembles an anarchic environ-
ment in which parties cannot rely on any neutral authority that would enforce
such bargain. In this situation, any deal – either reached explicitly in the form
of a peace agreement or informally on the battlefield (cf. Toft, 2010) – that asks
a weaker-growing party to lay down its arms without giving it some guarantee
that it will not be ambushed, will break down in war.
The game tree in Figure 3.2 – that is loosely based on the sequential two-
player game with perfect information by Walter (2002) – helps to illustrate this
approach. In Figure 3.2, I consider a situation in which G and R are at war
and assume that at a given moment G offers R a take-it-or-leave-it deal that
would stop any further fighting, but that would not offer R any guarantees it
will not be ambushed in future. For instance, G could ask R to lay down its
arms and surrender, and in return G would call its soldiers back to the barracks,
but keep control over the state and its institutions. The game begins as R must
choose between continuing war and accepting G’s offer. If it chooses combat, G
can either capitulate and let R win without resistance – but why would it do
that, given the smallest chance of winning in war – or fight back, and thus war
follows for both (WR, WG). If R however accepts G’s deal and surrenders, G
has the choice between either forgiving R for staging a rebellion (for instance
by offering R’s leaders amnesty, which would result in peace for both, PR, PG);
or prosecuting R for having violently challenged G’s authority in the first place.
G could, for instance, execute all of R’s leaders (ER). This move would make G
20Fearon (1995a) illustrates this point using the example of the Serb minority after Croatia’s
declaration of independence in 1991. The Croatian majority was unable to commit itself not
to exploit its greater power it would have enjoyed after the consolidation of an independent
Croatia, for instance by limiting autonomy rights of Serbs. Knowing this, ethnic Serbs were
better off mobilizing for secessionist war than waiting for what would happen in future.
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the dominant actor in the new state (DG). Considering the order of preferences,
both parties have the highest interest in states in which they are dominant. For
instance, G prefers executing R so that it can eradicate or severely weaken its
enemy (without paying the costs of further war) and show strength toward any
potential future challengers. The second-ranked preference is a state in which
they are offered amnesty without paying the costs of future war, and last ranks
execution or elimination.
Using the process of backward induction, Figure 3.2 shows the presence of
credible commitment problems. When G offers R the deal, it can rightfully
argue that both parties prefer a situation in which G forgives R to a situation
of continued fighting: for both, the payoffs rank PR > WR and PG > WG.
But G cannot credibly commit to uphold this bargain after R has accepted the
deal and we have moved to the second stage of the game, because now that
G faces the choice between executing or forgiving R, it will choose execution.
This is because now that R has integrated into G’s rule, power has shifted
to G’s advantage, and G’s payoff for eliminating R is higher than its payoff for
granting R amnesty (DG > PG). G thus has incentives to renege on the bargain.
Knowing this, R will not accept G’s offer in the first place, as its payoffs for
war (in which it has a chance of winning) are higher than for definite execution
(WR > ER). Therefore, in the presence of commitment problems, bargaining
will break down and fighting will occur.
But commitment problems can be overcome, and the existing peace and
conflict literature has proposed three specific causal mechanisms that are con-
ceptually distinct, but at times difficult to differentiate empirically. Firstly,
commitment problems are overcome by reducing future uncertainty – what Mat-
tes and Savun (2009) call “fear-reducing mechanisms” – through increasing the
benefits of cooperation in institutional mechanisms that raise the warring par-
ties’ expected utility of peace relative to their expected utility of defecting and
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returning to war (Flores and Nooruddin, 2011; North, 1990). As Sawyer et al.
(2015, p. 22) argue, “effectively reducing uncertainty about ... war-making ca-
pacity can ... open the door towards peaceful conflict resolution.” In Figure
3.2, if commitment problems arise and lead to war as R fears that the stronger-
growing G will exploit its position in future by marginalizing R, mechanisms
that reduce R uncertainty about the future behavior of G – for instance by
securing R’s role in future politics – would mitigate commitment problems.
Secondly, commitment problems are overcome by creating mechanisms that
raise the costs of defection for players to renege on a deal – or what Fearon
(1997) refers to as parties engaging in “tying their hands” to peaceful behavior.
This solution links to Elster (2000)’s work on constitutions as mechanisms of
constraint and his analogy of Homer’s Odysseus who resisted the calls of the
Sirens by making his crew tie him to the mast of his ship, and forcing them
to cover their ears in wax. In Figure 3.2, if commitment problems arise and
lead to war as R fears that the stronger-growing G will exploit its position in
future by marginalizing R, mechanisms that make defecting and returning to
guns extremely costly both prohibit G from reneging on the deal and “tie R to
the ship’s mast,” preventing it from taking up arms again.21
Thirdly, commitment problems are overcome through mechanisms that help
the parties send costly signals concerning their true commitment to peace,
thereby “distinguishing them from insincere parties that will only engage in
cheap talk” (Flores and Nooruddin, 2011, p. 482) by creating audience costs.
This means that insincere parties suffer ex post opportunity costs by inter-
national or domestic audiences (e.g. the donor community, civil society, or
electoral constituencies) if they do not follow through with an initial peaceful
commitment (cf. Manning and Malbrough, 2010). Audience costs thus “increase
the costs of bluffing” (Hegre, 2014, p. 161). In Figure 3.2, G’s offer to provide
amnesty to R was cheap talk, because as soon as R integrated, nothing would
force G to follow through with this promise. If mechanisms would however
be implemented that enable G to send a costly signal that it will not renege,
for instance by creating audience costs that would increase public disapproval
if G made a commitment and did not follow through, this would both help
demonstrate G’s commitment to peace while at the same time constraining it
from fighting in future war (cf. Fearon, 1994). For that matter, Flores and
Nooruddin (2011) suggest that parties could reassure each other by not only
committing to peace to each other, but also to players outside the bargaining
situations, including other societal actors or the international community.
While the signaling and audience costs mechanism is regularly portrayed as
a solution to the standard game of commitment problems both in the broader
institutions literature (e.g. Lohmann, 2003) as well as in peace and conflict re-
search (e.g. Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Mattes and Savun, 2009), studies have
21Both mechanisms thus concern the relationship between PG and DG, showing that com-
mitment problems are overcome by anything that increases G’s utility of PG over DG.
37
noted how it is different from the first two mechanisms presented here. This
is because through notions of bluffing or cheap talk, the mechanism introduces
incomplete information to the commitment problem game (where belligerents
are usually completely informed), which is in contradiction to studies that have
analyzed these two bargaining failures in isolation to one another (cf. above).
However, some studies have integrated audience costs also into situations of
commitment problems (cf. Moon and Souva, 2016; Wolford et al., 2011). As
Prins (2003, p. 69) holds, also in an “environment where the misrepresenta-
tion of preferences is common,” mechanisms that allow parties to signal their
true commitment to peace – by helping them to introduce political penalties
for backing down – solves commitment problems. These studies come with con-
trasting findings for the relationship between audience costs and commitment
problems, which I discuss further in Chapter 9.
3.2 Causal Mechanisms and Hypotheses
In sum, the foregoing discussion helps to show that if interim governments are to
help warring parties overcome commitment problems after internal conflict, they
must include mechanisms that (1) reduce their uncertainty and increase benefits
of cooperation, (2) tie their hands and increase costs of defection, and/or (3)
help parties send credible signals by generating audience costs. I now derive
hypotheses from this logic. I begin by following the lead of existing research on
interim government and integrate arguments on how the institutional designs
of power-sharing and international interim governments increase the stability of
post-interim peace into this model.
3.2.1 Institutional Designs of Interim Governments
Power-Sharing Interim Government I define power-sharing interim gov-
ernment as one in which warring parties are offered guaranteed positions in the
institutions exercising executive and/or legislative power between the demise of
an old regime and first elections (Jarstad, 2010; Walter, 2002).22 Under this def-
inition, the 2003-05 National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) is a
case of power-sharing interim rule – legislative institutions included fixed quotas
for the former government as well for the Liberians United for Reconciliation and
Democracy (LURD) and Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) rebels
– while the 1992-94 Mozambican interim government is not. In Mozambique,
22In Chapter 2, I noted the problematic comparability of previous research on power-sharing
that suffers from a large variety in conceptualizing and operationalizing joint rule (cf. Bin-
ningsbø, 2013). In order to position my research in the existing debate, I here follow those
works that study power-sharing (1) in political institutions (as opposed to manage participa-
tion in military, territorial, or economic dimensions), (2) as an interim, rather than a perma-
nent mode of government, (3) as an agreement between warring parties (rather than between
ethnic or religious groups), and (4) as an instrument to build peace (instead of democracy).
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only the ruling Frente de Libertação de Moçambique or Mozambique Liberation
Front (FRELIMO) controlled the interim government.
I argue that power-sharing interim government increases the stability of
post-interim peace predominantly through reducing future uncertainty and fear
by increasing the warring parties’ benefits of cooperation relative to their ex-
pected utility of returning to war. I expect power-sharing to do so through
three concrete sub-mechanisms (cf. Figure 3.3). Firstly, power-sharing interim
government comes with political benefits that reduce future uncertainty, because
– in the example of Figure 3.2 – the inclusion in such government increases R’s
immediate political leverage. Power-sharing interim government (1) grants R
a voice in the design of post-interim institutions (for instance through jointly
passed policies and laws that are difficult to achieve, costly to violate, and hard
to renege on later, cf. Jenne, 2004, p. 737) and the ability to learn about the
rules of the post-interim political game, which decreases its uncertainty about
G’s future behavior (Call and Cook, 2003; Manning, 2007; Sisk and Stefes,
2005). Power-sharing interim government (2) gives R the knowledge on how
to manipulate these future institutional rules to its advantage, for instance by
forcing G to introduce an electoral system that will give R a fair chance to be
represented in the post-interim period, or to circumvent laws on accountability
or transitional justice (Davis, 2013). Both aspects grant R the ability to look
down the road, see that it will not be marginalized or eliminated, and thus make
peaceful cooperation more likely in the long run.
Secondly, power-sharing interim government comes with economic benefits
that reduce future uncertainty for players. In war-torn states, the distribution of
resources and individual access to wealth or public goods is usually determined
by control of or loyalty to the government, and thus either side to a conflict must
fear to be economically marginalized if the other side fully controls a transition
to peace (Le Billon, 2008). If a weaker-growing party uses armed combat to
prevent or fight against its marginalization from the resources its requires to
survive, it should prefer joining a power-sharing interim government that offers
economic payoffs without paying the costs of war. By rewarding parties with
cabinet or legislative positions, power-sharing interim governments enable them
to control (or loot) the resources ascribed to their post – and keep them either
for themselves or distribute them to electoral constituencies – and thereby lower
their incentives to renege on a deal and acquire economic benefits by violent
means (Haaß and Ottmann, 2015). Anecdotal evidence demonstrates how vital
economic benefits through power-sharing interim governments are to buy parties
into a peace process. In Sierra Leone, RUF leader Foday Sankoh was convinced
into signing the 1999 Lomé Agreement by granting him Vice Presidency as
well as Chairmanship over the Commission for the Management of Strategic
Resources, National Reconstruction and Development that awarded him control
over the national diamond trade (Binningsbø and Dupuy, 2010). In Liberia,





































































































































































































































































national elections, joining the power-sharing interim government became purely
a question of what positions would be the most lucrative ones (International
Crisis Group, 2003a), and interim leaders even “blocked disarmament until they
received more government jobs” (Papagianni, 2008, p. 46).
Thirdly, power-sharing reduces future uncertainty by increasing R’s physical
security. Joining power-sharing institutions requires warring parties (1) to re-
veal at least some of their organizational structure to each other, which makes it
more difficult to remobilize for conflict. It also requires them (2) to come out of
their hiding places in the remote periphery and to join the interim government
institutions in the capital, where they become easy targets for enemy troops.
This should reduce uncertainty about the opponent’s behavior (cf. Binningsbø
and Dupuy, 2010). For instance, South Sudan’s rebel leader Riek Machar re-
turned to the capital Juba in April 2016 after two years in hiding to join a
power-sharing interim government as its Vice President, which diplomats called
the “best chance yet” for peace (in The Guardian, 2016). And in Burundi,
“to alleviate the minority’s physical insecurity from surrendering control, the
power-sharing deal ... guaranteed the Tutsi one of two key security posts – min-
ister of the army or police – and reserved one of two vice presidential slots for
a Tutsi” (Kuperman, 2015). In addition, power-sharing interim governments
frequently offer state bodyguards to rebel-leaders-turned-politicians, and the
move to the capital comes with increased international and media attention
that the new office brings, further increasing the physical security of parties.
As Rothchild (2007, 86f.) thus argues, power-sharing interim governments are
“logical responses” to “challenges of political – even physical – insecurity.” 23
Hypothesis H1: Power-sharing interim government, as opposed to any other
interim government, increases the stability of post-interim peace.
International Interim Government In Chapter 2, I discussed existing re-
search on international interim government and noted that the literature re-
mains limited in that it predominantly consists of under-theorized case studies
interested in the few prominent historical instances of international authority. I
have also contended that employing the model as a framework for analysis in the
way that it was put forward by Shain and Linz (1995) is problematic, not least
because most interim governments put in place in the aftermath of armed con-
flict today see some degree of international engagement (Guttieri and Piombo,
23Alternatively, one could theorize that power-sharing interim government raises the the
costs of defection for warring parties. Firstly, if G now has to share state resources with R
in a power-sharing interim government instead of being in control over all national means to
defend or attack in combat, this decreases its perceived probability of winning in war. Sec-
ondly, power-sharing interim government can weaken the relationship between party leaders
and subordinates. While this perspective violates a pure unitary actor assumption, one may
theorize that if G offers R positions in a power-sharing interim government, G demonstrates its
incentives to make such government an institution that addresses R’s fear of future marginal-
ization, thereby weakening R’s leaders’ claim to their followers that the interim government
does not act in their interest and should be fought. This in turn should increase the costs of
leaders of recruiting rank-and-file soldiers for war (Mukherjee, 2006).
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2007; Ottaway and Lacina, 2003). Building on this discussion, it is thus fruitful
to conceptualize international interim rule not as an exclusive category of a ty-
pology (such as in Figure 2.1 on page 13) but as cross-cutting other institutional
designs of interim government. I thus define international interim government
as one in which the international community assumes de facto executive and/or
legislative authority in some or all policy matters between the demise of an
old regime and first elections. Under this definition, East Timor and Liberia
are both cases of international interim government, as executive and legislative
power in the former rested until 2001 in the hands of UN Transitional Admin-
istrator Sergio Vieria de Mello, and as the UN also de facto functioned “as a
co-principal agent of executive authority” next to the NTGL in Liberia (Mor-
gan, 2007, p. 212). On the contrary, South Africa’s 1990-94 interim government
ruled with little to no international involvement (Höglund, 2008).
I argue that international interim government increases the stability of post-
interim peace predominantly through increasing the warring parties’ costs of de-
fection and tying their hands to peaceful action, and I expect it to do so through
two concrete mechanisms (cf. Figure 3.3). Firstly, international interim gov-
ernment increases costs of defection through physical deterrence, because the
military components associated to such rule bring a large number of interna-
tional troops that place physical constraints on the parties’ ability to break a
deal. For instance, parties do no longer only have to fight their adversary, but
also have to spend valuable human and military resources fighting peacekeepers
in case they want to break away from the peace process (Mattes and Savun,
2009; Salverda, 2013). In addition, external military force associated with in-
ternational interim government may also implement demilitarized buffer zones
– such as the “Zone of Separation” around the Inter-Entity Boundary Line ne-
gotiated in Bosnia’s Dayton Agreement (United Nations, 1995). Finally, and
not least because of the high financial and human costs that governing war-
torn states entails for international actors, international interim government
also assures parties that the international community has a strong interest in
upholding an agreement and achieving a positive outcome of the peace process,
which makes such interim rule a particularly good “moderating force” in war-
torn states (Flores and Nooruddin, 2011, p. 488).24 This all reduces the utility
of the outcome WG;WR for the parties (cf. Figure 3.2).
Secondly, international interim government increases costs of defection via
policy influence, because every policy field that is advanced by an international
interim officer decreases G’s ability to use its position for factional interest
and to pursue politics that will marginalize R in a future state, which in turn
strengthens R’s belief that the post-interim order will be one that is more at-
tractive than a costly war (cf. Doyle and Sambanis, 2006). This is in line with
previous academic studies on peacekeeping and transitional administration that
24Alternatively, agreeing to international interim government can serve as a costly signal by
one party to another that it intends to abide by a peaceful bargain (cf. Fortna, 2008a).
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have stressed particularly the UN’s role as “as truly neutral authority” (Gis-
selquist, 2002, p. 12) that mitigates commitment problems by reducing the in-
security produced by the anarchic institutional environment of war-torn states
(Doyle and Sambanis, 2006; Walter, 2002).
For instance, previous research has established that if elections in war-torn
societies are organized by the international community instead of by, for ex-
ample, the former government, this increases all warring parties’ belief that
such elections are free of large-scale fraud and that a subsequent political sys-
tem will allow for the fair representation of a variety of societal voices (Kumar,
1998). An example for the importance of international interim government in
increasing parties’ perceptions of neutrality is UNTAG in Namibia. In 1989, the
design of this interim government required South African Administrator Gen-
eral Louis Pienaar to consult with UN Special Representative Martti Ahtisaari
on the reform of legislative issues; and when Pienaar proposed an electoral law
for the upcoming elections, Ahtisaari identified a number of problematic issues
regarding the secrecy of the ballot as well as vote counting procedures. The law
was consequently altered according to Ahtisaari’s wishes, ensuring free and fair
elections and restricting South Africa’s ability to dominate Namibia’s transition
(International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990).25
Hypothesis H2: International interim government, as opposed to any other
interim government, increases the stability of post-interim peace.26
3.2.2 Reform Processes in Interim Governments
Following existing research, the foregoing paragraphs have argued that the short-
term institutional designs of power-sharing and international interim govern-
ment mitigate long-term commitment problems of warring parties and thus in-
crease the stability of post-interim peace. Weaker-growing parties, for instance,
can use power-sharing interim governments to negotiate laws that ensure their
survival in the post-interim period and thus decrease any future uncertainties.
International actors can prohibit the remobilization of forces during interim rule
and thus increase any costs of defection.
But it is also possible to imagine a counterargument to the causal stories
presented above. As Powell (2006) reasons and as I have shown in section 3.1, if
(1) commitment problems result from shifts in the relative distribution of power
between warring parties – G is growing stronger, R is growing weaker, and thus
25The counterargument is not trivial. One could also theorize that every post an inter-
national actor sits on during interim government is unavailable to the warring parties; thus,
their immediate quest for power and for political security is not addressed. This may have
been the case in East Timor, where all power rested initially with UNTAET and FRETILIN
soon protested for more power in the interim government (Bull, 2008; Chopra, 2000).
26While I formulate this hypothesis in binary fashion, my robustness checks in Chapter 4
include a continuous measure of the international interim government variable, and thus also
test the related hypothesis: The higher the degree of international authority in an interim
government, the higher the stability of post-interim peace.
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it is rational for R to fight now rather than wait until G consolidates its uni-
lateral grip onto power and eliminates R – and if (2) commitment problems are
overcome by introducing mechanisms that help parties to look into the future
and see that non-violent cooperation is their long-term best strategy, then the
terminable and temporary nature of interim governments introduces a logical
inconsistency to this idea. For instance, if one causal mechanism of how inter-
national interim governments mitigate commitment problems and lead to peace
moves through the notion of physical deterrence, what happens if international
personnel uses elections as an exit strategy and decreases its deployment signif-
icantly in the post-interim period – would knowledge about the future lack of
physical deterrence not increase rather than mitigate commitment problems on
the side of the weaker-growing party already during interim rule?
Similarly, if power-sharing interim rule mitigates commitment problems by
reducing insecurity through political, economic, or physical benefits, what hap-
pens when interim rule terminates in elections and a “much more fluid form
of democracy” (Sisk, 2008) is introduced that precisely allows for shifts in the
relative distribution of political power? It is easy to imagine that former power-
sharers will not accept being stripped of their authority and forced into taking
a seat in the opposition, as they have come to enjoy the goods associated with
holding office, or because they cannot trust the winning party that it will not
instantly get rid of elections as a means of peacefully assuming power (Paris,
2004). For instance, in Côte d’Ivoire, parties negotiated a power-sharing deal
in the 2007 Ouagadougou Political Accord that made rebel leader Soro interim
Prime Minister, while Laurent Gbagbo remained President. When Gbagbo lost
the 2010 presidential vote against opposition candidate Ouattara, violence by
pro-Gbagbo militias erupted throughout the country (Freedom House, 2012).
Weaker-growing parties in these situations thus have incentives to remobilize
for war. But given these incentives, what gives parties the capacity to do so after
they initially agreed to stop fighting? In other words, what aspects of interim
governments other than their institutional designs can explain why some warring
parties stick to peace in the long run also in the post-interim period, while other
mobilize for war? A first explanation offered by existing research is that in the
aftermath of armed conflict, the question why some parties remobilize while
others do not is at least partially due to “lingering” parallel war-time structures
of these parties (cf. Persson, 2012). These structures – that I will term in
what follows the parallel political and military institutions of warring parties
– include both persisting shadow governments and parallel administrations, as
well as lasting logistical military infrastructure and command structures (e.g.
Mampilly, 2011; Schlichte, 2009; Themnér, 2011). These parallel institutions
do not automatically disappear just because a peace agreement is signed that
declares armed conflict to be over and that installs an interim government as
a new national authority in the capital of a state. For instance, as Robinson,
Valters, et al. (2015, p. 36) note, “[the] limited job creation witnessed in Liberia
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can mean that former combatants rely on their old command structures to
source work, which in itself keeps the conditions in place for a potential return
to conflict.” The general argument of the literature is thus as long as parallel,
war-time institutions continue to exist following the formal termination of war,
parties retain the structures necessary to remobilize.
The Integration of Parallel Institutions To reconnect and integrate this
discussion into my model of section 3.1, I now build on this research on non-state
actors in post-war situations. I argue that as long as the parallel institutions
of these actors persist throughout an interim period, commitment problems are
not mitigated because parties retain the financial resources, popular legitimacy,
military infrastructure, and war-time mindsets to remobilize for war in the post-
interim period. I define parallel institutions as the warring parties’ political and
military structures that allow them to “accumulate the power and resources
necessary both to engage in the conflict and to maintain their organizations”
(Lyons, 2005, p. 34).
Specifically, by integrating parallel political structures, I mean that upon
joining the interim government, parties give up any forms of parallel admin-
istrations that exist if (1) they exercise control over territory, (2) establish
“institutions within or outside of its military to manage relations with the civil
population, and (3) these institutions set in place a series of formal or informal
rules that define a hierarchy of decision making and a system of taxation” (We-
instein, 2006, p. 164).27 A prominent example of parallel rebel government are
the institutions established by the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq since 2014.
A member of the Syrian opposition has recently more generally reflected on
the detrimental effects of parallel governance on peace processes by noting, “if
one milk carton cannot go in [to a besieged area, how] can there be a political
transition” to peace (in Black, 2016)?
By integrating parallel military structures I mean that interim governments
disarm and demobilize all non-statutory armed forces before they terminate in
elections, implying (1) that weapons are collected and disposed to strip parties
of their means of fighting and to create an environment of personal security
and political stability that reduces parties’ incentives for war; as well as (2)
that military units are formally disbanded and discharged (e.g. Humphreys and
Weinstein, 2005; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007; Knight and Özerdem, 2004;
Muggah, 2005; Muggah, 2010).28 According to this definition, the integration
27My definition is more narrow than the one of Lyons (2005, p. 35), who also understands
“black markets and humanitarian relief networks; and chauvinistic ... identity groups” as
parallel institutions – a thick conceptualization difficult to apply in statistical research.
28Following Spear (2002), I thus focus on the first two steps of a Disarmament, Demobiliza-
tion, and Reintegration (DDR) process. This is also because reintegration – the reinsertion
of demobilized recruits back into civilian lives, their reconciliation with communities, psycho-
logical treatment, integration in veteran’s organizations, or vocational training that enables
them to provide for a living without requiring a gun (Ball, 1997; Rolston, 2007) – is a process
that is unlikely to be feasible under short-term interim rule. As Collier, Elliott, et al. (2003,
p. 160) note, “[while] disarmament and demobilization are reasonably straightforward logis-
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of parallel institutions was fully realized in El Salvador, because at the time
of elections in 1994, the caretaker interim government had restored almost one
hundred percent of mayors and judges in former zones of Frente Farabundo
Martí para la Liberacíon Nacional or Farabundo Martí National Liberation
Front (FMLN) control, and had completed a disarmament and demobilization
process (Stanley, 2007). In Afghanistan, neither form of integration occurred,
as the rule of the AIA did not extend much beyond Kabul, and a disarmament
and demobilization process was far from being completed when elections were
held in 2004 (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2006).
I argue that interim governments that integrate the parallel political and
military institutions of warring parties increase the stability of peace predomi-
nantly by tying the hands and raising the costs of defection for parties through
four sub-mechanisms (cf. Figure 3.3). All link to previous arguments that the
dissolution of parallel structures, such as through Disarmament, Demobilization,
and Reintegration (DDR) programs, present solutions to credible commitment
problems in various forms (Diehl, 2016; Flores and Nooruddin, 2011). Firstly,
and concerning the integration of parallel political institutions, such integration
ties the hands of parties because it reduces their financial resources to remobi-
lize for war, while as long as parallel institutions continue to exist, parties retain
such financial resources. Referring to the game tree in Figure 3.2, this depicts
a situation in which facing commitment problems due to uncertainty about
G’s future behavior, the continued existence of parallel administration allows
R to retreat to its zones of territorial control and regroup for war, or to use
these parallel structure for acquiring the financial means to buy new weaponry:
“Zones of territorial control ... are often the backbone of a rebel group’s resource
mobilization capacity” (Fjelde and Nilsson, 2012, p. 610). Such acquisition of
means may come through the parallel taxation of the population living under
the party’s control – such as in Burundi (Sabates-Wheeler and Verwimp, 2014)
– or through controlling valuable natural resources in administrated territories
(cf. Johnston, 2004; Sanín, 2004). For instance, the RUF administrated the
eastern part of Sierra Leone and controlled the diamond mines, which allowed
it to fund their fight against the government (Binningsbø and Dupuy, 2010).
Secondly, integrating parallel political institutions into the authority of an
interim government also increases the costs of defection for warring parties by
affecting their levels of popular support. This mechanism builds on the idea
that, in order to raise its expected capability to prevail in war, parties need
to obtain and maintain support from the civilian population – for instance be-
cause this decreases their costs of conscription (if people join voluntarily rather
than after the use of force), or because civilian supporters provide valuable
lodging places for rebel groups in hiding (cf. Ottmann, 2015). Parallel political
structures in that regard represent key mechanisms to build and maintain such
tical operations, reintegration is a complex and long-term process of coalescing groups with
different backgrounds, experiences, norms, expectations, and capacities.”
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popular support, such as through providing public services including healthcare,
justice, or education (cf. Arjona, 2014; Barnabas and Zwi, 1997). As with the
sub-mechanism on financial means, as long as warring parties can continuously
prove in parallel administrated zones that they can deliver public services more
effectively than an interim government, they keep significant popular legitimacy
which reduces their costs of remobilizing for war (Branch and Mampilly, 2005;
Englebert and Tull, 2008).
Thirdly, and concerning the integration of parallel military institutions into
the authority of an interim government, such integration ties the hands of par-
ties because (1) it strips them of their means to prevail in combat by collecting
and destroying weapon stocks, for instance in public “Flames for Peace” arms
burning ceremonies, which reduces the utility of remobilizing for the parties
in the bargaining situation. It also (2) should weaken social networks within
military organizations, such as bonds between recruits and hierarchical com-
mand structures between rank-and-file soldiers and military leaders, increasing
the costs of such leaders to remobilize for war (Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis,
2010). For instance, one of the key reasons why ex-combatants in Sierra Leone
did not resort to war after their DDR process is that they had no access to net-
works of elites that were seeking to recruit them (Themnér, 2011). Banholzer
(2014, p. 7) also argues that the “hasty and disorganized” demobilization of
German soldiers at the end of World War I “resulted in a failure to collect all
weapons” and “[many] of these arms were later used in partisan struggles.”
Having said that, several authors have pointed out that this proposed the-
oretical mechanism of increasing the costs of war and defection (and thus of
decreasing the utility of the WR;WG outcome in Figure 3.2) through destroy-
ing weapons and weakening social relationships is unlikely to come about in
practice. Firstly, and ironically, the manner by which the demobilization of
military structures is carried out in the majority of DDR processes through the
isolated and concentrated cantonment of combatants has actually been found
to reinforce the very command structures “that the process is intended to dis-
solve” (Knight and Özerdem, 2004, p. 509). And while some weapons may be
destroyed in the aftermath of war or during the rule of an interim government,
it is unlikely that all weapons will be collected or cease to exist. Individual
soldiers may hide their gun out of fear of future harm; weapons may represent
an essential livelihood asset in post-conflict societies, such as for farmers who
want to protect their livestock (Young and Goldman, 2015); arms may be closely
connected to masculine identities (Myrttinen, 2003; Spear, 1999); black mar-
kets and weak border controls imply that guns are accessible at every time; and
even if many are destroyed, the skills to use such weapons remain widespread
(Collier, Elliott, et al., 2003).
For instance, Mozambique has often been considered a DDR success story,
in that elections ending the interim government were postponed several times
until the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana or Mozambican National Resis-
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tance (RENAMO) was considered sufficiently disarmed. When RENAMO then
lost the 1994 elections, the advanced state of the demobilization process gave its
leader Dhlakama no other opportunity than to accept a seat in the opposition
(Flores and Nooruddin, 2012). But by no means had all arms been collected and
destroyed in Mozambique. Instead, studies have stressed the symbolic nature of
DDR in Mozambique and elsewhere that creates situations in which the use of
weapons is not socially accepted anymore (particularly among ex-combatants,
Spear, 2002). Such reform processes are also seen to instill “trust in the entire
peace process” more generally, as well as to offer ex-combatants the opportunity
to envision alternatives to military livelihoods (Banholzer, 2014, p. 10).
Thus, fourthly, the integration of parallel military structures during interim
rule raises the costs of defection and ties the hands of warring parties to peaceful
behavior because it adds to changing cultures and acceptance of violence (on
how broader societal rejection of violence increases the costs of defection, cf.
Nilsson, 2012). By that I mean even if not all weapons, personal relationships,
or hierarchical command structures are destroyed or weakened at the end of
interim government, a sufficiently advanced DDR process still signifies “that
the country is embarking on an era of peace” (United Nations, 2000a), helps
to “push individuals away from war-time mindsets that legitimized violence”
and facilitates “ex-combatants’ attempts to distance themselves from war-time
abuses they committed or experienced” and to envision economic livelihoods al-
ternative to that of being soldiers in war (Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010,
pp. 10, 18). As one UN report noted, DDR programs that help combatants to
envision “livelihoods or employment options that offer a sense of purpose and
respect may thus provide an important source of resilience” against remobiliza-
tion (in Munive and Stepputat, 2015, p. 9). This in turn raises the costs of
defection for the party growing weaker in the bargaining situation.
Hypothesis H3: The more advanced the process of integrating parallel political
and military institutions into the authority of an interim government, the
higher the stability of post-interim peace.29
29A valuable critique concerning my third hypothesis may be that while integrating parallel
institutions into the authority of an interim government may increase the parties’ costs of
defection and tie their hands to peaceful behavior, parties would never agree to such inte-
gration in the first place because it is not in their self-interest (Thyne, 2009; Walter, 2002).
Following studies that do argue for DDR as a solution to commitment problems (Diehl, 2016;
Flores and Nooruddin, 2011), I disagree with this critique to some extent, because weaker-
growing parties in peace negotiations may not be in a position to refuse disarmament; and
even stronger-growing parties may have to agree to disarm in order to make concessions in
the settlement. But the question remains why, for instance, R should follow through with
disarming and demobilizing – and not cheat in the process, such as by actively solidifying its
command structures in cantonment sites – if it does not receive any guarantees that it will not
be marginalized after having finalized a DDR process? This question already indicates that
the precise implementation of integrating parallel institutions – and thus also their effects
on post-interim peace – is conditioned by underlying context factors; and the institutional
designs of interim governments may well represent such context. For instance, international
interim government increases parties’ costs of cheating in integrating their parallel military
institutions; and power-sharing increases the parties’ incentives to integrate parallel institu-
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The Participation of Unarmed Actors A second explanation offered by
the peace and conflict literature for why some parties remobilize while others
do not – in addition to lingering parallel structures – is the context of collec-
tive, domestic audiences, although Svensson (2014) has pointed out that such
domestic actors have received much less attention in the literature than warring
parties or their international custodians. Broadly speaking, studies have argued
that the participation of civil society and political parties in peace processes can
be regarded as explicitly influencing future violent behavior of warring parties.
This is because such participation increases transparency and lets audiences as-
sume a watchdog function over the warring parties’ courses of action (cf. Nilsson,
2012).30 Paffenholz and Spurk (2006, p. 8) hold, for instance, that civil society
and political parties without a history of armed insurgency have a “major role
... to establish [a] ‘democratic public’ and to act as a watchdog” over the peace
process. An often referred to example in this regard is the Women of Liberia
Mass Action for Peace movement. In 2003, this movement directly impacted
the Liberian warring parties’ behavior because it forced the warring parties to
engage in bargaining and peace negotiations. For instance, the movement pre-
vented party representatives from leaving the peace talks by physically blocking
the doors and windows of Charles Taylor’s presidential palace.
Nilsson (2012, p. 250) has furthermore reasoned that civil society and politi-
cal party participation in peace processes “can serve as an indication to warring
parties ... that the support for continued violence in the society at large is
reduced,” thereby limiting their utility of remobilizing for war. Others note
that civil society actors can undermine the “moral authority” of remobilizers
which may dissuade individuals from accepting or participating in future war
(Barnes, 2006, p. 8). A number of studies focusing on interim governments have
in the past also loosely referred to unarmed domestic actors – i.e. civil society
organizations and political parties – as an important and integral part of the do-
mestic audience of warring parties in peace processes (e.g. Papagianni, 2007a;
Papagianni, 2009; Paris, 2004). Most have however highlighted how interim
governments can help bring civil society and political parties into post-conflict
politics (cf. Chapter 2) and increase the general legitimacy of the peace process
(cf. Belloni, 2008; Paffenholz, 2010; Wanis-St. John and Kew, 2008). They
have not integrated this aspect into a theoretical model regarding the behavior
tions, because the economic benefits associated with a position in power-sharing can replace
the economic gain parties received from taxing a population in parallel institutions. Simi-
larly, while disarmament and demobilization (at best) retrieves parties of what constituted
the means of power during the war, power-sharing positions offer a replacement of such au-
thority. In Liberia’s interim government, leaders therefore “blocked disarmament until they
received more government jobs” (Papagianni, 2008, p. 46). If the institutional designs of
interim governments thus condition the effect of integrating parallel institutions, this would
methodologically call for interaction effects in my statistical models, as we could expect that
the integration of parallel institutions has a more pronounced positive effect on the stability of
post-interim peace in power-sharing or international interim governments. I test this aspect
in my robustness checks in Chapter 4 and 9.
30This perspective thereby reflects the perception of civil society’s role as a domestic audi-
ence in the broader political science literature (e.g. Lipson, 2003; Slantchev, 2006).
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of the warring parties.
This perspective yet links to my argument from section 3.1, that in order
to mitigate commitment problems, interim governments must introduce mech-
anisms that help parties send costly signals. That is – in the example of Figure
3.2 – G’s act of proposing R to integrate into a future state with the outcome
of PR; PG for both must create some cost that would discipline G, would it
not implement its proposal. I have shown that the literature has in this regard
perceived the creation of domestic audience costs as a way to signal one’s true
intentions (cf. Fearon, 1994; Fearon, 1997; Flores and Nooruddin, 2011).
As long as interim governments thus fail to enable warring parties to send
costly signals of their true intentions to each other that create domestic audience
costs – which would punish them if they renege on a peaceful bargain – violence
in the post-interim period is more likely. I propose that interim governments
can create such costs by allowing for the ad hoc or institutional participation
of unarmed actors in reform processes between the demise of the old regime
and first elections. By ad hoc participation I mean that unarmed actors are
invited to take part in decision-making processes through informal, one-time
and purpose-specific events in which reforms are negotiated between the mem-
bers of the interim government and unarmed actors – such as Sierra Leone’s
2002 National Dialogue Conference – or through regular consultations with the
interim government. Unarmed actors may, for instance, be regularly invited to
issue statements on electoral reform draft proposals. Institutional participation
means that unarmed actors assume positions in the interim government in order
to influence reform processes, such as in Liberia’s 2003-05 NTGL.
Consequently, I argue that interim governments that allow for the participa-
tion of unarmed actors either institutionally or through ad hoc measures increase
the stability of post-interim peace by representing a costly signal of G about
its true intention for peace, thereby mitigating R’s commitment problems (cf.
Figure 3.3). By agreeing to let a wider spectrum of unarmed actors participate
in interim governments and in the reforms implemented by the interim govern-
ment, G credibly signals to R that it is willing to be held accountable for its
actions through transparent and “publicly observable measures” (Fearon, 1997,
p. 577) and willing to accept sanctions from a public domestic audience if it
does not follow through (cf. Flores and Nooruddin, 2011). One may addition-
ally expect that participation of unarmed actors through receiving institutional
representation is a more costly form of commitment for G and should thus have
a more pronounced positive effect on the stability of post-interim peace than
mere ad hoc participation.
Hypothesis H4: The more advanced the opportunities of participation for un-
armed actors in interim government decision-making, the higher the sta-
bility of post-interim peace.
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3.3 Chapter Summary
This chapter has started out by conceptualizing intrastate armed conflict as a
bargaining failure due to the presence of credible commitment problems. This
means that bargaining breaks down and parties remobilize for armed conflict in
the post-interim period because anticipated shifts in the relative distribution of
power make them unable to credibly commit to uphold any previously brokered
deal in future. But commitment problems can be overcome. Following the theo-
retical and empirical literature on this topic, I have consequently outlined three
overriding causal mechanisms in how interim governments may mitigate com-
mitment problems and contribute to the stability of post-interim peace. Firstly,
by reducing future uncertainty for warring parties, secondly, by increasing the
parties’ costs of defection, and thirdly, by enabling the parties to send costly
signals that create audience costs.
Table 3.1: Overview of Hypotheses
H1: Power-sharing interim government, as opposed to any other interim
government, increases the stability of post-interim peace.
H2: International interim government, as opposed to any other interim
government, increases the stability of post-interim peace.
H3: The more advanced the process of integrating parallel political and
military institutions into the authority of an interim government, the
higher the stability of post-interim peace.
H4: The more advanced the opportunities of participation for unarmed
actors in interim governments, the higher the stability of peace.
I have then integrated previous research on interim governments and peace
processes into this theoretical model. Building on studies such as by Jarstad
(2010), I have argued that power-sharing interim government increases the sta-
bility of post-interim peace by reducing the warring parties’ political, economic,
and physical uncertainty (H1). Building on studies such as by Doyle and Sam-
banis (2000), I have argued that international interim government increases the
stability of post-interim peace by raising the warring parties’ costs of defection
(H2). I have then demonstrated that it is also plausible to imagine a counter
argument to these hypotheses, in that the previous argumentation may lack
explanatory power because it neglects the temporality of interim government
institutions that exacerbates, rather than mitigates commitment problems. I
have therefore complemented the approach of past research by incorporating
two further sub-fields of peace and conflict research into my framework. Both
address features of reform processes in interim governments. I have argued that
more advanced processes of integrating the parallel political and military in-
stitutions of warring parties into the authority of an interim government are
associated with a higher stability of peace (H3). This is because integrating
parallel structures – such as rebel governments and non-statutory armed forces
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– increases the warring parties’ costs of defection in the long run. Finally, I
have argued that more advanced opportunity of participation for unarmed ac-
tors should be associated with a higher stability of post-interim peace (H4).
This is because participation creates domestic audience costs that punish par-





This chapter tests my hypotheses by using statistical survival analysis. It repre-
sents the first of six empirical chapters that together make up the mixed-method
research design outlined in Chapter 1.31 To recall, the argument that this chap-
ter sets out to evaluate is that four institutional design and reform features of
interim government – (H1) power-sharing deals between warring parties, (H2)
international authority in interim institutions, (H3) the integration of the war-
ring parties’ parallel institutions into the authority of an interim government,
and (H4) the participation of unarmed actors in reform processes – all increase
the stability of post-interim peace. This chapter thereby provides first cor-
relational evidence for my broader argument from Chapter 3, i.e. that reform
aspects of interim government are better suited to explain long-term peace than
these governments’ institutional designs. The chapter yet also shows that se-
lection issues are part of an explanation for why the coefficient associated with
power-sharing interim government in particular lacks statistical significance.
To arrive at this conclusion, the chapter proceeds in three steps. Section 4.1
presents the data set underlying my statistical analysis. Because I coded sev-
eral variables myself, this section discusses my sampling strategy, the quality
of information underlying the coding process, as well as benefits and pitfalls
of coding choices. It then goes into detail concerning the operationalization of
my independent, dependent, and control variables, as well as concerning my
methodological approach. In section 4.2, I present and discuss the results of
several Cox Proportional Hazards (PH) models, perform a number of model di-
agnostics and robustness checks, and address the question whether institutional
design and reform features of interim governments are endogenous. Section 4.3
concludes by summarizing the insights gained in this chapter.
31I presented earlier versions of this chapter at the third ISP Network Conference in Geneva
(May 2014), a GIGA Research Program 2 – Research Team 3 meeting (August 2014), a
DFG-funded Point Sud Workshop in Stellenbosch (November 2014), the colloquium of Aurel
Croissant in Heidelberg (January 2015), and the International Studies Association’s 56th
Annual Convention in New Orleans (February 2015). I thank all participants, and in particular
Gerald Schneider, Christof Hartmann, and Susanna Campbell, for their valuable comments.
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4.1 Research Design
4.1.1 Sampling Strategy and Data Sources
I test my argument on a sample of all cases of interim government that followed
at least one year of intrastate armed conflict since 1989 and that terminated
in elections by 31 December 2012.32 In line with the vast majority of existing
research, I operationalize intrastate armed conflict as a contested incompatibility
between a government and at least one rebel group “where the use of armed force
... results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year” (cf. Chapter
1 and Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 2001).
Four theoretical and methodological issues motivate my choice for this obser-
vation period. Firstly, and concerning the left margin of 1989 as a delineation
of this period, the end of the Cold War enabled international engagement in
war-torn states to a degree that ever more included the reform of state insti-
tutions and the promotion of democracy. This empirical development closely
links to the role of interim governments as instruments for peacebuilding, not
least because such governments often convene to prepare war-torn states for
elections (cf. Paris, 2004; Sisk, 1993). Secondly, intrastate conflicts and their
resolution attempts before 1989 often took the form of proxy wars, were strongly
influenced by relations between the superpowers, and thus followed different dy-
namics compared to internal conflicts in the post-Cold War period (cf. Kalyvas
and Balcells, 2010). Thirdly, many data collections on conflict characteristics
start with information collected from 1989 onwards, so my choice also concerns
issues of data availability. Fourthly, because I want to understand the effects
of interim governments on the stability of post-interim peace, only analyzing
interim governments that terminated by December 2012 allows me to assess
this duration aspect of my dependent variable for at least two consecutive years
(as of June 2016, conflict data is available until December 2014).33
This strategy results in a sample of 62 instances of interim government, fully
listed in Table A.1 in the Appendix. To visualize the distribution of interim gov-
ernments across the world, Figure 4.1 additionally plots these governments on a
map that shows how interim governments are chiefly an African and Asian phe-
32Because I do not include any interim governments that enter my study already in place
in 1989, I circumvent the issue of left truncation.
33I argued in Chapter 1 that I understand interim governments as institutions that terminate
in elections. The only exception I make in my data set is Sudan’s interim government that
ended in a popular referendum in 2011, and that I keep in my sample because of its influence in
the qualitative debate on power-sharing interim government (e.g. Johnson, 2008; Zambakari,
2013). I run a robustness check in which I exclude the case from the sample. If an interim
government convened between 1989 and 2012 but did not hold elections by December 2012;
or if it convened but did not hold elections within 15 years, I drop a respective case from my
sample. This concerns three cases of interim rule: (1) Afghanistan’s 1992 Peshawar Accords
transferred power to an interim council, but elections never took place as the Taliban seized
power in 1996; (2) the May 1993 Memorandum of Settlement for India’s Bodoland conflict
called for an Interim Bodoland Executive Council, but elections scheduled for November 1993
never transpired; and (3) the interim government set up following a military coup in Mali in
2012 only ended in elections in 2013, well after my December 2012 cut-off point.
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Figure 4.1: Map of Interim Governments in the World
Notes: Map based on the data described in this chapter. Countries that experienced
interim governments following intrastate armed conflict are shaded in dark gray.
nomenon, reflecting the predominance of internal conflicts on these continents
(cf. Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015). It is important to note that previ-
ous studies on interim government – as well as more generally on institutions
in war-torn societies – have often used sampling strategies that only consider
institutional configurations negotiated in peace agreements (e.g. Hartzell and
Hoddie, 2003; Jarstad, 2010; Lyons, 2005), while I do not restrict my empir-
ical analysis to this criterion. Firstly, an important empirical argument for
extending my sample beyond cases of peace agreements is that a more inclusive
sampling strategy does not select against some of the four interim government
models as put forward by the Shain and Linz (1995) typology; a typology that
as I have demonstrated in Chapter 2 forms the conceptual basis of most present-
day interim government research. For instance, it is possible to imagine that
restricting my analysis to interim governments after peace agreements would
likely result in a biased sample where power-sharing governments comprised of
the signatory parties to an agreement are over-represented. Secondly, this strat-
egy would also overlook prominent cases of interim government that were not
called for in peace agreements but that have strongly influenced the qualitative
academic debate on the topic, such as the 2001-04 Afghan Interim Authority
(AIA), or the rule of UNTAET in East Timor from 1999 to 2001.
To delineate a sample of interim governments that goes beyond peace agree-
ments, I relied on a number of existing data sets as well as on information
from qualitative data sources. In a first step, I identified all intrastate con-
flict episodes using the Armed Conflict Dataset provided by the Uppsala Con-
flict Data Program (UCDP) and the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), v.
4/2014 (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, et al., 2002; Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015).
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I then coded whether an interim government convened after a case experienced
at least one year of intrastate conflict according to the UCDP/PRIO data,
consulting four existing data sets. Firstly, I referred to the Polity IV Annual
Time-Series Dataset that captures regime patterns and changes in all sovereign
states with a population of over 500,000 inhabitants since 1800. Polity IV also
reports “transition periods,” defined as phases in which new institutions are
planned and implemented (Marshall et al., 2014). Secondly, I relied on the Au-
thoritarian Regimes Dataset that includes a measure for “transitional regimes,”
defined as temporary institutions with the purpose to realize a transition (Hade-
nius and Teorell, 2007; Wahman et al., 2013). Thirdly, I consulted the National
Elections across Democracy and Autocracy Dataset (NELDA) that offers data
on all elections from 1960 to 2006 and that captures if a country was “ruled
by ‘transitional leadership’ tasked with ‘holding elections”’ (Hyde and Marinov,
2012). Fourthly, Jarstad (2010) presents the Post-Accord Elections (PAE) data
set on power-sharing interim rule between the signing of peace accords and first
post-accord elections (1989-2004).
Three aspects explain why it proved insufficient to only rely on these data
sets. Firstly, my theoretical definition of what constitutes as interim government
does not translate one-to-one to the conceptualizations of these data sets that
are often more restrictive in their definition of an interim government. For
instance, I have in Chapter 1 defined interim governments as the institutions
with executive and legislative power between a disintegration of an old regime
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Table 4.1: Sampling and Coding Sources
Source Period
Polity IV Dataset 1989-2014
Authoritarian Regimes Dataset 1989-2010
NELDA Dataset 1989-2006
PAE Dataset 1989-2004
UCDP Conflict Narratives 1989-2014
Africa Yearbook (Afrika Jahrbuch) 1989-2014
Asian Survey 1989-2014
BTI Reports 2003-2014
Freedom House Reports 1998-2014
Economist Intelligence Unit 1996-2014
and first elections. Wahman et al. (2013) however use a further coding rule and
only consider interim governments lasting fewer than three years, which would
inter alia exclude Burundi’s 2000-05 interim government from my sample. The
case of Burundi has yet inspired a vast number of qualitative analyses on power-
sharing interim government in particular (e.g. Curtis, 2007; Lemarchand, 1994).
Figure 4.2, depicting interim government duration by length in years, moreover
shows that it is not unusual for interim governments in war-torn societies to last
longer than three years. Secondly, many of the cited data sets select against some
of Shain and Linz (1995)’s four models of interim government. For instance,
although it is not explicitly stated in their codebook, Hyde and Marinov (2012)
do not include interim periods with high degrees of international authority in
the NELDA data set, such as the rule of UNTAET.
Thirdly, only using information provided by existing data sets does not al-
low me to consider if interim government was really the result of armed con-
flict and meant as an instrument for its resolution. For instance, according to
Hyde and Marinov (2012), Bangladesh has had repeated interim governments
since the early 2000s, and UCDP/PRIO data report an internal conflict in
Bangladesh in 2005-06, thus simply matching these two data sets would have
included Bangladesh as a case of post-conflict interim government in my sample.
But caretaker interim governments are formalized in Bangladesh’s constitution
and appear regularly before elections to create a political environment in which
voting can take place without influence by an outgoing regime. Similarly, Hyde
and Marinov (2012) code an interim government in Thailand in 2006-07, a
period in which Thailand also saw ongoing conflict. But fighting took place be-
tween the government and secessionist insurgents in southern provinces, whereas
the interim government was not put in place to solve this conflict over territory,
but resulted from a coup d’état against then-Prime Minister Shinawatra.
To deal with these issues of ambiguity, I complemented the data taken from
the existing regime data sets with qualitative information to delineate my sam-
ple – and, in a second step, to code my independent variables (cf. below). I used
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sources that are comparable over time and cases. These include, firstly, Ber-
telsmann Transformation Index (BTI) country reports that biannually assess
political transformation in independent countries with a population of over two
million inhabitants since 2003, except consolidated democracies (Bertelsmann
Foundation, 2014). All BTI reports include standardized sections on issues such
as institutional performance, power to govern, and elections. Secondly, Free-
dom House’s “Freedom in the World” country reports compare political rights
and civil liberties in all independent countries and in selected disputed terri-
tories since 1998 and address issues such as the nature of government or the
role of political opposition and civil society (Freedom House, 2014). Thirdly,
conflict narratives that also review the institutions put in place for conflict res-
olution are available for every intrastate conflict reported in the UCDP/PRIO
Armed Conflict Dataset in the UCDP “Conflict Encyclopedia” (Uppsala Conflict
Data Program, 2014). Fourthly, country reports of the Economist Intelligence
Unit (2014) provide detailed accounts on political and economic developments
worldwide since 1996, sometimes on a monthly basis, although reports vary in
frequency across countries and time. Finally, for cases in Sub-Sahara Africa,
I also used the annual Africa Yearbook (“Afrika Jahrbuch” until 2003) that
covers political developments in the region (Mehler et al., 2014); and for cases
in Asia, I relied on the bimonthly academic journal Asian Survey published by
the University of California Press, which covers contemporary politics in South,
Southeast, and East Asia since 1961. Table 4.1 displays that while more in-
formation is available for more recent cases of interim government, all years
in my observation period are covered by several independent sources (“period”
describes the portion of the observation period covered by each source).
4.1.2 Measuring the Dependent Variable
In Chapter 1, I defined my dependent variable by using a negative conceptu-
alization that understands peace as the absence of intrastate conflict after the
termination of interim government. I also discussed that this negative concep-
tualization is common in statistical conflict research, as it is easily measurable
across time and space, does not blur the lines between peace and its causes,
and thus comes with higher conceptual utility and clarity than “thick” con-
ceptual notions of positive peace (cf. Gerring, 1999). Given these theoretical
considerations, I operationalize my dependent variable here following the con-
vention in academic research as the duration of peace between the termination
of interim government until intrastate armed conflict occurs in the post-interim
period. Survival time is measured in days to allow for a maximum amount of
information. Because the bargaining theory framework employed in this disser-
tation focuses on war as a strategic interactions of warring parties (cf. Chapter
3), I measure conflict occurrence on the individual conflict-level, meaning I as-
sess whether the violence in the post-interim period was actually the result of
clashes between those parties that had previously been involved in war. I run a
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robustness check on post-interim violence on the country-level in section 4.2.2.
To identify if and at what time armed conflict occurs in a post-interim pe-
riod, I again rely on the data provided by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict
Dataset. To be included in the data set, a conflict must have surpassed 25
battle-related deaths before the installation of an interim government through
the formal termination of war in a military victory, peace agreement, or inter-
national intervention (cf. Chapter 1). If armed conflict does not occur after
the end of interim government, I right censor the respective case on 31 Decem-
ber 2014. Right censoring represents a particular type of missing data problem
that is common in survival analysis, and observations are right censored when
information about their survival time until an event is incomplete, meaning
that they did not experience the event before the end of an observation period
(cf. section 4.1.5).34 For instance, the case of Liberia is right censored on 31
December 2014, because no armed conflict occurred since the termination of
Liberia’s interim government in November 2005.35 In total, my sample includes
35 interim governments that were followed by armed conflict in the post-interim
period (56.5 percent), as well as 27 interim governments (43.5 percent) that are
right censored on 31 December 2014. In sum, these interim governments are at
risk for 172,380 days in the post-interim period, which I aggregate to 522 unique
yearly spells that represent actual changes in one of my time-varying co-variates
(cf. below and Wucherpfennig et al., 2012).
Assessing my dependent variable using the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict
Dataset comes with advantages and pitfalls. One general problem that the data
set shares with most other conflict data sets is that information on violence is
gathered by evaluating news resources (Kreutz, 2015; Öberg and Sollenberg,
2011), meaning that conflict data sets may in fact not capture intrastate armed
conflict as such, but rather intrastate armed conflict reporting. As a result, the
the UCDP/PRIO data (and every other conflict data set based on news reports)
may portray a biased form of the actual conflict. This bias may include capital
bias (reporting is skewed towards a capital, as more journalists are present in
urban areas), or event size bias (the more victims, the higher the news value of an
event, and the more likely it is that editors agree to publish it, cf. Davenport and
Ball, 2002). In addition, coding conflict data based on news reports is typically
obstructed by the phenomena of issue crowding (prominent international events
34Although not reported in any table, I ran my models also with a right-censoring date of
31 December 2013 as a robustness check. This only changed the coding of the dependent
variable for the case of Libya, and did not affect my results in any way.
35As a special case, the post-interim period of Comoros in 2002 and 2003 is right-censored on
19.12.2003, as the day after, a second interim government following a second peace agreement
convened, before the conflict had re-escalated again to over 25 battle-related deaths. I run a
robustness check excluding this case (and other critical coding decisions) below. In addition,
my data set also includes a number of cases where armed conflict occurs at the time a case
enters the sample. Excluding such cases can bias my results, if armed conflict is explained by
properties of interim government. Because Cox Proportional Hazards (PH) models are yet a
class of survival models only sensitive to the rank of duration values, not to their absolute
value, I code all respective cases with t = 1, a number that corresponds to a duration value
smaller than the smallest one recorded in my sample (cf. Nelson et al., 2007).
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overshadow conflict developments that are then less likely to be reported in
international news media) and issue fatigue (spells of limited conflict reporting
in civil wars of long duration or high intensity, cf. Themnér and Wallensteen,
2014). Chapter 5 offers a more general discussion of validity problems with
statistical data and information coming out of conflict zones.
Despite these drawbacks, the Armed Conflict Dataset has key advantages
over other conflict data collections that are readily available in an electron-
ically accessible format and can be used for statistical analysis (Eck, 2005).
This includes particularly the Correlates of War Project (Sarkees and Wayman,
2010) that only captures civil wars, i.e. intrastate armed conflicts that result
in over 1000 battle-related deaths per calendar year. By considering a casualty
threshold of 25 battle-related deaths, the Armed Conflict Dataset permits a
more nuanced view on conflict, allowing me to analyze the full range of conflict
behavior and to consider conflict intensity as a covariate (Eck, 2005).
4.1.3 Measuring the Independent Variables
Based on my theoretical argument on how interim governments mitigate com-
mitment problems of warring parties, I argued in Chapter 3 for the effects of four
independent variables: the institutional designs of power-sharing (H1) and inter-
national interim government (H2), as well as the reform aspects of integrating
parallel political and military institutions into interim government (H3), and
of allowing unarmed actors to participate in interim reforms (H4). In order
to test these hypotheses, I collected novel information on all four independent
variables, as well as for some control variables (cf. section 4.1.4), based on the
coding rules and sources reported below. More information on coding rules, as
well as a listed overview of the variables included in the data set, is available in
the codebook provided in Table A.2 in Appendix A.36
Power-Sharing Interim Government Firstly, and based on my definition
of power-sharing interim government in Chapter 3, I code such interim govern-
ment as present and with a value of 1 if rebel groups are offered guaranteed
positions in interim executive or legislative. Power-sharing is coded as a binary
variable; and thus all other cases receive the value 0. Given that my sample only
includes 62 actual instances of interim governments, it is unrewarding to have
too few cases in each variable category, and I thus code the revolutionary and
caretaker interim government models of the Shain and Linz (1995) typology as
non-instances of power-sharing. As a result, Liberia’s 2003-05 NTGL worked
under a power-sharing deal and is coded as “1”, while the party of President Aris-
tide boycotted Haiti’s 2004 interim government (“0”). If power-sharing deals
36Especially for early cases and those where little information was available, I relied in
addition to the sources reported below on news reports, case studies (e.g. Cohen, 2007; Curtis,
2007), or policy reports (e.g. Nixon and Hartzell, 2011; Papagianni, 2008). The data set and
R scripts to replicate my analyses are available at <https://github.com/juliastr>.
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change during the rule of an interim government, I consider the design that
exists at the end of interim government. For instance, Burundi’s 2000 Arusha
Peace and Reconciliation Agreement installed an interim government that con-
tinued to fight in armed conflict against the Conseil National Pour la Défense de
la Démocratie – Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie or National Council for
the Defense of Democracy–Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD).
The CNDD-FDD was only integrated into power-sharing interim government
when it signed a ceasefire agreement in 2001.
To code the power-sharing variable, I relied on those sources that I used
to select my sample and that I discussed above, in particular Freedom House’s
“Freedom in the World” country reports and the Bertelsmann Foundation’s BTI
reports. In addition, and for those cases of interim government that followed
negotiated peace agreements, I consulted the Peace Accord Matrix provided by
the University of Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies
(Joshi and Darby, 2013; Joshi, Quinn, et al., 2015). This project offers detailed
information on the implementation time line of accords negotiated between 1989
and 2012 and includes the category “power-sharing transitional government,”
defined as one that guarantees elites of a non-governmental party positions at
the level of cabinet or above, or one in which they receive quotas in the main
branches of government. In my sample, 32 interim governments (51.6 per cent)
include power-sharing provisions for the warring parties.
International Interim Government Following my definition of interna-
tional interim government in Chapter 3, I code such government as present and
with a value of 1 if members of the international community assume political
authority in some or all policy matters during interim rule. International in-
terim rule is also coded as a binary variable; thus, all other cases receive the
value 0. To recall, I outlined in Chapter 2 that past research has often looked
at international interim rule in a strict interpretation following Shain and Linz
(1995) or Doyle (2002). Doyle classifies subtypes of international interim gov-
ernment by separating supervisory, executive, administrative and monitoring
authority, and considers all but monitoring authority as types of international
interim government (cf. Croissant, 2008). In Chapter 3, I then explained that
I prefer a lenient perspective on international interim rule that follows the rea-
soning by Guttieri and Piombo (2007), who argue that most present day interim
governments see large degrees of international influence in decision-making, even
though this input may not be formalized in international administrations. This
perspective on international interim government is also based on the fact that
troops in monitoring UN peacekeeping operations usually tend to assume de
jure or de facto authority over “interim security arrangements” in some or all
parts of a war-torn state (Call and Stanley, 2001).
Based on this discussion, I code three versions of the international interim
government variable. A first version aligns my coding with Doyle (2002) and
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codes all supervisory, executive, and administrative authority as 1; and all other
cases as 0 (I will refer to this as the “strict” version of the variable). A second
version (that I prefer) also includes monitoring peacekeeping missions in the
category of values that are coded with 1 (the “lenient” version). A third version
used in my robustness checks codes international interim government without
any arbitrary conceptual delineations but as a continuous variable and according
to the total number of UN peacekeeping personnel (military observers, police,
and civilians) present in the final year of interim government. To code the
two binary variables, I relied on the classification by Doyle (2002) as a source,
as well as on the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2014) website
that informs about the mandate of all present and past peacekeeping missions.
Its reports include information on whether the tasks of peacekeeping missions
only comprised monitoring activities – such as for the 1993-97 United Nations
Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) – or if operations assumed further tasks
– such as the post-2003 United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). To code the
continuous version of the variable, I relied on the “Providing for Peacekeeping”
data made available by the International Peace Institute (2015). In sum, my
sample includes 13 international interim governments (20.9 per cent) in the
strict version, and 29 cases (46.8 per cent) of such government in the lenient
version. The continuous version of the variable ranges from zero international
staff deployed during the interim period (such as during South Africa’s 1993-94
transition) to 18.296 members of UN peacekeeping personnel deployed in the
final year of the DRC’s interim period (cf. Table A.3 in Appendix A).
Integrating Parallel Institutions Thirdly, and following my conceptualiza-
tion of the integration of parallel political and military institutions in Chapter
3, I code such integration as an ordinal variable receiving the values 2, 1, and
0. Integration is fully achieved and coded with a value of 2 if warring parties
abolished both parallel political institutions, such as a shadow governments,
and disarmed and demobilized before the end of interim government. Integra-
tion is partially achieved and coded with a value of 1 if either one of the two
institutional areas is integrated into the authority of an interim government.
All other cases receive a 0. For instance, and as I noted in Chapter 3, by the
time of the 1994 elections in El Salvador, the interim government had restored
almost 100 percent of mayors and judges in former zones of rebel control, and
had completed disarming and demobilizing ex-combatants (Stanley, 2007). The
case is thus coded as 1. The authority of Afghanistan’s AIA did yet not extend
much beyond Kabul, and a voluntary DDR program had only been initiated in
2003 and was not finalized with the 2004 elections (Bertelsmann Foundation,
2006). Afghanistan is thus coded as 0.
I assess the integration of parallel institutions into the authority of an in-
terim government on an ordinal scale that combines the integration of political
and military institutions into a single variable and measures the overall state
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics (1)
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Power-Sharing IG 522 0.494 0.500 0.000 1.000
International IG 522 0.538 0.499 0.000 1.000
Parallel Institutions 522 1.320 0.714 0.000 2.000
Participation 522 1.433 0.736 0.000 2.000
Ethnic Conflict 522 0.387 0.488 0.000 1.000
Incompatibility 522 1.703 0.457 1.000 2.000
Conflict Intensity 522 0.523 0.500 0.000 1.000
GDP per Capita 506 5,588.569 5,021.162 267.598 22,965.310
Population Size 522 29,612,268 53,874,004 575,428 254,454,778
Notes: The lenient, binary version of the international interim government variable is re-
ported. For descriptive statistics of all other coding versions and additional control variables,
see Table A.3 in Appendix A. For a correlation matrix, see Table A.4 in Appendix A.
of monopolization by an interim government, but I fit political and military
integration separately as a robustness check in section 4.2.2.37 To code whether
interim governments integrated the parallel political and military institutions
of warring parties, I relied on the sources I used to delineate my sample, in
particular the Bertelsmann Foundation (2014) BTI reports. In addition, and in
order to assess the state of military integration, I used the above-quoted Uni-
versity of Notre Dame’s Peace Accord Matrix that offers detailed accounts on
the timeline of realization of DDR programs after peace agreements (Joshi and
Darby, 2013; Joshi, Quinn, et al., 2015). I also relied on case studies published
by the Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) (Bryden
and Scherrer, 2012). In sum, my sample includes 16 cases of full integration
of parallel institutions (25.8 per cent), and 19 cases where parallel institutions
were partially integrated into interim rule (30.6 per cent).
The Participation of Unarmed Actors Fourthly, and following my def-
inition of the participation of unarmed actors in interim decision-making as
laid out in Chapter 3, I code such participation as an ordinal variable receiving
the values 2, 1 and 0. The variable is coded with the value of 2 if an interim
government includes institutional posts that allow for the participation of civil
society and/or political parties in decision-making processes, such as the afore-
mentioned Liberian NTGL that allocated seats in the parliament to civil society
leaders. The variable is coded with the value of 1 if the interim government al-
lows for ad hoc participation of civil society and unarmed opposition parties,
for instance in one-time, topic-specific events such as in Sierra Leone. During
37In my main analysis, I do not fit the categorical variable parallel institutions in the software
environment R’s factor data format (that lets me interpret each distinct variable value with
regard to a reference category), but treat the variable as continuous, because I am interested
in a continuous interpretation of its effects (cf. the formulation of my hypothesis in Chapter
3, “the more advanced the process of integration, the higher the stability of peace”). I run a
robustness check with the variable fitted in a factor data format in Table A.5 in Appendix A,
which does not change the interpretation of my results.
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the rule of the Sierra Leonean interim government, “politicians, former com-
batants, and civil society representatives joined together ... and approved a
new electoral system for polls scheduled for May 2002” in a national conference
(Freedom House, 2002b). All other cases are coded as 0, such as Haiti, where
one of the weaknesses of the post-2004 interim government was reportedly “its
complete neglect of the civil society within the formulation and implementation
of its policy” (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2008a).38
Some critique may be warranted that this coding rule (and the theoretical
conceptualization of civil society and political party participation that under-
lies this coding) represents a very liberal interpretation of what constitutes as
“participation.” For instance, my coding does not account for whether political
parties or civil society actually had a meaningful voice in decision-making, or
whether their participation was only pro forma – such as to please international
donors – while in reality, unarmed actors were intimidated by the warring par-
ties or threatened to cast their vote for a certain policy. Similarly, one may
criticize that a one-time, ad hoc participation of unarmed actors does not fully
capture the concept of participation; or that the inclusion of civil society and
political parties in interim government institutions may actually be harmful
for their theoretical role of creating domestic audience costs as hypothesized in
Chapter 3. These aspects would make my coding result in ineffective measures
of unarmed actor participation during interim rule.
While these are valuable points of critique that highlight the difficulties in
portraying the world in binary or ordinal variables, my choice to capture the
participation of unarmed actors in the way outlined above is driven by concerns
of reliability. A coding rule that asks if an interim government consults at least
once with unarmed actors; or if these actors received actual seats in interim
institutions can more easily be replicated by other researchers than a rule ask-
ing if an interim government, for instance, included meaningful participation
of civil society and political parties, as the latter rule is much more subject to
the perception of the individual researcher. In addition, particularly for early
instances of interim government, it was often difficult to find detailed informa-
tion on the role of unarmed actors during interim rule (cf. Chapter 5), so my
approach is also driven by data availability. The mixed-method research design
adopted in this study provides a remedy for the limitations of this coding rule,
as it allows me to analyze unarmed actor participation in interim rule in a more
nuanced way in subsequent case studies. In sum, 27 interim governments (43.5
per cent) include institutionalized participatory structures and 17 governments
(27.4 per cent) implemented ad hoc structures.
38As with the variable measuring the integration of parallel institutions, I treat the partic-
ipation variable as continuous. A robustness check with the variable fitted in a factor data
format in Table A.5 in Appendix A does not change the interpretation of my results.
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4.1.4 Measuring the Control Variables
A number of other factors, in addition to properties of interim government, can
affect commitment problems of warring parties and thus explain the stability
of post-interim peace. The existing literature has particularly argued for the
role of several characteristics of (1) a foregoing intrastate armed conflict, (2)
a previous regime, and (3) the post-interim period; and one may additionally
argue that (4) other aspects of interim governments than the ones captured by
my independent variables affect the stability of post-interim peace. In my main
analysis – and thus also in the subsequent discussion of this section – I follow
Achen (2005) and Clarke (2005) who caution against over-specified “garbage
can” regression models with too many controls, and I thus focus on five key
control variables belonging to these four categories just listed; control variables
that have been proposed as important by the vast majority of recent literature.
In my robustness checks in section 4.2.2, I fit further sets of controls that I
explain “on the go” and list in the codebook in Appendix A.
Firstly, many scholars reason that ethnic conflict is less conducive for stable
peace in the aftermath of war as compared to intrastate conflict over non-ethnic
issues. In ethnic conflicts, rebel groups typically fight in the name of a specific,
previously marginalized ethnic group or a coalition of several ethnic groups.
This impedes the chances for peace because violence exacerbated by ethnic
divisions makes peaceful coexistence unlikely if minorities do not receive credible
guarantees that they will not be marginalized in future politics (Doyle and
Sambanis, 2000; Lake and Rothchild, 1996; Wucherpfennig et al., 2012). To
capture the ethnic conflict control variable, I rely on previously collected data
by Walter (2004) and Kreutz (2010), who code all cases as conflict over ethnicity
and with a value of 1 where “combatants broke down along ethnic lines, or a
faction defined itself as a separate ethnic group” (Walter, 2004, p. 376), such as
in Burundi’s civil war between ethnic Hutus and Tutsis (Kuperman, 2015). All
other cases are coded as 0. In my sample, 31 interim governments (or exactly
50 per cent) follow periods of conflict over ethnicity.
Secondly, intrastate conflict over territorial issues has been found to result in
more stable peace as compared to conflict over government, for instance because
a government may be more willing to bargain and make concessions to a rebel
group if the fight concerns not the entire national territory, but only smaller
parts of it (Flores and Nooruddin, 2012; Svensson, 2009). I understand conflict
over government as one with an incompatibility “concerning type of political
system, the replacement of the central government or the change of its compo-
sition,” while a conflict over territory includes an incompatibility “concerning
the status of a specified territory,” such as secession or autonomy (Uppsala Con-
flict Data Program, 2015a). To capture the variable conflict incompatibility, I
use the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset that codes territorial conflicts
as 1 and government conflicts as 2 (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, et al., 2002; Pet-
tersson and Wallensteen, 2015). In my sample, 49 interim governments follow
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governmental conflicts, while 13 follow territorial conflicts.
Thirdly, past research argues that conflict intensity affects the stability of
peace, because intrastate conflicts that result in more battle-related deaths re-
duce the parties’ ability to reconcile (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Jarstad and
Nilsson, 2008; Mason and Fett, 1996).39 I follow previous studies that have cap-
tured armed conflict intensity as a dichotomous measure (e.g. Reid, 2015) and
include a dummy for conflict intensity in my models that captures if a preced-
ing conflict exceeded 1000 battle-related deaths over the entire conflict period
(“civil wars” coded as 1) or not (0), using data in the UCDP/PRIO Armed
Conflict Dataset. 33 interim governments followed high-intensity civil wars.
Fourthly, qualities of the post-interim period are possible explanations for
post-interim peace. Past research has found the level of economic development
and population size to impact the stability of peace. Low levels of economic
development decrease employment opportunities for young men; and a pool
of impoverished, unemployed men reduces the costs of recruiting for warring
parties (Bigombe et al., 2000; Collier, Elliott, et al., 2003).40 I capture economic
development as the level of GDP per capita in the post-interim period and
log-transform the variable for my models due to a right-skewed distribution.
Robustness checks additionally include a measure of annual GDP per capita
growth as well as infant mortality rate (per 1,000 births) to capture the quality
of post-interim socio-economic livelihoods. In addition, the very definition of
intrastate armed conflict “which classifies armed conflict as a civil war only if
there is a high threshold of deaths, implies that civil wars are more likely to
occur in populous countries” (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006, 514f.), and I thus also
include the logged value of a country’s population size. For all GDP, infant
mortality, and population statistics, I rely on the World Bank (2014)’s World
Development Indicators.
39Others have argued that more severe conflicts with higher numbers of deaths reveal more
private information and thus correlate with a lower risk of renewed violence (Fearon, 1995b).
40Generally, it would also be reasonable to argue that institutional aspects of the post-
interim period, such as the level of democracy or type of electoral system impacts the stability
of peace. Yet, these political variables may be directly affected by properties of the interim
government. For instance, electoral systems (or any other institutional qualities of a post-
interim political system) are likely to be negotiated by those elites that are involved in decision-
making in an interim government. Moreover, and related to a point I formulated in the
introduction, because my definition of interim government includes the criterion that such
governments end in elections, any variable measuring post-interim levels of democracy (a
concept that includes elections as a minimal criterion) would be biased. Thus, all variables
capturing political institutions of the post-interim period are likely to be intervening, instead
of confounding variables, and should thus not be controlled for (King, Keohane, et al., 1994;
Ray, 2003). By definition, a confounding variable is an antecedent factor that correlates with
both predictor and outcome. A variable Z however intervenes in the relationship between
predictor X and outcome Y: For instance, the design of post-interim institutions is likely to
be an intervening variable if it correlates with the stability of peace (Y), but is the result
of a property of interim government (X). This is likely the case if post-interim institutions
are designed, for instance, by parties in power-sharing rule. Controlling for Z may make me
discover intermediate links in the relationship between X and Y, but no confounding factors
that discredits my hypothesis about a link between X and Y (Ray, 2003).
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4.1.5 Estimation Techniques
In my main analysis and in most robustness checks, I use survival analysis to
test how properties of interim governments affect the stability of post-interim
peace (cf. Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2001). Survival analysis has as its central
advantage over other statistical methods for the purpose of my dissertation its
inherent interest to study the duration of time until an event occurs, rather than
whether it happens or not. This means that survival analysis provides clues as
to what makes peace more stable in one case than in the other, even if both
eventually fail – such as 19 years of peace in Mozambique between the end of
the interim government and the recurrence of war, as opposed to a few months
in the DRC. For this reason, Collier, Hoeffler, et al. (2008, p. 466) argue that
survival analysis is the method best suited to study “the distinctive structure
of post-conflict risks or how they evolve as a result of policy choices.”
Specifically, I fit semi-parametric Cox Proportional Hazards (PH) survival
models (Cox, 1972), because my theoretical considerations outlined in Chapter
3 do not predict any specific functional form of the underlying baseline hazard
0(t) – something which parametric models would do (cf. below). This means
that my empirical analysis can focus on how my co-variates shift the underlying
baseline hazard (cf. Wucherpfennig et al., 2012). In their basic form, the hazard
rate i(t) in Cox PH models is defined as
i(t) = 0(t)e
0x (4.1)
where 0(t) again specifies the baseline hazard and 0x depicts the co-
variates included in the regression model and their respective coefficients. The
baseline hazard is defined as the conditional probability of an event at time
t =  , given that the event did not occur at any t <  . For instance, it is the
risk of an onset of violence after one month in the post-interim period given
that conflict did not occur before this point in time. With this specification,
a coefficient K > 0 implies an increase in the hazard rate. This means that
with a positive coefficient, an increase in the associated explanatory variable xk
leads to an increase in the hazard of armed conflict in the post-interim period
and thus to a decrease in the expected stability of post-interim peace. Vice
versa, a negative coefficient K < 0 implies that an increase in the associated
explanatory variable xK leads to a decrease in the hazard of conflict and thus
an increase in the stability of peace.
For two different values of xK – for instance, an interim government i that
has implemented a power-sharing agreement between warring parties and an
interim government j without joint rule between belligerents – the hazard ratio











meaning that mathematically, 0(t) cancels out and stays unspecified. This
is why Cox models are called Proportional Hazards models: Even though the
hazard of seeing an event at time t may vary over time, the hazard in one group is
a constant proportion of the hazard in the other group. Hence, semi-parametric
Cox PH models come with a greater flexibility as compared to parametric sur-
vival models that make assumptions about the hazard. Weibull regression mod-
els assume that 0(t) is monotonic, and either decreasing or increasing over time.
Exponential models, representing a special form of Weibull regression models,
assume that 0(t) is constant. In sum, at two times t1 and t2 with t1 < t2, the







To illustrate this by using an example from this dissertation, although the
hazard of intrastate armed conflict in the post-interim period may be higher
right after an interim government ends (t1) than long way down the road when
war-torn societies stabilize (t2), the Cox PH models assumes that the hazard of
power-sharing interim governments to be followed by armed conflict is a constant
proportion of the hazard of interim governments without power-sharing deals.
As this is a strong assumption to be made, section 4.2.2 runs model diagnostics
that assess whether the proportional hazards assumption holds for my variables.
4.2 Results and Discussion
4.2.1 Regression Results: Main Analysis
To evaluate the hypothesized relationships of Chapter 3, I now explore the effect
of my predictor variables across several specifications of Cox PH models. Table
4.3 presents the results for four of such models. I estimate all models using
clustered standard errors on the country level to account for possible interde-
pendence, meaning that I assume that repeated cases of interim government
within one country are not independent of each other (such as interim rule
in Liberia in the 1990s, and in 2003-05). Model 1 reports a baseline model
that provides a test for the perspective of the previous literature on interim
governments that I reviewed in Chapter 2, and thus only fits the independent
variables measuring the institutional designs of power-sharing and international
interim government. This serves to illustrate the precise relationship between
my independent variables and post-interim peace and to make sure that adding
control variables does not arbitrarily change coefficient signs. Model 2 repeats
this exercise but additionally includes measures of the reform aspects in interim
governments that serve to evaluate my Hypotheses H3 and H4 on the integra-
tion of parallel institutions and the participation of unarmed actors. I again do
not include control variables in this model in order to present initial evidence of
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the relationship between all properties of interim government and the stability
of post-interim peace. Models 3 and 4 are then fully specified including all five
control variables described in section 4.1.
The broad story that these models tell – and that robustness checks con-
firm below – is that interim governments matter for long-term peace, but that
reform aspects come with higher explanatory power than the institutional de-
signs of such governments. Firstly, and following past research, I have argued
in Hypothesis H1 that power-sharing interim government, as opposed to any
other interim government, increases the stability of peace. I have reasoned
based on the existing literature that power-sharing can be expected to mitigate
commitment problems by reducing uncertainty for the weaker-growing party in
the bargaining situation concerning the future behavior of the stronger-growing
party. I have yet also cast my doubts on this predominant approach in the exist-
ing literature, and I have argued that the terminable nature of interim govern-
ment institutions introduces a logical inconsistency to the idea that short-term
power-sharing reduces uncertainty in the long run. Table 4.3 provides empirical
evidence for my doubts on the effect of power-sharing interim government on
peace, and Hypothesis H1 cannot be supported by the evidence presented in
Table 4.3. In all four models, the coefficient for power-sharing interim govern-
ment is positive (meaning power-sharing rule would actually increase the hazard
of armed conflict in the post-interim period), albeit not statistically significant.
This indicates that power-sharing interim government is not associated with
armed conflict risks in the post-interim period.
The lack of statistical significance for the power-sharing coefficient mirrors
studies that have previously argued that power-sharing in political institutions
is less vital for peace after war than territorial and military power-sharing deals,
for instance because the latter versions of power-sharing represent more credible
signals (Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008). Since power-sharing interim government
was the only variable for which I drew the causal mechanism to peace through
“reducing uncertainty” for the warring parties, my finding may also give initial
evidence that other mechanisms are more vital to mitigate commitment prob-
lems after war. I further scrutinize this finding in my robustness checks below
as well as in my qualitative case analyses in the next chapters.
Secondly, and also following past research, I have argued in Hypothesis H2
that international interim government, as opposed to any other interim gov-
ernment, increases the stability of post-interim peace. I have reasoned based
on the existing literature on international peacekeeping operations that external
actors taking over some or all political authority during interim government mit-
igates commitment problems because it renders defection very costly for warring
parties; thus decreasing the utility of the outcome WR;WG in the bargaining
situation (cf. Figure 3.2 on page 31). I again have cast doubts due to the
terminable nature of interim governments (cf. above). The results reported in
Table 4.3 empirically underline my doubts to some extent. In all four models, I
69
Table 4.3: Cox Proportional Hazard Models (Main Analysis)
Stability of Post-Interim Peace
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Power-Sharing IG 0.0002 0.245 0.099 0.283
(0.346) (0.362) (0.388) (0.400)
International IG  0.467  0.392  0.722  0.820
(0.358) (0.368) (0.461) (0.422)








Conflict Intensity 0.686 1.527
(0.433) (0.440)
ln. GDP/Capita  0.123  0.020
(0.175) (0.194)
ln. Population 0.049 0.004
(0.165) (0.166)
Observations 522 522 506 506
Number of interim gov. 62 62 62 62
Log Likelihood  129.320  106.808  107.631  85.952
Note that *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence level, re-
spectively. Standard errors clustered on country level are reported in parentheses. Coefficient
sizes instead of hazard ratios are reported.
fit the “lenient” version of international interim rule that also codes monitoring
peacekeeping missions with the value of 1 (cf. section 4.1). As expected, inter-
national interim government has a negative effect on the hazard of conflict in
the post-interim period throughout all model specifications and the coefficient
sizes are comparable in substantive terms, but only the coefficients in Model 3
and 4 are statistically significant at the 0.1 and the 0.05 level. Only the results
in Model 3 and 4 thus support findings of the existing statistical literature on
the positive effect of international actors in war-torn societies. In section 4.2.2,
I further scrutinize the effect of international interim government, for instance
by using a more strict definition of such rule that more closely follows the work
of Doyle (2002) and that excludes monitoring peacekeeping missions, and by
testing the continuous coding version of the variable.
Thirdly, I complemented the institutional design approach to studying in-
terim governments as employed by existing research and argued for the effect of
reform features during interim government. More specifically, in Hypothesis H3,
I expected a positive effect of interim governments that integrate the parallel
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Table 4.4: Hazard Ratios (1)
exp(beta) Effect on the Hazard Ratio
Power-Sharing IG 1:327 33% increase, but no significance
International IG 0:441 56 % decrease, but not very robust
Parallel Institutions 0:228 87 % decrease of conflict hazard
Participation 0:297 70 % decrease of conflict hazard
Ethnic Conflict 2:509 150 % increase of conflict hazard
Incompatibility 5:787 479 % increase of conflict hazard
Conflict Intensity 4:603 360 % increase of conflict hazard
GDP per Capita 0:980 2 % decrease, but no significance
Population Size 1:004 <1 % increase, but no significance
Notes: Model 4 was selected as it had the best fit according to the Aikake Information
Criterion (AIC). The AIC balances model parsimony and fit and informs about the predictive
power of models compared to the number of variables included. AIC values for my main
analysis are: Model 1 (262.6405), Model 2 (229.2615), Model 3 (221.6168), Model 4 (189.9042).
political and military institutions on the stability of peace. In Chapter 3, I built
on research regarding non-state actors and their parallel political and military
institutions in post-conflict situations and reasoned that as long as the parallel
political and military institutions persist throughout the interim period, parties
retain the financial resources, popular legitimacy, military infrastructure, and
war-time mindsets to remobilize for war in the post-interim period. The more
advanced the process of integrating such parallel institutions into the author-
ity of an interim government at the end of such government’s rule, the higher
the costs of defection for warring parties and the higher consequently also the
stability of post-interim peace.
The results reported in Table 4.3 strongly support this hypothesis. Table
4.3 shows that more advanced processes of integrating parallel institutions into
an interim government come with a statistically significant and negative ef-
fect on the hazard of conflict in the post-interim period, meaning that such
integration substantially increases the stability of post-interim peace. As the
reported hazard ratios in Table A.6 in Appendix A show (that fits the parallel
institutions variable in factor data format, allowing me to distinguish the effect
of each step in the integration process), the effect of the variable is also pro-
nounced. Interim governments that integrate both parallel political institutions
and completely disarm and demobilize warring parties before their termination
in elections decrease the hazard of armed conflict by 94 per cent compared to
interim government where no integration whatsoever takes place (cf. also Table
4.4). Interim governments that only manage to integrate one type of parallel
institution still decrease the conflict hazard by 79 per cent. This is an impressive
result, and it further underlines the findings of a vast array of qualitative case
studies, for instance on the vital role of disarming and demobilizing warring
parties in the aftermath of war (e.g. Knight and Özerdem, 2004; Muggah, 2005;
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Myrttinen, 2003; Spear, 2002). I disaggregate the variable in section 4.2.2 in
order to test whether the integration of military or of political institutions into
the authority of an interim government is more conducive to peace.
Finally, in Hypothesis H4, I have argued that more advanced opportuni-
ties of participation for unarmed actors in interim government decision-making
increase the stability of post-interim peace, because such participation creates
domestic audience costs that punish parties who renege on previously struck
peaceful bargains (cf. Fearon, 1994). I theorized also that participation through
institutionalized positions in the interim government (e.g. if civil society mem-
bers receive seats in the interim parliament) should have a more pronounced and
positive effect on the stability of post-interim peace than ad hoc participation
of unarmed actors. The empirical results as reported in Table 4.3 as well as in
Table A.5 in Appendix A support my expectations. In Table 4.3, the variable
measuring the participation by unarmed actors has a statistically significant
and negative effect on the hazard of armed conflict in the post-interim period;
an effect that is in substantive terms yet a little smaller than the one for the
integration of parallel institutions.
Table A.5 in Appendix A that fits the participation variable in R’s factor
data format also shows more clearly that the coefficient size is constantly larger
for institutionalized participation, meaning the results also support my expec-
tation that letting unarmed actors participate in the actual interim executive
or legislative has a more pronounced effect than ad hoc participation because
it is a more credible and costly signal for peace. As Table A.6 in Appendix A
visualizes, interim governments that allow for the institutional participation of
unarmed actors decrease the hazard of armed conflict in the post-interim period
by 92 per cent as compared to interim governments where no unarmed actors
are invited to participate in decision-making. In sum, these results support the
general idea as brought forward by Papagianni (2007b) and others that when
studying interim government, it is fruitful to not only look at power relations
between warring party elites, but to also examine how such elites engage with
unarmed societal actors in decision-making processes.
With regard to control variables, several important findings appear in Model
3 and Model 4. As expected, all variables measuring characteristics of the fore-
going armed conflict are strong and robust determinants of the stability of post-
interim peace. Intrastate armed conflicts fought over ethnic issues (such as the
protracted civil wars in Burundi or Bosnia), armed conflicts fought over control-
ling the national government (such as in Liberia or Nepal), as well as conflicts
that result in over 1000 battle-related deaths over the entire conflict period (such
as in Afghanistan or Mozambique) all have a statistically significant, positive
effect on the hazard of conflict in a post-interim period. In other words, ethnic
conflicts, conflicts about government, and conflicts of high intensity decrease the
expected stability of peace in my sample, which is consistent with findings from
past research. As the hazard ratios reported in Table 4.4 show, these effects are
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Figure 4.3: Predicted Survival Functions (1)
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Notes: Dark gray lines mean a property of interim government was present (e.g. power-
sharing deals), light lines plot the survival function for absent properties. The medium
gray line represents the “1” coding for the parallel institutions and participation variables.
also quite pronounced. For instance, ethnic conflicts increase the hazard of vio-
lence in the post-interim period by 150 per cent, as opposed to conflicts where
ethnicity plays no role. This is in line with findings that ethnic nationalism and
mobilization tend to “continue to exist after an often unstable peace [has] been
made” (Cordell and Wolff, 2009, p. 177). The remaining control variables do
not report any statistically significant results.
Figure 4.3 provides a graphical interpretation of my analysis. The upper left
panel plots the predicted survival functions from Model 4 for interim govern-
ments with (dark gray) and without (light gray) power-sharing arrangements.
All other variables are held at their median (for continuous variables) or mode
(for categorical variables). The y-axis depicts the predicted survival rate at
any given day of peace in the post-interim period (on the x-axis). The upper
left panel thereby reiterates the previous insight from Model 4, in that it does
not predict a higher stability of peace for power-sharing governments than for
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interim governments without power-sharing deals for warring parties. The two
curves are almost indistinguishable from each other, meaning that there is no
statistically significant difference in the predicted survival rate.
The other panels repeat this exercise for all additional independent variables.
The upper right panel plots the predicted survival functions from Model 4 for
interim governments with (dark gray) and without (light gray) international
authority. The lines are further apart than those in the power-sharing panel
and this divergence indicates a difference in the predicted survival percentage
for interim governments with and without international actors involved. The
difference in survival probability becomes most obvious for the reform features
of interim governments in the two bottom panels. For instance, the bottom
left panel plots the predicted survival functions based on Model 4 that allow to
differentiate between interim governments that integrate both parallel political
and military institutions (dark gray), either one of (medium gray), or no parallel
institutions whatsoever (light gray). The graph reiterates the prediction of the
model that interim governments integrating both types of parallel institutions
into their authority are followed by much more stable peace in the post-interim
period than interim governments without an implementation of such integration.
For instance, after approximately four years – the usual length of one legislative
period – almost fifty percent of interim governments without an integration of
parallel institutions are at war again, while most of those interim governments
that integrated both types of parallel institutions remain at peace. Results are
similar for the participation of unarmed actors.
4.2.2 Model Diagnostics and Robustness Checks
In addition to the results reported in Table 4.3 for my main analysis, I now
evaluate my models with respect to two diagnostics: (1) influential observations
and (2) proportional hazards. I discuss the proportional hazards assumption in
this section, while I report the test for influential observations in section A.4
in Appendix A due to reasons of parsimony.41 I also test the robustness of my
findings by replicating the above Cox PH models in several ways. The follow-
ing section reports results from (1) sub-setting my original sample in various
ways, (2) recoding independent and dependent variables, and (3) fitting addi-
tional control variables. I also address (4) possible selection bias of properties
of interim government in section 4.2.3. I report further robustness checks, in-
cluding (5) interaction models (cf. Footnote 29 in Chapter 3), (6) additional
recodings of variables, (7) further control variables, and (8) results from frailty
models in Appendix A. Interaction and frailty models – the latter aiming to
account for unobserved heterogeneity if it is impossible to measure all relevant
covariates related to post-interim peace (cf. Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 1999;
Wienke, 2003) – are also only reported in the Appendix because they reveal
41Because none of my main independent variables represent continuous predictors, I do not
report any results that test the linearity assumption of Cox PH models.
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Table 4.5: Schoenfeld Residuals Test
rho () p
Power-Sharing Interim Government 0:122 0:420
International Interim Government -0:285 0:120
Integration of Parallel Institutions 0:406 0:055
Participation of Unarmed Actors 0:126 0:322
Ethnic Conflict 0:249 0:112
Incompatibility 0:120 0:531
Conflict Intensity 0:120 0:405
GDP per Capita -0:208 0:258
Population Size -0:020 0:913
GLOBAL 0:432
no new insight into the relationship between properties of interim government
and stable peace in the post-interim period.42 If anything, the results based
on the frailty models in particular strengthen my confidence in the effect of the
reform aspects of interim governments, while they do not produce statistically
significant results for the institutional design aspects.
The Proportionality Assumption
As their name indicates, Cox PH models rest on the assumption of proportional
hazards, meaning that the hazard of seeing an event in one group is a constant
proportion of the hazard of seeing the event in the other group. I test this
assumption by applying the Schoenfeld (1982) residuals test to Model 4 of Table
4.3 (cf. the notes to Table 4.4). The test – as reported in Table 4.5 – assesses
the null hypothesis that the  coefficient of each co-variate is constant in time,
and gives a column for  (for the Pearson product-moment correlation between
scaled Schoenfeld residuals and the logarithm of time for each of my predictor
variables) as well as a column with p-values. A statistically significant p-value
of less than 0.05 indicates a violation of the proportionality assumption and a
rejection of the null hypothesis. As Table 4.5 shows, none of the variables violate
the proportional hazards assumption, and there is no statistically significant
42In Footnote 29, I argued for interaction effects between the institutional designs of power-
sharing or international interim government and the integration of parallel institutions, and
thus Table A.9 in Appendix A adds interaction terms. In Table A.9, the unique effect of
integrating institutions on the hazard of conflict is not limited to interpreting the coefficient
of the parallel institutions variable, but also depends on the values of the interaction coeffi-
cient and on those of power-sharing and international interim government. This means that
the coefficient of integrating parallel institutions is now interpreted as the unique effect of
integration on the hazard of armed conflict only when power-sharing or international interim
rule equal 0, which allows me to evaluate the effect of integrating institutions in institutional
contexts where parties do not come together in power-sharing deals, or where international
actors are absent, and see if the effect is any different. As Table A.9 shows, the integration of
parallel political and military institutions has a negative and statistically significant effect on
the hazard of armed conflict in interim governments without power-sharing and international
rule. The idea of conditional effects can thus not be supported.
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Table 4.6: Robustness Check I: Sub-setting (1)
National No TA No Coup Critical
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Power-Sharing IG 0.544 0.207 0.340 0.324
(0.433) (0.404) (0.478) (0.409)
International IG  0.819  0.767  0.635  0.883
(0.434) (0.440) (0.466) (0.438)
Parallel Institutions  1.368  1.362  1.776  1.441
(0.370) (0.353) (0.457) (0.369)
Participation  1.258  1.224  1.113  1.217
(0.318) (0.303) (0.339) (0.302)
Ethnic Conflict 0.910 1.093 0.946 0.974
(0.454) (0.465) (0.503) (0.460)
Incompatibility 1.804 1.504 1.378 1.673
(1.221) (0.725) (0.754) (0.720)
Conflict Intensity 1.360 1.565 1.393 1.493
(0.452) (0.449) (0.503) (0.456)
ln. GDP/Capita  0.119 0.028  0.040 0.037
(0.212) (0.193) (0.221) (0.199)
ln. Population 0.092  0.044 0.014  0.013
(0.193) (0.167) (0.185) (0.171)
Observations 434 416 446 464
Number of interim gov. 55 56 53 58
Log Likelihood  78.017  82.125  60.956  80.526
Note that *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence level, re-
spectively. Standard errors clustered on country level are reported in parentheses. Coefficient
sizes instead of hazard ratios are reported.
evidence of non-proportional hazards for my predictors.
Sub-setting the Sample
It makes sense to subset my original sample to address a number of theoretical
concerns. Firstly, my sample of 62 interim governments includes both national
interim governments – such as Liberia’s 2003-05 NTGL – as well as interim
governments that only convened to govern part of a territory, such as the 1996-
98 United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and
Western Sirmium (UNTAES) in Croatia, or Bougainville’s Interim Provincial
Government that convened in 2001 as a result of a territorial conflict between
the government of Papua New Guinea and the Bougainville Revolutionary Army
(BRA). Some have studied such sub-national interim institutions together with
national-level ones (e.g. Caplan, 2005). But it may be plausible to assume
that sub-national interim institutions follow a different causal logic in terms
of how they address commitment problems, for instance they may build more
strongly upon parallel rebel administrations than national governments that
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aim to reestablish control over a territory. Model 1 (“National”) in Table 4.6
reports results of a Cox PH model that tests my hypotheses on a sub-sample of
national-level interim rule only.
Secondly, and addressing a similar concern, my sample of interim govern-
ments includes also six UN transitional administrations that are typically stud-
ied separately from interim governments run by domestic actors in the quali-
tative literature on the topic.43 From the perspective of bargaining theory, it
is also reasonable to assume that UN administrations follow a distinct logic as
compared to interim governments run by domestic elites in terms of how they
address commitment problems, for instance as they may put less effort in al-
lowing for the participation of unarmed actors and focus on establishing basic
levels of security and a monopoly of violence. Addressing this concern, Model
2 (“No TA”) in Table 4.6 reports the results of a Cox PH model that test my
hypotheses on a sub-sample excluding international administrations.
Thirdly, in Hypothesis H3 I argued for the peace-conducive effect of inte-
grating parallel political and military institutions of warring parties into the
authority of an interim government; and the results as reported in Table 4.3
lend strong empirical support to this hypothesis. Integrating parallel institu-
tions requires that such structures exist in the first place, and in coding this
variable, I thus had to first assemble information on whether parties had even
set up parallel political institutions (the use of armed force by an opposition that
is inherent in the concept of intrastate conflict means parallel military struc-
tures must be given by definition). I found information on parallel institutions
to various degrees in all but seven cases (these are coded as 0 in my main anal-
ysis) – but, as Buhaug et al. (2009) note stating a similar concern, these cases
are not a random sub-sample but all represent interim governments that follow
coup d’états. Coups are captured by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset
if they resulted in over 25 battle-related deaths, such as the ousting of Haiti’s
President Aristide in 1991 by military forces that then installed an interim gov-
ernment. To address a possible bias, Model 3 (“No Coup”) in Table 4.6 reports
results that test my hypotheses on a sub-sample excluding interim governments
that followed coup d’états. Information on coup d’états comes from the data
set provided by Powell and Thyne (2011).
Fourthly, during the coding process, I had difficulties fitting the cases of
Bosnia and Mozambique to the overall conceptual framework, because the ne-
gotiated peace agreements in these countries specifically asked rebel groups to
retain parallel political institutions during the interim period. For instance,
the General Peace Agreement for Mozambique states in Protocol V.3 (“Specific
guarantees for the period from the cease-fire to the holding of the elections”)
that in order to provide for a stable interim period, “public administration in
the areas controlled by Renamo shall employ only citizens resident in those ar-
43These are the previously described UNTAC in Cambodia, UNTAET in East Timor, UN-
TAES in Croatia, UNMIK in Kosovo, UNTAG in Namibia, and the international administra-
tion of Bosnia after the Dayton Peace Agreement (cf. Caplan, 2005; Chesterman, 2005b).
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Table 4.7: Robustness Check II: Recoding Variables (1)
Stability of Post-Interim Peace
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Power-Sharing IG 0.117 0.134 0.224 0.369
(0.387) (0.388) (0.415) (0.373)
International IG (lenient)  0.540  1.048
(0.433) (0.410)
International IG (strict)  1.505
(0.575)
International IG (cont.)  0.0001
(0.0001)
Parallel Institutions  1.558  1.524  1.068
(0.356) (0.360) (0.313)
Parallel Pol. Institutions  0.769
(0.470)
Parallel Mil. Institutions  2.812
(0.747)
Participation  1.428  1.082  1.237  1.169
(0.312) (0.274) (0.292) (0.264)
Ethnic Conflict 0.855 0.848 1.104 0.662
(0.445) (0.439) (0.435) (0.411)
Incompatibility 1.750 1.511 1.438 1.281
(0.702) (0.699) (0.715) (0.591)
Conflict Intensity 1.647 1.303 1.882 1.379
(0.450) (0.424) (0.480) (0.402)
ln. GDP/Capita  0.029  0.048  0.074  0.210
(0.204) (0.192) (0.208) (0.198)
ln. Population  0.058 0.063  0.052 0.092
(0.162) (0.174) (0.163) (0.145)
Observations 506 506 506 473
Number of interim gov. 62 62 62 62
Log Likelihood  83.744  87.349  83.557  99.400
Note that *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence level, re-
spectively. Standard errors clustered on country level are reported in parentheses. Coefficient
sizes instead of hazard ratios are reported.
eas, who may be members of Renamo” (United Nations, 1992a) and thus the
rebels continued to control approximately 25 percent of territory (Bekoe, 2005).
Furthermore, I argued above that the case of Sudan represents an exception in
my sample, because the popular vote ending interim government was a refer-
endum for independence, instead of an election; and I also noted difficulties in
coding the first interim government in Comoros. Model 4 (“Critical”) in Table
4.6 thus reports results that test my hypotheses on a sub-sample excluding the
critical cases of Bosnia, Mozambique, Sudan, and Comoros.
The results in Table 4.6 strongly support the findings of my main analysis.
The variable measuring power-sharing interim government continues to come
with a positive coefficient, but misses out on statistical significance at the con-
ventional levels. The variable capturing the presence of an international interim
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Figure 4.4: Predicted Survival Functions (2)
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Notes: Dark gray lines represent interim governments that have integrated parallel polit-
ical or military institutions, light lines plot the survival function for when parallel insti-
tutions have not been integrated.
government reduces the risk of armed conflict in the post-interim period, indi-
cated by the negative coefficient for the variable that is statistically significant
at the 0.05 level in all models but Model 3 that excludes coup d’états, where it is
significant at the 0.1 level. Both the integration of parallel institutions as well as
the participation of unarmed actors in interim decision-making strongly reduce
the hazard of armed conflict in the post-interim period, again indicated by sub-
stantial and statistically significant negative coefficients. Findings for control
variables remain overall similar to those of the main analysis: Ethnic conflict
and conflict intensity are robust predictors of violence in the post-interim pe-
riod, as expected by theory and past research. The variable measuring conflict
incompatibility loses its statistical significance in Model 1 (“National”), which
is likely the result of the few observations of territorial conflict in the reference
category. All other controls remain statistically insignificant.
Recoding Variables
I addressed the value of fitting stricter or more lenient versions of my variables
above (cf. section 4.1). Firstly, I described in section 4.1.3 that I coded different
dichotomous and continues versions of the variable assessing whether an interim
government included degrees of international authority; and I used the lenient
and dichotomous version in my main analysis. Because this lenient coding goes
against some of the qualitative literature that follows the work of Doyle (2002),
Model 1 in Table 4.7 instead fits the strict coding version of the variable, and
Model 2 fits the continuous coding version of international rule.
Secondly, I used the integration of parallel political and military institutions
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to assess the overall state of institutional monopolization by an interim govern-
ment in my main analysis and did not distinguish between political and military
institutions. It is however interesting to evaluate whether it is more important
for the stability of post-interim peace that warring parties disarm and demo-
bilize before an interim government terminates, or that they integrate parallel
political structures into the authority of the interim government. Thus, Model
3 in Table 4.7 fits political and military integration separately.44
Thirdly, I have noted above that because the bargaining theory framework
employed in Chapter 3 focuses on war as a strategic interactions of warring par-
ties, my main analysis measured conflict occurrence on the individual conflict-
level, which means that I assessed whether violence in the post-interim period
was actually the result of clashes between those parties that had previously been
involved in war. This does yet not mean that all armed conflict ceases to exist
in a country. For instance, while intrastate armed conflict between Angola’s
Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola or People’s Movement for the Lib-
eration of Angola (MPLA) and União Nacional para a Independência Total de
Angola or National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) ended
in 2002 following the death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, the MPLA contin-
ued to fight a territorial conflict against insurgents in the Cabinda region. For
that reason, Model 4 in Table 4.7 recodes the dependent variable to assess the
occurrence of post-interim conflict on the country-level.
The results in Table 4.7 again provide support for the findings of my main
analysis, but also shed some new insights. The variable assessing whether or
not warring parties implemented a power-sharing agreement during interim gov-
ernment continues to come with a positive, but not statistically significant co-
efficient. International interim government continues to decrease the risk of
armed conflict, as indicated by the negative coefficient, but the variable is not
robust across model specifications or coding rules. There is some evidence that
the strict version of the variable has a more substantial effect than the lenient
version, as seen in Model 1 in Table 4.7. The variable coefficient yet loses its
significance in the continuous coding version (Model 2) or when parallel political
and military institutions are fit separately (Model 3).
The integration of parallel institutions and the participation of unarmed ac-
tors stay valid predictors for decreased risks of armed conflict in the post-interim
period. Model 3 shows that military integration – i.e. the disarmament and de-
mobilization of warring parties before the termination of interim government –
has a much more substantive effect that integrating parallel political structures.
Hazard ratios – not reported in any table – of 0.06 for the integration of military
institutions and of 0.46 for the integration of political institutions indicate that
the risk of armed conflict in the post-interim period drops by 94 percent when
interim governments perform DDR processes for their termination, but by only
44I also coded a dichotomous version of the participation variable that codes with a value of
1 both instances of ad hoc and of institutional participation of unarmed actors. Fitting this
variable does not change my results, and it is for reasons of brevity not reported in any tables.
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54 percent when they integrate political institutions. This is further reflected in
Figure 4.4 that plots predicted survival functions based on Model 3 in Table 4.7.
The left panel compares interim governments that integrate parallel political in-
stitutions (dark gray) and interim governments that miss out on doing so (light
gray). All other variables are again held at their median or mode. The right
panel repeats this exercise for the integration of military institutions. The y-axis
depicts the predicted survival rate at any given day of peace in the post-interim
period (on the x-axis). The graph reiterates, for instance, that after almost
four years almost thirty percent of interim governments without an integration
of parallel military institutions are at war again, while most of those interim
governments that integrated such institutions remain at peace. This finding
speaks to qualitative research that has called for the timely implementation of
DDR processes during the rule of interim governments and before first elections
are held after war (e.g. Lyons, 2005; Reilly, 2015). It also links to results of
statistical research on the importance of reforming military organizations early
on during peace processes (cf. Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008).
Fitting Additional Control Variables
I now fit several additional control variables. Firstly, and in terms of addi-
tional measures of a foregoing war, in Model 1 of Table 4.8, I add a measure
for conflict duration. Previous studies have found conflicts of longer duration
to have reduced risks of new war, for instance because long conflicts decrease
parties’ prewar uncertainty about an enemy’s capabilities or resolve (Doyle and
Sambanis, 2000; Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008). I capture conflict duration as the
number of weeks since a conflict first became active, using UCDP/PRIO data.
Secondly, and also regarding measures of a foregoing war, in Model 2 of Table
4.8, I add a variable for rebel strength, taken from Cunningham et al. (2013),
because stronger rebels may be able to press a government into making consid-
erable concessions concerning the design of an interim government.
Thirdly, I add measures for democratic experience to Models 3 and 4 in Ta-
ble 4.8. Scholars have argued that a history of democratic rule before conflict
onset is conducive to peace, because past experiences with democracy make it
more likely that elites accept to bargain in a framework of political institutions
instead of fighting on the battlefield (Fortna, 2004b; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007;
Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008). I control for democratic history using the Democ-
racy/Autocracy Dataset (Ulfelder, 2012; Ulfelder and Lustik, 2007). Ulfelder
(2012) defines democracy as a form of government in which citizens freely and
fairly elect and routinely hold accountable their rulers and which meets four
conditions: (1) elected officials make policy, (2) elections are fair and compet-
itive, (3) all adult citizens have equal rights to vote and be voted for, and (4)
civil liberties are protected (codebook of Ulfelder, 2012). He captures history of
democracy as a variable that indicates any occurrence of any episodes of democ-
racy, coded as 1 if a country saw at least one episode of democracy (0 if not),
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Table 4.8: Robustness Check III: Additional Control Variables (1)
Stability of Post-Interim Peace
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Power-Sharing IG 0.269 0.279 0.355 0.269
(0.407) (0.406) (0.406) (0.396)
International IG  0.818  0.809  0.804  0.725
(0.424) (0.451) (0.420) (0.428)
Parallel Institutions  1.482  1.483  1.509  1.564
(0.355) (0.356) (0.356) (0.356)
Participation  1.224  1.215  1.196  1.228
(0.297) (0.295) (0.294) (0.297)
Ethnic Conflict 0.928 0.911 0.814 0.778
(0.448) (0.464) (0.451) (0.441)
Incompatibility 1.756 1.754 1.551 1.590
(0.723) (0.721) (0.752) (0.737)
Conflict Intensity 1.570 1.525 1.438 1.474
(0.471) (0.440) (0.449) (0.444)
ln. GDP/Capita  0.017  0.021  0.006 0.040
(0.194) (0.194) (0.190) (0.187)
ln. Population 0.022 0.002  0.016 0.014









Observations 506 506 506 506
Number of interim gov. 62 62 62 62
Log Likelihood  85.920  85.950  85.505  84.417
Note that *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence level, re-
spectively. Standard errors clustered on country level are reported in parentheses. Coefficient
sizes instead of hazard ratios are reported.
which is the measure added to Model 3. In Model 4, I include a more restrictive
version of this variable that is coded as 1 if a country sustained democracy for
at least five consecutive years in its history.
In Table A.7 (reported in Appendix A), I add further control variables. In
Model 1 to 3, I fit several measures of additional characteristics of interim gov-
ernment. According to previous research, the stability of peace decreases if an
interim government is the result of a peace agreement, because warring parties
retain sufficient resources to attack each other. This creates situations in which
warring parties have difficulties to credibly commit to disarm (Licklider, 1995;
Mason and Fett, 1996; Walter, 2002). I follow Kreutz (2010) and define peace
agreements as pacts concerned with the resolution of the core incompatibility
underpinning a conflict and signed by the key actors engaged in such a con-
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flict. As Kreutz, I capture peace agreement as a dummy variable that indicates
whether an interim government was created in an agreement signed between
the warring parties to an armed conflict (coded as 1) or not (0).
Also the duration of interim government may affect the stability of peace:
During short interim periods, parties should have little time to actively imple-
ment reforms, integrate their parallel political institutions, or disarm and de-
mobilize, thus decreasing the stability of post-interim peace. I capture interim
government duration as the number of weeks an interim government ruled be-
tween the demise of an old regime and first elections using self-collected data.
I log-transform the variable due to a right-skewed distribution. In my sample,
the shortest interim government was Sierra Leone’s 1996 National Provisional
Ruling Council that lasted for 73 days; while the longest interim government
ruled for 3673 days or 10 years in Rwanda, terminating in elections in 2003.
As noted above, my assessment of peace as the dependent variable starts
only after an interim government ends, meaning that if conflict occurs during
interim rule, it is unaccounted for by my dependent variable. This choice is
motivated by my hypotheses H3 and H5 that argue for the effect of integrating
parallel institutions and of allowing for the participation of unarmed actors:
implementing reforms takes time and parties will not let go of parallel struc-
tures on day one of interim government, but only once they believe that an
adversary’s promise not to ambush them is credible. But one may plausibly
argue that violence during interim rule can affect whether and how reforms are
implemented, for instance because parties may refrain from allowing the partic-
ipation of unarmed actors as quick decisions are needed. To address this aspect,
I capture interim violence as a dummy variable that is coded with the value of
1 if conflict over the 25 battle-related deaths threshold occurred during the rule
of an interim government (0 in all other cases).
Finally, in Model 4 of Table A.7, I address a further measure of the quality of
a post-interim period and fit a variable assessing the extent of natural resource
rents (as % of GDP). Natural resources have been argued to imply that rebels
have decreased costs of remobilization, because they have access to fund their
strive through looting resources (Le Billon, 2001b). I capture the variable by
relying on the World Bank (2014)’s World Development Indicators. Further
measures of the quality of socio-economic livelihoods in the post-interim period
– captured through annual per capita GDP growth as well as infant mortality
rates – are reported in Table A.12 in Appendix A.
The results reported in Table 4.8 and A.7 support my previous findings.
The variable assessing the presence of power-sharing interim government is not
associated with hazards of armed conflict in the post-interim period, while in-
ternational interim government, the integration of parallel institutions into an
interim government, as well as the participation of unarmed actors in such
government all decrease the conflict hazard. With the exception of the strict
version of democratic history, all additional control variables in Table 4.8 and
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Table 4.9: Robustness Check IV: (Ordered) Logistic Regressions
Power-Sharing International Parallel Inst. Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ethnic Conflict 0.501  0.069  1.219  0.008
(0.592) (0.635) (0.540) (0.488)
Incompatibility 0.756 0.372  1.440 0.593
(0.815) (0.790) (0.714) (0.655)
Conflict Intensity  0.035 1.267 0.164  0.165
(0.649) (0.627) (0.554) (0.523)
Democratic History 0.611  0.197 0.311 0.610
(0.665) (0.681) (0.566) (0.521)
Peace Agreement 2.150 2.003 0.804 0.450
(0.713) (0.707) (0.617) (0.559)
Constant  3.126  2.612
(1.930) (1.845)
Observations 62 62 62 62
Log Likelihood  35.376  32.849  59.026  65.580
AIC 82.752 77.698
Note that *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence level.
A.7 stay statistically insignificant at conventional levels and do not affect the
statistical influence of any of the other variables included. Model 4 in Table 4.8
yet shows that countries with a history of more than five years of democratic
rule (such as El Salvador) face substantially lower risks of peace breaking down
in the post-interim period. Table A.12 in Appendix B furthermore shows that
while infant mortality rates are not associated with risks of armed conflict in
the post-interim period, the variable measuring annual GDP per capita growth
decreases such risk, and the coefficient is statistically significant at p < 0.05.
4.2.3 Addressing Endogeneity Issues
Do interim governments matter? The analysis presented in this chapter gives
strong evidence that they do; and I particularly demonstrated in the sections
above that reform aspects of interim government play a profound role in predict-
ing the stability of post-interim peace. Nevertheless, a number of studies have
recently considered that institutions and institutional reforms in post-conflict
societies are endogenous (e.g. Fortna, 2003b; Mattes and Savun, 2009; Reynal-
Querol, 2005; Schneider and Wiesehomeier, 2008). For my analysis, this means
that the effects I see for interim governments may be conditioned by the specific
context they appear in: properties of interim governments are not distributed at
random, but are consciously selected by the warring parties who will be directly
affected by such properties, or by their third-party mediators. For instance,
the non-effect of power-sharing interim government in all of my models may be
due to the fact that warring parties agree on power-sharing only in particularly
difficult cases of armed conflict, such as conflicts over ethnic issues or conflicts
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of particularly high intensity. If this is the case, then the non-conducive effect
of power-sharing interim government on peace would rather reflect the unfavor-
able circumstances in which such interim government is selected, rather than
the effect of power-sharing deals as such.
To address this point, I follow previous research designs and proceed in two
steps. Firstly, and heeding the approach to address endogeneity issues in Cox
PH models by Mattes and Savun (2009), Fortna (2008a), or Nilsson (2012), I
estimate several models that predict the presence of properties of interim gov-
ernments based on the armed conflict characteristics that I discussed in section
4.1.4. I also add information on whether interim governments were the result
of a peace agreement and appeared in countries with a history of democracy as
predictor variables to my models. Peace agreements help to capture how the
distribution of bargaining power affected the choice of interim government, and
former democracies may be most likely to allow for civil society and political
party participation during interim rule. In these models, I use logistic regres-
sion to predict the outcome of my binary dependent variables (power-sharing
and international interim government); while I use ordered logistic regression to
predict the integration of parallel institutions and the participation of unarmed
actors that are assessed on ordinal scales (McCullagh, 1980). All previously dis-
cussed variable codings apply, and results are presented in Table 4.9. Secondly,
I then follow the approach by Hultman et al. (2015) and fit all my predictor
variables to limited sub-samples of those variables that have predicted proper-
ties of interim governments to be more or less likely. This allows me to assess
whether the effect of institutional design and reform features is actually different
depending on certain underlying conditions. The results of these four additional
Cox PH models are presented in Table 4.10.
In the four logistic and ordered logistic regression models reported in Table
4.9, a positive coefficient indicates that an independent variable increases the
likelihood of an interim government to include power-sharing between warring
parties (Model 1) or the assumption of authority by international actors (Model
2), respectively the likelihood that such government integrates parallel institu-
tions (Model 3), or that it allows for the participation of unarmed actors (Model
4). The findings reported in Table 4.9 lend support to the notion that properties
of interim government are not distributed at random.
Ethnic conflict and conflict incompatibility have a statistically significant
and negative impact on the integration of parallel political and military in-
stitutions, meaning that in cases of conflict fought over ethnic issues or over
government, warring parties are less likely to integrate parallel structures of au-
thority into an interim government. This may point to the particular dynamics
of an ethnic security dilemma after civil war, as noted in the broader literature
(e.g. Jenne, 2009; Manning, 2004). For instance, following the 1998-99 ethnic
conflict in Kosovo, ethnic Serbs maintained extensive parallel governance struc-
tures that neither the UNMIK international interim government nor Kosovo’s
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Table 4.10: Robustness Check V: Sub-setting (2)
Ethnic Governm. Civil War Accords
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Power-Sharing IG 0.204 0.540 0.158  1.297
(0.607) (0.438) (0.662) (1.012)
International IG  0.011  0.763 0.267  1.333
(0.616) (0.439) (0.680) (0.990)
Parallel Institutions  2.490  1.392  2.833  3.009
(0.768) (0.375) (0.832) (0.958)
Participation  1.655  1.307  1.510  2.858
(0.449) (0.330) (0.534) (0.998)
Incompatibility 0.923 1.000 2.301
(1.075) (0.970) (1.335)
Ethnic Conflict 0.848 0.121 3.321
(0.472) (0.665) (1.280)
Conflict Intensity 1.767 1.485 3.502
(0.657) (0.466) (1.363)
ln. GDP/Capita  0.280  0.079 0.099  1.150
(0.318) (0.213) (0.257) (0.565)
ln. Population  0.323 0.007 0.168  0.420
(0.282) (0.200) (0.275) (0.285)
Observations 200 352 264 322
Number of interim gov. 31 49 33 35
Log Likelihood  37.608  72.896  27.306  20.014
Note that *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence level, re-
spectively. Standard errors clustered on country level are reported in parentheses. Coefficient
sizes instead of hazard ratios are reported.
national authorities have yet been able to integrate. This is particularly so in the
northern exclave Mitrovica, where Serbs retain (inter alia) separate monetary
and healthcare systems. Existing studies have revealed that such parallel struc-
tures are also kept because Serbs feel unsafe visiting hospitals run by Albanian
staff, due to fears of “violence and maltreatment, mutual mistrust and a lack
of inter-ethnic confidence in the quality of care provided by other communities”
(Bloom et al., 2007, p. 431).
Conflict intensity has a statistically significant and positive coefficient in the
model predicting the presence of international interim government, meaning
that external actors are more likely to assume authority in interim periods
following civil wars. This is consistent with previous studies that have found
that the UN only gets involved in the most “difficult” cases of conflict and
deploys its peacekeeping missions predominantly to particularly bloody wars
that the parties are unable to resolve on their own (Fortna, 2008a). Some have
argued that this selection effect explains “why the UN fails” (Touval, 1994). But
while this selection effect may explain why the international interim government
variable has not been a robust predictor of post-interim peace, the fact that the
variable measuring international interim rule still has a negative effect on the
hazard of armed conflict in the post-interim period in several models give some
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validation to the peace-conducive effect of international interim rule.
Finally, while a history of democracy does not predict any properties of
interim government at the conventional levels of statistical significance, the
variable measuring whether or not warring parties decided on interim govern-
ment in a peace agreement predicts the presence of both institutional design
features of interim rule, i.e. the presence of power-sharing and international
rule. This is consistent with my above reflections on the selectivity of power-
sharing interim government as well as with findings from previous studies on
where international actors get involved (Hultman et al., 2015). Furthermore, if
power-sharing is most likely to follow peace agreements, and if peace agreements
make peace after war inherently unstable (Licklider, 1995; Walter, 1997), then
the fact that power-sharing interim government has no statistically significant
effect on post-interim peace may be explained by this selection issue.
Building on these insights, Table 4.10 fits four final Cox PH models on dif-
ferent subsets. Model 1 (“Ethnic”) limits the sample to ethnic conflicts, because
I found parallel institutions are less likely to be integrated after such conflicts;
and Model 2 (“Governm.”) limits the sample to conflicts over government for
the same reason. Model 3 (“Civil War”) limits the sample to civil wars, because
I have found that international interim government is more likely to be present
after conflicts of high intensity. Finally, Model 4 (“Accords”) limits the sample
to interim governments negotiated in peace agreements, because such accords
were strong predictors of power-sharing and international interim government.
Overall, while some of the results for my control variables are now less ro-
bust, the models in Table 4.10 validate the broader story as presented in this
chapter. The variable capturing power-sharing continues to have no statisti-
cal significant effect on the risk of armed conflict in the post-interim period
at conventional levels of statistical significance, except if we only look at the
sample of interim governments that followed peace agreements (Model 4). In
that sample, power-sharing has a statistically significant and negative effect on
the hazard of armed conflict in the post-interim period. This means if we only
compare interim governments that followed peace agreements, those that in-
clude a power-sharing deal between the warring parties increase the stability of
peace. This is thus the only model that confirms hypothesis H1. The effect of
international interim governments on peace remains inconclusive, and as in my
main analysis it is not robust over model specifications. If only governmental
conflicts and interim governments following peace agreements are compared,
international interim government is associated with reduced risks of violence in
the post-interim period. This is not the case for the sub-samples of ethnic con-
flicts and civil wars. This finding can be interpreted as an interaction effect, in
that the effect of international interim government is different following ethnic
conflicts and civil wars. The integration of parallel institutions and the partic-
ipation of unarmed actors in interim decision-making, however, remain strong
and robust predictors of post-interim peace, throughout model specifications
87
Table 4.11: Summary of Evidence: Statistical Analysis
Hypothesis Result
H1: Power-sharing interim govern-
ment, as opposed to any other in-
terim government, increases the sta-
bility of post-interim peace.
Not supported. The coefficient is
not statistically significant at con-
ventional levels, throughout model
specifications. One explanation is
that power-sharing is more likely fol-
lowing peace agreements that leave
both warring parties with sufficient
resources to attack each other.
H2: International interim govern-
ment, as opposed to any other in-
terim government, increases the sta-
bility of post-interim peace.
Weakly supported. International
interim rule decreases risks of conflict
in the post-interim period, but the ef-
fect is not robust. One explanation is
that such interim government is more
likely after intense civil war.
H3: The more advanced the pro-
cess of integrating parallel political
and military institutions into the au-
thority of an interim government, the
higher the stability of post-interim
peace.
Supported. The coefficient is ro-
bustly negative and statistically sig-
nificant throughout model specifica-
tions and independently of the con-
dition it appears in. The integration
of parallel military institutions has
a more pronounced effect on peace
than political integration.
H4: The more advanced the oppor-
tunities of participation for unarmed
actors in interim governments, the
higher the stability of post-interim
peace.
Supported. The coefficient is ro-
bustly negative and statistically sig-
nificant, throughout model specifica-
tions. Institutional participation has
a more pronounced effect than ad hoc
participation.
and independently from the conditions they appear in. To further investigate
the underlying mechanisms between these variables and post-interim peace, the
next Chapter will select case studies for qualitative analysis.
4.3 Chapter Summary
This chapter presented correlational evidence and a first empirical test of the
hypotheses developed in Chapter 3. After introducing my data set and estima-
tion techniques, I discussed the results of several Cox PH models and scrutinized
these results in a number of model diagnostics and robustness checks. In sum,
these tests lend support to the general argument in Chapter 3 that held that
reform aspects of interim government are more important for the long-term sta-
bility of post-interim peace than institutional design aspects. Firstly, the vast
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majority of my models show that in particular power-sharing interim govern-
ment has no statistically significant effect on the hazard of armed conflict in
the post-interim period at conventional levels of statistical significance. this is
however likely the result of a selection effect. I found power-sharing interim
government to be most likely following the signing of a peace agreement, and
the existing literature portrays peace agreements as resulting in rather unsta-
ble peace spells (e.g. Walter, 2009). If only interim governments following the
signing of peace agreements are compared to each other, power-sharing interim
government comes with the hypothesized negative effect on hazards of armed
conflict. I scrutinize the effect of power-sharing interim government on peace
further in my case studies.
Secondly, there is more evidence for the variable measuring the effect of
international interim governments. In most models, the variable assessing the
presence of such interim government comes with a statistically significant and
negative coefficient, meaning that the assumption of authority by international
actors during interim rule decreases the hazard of post-interim violence. This
is even though international actors get engaged in interim governments only in
especially difficult cases, such as after particularly intense civil wars with high
battle-related death counts. This selection issue may explain why the variable
is not overly robust throughout model specifications.
Thirdly, both the integration of parallel political and military institutions
as well as the participation of unarmed actors in interim rule come with sub-
stantive, negative, and statistically significant coefficients, meaning that they
robustly decrease the hazard of armed conflict after interim government has ter-
minated. As my robustness checks have revealed, the effects are most profound
for the integration of military institutions through disarmament and demobiliza-
tion, as well as for institutional (rather than ad hoc) participation of unarmed
actors. Notably, these effects persist and remain comparable in substantive
terms when I fit the variables to subsets of cases aimed at addressing the selec-
tivity of these properties. In that way, my analysis in this chapter lends not only
compelling evidence for my theoretical argument of Chapter 3, but also adds to
the existing literature on parallel political and military institutions after civil
war that is thus far dominated by qualitative case studies (cf. Chapter 10).





In the foregoing Chapter 4, I estimated several Cox PH models that established
profound correlational evidence on the role of interim governments for stable
peace after war. I showed that while there is lesser empirical evidence for the
impact of the institutional designs of interim government, i.e. power-sharing
arrangements between warring parties and international authority during in-
terim rule, reform aspects of interim rule are substantive and robust predictors
of stable peace in the post-interim period. More specifically, whether interim
governments integrate the parallel political and military institutions of warring
parties into their authority, and whether they allow for the participation of un-
armed actors in reform processes, significantly decreases risks of armed conflict
in the post-interim period. This chapter complements my statistical analysis by
outlining a research design for qualitative case studies. It proceeds in four steps.
In section 5.1, I motivate the necessity of case studies for the purpose of this
dissertation by discussing the limitations of my statistical analysis. In section
5.2, I discuss my strategy of selecting cases according to a most-similar system
design and by using matching techniques. This selection strategy results in (1)
Nepal’s 2006-08 interim government, (2) Angola’s 1991-92 interim government,
and (3) Cambodia’s 1991-93 interim government as cases under analysis. I also
present the qualitative research design, discuss the methodology of within- and
in-between case analysis, and give an overview of the sources that underlie my
qualitative analysis. Finally, in section 5.3, I discuss my empirical fieldwork in
Nepal in the fall of 2015; outlining methods, sources, as well as some reflections
on fieldwork in post-disaster situations.
5.1 Limitations of the Statistical Analysis
In Chapter 4, I achieved two central goals of this dissertation that help to
better understand the role of interim governments for stable peace after war.
Firstly, and based on my theoretical framework of Chapter 3, I identified those
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Notes: Graph based on the results of Table 4.3 on page 62. The dots display coefficient
sizes, the whiskers span the 95 per cent confidence interval.
properties of interim government that are particularly relevant for the stability
of peace across all cases under analysis. In that regard, I added to existing
research on interim governments that has been conceptually and empirically
limited by focusing exclusively on the institutional designs of power-sharing
and international interim authority (cf. Chapter 2). Secondly, I was able to
establish that my statistical results are robust across model specifications; and
I confirmed that my models meet the underlying assumptions of Cox PH models.
At the same time, Chapter 4 was unable to achieve a third objective of this
dissertation: My inferences based on Cox PH models are inapt to confirm the
precise causal mechanisms by which properties of interim government link to
stable peace in the post-interim period – “the pathway or process” by which
peace comes into being (Gerring, 2008, p. 161). This relates to what Shadish et
al. (2002) have termed problems of internal validity of statistical research. For
instance, in Chapter 3, I argued that integrating parallel military institutions
into the authority of an interim government mitigates commitment problems
of weaker-growing parties in the long run, because it increases their costs of
remobilization by disentangling hierarchical relationships within military orga-
nizations. My analysis in Chapter 4 lends strong correlative support to the em-
pirical relationship between integrating parallel military structures and reduced
risks of post-interim conflict, but it cannot test any assumed causality. This is
because none of the intervening steps in the process – such as the dissolution of
hierarchical command structures – are observed.
In addition, the inability to test any underlying causal mechanisms between
independent and dependent variables also relates to issues of construct (Shadish
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et al., 2002) or concept validity (George and Bennett, 2005). By this I mean
the “validity of inferences about the higher order constructs that represent sam-
pling particulars” (Shadish et al., 2002, p. 38). As George and Bennett (2005,
p. 19) argue, quantitative research does often not allow to assess “the indicators
that best represent the theoretical concepts the researcher intends to measure,”
because many social sciences variables are “notoriously difficult” to assess (cf.
also Ahram, 2013). This is not least due to the quality of statistical data that
is impaired by difficulties in obtaining precise information from conflict zones,
a topic that I have addressed in Chapter 1 for the operationalization of post-
interim peace. But construct validity does not only become an issue with regard
to the statistical measurement of peace. In Figure 5.1, I present a graphical in-
terpretation of my Cox PH models from Table 4.3. The dots represent the
estimated coefficients of each variable in the four models, the whiskers span
the 95 per cent confidence interval. Figure 5.1 shows that many variables in
my models have large standard errors, represented through wide whisker spans
particularly of the variable measuring conflict incompatibility. This can mean
that they are inefficient measures (cf. Menard, 2002), which “in themselves do
not devalidate the model” (Grobbel, 2009, p. 189), but which may not truly
represent the underlying theoretical concepts at large. I discussed this issue for
the participation variable in Chapter 4 in particular.
5.2 Research Design
5.2.1 Case Selection Strategy
To address these validity concerns of statistical research, I complement my anal-
ysis of Chapter 4 with three qualitative and comparative case studies that are se-
lected according to a most-similar system design (cf. George and Bennett, 2005;
Lijphart, 1975; Przeworski and Teune, 1970; Seawright and Gerring, 2008).
Following Gerring (2004, p. 342), I understand a case as “a spatially bounded
phenomenon” that is “observed at a single point in time or over some delimited
period of time”, and a case study as an intensive study of this phenomenon
with the goal of understanding a larger class of comparable phenomena. Given
these definitions – and inherently linked to Mill (2002)’s “method of differ-
ence”, Lijphart (1975)’s “comparative method”, as well as George and Bennett
(2005)’s “controlled comparison” – selecting cases according to a most similar
system design means that I select cases that are similar on a large number of
important explanatory variables except the explanatory variables of interest.
Consequently, any set of variables that are similar in the cases are irrelevant in
determining the outcome, because different outcomes are observed among cases
that share these variables. Any set of variables differentiating these cases can
be considered as explaining distinct outcomes, such as post-interim peace and
the absence thereof (Przeworski and Teune, 1970). I use such a most similar
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system design for my between-case analysis not least because this approach to
case selection has been identified as one of the most useful strategies for theory-
and model-testing in mixed-method research designs (Gerring, 2004).
To implement a most similar system design and arrive at a selected group
of cases, I use statistical matching techniques (cf. Tarrow, 2010).45 Match-
ing techniques have become increasingly popular in statistical observational or
quasi-experimental research designs (notable examples include Arceneaux et al.,
2006; Ho et al., 2007). For qualitative research, matching has recently been iden-
tified as “an approach to purposeful case selection in large-n studies with the
goal of finding comparable unites within a data set” (Nielsen, 2014, p. 7). It has
in this regard been recognized as the “most useful statistical tool for identify-
ing cases for in-depth analysis in a most similar setting,” also because matching
means that case selection is more transparent and replicable than selecting cases
by hand (Gerring, 2006, p. 134). Having said that, matching does come with
similar practical research issues as if one would select cases by hand. Firstly,
exact matching of control variables is often impossible, especially if the variable
that is to be similar is not binary but continuous. In such instances, cases are
selected in order “to maximize the variance of the independent variables and
to minimize the variance of the control variables” (Lijphart, 1975, p. 164), so
that cases from the control group approximate or are “close enough” to those
of the treatment group (Seawright and Gerring, 2008, p. 305). Secondly, it is
wise to restrict one’s analysis to “the key variables and omitting those of only
marginal importance” (Lijphart, 1975, p. 159), because it can have negative
consequences to condition on control variables that are not actual confounders,
since matching on these controls reduces the similarity on actual confounding
variables (Nielsen, 2014).
Bearing in mind these issues and heeding Lijphart’s advice to focus on the
most important confounders for case selection, I started by matching cases to
be similar according to the three control variables from my Cox PH models
of Chapter 4 that have robust statistically significant effects on the stability
of peace. These are (1) ethnic issue, or whether warring parties broke down
along ethnic lines; (2) conflict intensity, or whether a foregoing armed conflict
reached the level of a civil war with over 1000 battle-related deaths; and (3)
incompatibility, or whether conflict was fought over controlling a government or
a territory (cf. the coding rules listed in section 4.1). But because all three
control variables are coded following binary schemes, matching produced a high
number of most similar case groups, and I thus also introduced the statistically
non-significant controls to the matching equation, while weighting those three
control variables with statistically significant effects.46
45Practically, this means I employ the software environment R’s caseMatch package to
match cases (Appendix A, Nielsen, 2014). By default, caseMatch matches cases according to
an approximate matching technique that minimizes their pairwise Mahalanobis distance – a
scale-invariant distance metric – in order to ensure that a selected pair of cases is as similar
as the data allow (cf. Gerring, 2006).
46To recall, the non-significant control variables or those that are not robust across model
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In addition to minimizing the variance on control variables while maximizing
the variance on independent variables, I require three practical research issues
from the selected pair of cases, in order to address issues similar to those that
have been identified for random case selection (Seawright and Gerring, 2008).
Firstly, I demand that interim governments selected for case studies ruled for at
least six months. This choice is implemented to ensure that a sufficient amount
of case-specific literature exists, and that interview respondents during empirical
fieldwork recall the course of a respective interim government (cf. section 5.3 and
Eck, 2011). The decision should not result in a bias in that I select particularly
successful or unsuccessful cases of interim government, because my statistical
analysis in Chapter 4 has demonstrated that the duration of an interim period
has no statistically significant effect on the stability of peace, and the substantive
effect is also comparatively small. Secondly, I select cases from distinct world
regions – which “still constitutes the exception to the rule” when analyzing
polities in the Global South – because I expect this to further validate my
findings by ensuring that no cultural factors underlie the stability of post-interim
peace, thus permitting me to test “the universal character” of my theory and
concepts (Basedau and Köllner, 2007, p. 112). Thirdly, I demand that at least
one case is suitable for fieldwork in 2015 in terms of security and language
issues. This case selection strategy is common in the sub-discipline of peace and
conflict research, where data gathering is often risky for both the researcher and
her informants (Brounéus, 2011; Höglund, 2011). For instance, I opted against
matched groups of cases such as Afghanistan, Libya, and Liberia, due to travel
warnings for ongoing violence or the prevalence of the Ebola virus at the time
I implemented my case selection in December 2014 (but see my discussion on
Nepal in section 5.3).
5.2.2 Introducing the Cases
This case selection strategy resulted in the matched group of (1) Nepal’s 2006-
08 interim government, (2) Angola’s 1991-92 interim government, as well as (3)
Cambodia’s 1991-93 interim government as cases under analysis. In Nepal, the
decade-long “People’s War” between the insurgents of the Communist Party of
Nepal (Maoist) (CPN (M)) and the national government escalated when King
Gyanendra ascended the throne following a massacre of Nepal’s royal family
in June 2001. Unlike his deceased brother King Birendra – who had refused
to deploy the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) internally and to fight the Maoist
insurgency – Gyanendra had no such reservations. Consequently, the number
of battle-related deaths exploded between 2002 and 2005. Gyanendra also dis-
specifications include conflict duration, democratic history, peace agreements, interim govern-
ment duration, GDP per capita in the post-interim period, natural resource rents, as well as
population size (cf section 4.1). I also matched according to whether the interim government
was established in a coup d’état, and if such government was installed at the national or
sub-national level. Because the caseMatch package does not allow matching time-series data,
I used the value of the first post-interim year for all time-dependent variables in the data set.
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solved the parliament and dismissed the Prime Minister in order to consolidate
his power. This move united the political parties and the Maoists who signed
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in November 2006 and decided on
implementing an interim government. This government was characterized by
strong power-sharing provisions for the Maoist rebels, as well as by the sub-
stantial participation of civil society and political parties in interim decision-
making. The CPN (M) also formally abandoned its parallel political structures
– the “People’s Courts” and “People’s Governments” – upon joining the in-
terim institutions and completed cantonment and disarmament, although the
demobilization of its troops was stalled. Nepal’s interim government thereby
saw almost no international authority, as the small United Nations Mission in
Nepal (UNMIN) was under the control of the United Nations Department of
Political Affairs (UNDPA), not the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping
Operations (DPKO). Following the termination of interim government in April
2008, no armed conflict has been observed in Nepal.
In Angola, the two former liberation movements Movimento Popular de Lib-
ertação de Angola or People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)
and União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola or National Union
for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) had been at war ever since the
country’s independence from Portugal in 1975. Peace talks only became possi-
ble when the end of the Cold War put a halt to financial and ideological support
to the warring parties by the superpowers. In May 1991, the MPLA government
and UNITA insurgents signed the Bicesse Agreement, in which they decided on
the rule of an interim government and on holding national elections in Septem-
ber 1992. The interim government did not include any power-sharing provisions
for UNITA but represented a caretaker interim government controlled by the
MPLA alone; and it also did not foresee any participation of unarmed actors
in decision-making. The warring parties invited the UN to monitor the interim
period and the elections, and the Security Council consequently authorized the
deployment of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I).
UNITA initially agreed to integrate its parallel political structures – the Terras
Libres de Angola – and to disarm and demobilize before the end of the interim
period, but the interim government failed to implement either of the two re-
forms. Following the termination of interim rule with a MPLA victory in the
1992 elections, UNITA remobilized and a high-intensity civil war endured in
Angola until UNITA’s leader Savimbi was killed in battle in 2002.
Cambodia’s civil war started when neighboring Vietnam invaded in Jan-
uary 1979 to overthrow the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) or “Khmer
Rouge,” which had led one of the most brutal regimes in history in the years
before. Forcing the PDK to flee to the Thai border, Vietnam installed the Peo-
ple’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) in Phnom Penh, a puppet regime that was
subsequently fought by three rebel factions: Pol Pot’s communist PDK, Prince
Sihanouk’s royalist Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre,
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Pacifique et Coopératif or National United Front for an Independent, Neutral,
Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), and Son Sann’s republi-
can Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF). The end of the Cold
War also enabled an intensification of peace negotiations in Cambodia, and in
October 1991 the warring parties signed the Paris Agreements and agreed on
the formation of an interim government. This interim government combined the
rule of the power-sharing Supreme National Council (SNC) – where each faction
was represented – with unprecedented degrees of international authority through
the deployment of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UN-
TAC). Unarmed actors were excluded from any interim decision-making. The
warring parties also neither negotiated nor implemented the integration of par-
allel political or military structures during the rule of the interim government.
Following the end of the interim period in May 1993, the PDK fought a low-level
armed conflict against the elected government.
Table 5.1 gives an overview of the variable values of the cases and shows that
they are similar on all statistically significant control variables and on almost all
other control variables, while they differ in their respective properties of interim
governments (as well as in their outcome). Most importantly, Nepal, Angola,
and Cambodia share that they experienced conflicts fought over the incompati-
bility of controlling the national government, but not over an ethnic issue, and
all three conflicts were civil wars that resulted in over 1000 battle-related deaths
over the entire conflict period – the three most robust and substantive control
variables to determine the stability of peace.
Having said that, Table 5.1 also demonstrates the issue of construct valid-
ity with statistical variables as mentioned above. For instance, while the civil
wars of Nepal, Angola, and Cambodia are all considered non-ethnic conflicts in
the statistical literature and according to the data provided by Walter (2004)
and Kreutz (2010) that I depend on, the respective case literature strongly dis-
agrees with this crude approximation of conflict dynamics. In Nepal, the Maoist
insurgents of the CPN (M) recruited particularly among excluded ethnic and
social groups, such as the Tharu and Madhesi communities in the southern
Tarai plains or the Dalit “untouchables” in the caste system (Lawoti, 2012;
Lecomte-Tilouine, 2011). In Angola, while UNITA’s strive started out as a
Maoist insurgency against the MPLA government – Jonas Savimbi even copied
Mao Zedong’s “Long March” that would come to represent a significant event
in UNITA’s history – the rebels mobilized particularly from Savimbi’s Ovim-
bundu ethnic group (Heywood, 1989). And in Cambodia, the PDK often pri-
marily attacked ethnic Vietnamese, while the ruling PRK regime was installed
and backed by Vietnam (Chandler, 2009). The ethnic conflict variable in my
statistical models may thus represent an inefficient measure, and it accordingly
comes with large standard errors as displayed in Figure 5.1.
In that way, Table 5.1 also shows the merit of the three cases with regard
to addressing issues of construct validity for my binary independent variables,
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Table 5.1: Matching Nepal, Angola and Cambodia
Variable Nepal Angola Cambodia
Statistically Significant and Robust Control Variables
Ethnic Conflict No, but underlying ethnic
issue (CPN (M) recruited
from excluded groups)
No, but underlying ethnic
issue (UNITA recruited
among Ovimbundus)
No, but underlying ethnic
issue (e.g. PDK violence
against Vietnamese)
Incompatibility Conflict over government Conflict over government Conflict over government
Conflict Intensity Civil war with over 1000
battle-related deaths
Civil war with over 1000
battle-related deaths
Civil war with over 1000
battle-related deaths
Not-Significant or Not-Robust Control Variables
Peace Agreement Comp. Peace Agreement Bicesse Peace Agreement Paris Peace Agreement
Governance Level National interim gov. National interim gov. National interim gov.
Coup d’état No coup d’état No coup d’état No coup d’état
Democratic History History of democracy No history of democracy No history of democracy
Conflict Duration Long (> 10 years) Long (> 10 years) Long (> 10 years)
IG Duration 506 days (2nd quantile) 488 days (2nd quantile) 583 days (2nd quantile)
GDP/Capita 1787 USD (2nd quantile) 2131 USD (2nd quantile) 1792 USD (2nd quantile)
Natural Resources Low (5.3% of GDP) High (47.9% of GDP) Low (8.2% of GDP)
Population Size 26 Mio. (3rd quantile) 10 Mio. (3rd quantile) 11 Mio (3rd quantile)
Independent Variables: Properties of Interim Government
Power-Sharing IG Strong degree of power-





Medium degree of power-
sharing in SNC with lim-
ited powers
International IG No international author-
ity; UNMIN managed by
UNDPA, not DPKO
Medium level of interna-
tional authority via moni-
toring UNAVEM I
High degree of interna-
tional authority (UNTAC
transitional authority)
Parallel Institutions Fully integrated political
structures, military inte-
gration under way
Political and military in-
tegration negotiated but
not implemented




for political parties and
civil society
No participation of un-
armed actors during in-
terim government
No participation of un-
armed actors during in-
terim government
Dependent Variable: Stability of Post-Interim Peace
Post-Interim Peace No armed conflict in the
post-interim period




as the cases allow for a deeper investigation of the particularities of different
properties of interim government. For instance, while both Nepal and Cambo-
dia are considered cases of power-sharing interim government in the statistical
literature and in my analysis of Chapter 4, power-sharing was present to a sig-
nificantly higher degree in Nepal than in Cambodia, where the powers of the
interim Supreme National Council (SNC) were limited due to the additional
presence and authority of UNTAC (cf. Chapter 8). And while both Cambodia
and Angola saw some degree of international authority during the interim period
(according to the lenient coding version of the international interim government
variable that I discussed in Chapter 4), such authority was significantly higher
in Cambodia’s UNTAC mission. While UNTAC assumed administrative au-
thority, Angola’s UNAVEM I peacekeeping operation only assumed monitoring
powers during the country’s interim period.
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A note of caution is necessary with regard to two control variables, in that
Nepal, Angola and Cambodia differ in their experience with democracy as well
as in their reliance on natural resource rents as percentage of GDP. Following
the downfall of the panchayat authoritarian system through the popular Jana
Andolan I movement in 1990, Nepal had begun a process of democratization
and looked back on five years of (unstable) multi-party democracy when its civil
war broke out in February 1996 (cf. Chapter 6). Neither Angola nor Cambodia,
however, had implemented any democratic political system before the outbreak
of violence. Angola’s civil war started immediately following the country’s in-
dependence in 1975; and while a series of elections had been held in Cambodia
since the 1950s, those either de facto or de jure took place in authoritarian one-
party systems (cf. Chapter 8). Similarly, while natural resource rents – chiefly
through the extraction of oil – make up a significant part of Angola’s national
GDP (Le Billon, 2001a), this is not the case for Nepal and Cambodia, although
timber exports did play a role as a financial resource for the warring parties of
Cambodia’s civil war (cf. Chapter 8 and Le Billon, 2000). Following the results
of my Cox PH models of Chapter 4, I do not expect this divergence to bias
my case study results, because these two control variables were statistically in-
significant and/or not very robust in their effects on the stability of post-interim
peace. However, because both variables have been regarded as predictors for
peace after war in the broader qualitative and quantitative literature, I will pay
particularly attention to democratic history and natural resources as possible
confounding variables in my case studies.
Finally, the selection of Nepal as a relatively recent “success” case as opposed
to Angola and Cambodia as early “failures” could reflect that successes and
failures of interim government are unevenly and non-randomly distributed over
time. If failure cases – i.e., interim governments that are followed by armed
conflict in the post-interim period – all occur in the early 1990s, while successes
of interim rule are clustered in the late 2000s, this could mean that cases are not
independent of each other. For instance, international policy makers could have
learned from early mistakes and adopted the interim designs they promote for
war-torn societies. This is yet not the case, as Figure A.2 in Appendix B shows.
Figure A.2 displays the number of events (i.e., armed conflict recurrence in the
post-interim period) grouped by calendar year, and no clear trend is detectable.
5.2.3 Within- and Between-Case Analysis
I make use of both within-case analysis and between-case comparison in my
qualitative analysis. Combining the tracing of precise causal mechanisms and
the study of covariance with a comparative approach has widely been regarded
as the most fruitful way to improve certainty on a causal story, as well as to
derive generalizable conclusions from qualitative research (Bennett and Elman,
2006; Checkel, 2006; Checkel, 2008; George and Bennett, 2005).
Systematic within-case analysis through process-tracing has been described
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as one of the most suitable analytical tools to investigate the underlying causal
mechanisms between independent and dependent variables (Beach and Peder-
sen, 2013; Collier, 2011). Two aspects make it a particularly helpful approach for
the purpose of this dissertation. Firstly, process-tracing helps to alleviate some
of the disadvantages of statistical analysis and in particular the above discussed
internal validity threats to quantitative modeling, as it allows to systematically
investigate the historical sequences that link my independent variables to sta-
ble post-interim peace. It also allows me to test whether empirical evidence
exists that each part of my hypothesized causal mechanisms is present in each
case. Existing research has in that regard argued for the value of within-case
analysis through process-tracing to empirically evaluate bargaining models, be-
cause the central components of these models are nothing else but descriptions
of “patterns in agents’ perceptions, decision-making and action” (Nome, 2013,
p. 51). Thus, they are causal mechanisms that statistical studies are often inapt
to trace (e.g. Jenne, 2004; Lake, 2010).47 Process-tracing therefore allows me
to counterbalance one problem in particular: an independent and a dependent
variable may positively correlate with each other although no causal pathway
between them can be detected. For instance, Nepal’s CPN (M) integrated its
parallel People’s Courts and People’s Governments into the authority of the
interim government, but this action may be unlinked to why the party decided
to stick to peace following the interim period.
Secondly, within-case analysis through process-tracing helps me to alleviate
some of the disadvantages of comparative between-case analysis in most similar
system designs (Nome, 2013). This is because one of the central pitfall of such
designs is that it is often “not possible to find cases similar in every respect
but one” and that more than one independent variable may have causal impact
(George and Bennett, 2005, p. 214) – see my note above on the role of democratic
history and natural resource rents. Tracing causal processes and mapping the
historical paths from X to Y is a suitable strategy to assess whether each of the
variables can or cannot be ruled out has having causal significance, and helps
to mitigate risks of obtaining spurious results.
My bargaining model for the role of interim governments in increasing the
stability of peace already formulates explicit causal mechanisms by identifying
a set of intervening steps and observable implications under which the theorized
mechanisms should become visible (cf. Figure 3.3 on page 34). Consequently,
if I can establish in my within-case analyses in Chapters 6, 7, and 8,
1. that each property of interim government correlates in the theoretically
expected manner with the dependent variable;
2. that commitment problems were at play for a weaker-growing party in
each of the cases, risking a remobilization for armed conflict;
47Having said that, arriving at a definitive test of all underlying assumptions of bargain-
ing theory is often not possible through process-tracing, for instance when it comes to the
rationality assumption of players in the bargaining situation (cf. Chapter 9, Kuehn, 2013).
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3. that a specific property of interim government mitigated such commitment
problems for the relevant parties (or, alternatively, that the absence of such
property exacerbated commitment problems); and
4. that mitigated (exacerbated) commitment problems influenced the the-
orized decision-making process of the warring parties in the bargaining
situation to follow (or not) peaceful behavior ,
then confidence in my theoretical argument of Chapter 3 is greatly strengthened.
My case studies of Chapters 6 to 8 are thus all structured as follows. Firstly, and
in order to situate the rule of the respective interim government, each chapter
begins with a brief historical overview of the countries. Each overview thereby
(1) focuses in particular on the dynamics that led to the Nepalese, Angolan,
and Cambodian civil wars; (2) introduces the warring parties of the respective
civil wars; and (3) ends with a detailed description of the negotiation processes
that culminated in the peace agreements in which the parties decided on the
formation of the interim governments under analysis. Secondly, I then outline
in detail the role of commitment problems during and after the rule of each
interim government under analysis and discuss some of the merits and pitfalls of
applying the bargaining theory argument to each of the cases. Thirdly, the main
part of each within-case analysis will then be attending to each hypothesized
property of interim government and analyzing whether the respective property
set into motion the theorized process of steps and actions that led to post-
interim peace or the absence thereof. In this analysis, I also attend to possible
confounding mechanisms and variables, such as alternative and case-specific
explanations. Fourthly, and not least in order to discern the relative explanatory
power of each of my proposed causal mechanisms, each chapter ends with some
main conclusions drawn from within-case analysis.
Three notes of caution with regard to my within-case analysis. Firstly, it is
not enough to show that the relationship of X and Y changes via the theorized
mechanism. For instance, it is not sufficient to demonstrate that integrating the
Maoist People’s Governments into the authority of the Nepalese interim gov-
ernment limited the possibilities for parallel taxation and thereby influenced the
decision-making of the CPN (M) to remain at peace. I must also demonstrate in
Chapters 6 to 8 that alternative or counterfactual causal paths and explanatory
variables are not responsible for the change of Y (Checkel, 2008; Collier, 2011).
Secondly, the scope of my case studies does not allow me to trace each and
every underlying decision and micro process of all relevant actors, and thus I
understand process-tracing in my case studies “merely as a conceptual approx-
imation to the logic underlying such situations” (Kuehn, 2013, p. 59). Thirdly,
while within-case analysis generates strong knowledge about the precise causal
mechanisms at work in one or several cases, results from such analysis cannot
be generalized. In other words, knowledge generated from process-tracing “im-
proves the internal validity of causal claims, but does not enhance the robustness
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of the inferences on the cross-case level” (Kuehn, 2013, p. 56). Also for that
reason, combining within-case analysis with other qualitative and quantitative
methods is fruitful; and thus Chapter 9 closes the empirical part of this disser-
tation by scrutinizing the three cases in relation to each other to lend further
evidence to my causal argument.
5.2.4 Material and Sources
The detailed evidence that is necessary to detect every step in a theorized causal
mechanism and thus to conduct within-case analysis through process-tracing is
often difficult to obtain. This is especially so in conflict settings where warring
parties may refrain from stating their true intentions in order to keep ahead
of an adversary; where victims may be too frightened to speak the truth due
to fears of reprisal or revenge; or where official documents may get lost or are
purposefully destroyed (cf. Bakke, 2014). UNESCO, for instance, lists deliberate
war-related violence as one of the key threats to “world documentary heritage”
(Hoeven and Albada, 1996). Therefore, and similar to the importance of being
aware of validity issues and selection bias when gathering statistical conflict
data through the evaluation of news reports (cf. Chapter 1 and Kreutz, 2015;
Öberg and Sollenberg, 2011; Themnér and Wallensteen, 2014), it is vital to
discuss possible weaknesses in the data underlying my qualitative, comparative
analysis (George and Bennett, 2005).
In a first step, and in order to arrive at detailed day-by-day information ac-
count on events leading up to, during, and after the respective interim periods
in Nepal, Angola, and Cambodia, I conducted an initial search on news reports
in the LexisNexis database on the situation in the three countries. Due to the
overwhelming amount of material, I concentrated my search on news reports
published by the two largest global news agencies that hold offices in the major-
ity of countries around the world – the Associated Press (AP) and the Agence
France Press (AFP). I also included articles published by a few internationally
renowned newspapers that had sent their own foreign correspondents to the
respective conflict zones, such as Victoria Brittain reporting for The Guardian
in Angola (e.g. Brittain, 1992a; Brittain, 1992c), Somini Sengupta reporting for
The New York Times from Nepal (e.g. Sengupta, 2006a; Sengupta, 2006b), or
Terry McCarthy (1991) reporting for The Independent from Cambodia. Con-
fining my search that way resulted in 2892 documents published for the search
term “Nepal” between 01 January 2006 and 31 December 2008; 2258 docu-
ments published for “Angola” between 01 January 1991 and 31 December 1992;
and 2673 documents published for “Cambodia” between 01 January 1991 and
31 December 1993. For Nepal, I additionally relied on three English language
newspapers published by outlets in Kathmandu – the Nepali Times, The Hi-
malayan Times, and The Kathmandu Post (cf. section 5.3) – and for Cambodia,
I made use of the online archives of The Phnom Penh Post.
Naturally, these news reports suffer from similar issues as gathering quanti-
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Notes: Figure based on a LexisNexis search of AP publications on the search term “An-
gola.” I excluded all articles that contained the term “Olympics,” because Angola’s par-
ticipation in the 1992 Summer Olympic Games in Barcelona resulted in a large number of
hits for the search term in July and August 1992; hits that were unrelated to the situation
in Angola at that time. The interim period is shaded in gray.
tative conflict data through reporting as discussed in Chapter 1, not least in that
foreign correspondents are likely to be based in the national capital. This bias
is also detrimental for the purpose of this dissertation, because it could result
in under-reporting of events in the periphery, in particular events and actions
concerning parallel political rebel government structures (although UNITA, for
instance, regularly invited journalists to its parallel-held territories and the rival
capital of Jamba, cf. Chapter 7 and AFP, 1991c). Furthermore, news reports
come with a temporal bias in that they tend to focus on “big events” of interest
for readers in Western societies. This includes in particular the signing of peace
agreements and the holding of elections that terminate an interim government.
I illustrate this temporal bias using the example of AP reporting on Angola
between January 1991 and December 1992, as visualized in Figure 5.2. The
graph displays the number of AP articles containing the search term “Angola”
aggregated by week, with the interim period shaded in gray. The graph shows
that the largest number of articles was published in the last week of May 1991
(33 articles in total), which is when the warring parties signed the Bicesse Peace
Agreement in Portugal. The second largest spike in Figure 5.2 is displayed in
the last two weeks of September and the first two weeks of October 1992 (be-
tween 19 and 26 articles per week), which is when the elections terminating the
interim period were held.
I also found that news reports were more likely in providing information
on aspects relating to power-sharing or international interim government, or
103
with regard to the disarmament and demobilization of warring parties, while
they rarely report details on the role of civil society in interim decision-making.
Finally, news reports can of course be biased in how they provide information
on the respective warring parties engaged in a civil war, and some journalists
may be more supportive of one side to the conflict than of the other. For
instance, Heywood (2000) and Windrich (1992) discuss how UNITA leader Jonas
Savimbi managed to gather a significant amount of overly sympathetic support
for his strive against Angola’s MPLA government, as reflected in the style of
reporting by Western journalists. Becker (1998) similarly reflects upon her own
interpretations in reporting as a correspondent on Cambodia’s civil war.
In order to deal with these issues, I rely in my case studies on a broad mix
of sources to assess the statements and actions of parties in each interim gov-
ernment under analysis; and while I expect this triangulation of sources to be a
remedy for some of the problems of news reports, each of the additional types of
sources of course suffer from their own limitations. In particular, I complement
news reports with secondary political science, historical, ethnographic, and area
studies academic literature (that is however often not detailed enough to trace
very particular mechanisms). I also consult a variety of primary sources, such
as policy reports (e.g. Human Rights Watch, 2015b; International Crisis Group,
2005) and official documents (e.g. UN Security Council Resolutions). Policy re-
ports are insofar often biased in that they tend to focus on issues of interest to
Western policy makers, while official documents may be biased in that confiden-
tial documents with particular important insights may be impossible to obtain.
I also rely on personal memoirs (e.g. Anstee, 1993), transcripts of speeches and
radio broadcasts (e.g. in Weimer and Fandrych, 1995), blog posts and websites
(e.g. Nepali Congress, 2015; United We Blog, 2006), as well as “gray literature”
like party manifestos (e.g. Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), 1993; Embassy
of Democratic Kampuchea, 1976) or letters to newspapers by warring party rep-
resentatives (Primo, 1992; Savimbi, 1989). Particular sensitive aspects of gray
literature published by the parties may thereby get lost throughout the course
of the war, especially so if there is one clear winner or loser. Finally, my collec-
tion of information on the qualitative case studies is limited because I have to
rely on sources published or translated into English or German – UNITA, for
instance, published German versions of their party programs (National Union
for the Total Independence of Angola, 1988; National Union for the Total Inde-
pendence of Angola, 1991) – and I thus cannot reconstruct events only reported
in Portuguese, Khmer, or Nepali.
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5.3 Empirical Fieldwork in Nepal
5.3.1 Methods and Techniques
For the early cases of interim government in Angola and Cambodia, I can draw
upon a large variety of existing research. For the case of Nepal, I furthermore
rely on new data gathered through semi-structured interviews conducted dur-
ing six weeks of empirical fieldwork in the Kathmandu Valley in September and
October 1015. The generation of new data has been named one of the most im-
portant steps for qualitative case study research (Blatter and Haverland, 2014),
and the method of semi-structured interviews has been argued to offer a unique
“source of information since it provides research with depth, detail and perspec-
tive on a certain research question, and at a certain moment in time” (Brounéus,
2011, p. 131). Semi-structured interviews have also been portrayed as being es-
pecially well-suited for gathering the information necessary for process-tracing
(Tansey, 2007); and interviews have been identified as a technique to increase
the validity of inferences in triangulations of qualitative data (Kern, 2016).
To select my interview partners, I used a combination of specific targeting
and snowball sampling. For instance, when I interviewed Chandra Prakash
Khanal alias “Baldev,” a former deputy commander in the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) – the armed wing of the CPN (M) – he provided me with the
contact details of Nanda Kishor Pun alias “Pasang,” also a former deputy com-
mander of the PLA and the current Vice President of Nepal as of 2016. To
avoid bias and gatekeeper problems in targeting interview partners, I thereby
relied on different points of entry to informants, including the help of a lo-
cal peacebuilding NGO, several academics previously and presently employed
at the Tribhuvan University in Kirtipur, as well as members of the interna-
tional development community previously and presently employed in Nepal (on
avoiding gatekeeper problems during fieldwork in post-conflict countries, see
Höglund, 2011). Having said that, and due to the politicized situation in Nepal
in September and October 2015 following the April 2015 Gorkha Earthquake
and the subsequent promulgation of a new constitution (cf. below), it was of-
ten easier to access members of the CPN (M) and PLA than members of the
Nepali Congress (NC) or Communist Party of Nepal – United Marxist Leninist
(CPN-UML). The NC and CPN-UML represented the “government” side to the
previous armed conflict and were engaged in coalition talks in the fall of 2015.
In order to gain a better understanding of the role of the interim govern-
ment in Nepal’s peace process, and how features of this interim government
affected the actions and decision-making of the warring parties, I asked my in-
terview partners a broad set of questions regarding their perceptions on the
interim government. These questions included, but were not limited to, how
the parties used the power-sharing arrangement to negotiate laws for the post-
interim period, how they experienced the actions of UNMIN in Nepal’s peace
process, or how interim government officials cooperated with civil society in re-
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Table 5.2: Overview of Semi-Structured Interviews
Type of Interview Partner Count
Civil society leaders, academics, journalists 7 Interviews
Employees of international organizations 9 Interviews
CPN (M) & PLA leaders and ex-combatants 9 Interviews
NC, CPN-UML, and Nepal Army (NA) leaders 5 Interviews
form processes. For instance, to assess the CPN (M)’s capacity and resolve for
remobilization, I asked interview partners if they believed that the party would
also have accepted loosing the 2008 Constituent Assembly elections; and if they
believed that UNMIN had been in a position to stop the Maoists had the latter
decided to remobilize. While I formulated a core set of questions that I tried to
ask every interview partner, some questions varied between interviewees. For
instance, I did not speak to ex-combatants of the PLA on how the interim gov-
ernment allowed for the participation of civil society but concentrated on their
experience of the disarmament and demobilization process and how it affected
their perceptions of the party leadership; while I asked more questions about
civil society involvement in the interim period to representatives of Nepalese
NGOs. The template of my core interview questions is provided in section B.1
in Appendix B; while transcripts can be provided upon request.
In total, the empirical evidence underlying my analysis in Chapter 6 is based
on 30 semi-structured interviews. Table 5.2 gives an overview of my interview
partners by type, although this distinction is not always easy to make, because
some of my interview partners were quick to identify themselves as academics,
civil society activists, political party members, and technical advisers to the
peace process all in one. Table B.1 in Appendix B provides a full overview of all
semi-structured interviews conducted on Nepal’s interim government. All inter-
views took place in the Kathmandu Valley and primarily in the cities of Patan
and Kathmandu, except for interviews INT-29 with a diplomat (on 03 November
2015) and interview INT-30 with an international development worker (on 12
November 2015), which were conducted via phone and in Berlin respectively, fol-
lowing my return from Nepal. Some of my interview partners wished to remain
anonymous in order to openly speak about politically sensitive subjects. This
concerned particularly those who were members of the international community
(who cited their diplomatic standing), as well as demobilized ex-combatants of
the PLA (who cited security reasons). To ease an overview, all interview part-
ners are thus listed in Table B.1 not with their names, but with a description
of their professional roles during the peace process as well as with a short code
so as to indicate when the same interview partner is quoted more than once.
A list with the actual names of those interview partners that did not insist on
remaining anonymous can be obtained on request.
Most interviews were recorded on tape, but again some interview partners
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felt uncomfortable with being recorded, so I relied on taking notes for these
interviews. While I at times directly quote a statement from a taped interview,
I cannot use direct quotes from unrecorded conversations. Furthermore, I had
to rely on the help of an interpreter for some interview partners who felt uncom-
fortable talking in English. The interpreter was trained beforehand in that we
discussed my questionnaire template and I instructed her to translate back to
me every few sentences, so that little information would get lost (cf. Brounéus,
2011). I discuss some reflections on working with an interpreter below. Finally,
and in addition to interviews, I also conducted archival work while staying in
Nepal. I accessed Nepali newspapers in English (cf. above) through the archives
of the Press Council Nepal and used the library of the Martin Chautari organi-
zation in Kathmandu that offers a collection of academic literature and policy
reports. I was also provided with additional gray literature by some of my inter-
view partners (e.g. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit,
2013; Pasang, 2008).
5.3.2 Reflections on Fieldwork
Personal reflections on empirical fieldwork – that go beyond the usefulness of a
specific scientific method in the field (e.g. Bunselmeyer and Schulz, 2016), but
that also address how demographic aspects of the researcher may bias access to
informants – have become increasingly common in peace and conflict research.
Such reflections are naturally more common in research designs with construc-
tivist methodological foundations (e.g. Höglund, 2011; Pearce, 2015; Wood,
2003). Nevertheless, a few reflections on my fieldwork in Nepal are fruitful to
discuss also here in order to understand how certain aspects of my fieldwork
may influence my results.
First and foremost, Höglund (2011) has reflected upon how fieldwork in
volatile social contexts means that security conditions change rapidly and thus
force the researcher to limit or adapt her initial research design. This also
applies to my fieldwork in Nepal. I carried out my case selection in December
2014 and as discussed above, required that at least one case of my matched
group of cases was suitable for fieldwork. At that point, Nepal, Angola, and
Cambodia seemed like a particularly rewarding group of cases to study for the
purpose of this dissertation due to three reasons. Firstly, comparatively little
detailed information was available on the role of Nepal’s interim government
for the country’s peace process, which made the gathering of new data through
empirical fieldwork especially fruitful. Secondly, Nepal was also a relatively
safe country to travel to for a Western, female researcher. Thirdly, Nepal has
furthermore hardly been studied in comparative case study research designs;
while Cambodia and Angola could serve as historical comparisons that have
been thoroughly covered by the existing literature, although often only in intra-
regional comparisons (e.g. Bekoe, 2005; Croissant, 2007; Pearce, 2010).
After having made all necessary travel arrangements to start my fieldwork
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at the end of April 2015, the 7.8 magnitude Gorkha earthquake struck Nepal on
25th April 2015, killing over 8,000 people, while displacing and injuring many
more. As a result, I postponed my fieldwork and after addressing the ethical
considerations of the value and necessity of research in a post-disaster zone (I
closely stayed in touch with my contacts in Kathmandu, cf. the discussions
in Brounéus, 2011; Höglund, 2011), I arrived in Nepal on 21 September 2015.
However, in the aftermath of the earthquake, an urgency to begin reconstruction
had accelerated a long-stalled constitution-making process between the former
warring parties. After nine years of deadlocked constitution-making, Nepal’s
Constituent Assembly (CA) promulgated a new constitution for the country on
the day before my arrival, 20 September 2015 (cf. International Crisis Group,
2016; Strasheim and Bogati, 2016). While some argue that this constitution rep-
resents the successful “end of the peace process” with the Maoist insurgents (cf.
Chapter 6) – meaning I was able to observe this peace process at a particularly
crucial point in time – constitutional provisions concerning the federalist re-
structuring of Nepal had over the summer created a highly politicized situation
in the Himalayan state. As a result, violent protests among the Madhesi and
Tharu communities had erupted in southern Nepal in August 2015 and clashes
between security forces and civilians had killed at least 50 individuals, including
eight policemen (Human Rights Watch, 2015b). In order to make their demands
heard, protesters also began to establish a blockade of the Nepali-Indian border
in late September that stalled all imports of petroleum – as well as medicine
and earthquake relief material – which meant that from early October onwards,
and for the better part of my fieldwork, little to no fueled transportation was
available as gas stations were out of petrol.
This situation affected my fieldwork with regard to two aspects. Firstly, it
meant that traveling within Nepal (and even within the Kathmandu Valley) was
extremely restricted. While I had originally planned to conduct semi-structured
interviews not only in Kathmandu but also in a district under former Maoist
control during the civil war – such as the western districts of Rukum or Rolpa –
in order to learn more about local perceptions of parallel rebel government, the
earthquake had destroyed many roads and made several regions inaccessible,
and violent protests as well as the fuel crisis resulted in further physical travel
restrictions. The fuel crisis also meant that I was able to do less interviews per
day in Kathmandu, because my interpreter and I often had to walk for several
hours across town to get to an interview, as no taxis or buses were available.
Secondly, the politicized situation that the new constitution had created also
meant that members of the governing NC and CPN-UML parties were more dif-
ficult to reach than members of the CPN (M), as the former were engaged in
coalition negotiations. This situation also meant that many interview part-
ners wanted to discuss the current situation and thus may have spoken more
negatively of the CPN (M)’s role in the interim government: A number of re-
spondents pointed out that because the Maoists had broken the promises they
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had made during the war to Madhesi and Tharu communities, these groups
felt betrayed by their politicians and resorted to protests. This can however
be interpreted as a “hard test” for my argument, in that if interview partners
evaluate the Maoists’ strategies and actions more critically, they may for in-
stance not easily admit that the Maoists were sending costly signals to prove
their intention for peace.
Finally, Höglund (2011) also reflects upon how the demographic identity of
the researcher can bias access to interview partners in the field. Therefore, it
is important to point out that being a woman (and having a young woman
function as my interpreter during interviews) meant that access into the patri-
archal political structures of Nepal was challenging at times. Having said that,
I more often than not felt that my identity meant that interview partners spoke
very openly because they did not regard me or my interpreter as a “threat”
to sensitive information. Finally, being German also greatly aided my access
to interviews with the CPN (M) in particular. Many interview partners men-
tioned their respect for the work of the German development cooperation agency
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in Nepal during our con-
versations, an organization that has a particular positive standing among the
Maoists due to its poverty-alleviating work during the civil war. GIZ was also
the only development organization the Maoists allowed into their cantonment
sites after the end of the war (Bleie and Shrestha, 2012; Bogati, 2015; Deutsche




Interim Rule in Nepal
In November 2006, Nepal’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) brought a
civil war to an end that had been ravaging the country for ten years. This
accord, negotiated by the rebels of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
(CPN (M)) and a coalition of political parties calling itself the Seven-Party-
Alliance (SPA), paved the way for an impressive number of political reforms.
Within two years alone, the former belligerents installed a power-sharing interim
government, proclaimed the country a republic, brought the army under par-
liamentary control, disarmed the Maoist ex-combatants, and held elections to a
Constituent Assembly (CA). These elections – to everyone’s surprise – were won
by the Maoists, who had themselves already prepared to be badly defeated at
the polls after several opinion surveys had placed them in a distant third place
behind the established political parties (Ogura, 2008). Following the elections,
the former rebels entered politics. While peace has prevailed ever since, this
was not always the case for the Maoist dominance. Corruption, factionalism,
personal feuds, and broken promises all contributed to the party’s difficulties
in maintaining a position of power in the post-interim period, and some even
argue that the party is among the key losers of the peace process (cf. below).
This is not least because the Maoists’ goals of a “radical transformation” of the
Nepalese society and the political inclusion of minorities (Lawoti, 2003, p. 52)
remain unachieved, and Nepal is today still ruled by its traditional social and
political elites.
This chapter aims to answer the question to what extent post-interim peace
in Nepal is attributed to the interim government mitigating the warring parties’
commitment problems, rather than the favorable coincidence that the Maoists
won first post-war elections and were subsequently no longer interested in re-
mobilizing for war. I proceed in three steps. Firstly, to contextualize Nepal’s
interim and post-interim politics, section 6.1 offers an overview of the coun-
try’s conflict-ridden history. I focuses particularly on the political developments
since 1950, when those organizations began to grow that would later become the
warring parties in Nepal’s civil war. Section 6.2 consequently analyzes if com-
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mitment problems were at play during and after interim government in Nepal,
and how the design of each property of interim rule mitigated such commitment
problems, thus adding to peace in the post-interim period. Throughout section
6.2, I also attend to alternative explanatory variables and mechanisms for peace
in Nepal. Finally, section 6.3 concludes with a summary of findings, while I
conduct a comparative analysis that evaluates my findings vis-á-vis the results
from the other case studies in Chapter 9.
6.1 Nepal: A History of Political Turmoil
“[The] palace, the parties, and the Maoists” – the modern history of Nepal
has been defined by political-ideological conflicts between these three forces
over controlling the state, its political system, and its resources (International
Crisis Group, 2003b, p. 7). While particularly the time since 1951 has been
one in which “revolution has been followed by royal coup followed by revolution
followed by royal coup” (Cadwalladr, 2016), the latest escalation of turmoils into
large-scale violence occurred in 1996. That year, the CPN (M) began attacking
government offices, police stations, and banks, marking the start of the country’s
decade-long civil war (Upreti, 2008).48 At that time, Nepal looked back on over
half a century of turbulent transitions to – and from – democracy. This historical
overview thus begins with a short outline of key political events before 1950,
before it focuses on the anti-Rana movement in the 1950s, the Panchayat system
of the 1960-80s, and Nepal’s transition to democracy in the 1990s. All periods
are vital to understand the formation of those political-ideological movements
that later became the warring parties in Nepal’s People’s War.49 Subsequently,
48The name Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) has been used by a number of organizations
since 1995. The first group was the CPN (M) led by Pushpa Kamal Dahal (“Prachanda”) and
“chief ideologue” Baburam Bhattarai. The party went under the name from 1995 to January
2009 before changing it to Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (UCPN (M)), when
it merged with the CPN (Unity Centre – Masal). The second organization is a breakaway
faction of the UCPN (M), the Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist (CPN-M) or “Dashists”
that uses a dash instead of parentheses in writing its name. The CPN-M was formed in June
2012 by Mohan Baidya (“Kiran”) and Ram Bahadur Thapa (“Badal”), who were leading a
radically left-wing faction that argued the CPA had “seriously hurt ... the credence and value
of the Nepalese revolution” (Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist, 2012). The third group is
the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN (M)), formed in March 2014 by Netra Bikram
Chand (“Biplav”) and equally arguing that the UCPN (M) leadership was betraying the causes
of the revolution. To make the series of splits and mergers of the Maoist movement in the post-
interim period complete, Vice Chairperson Baburam Bhattarai announced his resignation from
the party on 26 September 2015 and formally launched the Naya Shakti (New Force) party on
23 November; and several members of the post-2014 CPN (M) announced in May 2016 that
they are re-joining Prachanda’s UCPN (M), which announced its new name CPN (Maoist
Center) at its first Central Committee meeting on 23 May 2016. Because this dissertation
focuses on the 2006-08 interim government and Nepal’s immediate post-interim politics, I use
the acronym CPN (M) to describe the rebel group turned political party led by Prachanda.
49The label “People’s War” was coined by the Maoists and is thus an inherently political
description of the violence in Nepal. But it is also a common colloquial term among Nepalis
when referring to the war – regardless of political affiliation – and I use it thus interchange-
ably with the more objective terminology. Additionally, many political leaders in Nepal are
colloquially referred to by acronyms (e.g. “B.P.” for Bishweshwar Prasad Koirala) or by their
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I discuss the unfolding of the war in 1996, the events leading up to the signing
of the CPA in November 2006 that marked the start of Nepal’s interim period,
as well as the political dynamics of Nepal’s post-interim period.
6.1.1 Introducing the Warring Parties
Present-day Nepal was created in the early nineteenth century (Burghart, 1984).
Before, and until 1769, the geographical area of what is today Nepal had been
ruled by several small, independent kingdoms. The culturally most influential
ones were those of the Kathmandu Valley – the kingdoms of Kathmandu, Lal-
itpur, and Bhaktapur, each headed by a ruler of the Malla dynasty – as well
as the Kingdom of Gorkha, where members of the Shah dynasty occupied the
throne (Whelpton, 2013). But after he was crowned King of Gorkha in 1743,
Prithvi Narayan Shah initiated a process of territorial expansion of his king-
dom that would defeat the Malla rulers in the Kathmandu Valley, unify several
independent kingdoms, and create a national monarchy under the rule of the
Shah dynasty in 1769 (Burghart, 1984; Whelpton, 2005). The Gorkha rulers’
territorial expansion continued after Prithvi Narayan Shah died in 1775, but
reached its limits when the British East India Company disputed the Gorkha’s
claim to the agriculturally fertile Tarai plains in southern Nepal. These disputes
escalated into the Anglo-Nepali War in 1814, which ended two years later in the
Treaty of Sugauli that put halt to the Gorkhas’ territorial quest and established
Nepal’s modern boundaries (Mann, 2015). By making the Gorkha rulers accept
significant territorial concessions in the Tarai, the treaty also marked the begin-
ning of intra-elite disputes within the kingdom, which would ultimately “create
an environment favorable for a strong leader to emerge and seize control” of the
government (Malagodi, 2013, p. 74).50
nom de guerre (e.g. “Prachanda” for Pushpa Kamal Dahal). I use the acronyms and assumed
names if they are more commonly used than the original names. Finally, Nepal uses the
Vikram Samvat as its official calendar, which is roughly 56 years ahead of the Gregorian cal-
endar. In this dissertation, I use the Gregorian date except for when I cite official documents,
which is when I give reference to both dates (e.g. “Interim Constitution of 2063 (2007)”).
50Contributing to the instability of the Gorkha Kingdom’s final years was Nepal’s new
multitude of ethnic, linguistic, regional, and religious groups, as well as social castes. Before
Nepal’s unification, the large number of identity groups populating the area had been able to
pursue its daily affairs autonomously within the borders of the independent kingdoms, but the
Gorkhas’ territorial expansion forced them to live under one political roof (Gellner, 1997b).
This situation was not accommodated by the authorities of unified Nepal (who promoted the
Nepali language and the Hindu religion); and it troubles Nepal until today (Hangen, 2010;
Lecomte-Tilouine, 2011). While ethnic, linguistic, regional, caste, or religious cleavages are
often blurred, six broad identity markers remain politically salient until today. (1) Nepali-
speaking, high-caste Hindus from the central hill region (Pahad) – chiefly Bahuns and Chhetris
– make up only 30 percent of the population but constitute the politically dominant groups
that have controlled positions in the government, administration, or army from unification
until today (Hangen, 2010). (2) Newars, the indigenous people of the Kathmandu Valley,
have developed their own caste system and also hold positions of power (Gellner, 1997a).
(3) Janajatis – an umbrella term for all other indigenous groups – remain outside the Hindu
caste system and are facing pervasive political and economic discrimination (Lawoti, 2012).
(4) Tharus are an ethnic group indigenous to the southern and south-western Tarai and (5)
Madhesis, Muslims or caste-based Hindus equally living in the Tarai, have close socio-economic
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Table 6.1: Key Dates and Events in Nepal’s History
1743 Prithvi Narajan Shah ascends the throne of the Ghorka Kingdom
1769 As several independent kingdoms are unified under Ghorka rule, sev-
eral ethnic groups now live under one political roof
1846 The Rana family comes to power in the Kot Massacre and over the
next 100 years systematically benefits high-caste Hindus from the
central hill region while minorities are politically marginalized
1950 The NC forms in Indian exile under the leadership of B.P. Koirala
1951 The NC succeeds in an armed uprising against Rana rule
1959 The NC wins Nepal’s first democratic elections, B.P. Koirala becomes
Nepal’s first elected Prime Minister
1960 A royal coup by King Mahendra ends the short democratic experi-
ment and introduces the authoritarian Panchayat system
1990 The First People’s Movement ends absolute monarchy and returns
the NC to power, but minorities remain marginalized
1996 The CPN (M) begins its insurgency against the government and
promises minorities enhanced political representation
2001 King Gyanendra ascends the throne following the Royal Massacre
2005 A royal coup by King Gyanendra dissolves Nepal’s government
2006 The Second People’s Movement ends absolute monarchy; the SPA
and the CPN (M) sign the CPA and form an interim government
2008 The CPN (M) wins elections to a CA and abolishes the monarchy.
The factionalized CA is unable to proclaim a constitution.
2013 The CPN (M) is defeated in elections to a second CA, its political
leader Prachanda loses his seat in parliament
2015 Earthquakes kill over 8,000 people but accelerate the constitutional
process. A constitution is proclaimed on 20 September. Minority
protests over constitutional provisions kill 58 people.
This leader was Jang Bahadur Rana, who used the instability and cultural
heterogeneity (cf. Footnote 50) of the late Gorkha Kingdom to seize power in
the 1846 Kot Massacre (Pradhan, 1991). In this coup d’état, Rana and his
brothers killed 40 members of the royal court, ended the rule of the Shah dy-
nasty and started what would become known as the Rana Period of Nepalese
politics. Rana and his brothers introduced a deeply unequal and discriminatory
political system of hereditary prime ministers within their family that systemat-
ically benefited high-caste Bahuns and Chhetris, while marginalizing everyone
else (Hachhethu, 2007a; Rose, 2001; Thapa, 2012). In building their rule, the
ties to communities in northern India, and constitute approximately 35 per cent of Nepal’s
total population (Government of Nepal, 2014). (6) Dalits, the lowest Hindu caste, make up
15 percent of the population and “are affected by the widespread practice of untouchability
that considers them impure” and segregates them from society (Lawoti, 2012, 130ff.).
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Ranas also reduced the Shah king to a “ceremonial figurehead” without any
real political or military power (Malagodi, 2013, p. 74), and they were said
to preserve the monarchy mostly “for the façade of legitimacy that it offered”
(Ganguly and Shoup, 2005, p. 130).
Despite several splits and tensions within the family, the Rana Period lasted
for 104 years. Opposition – long restricted as the regime closely monitored all
public life in Nepal – only began to grow in the years following World War II
among the educated classes in Kathmandu, as well as in the Nepalese diaspora
in India. This opposition was spurred both by the struggle of independence in
India, as well as by new Western ideas of democracy (Lal, 2001; Levi, 1952;
Whelpton, 2005). The new opposition found a partner in King Tribhuvan,
who was far from being a democrat but “unhappy with his own status as a
pampered puppet” and thus willing to cooperate with the emerging political
parties to reclaim power (Whelpton, 2013, p. 39).
Among the key drivers in the anti-Rana movement was the Nepali Congress
(NC) that would later not only lead the revolution ending Rana rule, but that
would also be among the key agents of Nepal’s People’s Movements in 1990 and
2006, as well as of the post-2006 peace process. Led by Bishweshwar Prasad
(“B.P.”) Koirala, the NC was founded in 1950 following the unification of the
Nepali National Congress and the Nepali Democratic Congress, which had both
been created in 1947 in India (Levi, 1952). Today, the NC is described as
a conservative to centrist “grand old lady among Nepal’s parties” (Krämer,
2007, p. 184), dominated by Bahuns and with the strong electoral advantage
of being an alternative to the left majority (International Crisis Group, 2008).
The NC has throughout its existence particularly stressed its commitment to
democracy, which remains deeply entrenched in the party’s self-perception until
today (Hachhethu, 2007b). For instance, the NC describes its early objectives
in the 1950s as to “raise political consciousness of the people to overthrow the
century old Rana rule” and “to establish a democratic system of government
with constitutional monarchy” (Nepali Congress, 2015).51
The NC’s plan succeeded. On 6 November 1950, the disempowered king fled
to the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu to seek political asylum from the Ranas,
thus deriving their rule of any royal legitimacy (Malagodi, 2013). Five days
later, the NC’s military wing Mukti Sena (Liberation Army) started a violent
uprising in the Tarai. This led to the Indian-mediated Delhi Accord in 1951 that
reinstated Tribhuvan in power, installed a government jointly run by the Ranas
and the NC, and made Matrika Prasad (“M.P.”) Koirala – the older brother
of B.P. – Prime Minister of Nepal (Gupta, 1994; Lal, 2001; Levi, 1952). The
51This self-perception is not always reflected in how others see the NC, for instance after
several prominent former NC ministers were convicted of corruption by Nepal’s Supreme
Court after 2007. Recently, both Madhesis and NC leaders have accused the NC leadership
of participating in “undemocratic democracy” in the 2015 constitution-making process, as
the leadership inter alia supported the abandonment of public consultation procedures of
constitutional provisions (International Crisis Group, 2016, p. 17).
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Communist Party of Nepal (CPN)
CPN Pro-China Faction CPN Pro-Russia Faction
CPN Fourth Convention
CPN Masal CPN Mashal Fourth Conv.
CPN Unity Center
CPN Unity Center Parallel CPN Unity Center
CPN (Maoist)
Notes: Illustration based on the analysis of communist splits by Lawoti (2010) and Khadka
(1995). For a detailed description of the factionalization process, see Footnote 52.
Delhi Accord marked the beginning of a decade of constitutional monarchy in
the 1950s in which Tribhuvan and – after his death in 1955 – his son Mahendra
promulgated two constitutions that called for a democratic government with the
king as head of state. The document also allowed for free and fair elections on
18 February 1959 (Malagodi, 2013). In these elections, the NC won a two-third
majority and B.P. Koirala consequently became the first democratically elected
Prime Minister of Nepal (Nickson, 1992).
The Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) only played a marginal role in the
1959 elections, winning only 7.2 percent of the vote and four seats in parliament,
and observers agree that the party’s lack of support for the monarchy was a key
reason for its poor showing (Krämer, 2001; Nickson, 1992). Similar to the
NC, the CPN had been founded in the late 1940s by the Nepalese diaspora
in India under the leadership of Pushpa Lal Shrestha and in order to fight
against the Ranas. After it had only played a secondary role in the anti-Rana
movement, the CPN was then banned between 1952 and 1956 because of anti-
government activism – in 1951, it had for instance stated that its main objective
was to “transform Nepal into a republican state through violent revolution”
(in Khadka, 1995, p. 57). In the decades to follow, the CPN’s popularity and
organizational strength would increase, but its political development was always
hampered by “a series of never ending splits and mergers” (Whelpton, 2005,
p. 203) caused by “internal feuds and factionalism” (Khadka, 1995, p. 57).
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Figure 6.1 illustrates the main splits that led from the CPN to the CPN (M),
the party that would start an insurgency against the state in 1996.52
Nepal’s democratic experiment of the 1950s was short lived. Only eighteen
months after the 1959 elections, King Mahendra staged a royal coup that sus-
pended the constitution, dismissed the elected government, detained all political
leaders or drove them into exile, and ruled under emergency powers until he pro-
mulgated the Panchayat constitution in 1962 (Brown, 1996). Having declared
that political parties had endangered Nepal’s national security and that “Nepal
was unprepared to function according to the rules of Western-style ... democ-
racy” (Malagodi, 2013, p. 88), Mahendra used the Panchayat constitution to
legally enshrine a ban of all parties and create a political system that foresaw
the monarch’s involvement at every level of the state. The system provided for
directly elected village councils that formed electoral colleges to choose district-
level representatives. Representatives in turn selected members of a national
legislature that had however only advisory powers (Malagodi, 2008). All power
rested with the monarch – “the whole arrangement was designed to allow an ele-
ment of popular representation while the king ruled unhindered by the pressures
of parliamentary democracy” (Whelpton, 2005, p. 101).53
When Mahendra died in 1972 and his Western-educated son Birendra as-
cended the throne, hopes for liberalization arose among Nepal’s banned parties,
but it would take until Birendra was facing student protests in May 1979 that
he could no longer ignore public pressure, and was ultimately forced to schedule
a referendum on the Panchayat system (Ganguly and Shoup, 2005). The vote
was hardly free and fair: “While the government used all the financial and po-
litical resources at its disposal, the opposition was hampered by the prohibition
placed upon the formal organizational structures of political parties” (Nickson,
1992, p. 361). Together with the regime’s grip on rural Nepal, where illiteracy
52Both the CPN (M) and the second prominent communist party in Nepal today, the Com-
munist Party of Nepal – United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML), eventually emerged from this
series of splits and mergers of the CPN. In 1974, the CPN split when Mohan Bikram Singh
established his own Communist Party of Nepal (Fourth Convention). In 1983, the CPN –
Fourth Convention then split into two, Singh’s own group – the Communist Party of Nepal
– Masal (CPN – Masal), which also included the future CPN (M) leaders Prachanda and
Bhattarai – as well as Nirmal Lama’s faction that continued to call itself CPN – Fourth Con-
vention. In 1985, the CPN – Masal split into the CPN – Masal – led by Mohan Bikram Singh
– and the CPN – Mashal. Both parties were differentiated mostly “by their pronunciation”
and little “in their ideology” (Khadka, 1995, p. 60). In 1990, the CPN – Mashal merged with
the CPN – Fourth Convention and the Nepal Proletarian Worker’s Organization, to form the
CPN – Unity Center. In 1994, a faction led by Bhattarai and Prachanda broke away from
the CPN – Unity Center to form the Parallel CPN – Unity Center that promoted “politics
in favor of an armed revolt in a bid to capture state power by force” (Thapa, 2012, p. 42).
And in 1995, this faction formally assumed the name CPN (M) and condemned the existing
political parties as supporters of the feudal system (Lal, 2001; Whelpton, 2013).
53In an attempt to strengthen the legitimacy of the Panchayat system, the new constitution
also declared Nepal a Hindu kingdom and revered the monarch in his position as a god-
like king and reincarnation of Vishnu (Haviland, 2005; Shrestha, 2012). The constitution
also enshrined Nepali as the national language, deepening the systematic marginalization of
Madhesis, Tharus, Dalits, and Janajatis (Thapa, 2012) that later played into the hands of the
CPN (M) that capitalized on the grievances of these marginalized groups.
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rates remained at up to 98 percent, this produced a victory for Birendra and
further endorsed the Panchayat system for another decade (Khadka, 1995).
6.1.2 Democratization and Insurgency
The end of the Panchayat system only came in 1989, when the collapse of
communism in Eastern Europe and an intensifying economic crisis inspired many
young Nepalis to urge the banned political parties to take action and reestablish
democracy (Einsiedel et al., 2012; Malagodi, 2013). The still banned political
parties started to publicly organize and – led by the NC, as well as by a coalition
of seven leftist parties calling itself the United Leftist Front (ULF) – to pressure
the king into introducing serious political reforms (Baral, 1994; Mitra et al.,
2006). In February 1990, large numbers of citizens began to take the streets
of Kathmandu and other cities in the Valley, in order to demand free and fair
elections and the end of Panchayat rule – a movement that is today known as
Jana Andolan I or First People’s Movement (Srivastava and Sharma, 2010).
After initial resistance, Birendra eventually bowed to public pressure, lifted
the ban on political parties, nominated a government under the NC’s Krishna
Prasad Bhattarai, and promulgated a new constitution in November 1990 (Hutt,
1991). This constitution “largely reflected the demands of the democratic forces”
– such as the introduction of multi-party democracy under constitutional monar-
chy – but “in a compromise with the palace and the generals, confirmed Nepal
as a Hindu state and the king as the supreme commander of the army” (Ein-
siedel et al., 2012, p. 7). Thus, with democracy reinstated, the representation
of Janajatis in government institutions actually decreased as compared to the
Panchayat period, while male, high-caste Hindus from the central hill region
further monopolized their grip onto power, their dominance in party structures,
and their rule in an exclusive political system dominated by patron-client rela-
tionships (Lawoti, 2010; Riaz and Basu, 2007).54
In 1991, elections set the stage to a rocky restart of democracy, in which a
series of unstable, short-lived, and relentlessly reshuffled governments came to
power that failed to advance any poplar aspirations for economic inclusion or
good governance (Einsiedel et al., 2012).55 It was this time of political instabil-
ity that the CPN (M) launched its violent rebellion, which soon turned into one
of the “highest intensity internal conflicts in the world” (Murshed and Gates,
2005, p. 121). After communist leaders Pushpa Kamal Dahal (“Prachanda”)
54This was also reflected in the May 1991 elections that the NC won with 39.5 percent
of the vote and following which Girija Prasad (“G.P.”) Koirala, brother of early NC leaders
M.P. and B.P., was inaugurated as Prime Minister (Krämer, 2001): “Was this too much of a
coincidence or a disturbing reminder of the system devised by Rana Jung Bahadur” 150 years
earlier (Gupta, 1994, p. 2799)?
55In the 1990s, Nepal saw eight different governments under six Prime Ministers of four
parties. These were K.P. Bhattarai (1990-91, NC), G.P. Koirala (1991-94, NC), Man Mo-
han Adhikari (1994-95, CPN-UML), Sher Bahadur Deuba (1995-97, NC), Lokendra Bahadur
Chand (1997, Rastriya Prajatantra Party (Chand)), Surya Thapa (1997-98, Rastriya Pra-
jatantra Party (RPP)), G.P. Koirala (1998-99, NC), K.P. Bhattarai (1999-2000, NC).
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and Baburam Bhattarai had split from the CPN – Unity Center to form the
“parallel” CPN – Unity Center in 1994, they created the political front United
People’s Front Nepal (UPFN) in order to participate in the upcoming 1994 elec-
tions (cf. Footnote 52, Figure 6.1, and Lawoti, 2010). But just before the elec-
tions took place, the parallel CPN – Unity Center and UPFN union experienced
the chronic problem of factionalism that has defined the communist movement
since its foundation, and the splinter faction that emerged under Prachanda
and Bhattarai quickly denounced all other political parties as supporters of the
feudal system. This was likely also because their group was denied participation
in the 1994 elections by the Election Commission (Lawoti, 2010).
In 1995, the Prachanda and Bhattarai faction renamed itself the Communist
Party of Nepal (Maoist) and openly declared its goal to change Nepal’s unequal
and discriminatory political system through violent rebellion, with the explicit
aim to “confiscate the lands of feudals and landlords,” distribute them among
landless and poor peasants, and – “in order to cut the roots of imperialist
exploitation” – to nationalize all industries and banks that they argued were in
the hands of “bureaucratic capitalists” (Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist),
1995). On 4 February 1996, Bhattarai and female party leader Pampha Bhusal
handed the NC-government a list of forty demands that was effectively their
party manifesto, but the Maoists threatened that they would start an insurgency
if the government would not meet their demands before 17 February (Whelpton,
2005). Among those demands were that elected representatives would draft a
new constitution that would declare an end to monarchy and turn Nepal into
a secular state, and that all languages should be given equal status (Raghavan,
2011). On 13 February and four days before the ultimatum ran out, the CPN
(M) began attacking police stations, banks, and local government offices.
As Figure 6.2 shows, the first years of the Maoist insurgency were thereby
marked by low levels of fatalities, but the CPN (M) was still able to slowly
extend its sphere of influence to numerous districts throughout the country.
Both the low number of battle deaths and the CPN (M)’s ability to conquer
territory can be explained by two aspects. Firstly, the rebels were only fighting
the Nepal Police, while the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) under the control of
the king was not deployed.56 This was in part because of Birendra’s “genuine
unwillingness” and reluctance to use the RNA against his own citizens, but
also because the monarch perceived the insurgency “as a useful tool against
the politicians who had forced him to yield power in 1990” (Whelpton, 2005,
p. 207). Secondly, the rebels were able to conquer territory because the state
and its institutions only weakly penetrated the remote areas in western Nepal
and the mountainous north (Parbat) and was inefficiently equipped to stand in
the way of the Maoists. For instance, the Nepal Police is traditionally centrally
56In theory, the RNA was during the 1990s under the control of the National Defense Council
made up of the army’s Chief of Staff, the Prime Minister, and the Defense Minister (Adhikari,
2015). In practice, however, the traditionally Chhetri dominated army “looked to the king
who thus had a de facto veto upon its deployment” (Whelpton, 2005, p. 207).
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Notes: Data from the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (Sundberg and Melander,
2013). The data display the number of battle-related deaths per month from the dyad
“Government of Nepal vs. CPN (M).” The interim period is shaded in gray.
recruited and trained, so that police forces do “not normally enjoy close ties to
the community in which they [are] stationed” (Whelpton, 2005, 206f.). Many
Village Development Committees (VDCs) also lack roads that police vehicles
can drive on (Adhikari, 2014).
With little resistance by the state, the CPN (M) was in the late years of
its insurgency also able to establish an extensive structure of parallel “Peo-
ple’s Governments” and “People’s Courts” in the VDCs under its control (cf.
section 6.2.3). The People’s Courts were primarily set up by the Maoists in
order to adjudicate conflicts in the villages and punish opponents (but see the
self-perception of the courts by Maoist deputy commander Pasang, 2008). The
People’s Governments additionally enforced a parallel taxation system to level
revolutionary taxes, staged political education programs in which villagers were
indoctrinated with Maoist ideology, and coerced villagers into providing “vol-
untary” labor for development projects, as well as food and lodging for traveling
cadres of the CPN (M)’s armed wing People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (Einsiedel
et al., 2012). The People’s Courts would however also address “the immediate
needs of the rural people because the formal conflict resolution mechanism –
the district court system – was far away, slow, costly and often corrupt,” so
that many villagers were “relieved when minor conflicts were settled quickly
in villages at much lower costs” (Lawoti, 2010, p. 16). For instance, because
the Maoists promoted an ideology opposed to gender discrimination, women
often benefited from the People’s Courts that strictly punished domestic vio-
lence, polygamy, or men taking child brides (Lohani-Chase, 2008). The People’s
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Governments would also burn land-ownership records, which “made them im-
mensely popular among the poor segments of the rural population” (Uppsala
Conflict Data Program, 2015b).
A change to the low-intensity insurgency came on 1 June 2001. That day, an
intoxicated Crown Prince Dipendra shot his father King Birendra, his mother
Queen Aishwarya, and eight other members of the royal family before com-
mitting suicide – although conspiracy theories remain widespread, and many
Nepalis do not believe official reports but instead accuse Birendra’s only sur-
viving brother Gyanendra as the murderer (Shrestha, 2012). Gyanendra, for
that matter, ascended the throne on 4 June, and inaugurated the NC’s Sher
Bahadur Deuba as a new Prime Minister in July 2001. Following Deuba’s nom-
ination, the CPN (M) initially agreed to a ceasefire, as it believed that Deuba
“would be more flexible in negotiations” than his predecessor Koirala (Freedom
House, 2002a). This belief would not manifest itself. The CPN (M) soon ar-
gued that Deuba was “a mere helpless pawn in the hands of Gyanendra” and
“did not make a single political proposal to solve the problems of the country”
(Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), 2001).
Consequently, the rebels broke the ceasefire in November 2001, upon which
Gyanendra declared a state of emergency and ordered the RNA to fight the
Maoists. While Birendra thus had always been reluctant to deploy the RNA
internally, Gyanendra had no such reservations (Adhikari, 2015). As Figure 6.2
shows, deploying the RNA led to an escalation of the war and to skyrocketing
numbers of battle deaths – what it did not lead to, however, was an increased
control of the state over its territory. The CPN (M) would not only keep most
rural areas under its control but would also come to be “increasingly active
in towns nominally controlled by the government” and build up “a nationwide
presence” (International Crisis Group, 2005). For instance, in the final years of
the war, the rebels were said to control up to 80 percent of Nepal’s territory,
and had forced 68 percent of VDC secretaries and 1,271 of 1,979 police units to
withdraw (Adhikari, 2014; Einsiedel et al., 2012).
Lingering hopes for peace or democracy were further shattered on 1 Febru-
ary 2005. In a move similar to his father Mahendra’s 1959 decision to suspend
fundamental constitutional rights, Gyanendra that day sacked the Prime Min-
ister, assumed full political power, and claimed he did so to defend multiparty
democracy (International Crisis Group, 2005). This royal coup only played into
the hands of the CPN (M) that could rally supporters ever more around the
idea that the king was opposing democratic reforms. The coup thus led to a
further escalation of violence until 3 September 2005, when the CPN (M) de-
clared a ceasefire in order to hold talks with political parties, who had come to
equally opposed Gyanendra. These talks culminated in the 12-Point-Agreement
of November 2005, in which the Maoists and the parties agreed that the main
obstacle to peace was the monarchy, and that all forces should step up “to end
the autocratic monarchy and establish complete democracy” (in Nepali Times,
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2005). The 12-Point-Agreement thus not only united the seven mainstream po-
litical parties against Gyanendra – a movement calling itself the Seven-Party-
Alliance (SPA). It also “changed the political equation and squarely allied both
the parties and Maoists against the palace” (Freedom House, 2006), and set the
stage for a Second People’s Movement (Jana Andolan II) in April 2006 that de-
manded a return to democracy, peace, and finally inclusion for the historically
marginalized groups (Routledge, 2010).57
Gyanendra eventually bowed to public pressure, accepted to install a gov-
ernment formed by the mainstream political parties, and reinstated Nepal’s
parliament. This move opened new opportunities for intensified peace negoti-
ations between the political parties and the CPN (M) – but not with the king
(Routledge, 2010). These negotiations culminated in the signing of the CPA in
November 2006, as well as of the subsequent Agreement on the Monitoring of
Arms and Armies (AMAA) of December 2006 and the Interim Constitution of
2063 (January 2007). In these documents, the SPA and the Maoist insurgents
inter alia agreed on (1) the formation of a power-sharing interim government
to rule the country until (2) the holding of elections to a Constituent Assembly
(CA), which would draft a final constitution for Nepal; (3) on the dissolution of
all parallel forms of governance, in particular the Maoist People’s Courts and
People’s Governments; and (4) on the encampment and disarmament of the
PLA under UN supervision, and the simultaneous reform of the RNA that was
brought under parliamentary control and renamed the Nepal Army.
6.1.3 Post-Interim Politics in Nepal
The CPA formally ended Nepal’s People’s War, and intrastate conflict has not
resumed ever since (cf. Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2015b).58 While some
observers were concerned that radically left elites of the CPN (M) would remobi-
lize following a series of splits in the party between 2012 and 2014 (cf. Footnote
48), most agree today that the Maoist movement has given up violence for good,
has fully integrated into parliamentary politics (Basnyat, 2013; Ishiyama and
Batta, 2011; Ishiyama and Marshall, 2015), and that the shape of politics in
Nepal has been “seriously revised” (International Crisis Group, 2008).
57Jana Andolan II ’s legitimacy was boosted among the poorer and rural segments of Nepal
– after Jana Andolan I had taken place largely in urban areas – when the CPN (M) called its
supporters to join peaceful protests (e.g. Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), 2006).
58In 2007, Nepal saw a short period of non-state conflict between Maoist cadres and the
Madhesi Jana Adhikar Forum (Madhesi People’s Rights Forum) in the Tarai. This violence
erupted and resulted in 32 battle-related deaths after it became apparent that the Interim
Constitution would not fully address the interests and grievances of Madhesis (Uppsala Con-
flict Data Program, 2015b). Notably, violence broke out again in the Tarai in 2015, and once
more these turmoils were a result of Madhesi unrest in relation to the constitutional process
(International Crisis Group, 2016; Strasheim and Bogati, 2016). Yet again, these tensions did
not escalate into an intrastate conflict between the government and an organized rebel group,
but instead 58 individuals died as a result of government violence against civilian protesters
(cf. Human Rights Watch, 2015b). In Chapter 9, I discuss how these forms of post-interim
violence relate to issues of concept validity in my dependent variable.
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The post-interim period started when, to everyone’s surprise, the CPN (M)
won the CA elections in April 2008 with 30.52 percent of the vote, turning
Prachanda into Nepal’s first elected post-war Prime Minister. This victory
allowed the Maoists to achieve one of their central goals: to abolish the monarchy
and promulgate the Republic of Nepal in May 2008 (Bhatta, 2012; Lawoti, 2014).
The party’s electoral victory and Prachanda’s nomination as Prime Minister was
unexpected or “shocking” (cf. Martin, 2010) to most observers, also because the
CPN (M) had itself not expected to do well under the mixed proportional and
First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) electoral system that had been subject to much
debate during the interim period (cf. section 6.2.1). Several opinion polls had
also placed the party behind both the NC and the CPN-UML (Nepali Times,
2007; Reuters, 2007; Uppal, 2007). “Some voices [had] even suggested that the
CPN (M) did not want CA elections to be held because they were afraid of
being badly defeated” (Ogura, 2008, p. 46).
Following their victory, the Maoists could not sustain their early success,
were unable to consolidate their power, and did not manage to push through
other central goals they have formulated as their policy platform during the war.
From today’s perspective, some even argue that the CPN (M) belongs to “the
biggest losers of the peace process” (INT-20, 09.10.2015) and is “damaged” (cf.
Randolph, 2013) and “completely ruined as a party” (INT-12, 29.09.2015, cf.
INT-27, 19.10.2015 and INT-28, 19.10.2015). For instance, in 2012, one news
magazine commented that while Prachanda was long “regarded as a strong
political personality,” his status had changed and severely weakened: “Maoist
supremo Prachanda is nowhere near what he was then” (Spotlight Nepal, 2012).
The decline of the Maoists took several steps. In July 2008, the CPN (M)
lost the presidential election, after its new coalition partner CPN-UML decided
to vote for the rival NC candidate Ram Baran Yadav (United Nations, 2008).
In May 2009, Prachanda’s government fell over a dispute concerning the NA
Chief of Staff, and he was succeeded by CPN-UML Prime Minister Madhav
Kumar Nepal.59 Prachanda’s replacement was the beginning of intense fac-
tionalism within the CPN (M), and “[ideological], partisan, intra-party, and
personal conflicts as well as sheer lust for power led to four governments” in the
next four years (Lawoti, 2014, p. 135). In June 2012, and as a consequence of
these power struggles, the Maoist party split and a significant breakaway fac-
tion under “Kiran” and “Badal” formed the CPN-M (cf. Footnote 48). In early
2013, the Maoists lost negotiations on the integration of their ex-combatants
into the NA. The NA resisted former PLA cadres joining its ranks, because the
army deemed the ex-combatants to have too little formal education. Instead of
the originally desired 4,000 ex-combatants joining the NA, only approximately
59Prachanda had wanted to dismiss the NA’s General Rookmangad Katawal, who was a ma-
jor opponent of the Maoists during the People’s War, but the move was objected by President
Yadav who personally instructed Katawal to continue in his position. Prachanda’s succes-
sor Madhav Kumar Nepal promptly restored General Katawal to his post – where he had
continued to function on the basis of Yadav’s direction in any case (Lal, 2009).
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1,400 were integrated (Martin Chautari, 2013).
Finally, in November 2013, the factionalized CA was dissolved because it had
been unable to draft a new constitution, and the CPN (M) only scored a distant
third place in elections to a second CA. It regressed from 229 parliamentary
seats to a mere 80, and was forced into opposition (Lawoti, 2014, p. 139).
Most humiliatingly, Prachanda lost his own seat in the national parliament
(Randolph, 2013). Many observers argue that the internal power struggles that
reminded voters of the unstable years in the early 1990s were only part of the
equation for why the CPN (M) lost substantively. In addition, the Maoists had,
once in power, displayed corruption, nepotism, and personal enrichment on the
same level as the political parties they used to fight during the war, and they
had abandoned many of the promises they had made to mobilize minorities
into their ranks (cf. below, Bhatta, 2012; Strasheim and Bogati, 2016). This
particularly drove poorer segments of society away from the party (INT-02,
22.09.2015,; INT-01, 22.09.2015; INT-23, 12.10.2015; INT-27, 10.10.2015). As
one Nepali UNDP official remembers,
“In 2008, who were these people? [They were] strangers, revolution-
aries, their body language [was] different. ... Many of them had
been [living] underground for 10 years ... Prachanda was a brand
new [politician], he had been active underground his entire life ...
So with that kind of aura, inspiration, and threat, it was possible [to
win the election] in 2008. In 2013, they just had become one of the
other [parties]” (INT-24, 13.10.2015).
Having the experienced NC back in power in 2013 – the party won 196 out
of 575 CA seats – did however not speed up the constitutional process, and also
the second CA was politically deadlocked for over one year. This was largely
due to differences over how to delineate federal provinces (Human Rights Watch,
2015b). The constitutional process only accelerated after the devastating 7.8
and 7.3 magnitude earthquakes on 25 April and 12 May 2015 killed almost
9,000 people: “[Propelled] by the urgency to begin reconstruction” (Sharma
and Barry, 2015), the major parties agreed to complete the constitution in a
“fast track” process (Human Rights Watch, 2015b). On 20 September 2015,
President Yadav promulgated Nepal’s first post-war constitution in what many
call “the end of the peace process” with the former Maoist insurgents (INT-02,
23.09.2015, Bhattarai, 2015; Kantipur, 2015).
6.2 Interim Government in Nepal
Peace thus prevailed in Nepal’s post-interim period. Can this outcome be ex-
plained by properties of the 2006-08 interim government mitigating credible
commitment problems, such as when the perceived relative distribution of power
shifted to the CPN (M)’s disadvantage in 2007, as the party feared it would lose
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the elections? Would the Maoists also have accepted loosing these elections, or
would and could they have remobilized for war? Or are other causal mechanisms
and variables more powerful explanations for the absence of intrastate conflict,
such as the favorable condition that the CPN (M) won the 2008 elections?60
In the subsequent sections, I will argue that stable peace in Nepal can be
regarded as a function of mitigated commitment problems that drove the par-
ties’ decision to abolish their violent campaigns and that made it rational to
stick to peaceful behavior. This is particularly because, firstly, the interim
government enabled the Maoists to decrease any future political or economic
uncertainty, thus increasing their utility of the PR; PG outcome in Figure 3.2
relative to the WR;WG outcome. Secondly, both institutional designs of and
reforms in the interim government helped to alter intra-party elite-combatant
dynamics in the CPN (M), which substantively increased the party’s costs of
remobilization. In these sections, I will yet also show that while mitigated com-
mitment problems are among the explanation for peace in Nepal, the case study
also demonstrates the limitations of bargaining theory with regard to two as-
pects. Firstly, applying bargaining theory to Nepal faces limitations due to the
theory’s standard modeling of war as a two-player game (cf. Chapter 3 and
Lake, 2010), because Nepal’s modern politics are marked by conflicts between
the palace-parties-Maoists troika. Excluding the palace from the analyses would
overlook some important dynamics in how particularly power-sharing interim
government helped to mitigate commitment problems. Secondly, bargaining
theory faces limitations for the case of Nepal due to its modeling of players as
unitary actors. Not only have political forces in Nepal been historically plagued
by extreme horizontal factionalism, as well as frequent splits – with the “lines
of difference” often not being “over ideologies but over individual personality”
(Bhatta, 2012, p. 2). Furthermore, my discussion on power-sharing interim
government below will also demonstrate the importance of adhering to vertical
elite-combatant divides within the CPN (M). I discuss these limitations in detail
also in Chapter 9.
In what follows, I attend to each hypothesized property of interim govern-
ment sequentially in order to analyze how institutional designs and reforms did
or did not help to overcome commitment problems in Nepal, and how this is
linked to stable post-interim peace This concerns (H1) power-sharing and (H2)
international interim government, (H3) the integration of parallel institutions,
and (H4) the participation of civil society and political parties. I structure each
section in three parts. Firstly, I briefly review the theoretical causal mechanism
for each property of interim government. Secondly, I describe the respective
provisions as decided upon in the 2006 CPA, as well as the ensuing AMAA
60Past research on Nepal has hardly referred to bargaining theory, while structural, socioe-
conomic variables remain “central in the existing literature and dominate most analyses of the
armed conflict in Nepal” (Eck, 2010, p. 37). Extreme poverty (Do and Iyer, 2010), economic
inequality (Murshed and Gates, 2005), as well as the exclusion of minorities (Malagodi, 2013)
belong to the most prominent explanations of conflict in the country.
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and Interim Constitution. Thirdly, I outline the process of its implementation,
present an analysis on how this process of events and actions affected the causal
mechanisms between each property of interim rule and peace in the post-interim
period, and discuss competing explanations and limitations of my theoretical
argument.
6.2.1 Power-Sharing Interim Government
Following the seminal work on interim governments by Shain and Linz (1995),
Chapter 3 formulated a distinction between power-sharing interim government
and interim periods in which only one party holds power. I held that compared
to caretaker or revolutionary rule, power-sharing is more likely to mitigate com-
mitment problems as it comes with physical, economic, and political benefits
that decrease future uncertainty for warring parties (cf. Figure 3.3).
In the CPA and the Interim Constitution of 2063 (2007), CPN (M) and
SPA negotiated a power-sharing interim government to rule until first post-war
elections.61 In specific, the parties agreed to “form an interim legislature on the
basis of [the] interim constitution” (Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2006),
which promulgated that the interim legislature should have 330 seats as an
“expanded form of the current House of Representatives” (International Crisis
Group, 2006, p. 12). The House was to be formally dissolved, but all sitting
members would fill 209 seats, the CPN (M) would receive 73 seats, and 48 seats
would be allocated to civil society and oppressed communities.
These provisions were accordingly implemented. On 12 January 2007, the
Maoists named the 73 people to represent them in the interim legislature, among
them – in a first for Nepal – nine women, eleven Dalits, 20 Madhesis, and 23
Janajatis (AFP, 2007c). The CPN (M) formally joined the interim parliament
three days later, and formed a power-sharing interim cabinet with represen-
tatives of the SPA on 31 March 2007. Although the CPN (M) had thereby
initially voiced its desire to obtain the position of Chair or Vice-Chair in the
interim parliament, it compromised and ceded both seats to the NC and the
CPN-UML; but instead received the post of deputy prime minister in the interim
61That the warring parties decided on implementing a power-sharing interim government in
the first place was certainly not a random coincidence, but is the result of an inherently path-
dependent process and intrinsically linked to Nepal’s historical experiences with democratic –
and power-sharing – rule. This aspect is particularly relevant for the research design of this
dissertation, because its democratic history distinguishes Nepal from the other two case studies
in my analysis (cf. Chapter 5). That NC and CPN-UML leaders had experience in forming
coalition governments and cooperating in the political institutions of the state during the
1990s – at least among high-caste, Nepali-speaking, Hindu men from the central hill region –
contributed both to why power-sharing interim government with the Maoists became possible
in 2006; and to to why the NC and CPN-UML also quickly accepted their 2008 electoral defeat
(Upreti, 2008). For instance, interim Prime Minister G.P. Koirala demonstrated his confidence
in the democratic system by declaring in late 2007: “Victory or loss is part of the election. If
we lose this time we’ll win in the next election five years later” (in Reuters, 2007). But as I
showed in Chapter 4, what holds for Nepal cannot be generalized for the whole sample, as a
history of democratic rule is not a valid predictor of why power-sharing interim governments
form. I further discuss the role of democratic history comparatively in Chapter 9.
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government (Ogura, 2008). The rebels in total assumed five cabinet portfolios,
although the NC kept the position of the Prime Minister and the crucial min-
istries of defense, interior, and finance. The CPN-UML received the foreign
ministry (Taylor, 2007).
Decreasing Uncertainty through Physical Security
In Chapter 3, I held that a first causal mechanism for why power-sharing interim
government is more apt to increase the stability of peace than other governments
is that power-sharing reduces future uncertainty by raising the physical secu-
rity of weaker-growing parties (cf. Figure 3.3). Power-sharing requires, firstly,
that parties come out of hiding in the periphery and join the institutions in
the capital, which means they reveal their organizational structure to one an-
other (making it difficult to remobilize for war) and which turns them into
easy targets for enemy troops (further reducing uncertainty about their future
behavior). Secondly, power-sharing governments also tend to offer state body-
guards to rebel-leaders-turned-politicians, and the move to the capital comes
with international attention, further increasing physical security.
Nepal does not confirm to this causal pattern, because the necessary tempo-
ral precedence of cause to effect cannot be established: On the one hand, there
is evidence of a clear link between the offer or awaiting possibility of joining
power-sharing interim rule and Maoist senior leaders coming out of hiding and
moving to the capital. On the other hand, these leaders came out of hiding
well before they actually joined the power-sharing institutions, but appeared in
public already in June 2006 as they struck an informal deal on joint rule.
CPN (M) chief negotiators arrived in Kathmandu on 22 May 2006 to start
talks with the SPA (Gurubacharya, 2006a). Only weeks later Prachanda started
publicly appearing for the first time after a decade of living underground at a
meeting 2,000 kilometers southwest Kathmandu (AFP, 2006). Based on his
interviews with the Maoist leadership, Ogura (2008, p. 31) notes that these
early public appearances were specifically meant to convey the CPN (M)’s com-
mitment to peace. By mid June, Bhattarai and Prachanda arrived in Kath-
mandu – much in contrast to their Angolan or Cambodian counterparts, who
only returned to the capital well into the interim period. On 16 June 2006,
“Prachanda’s first media appearance in 35 years of political life took place at
the press conference that was held after a meeting with SPA leaders at the
prime minister’s official residence” (Ogura, 2008, p. 31). The next day, the
parties struck an informal bargain to include power-sharing provisions in the
upcoming peace deal. Narayan Wagle, editor of the Kantipur newspaper and
one of Nepal’s best-known journalists, commented that Prachanda’s public ap-
pearance was “a big achievement that guarantees that ... the rebels will not be
returning to the jungles again” (in Gurubacharya, 2006b).
Nepal equally does not confirm to the aspect of the proposed causal mecha-
nism that power-sharing interim governments decrease uncertainty by providing
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official bodyguards to rebel-leaders-turned-ministers. Evidence from Nepal’s
peace process rather points to the opposite. Upon joining the interim govern-
ment, CPN (M) leaders were provided with official government security guards,
a deal negotiated upon in the CPA. Leaders yet perceived this as a security
threat instead of as a benefit; and in July 2007, they threatened to pull out of
the interim government because of these physical security details. CPN (M) in-
terim Minister for Communication Krishna Bahadur Mahara stated: “We have
sensed a conspiracy against us ... Of all the 22 ministers only we were given
security guards from the ranger battalion, who received jungle warfare training
during the insurgency ... There was no need to send army with sophisticated
weapons for our security ... This move is very suspicious and we were not
consulted. We are now seriously considering whether to stay in the [interim]
government or not” (in AFP, 2007b). In the following weeks, the CPN (M)
demanded that their representative’s security was provided by the PLA, and
accordingly, “a small number of armed combatants were [mobilized] outside the
cantonments in order to provide security to the Maoist leaders” (Subedi, 2013,
p. 148) parallel to the NA security guards (Adhikari, 2015).
Decreasing Uncertainty through Economic Security
In Chapter 3, I held that a second mechanism for why power-sharing interim
government is more efficient in increasing the stability of peace than caretaker or
revolutionary governments is that power-sharing reduces future uncertainty by
raising the economic security of weaker-growing parties (cf. Figure 3.3). In war-
torn states, access to wealth is often determined by control of the government,
and thus either party must fear to be economically marginalized if the other
one fully controls an interim government. By rewarding weaker-growing parties
with cabinet or legislative positions, power-sharing enables them to control (or
loot) resources that come ascribed to each post they hold and lowers incentives
to acquire such benefits through costly war (Haaß and Ottmann, 2015).
Nepal strongly confirms to this causal pattern. Both my interview data as
well as previous accounts on Nepal’s interim period indicate that economic ben-
efits from joining the power-sharing interim government were among the main
reasons for why CPN (M) leaders abandoned their violent campaign against
the state. This becomes visible as throughout the interim period (and well
thereafter), corruption among political elites in Kathmandu was perceived to
be “epidemic” (cf. Freedom House, 2008). Others argued that the inclusion of
provisions in the interim constitution, “such as the unrestricted authority of the
government to grant pardons suggest that interim arrangements may enable the
political elite to sweep past misdeeds under the carpet” (Bertelsmann Founda-
tion, 2008b, p. 10). Some media outlets accused Maoist chairman Prachanda
in particular of “promoting corruption, nepotism and lack of transparency in
financial matters,” and of using his control and influence over political institu-
tions and processes to protect corrupt elements within his party (Indian Express,
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2010). Several interview partners – and many Nepalis in private conversations –
voiced their perception that as soon as Maoist senior leaders joined the interim
government, they underwent a “remarkable change in ... lifestyle” opposed to
what they had preached during the war (Dahal, 2008, p. 28).62 Instead, it
resembled the lifestyle of those politicians the Maoists had fought against (Ad-
hikari and Gautam, 2014). They were said to use the interim government to
prioritize their individual economic benefits over society’s growth, much in the
tradition of the Nepalese state as “the overriding mechanism of accumulation
and vehicle for private enrichment” (Pfaff-Czarnecka, 2005, p. 164).
For instance, a civil society leader pointed out that as soon as the Maoist
leaders moved into the capital and joined the political institutions, “the prices
of real estate in Kathmandu went so high, and [sixty per cent of] the buyers
... were Maoists” (INT-27, 19.10.2015). Similarly, an international develop-
ment worker remembered how Nepalis liked “to point out the residences of the
[Maoist] leadership,” in particular of Baburam Bhattarai (INT-02, 23.09.2015);
and a former NC minister equally remembered that Nepalis saw how the Maoist
leaders became “the richest people” heading “the richest party within one year”
after signing the CPA (INT-23, 12.10.2015). This public perception is not least
reflected in cartoons published in late 2006 in the Kantipur newspaper that
depict NC leader Koirala and Maoist chairman Prachanda in large government
vehicles they were reported to misuse (see United We Blog, 2006). All in all, the
acquisition of economic benefits through joining the power-sharing government
not least meant that even though the Maoists were growing weaker in the post-
interim period, they were doing so while the leadership was in an economically
extremely comfortable position. For instance, in 2012 – the year that the CPN
(M) split up into two factions, and the year before the party was badly defeated
in the elections to a second CA – Prachanda came under fire and “compounded
the resentment of some of his comrades” for acquiring a luxury mansion and
seemingly adopting “the lifestyle of the billionaire royals he once loathed” (Nel-
son, 2012).63
Having said that, there is also evidence that the causal mechanism link-
ing power-sharing interim government to post-interim peace through economic
security includes a further intermediate step for Nepal. My interviews indi-
cate that while receiving economic benefits reduced uncertainty for elites; this
was directly linked to another sub-mechanism that raised the costs of defec-
tion for Maoist elites by changing intra-party elite-combatant dynamics. As the
above-quoted statement of “comrade resentment” towards Prachanda’s post-war
62To which Prachanda responded: “We’re in multiparty politics now, not in the jungles...
We must understand that the notion of equality is relative even within Marxism. If the
leadership has a horse to ride, all cadres can’t expect to have that” (Dahal, 2008, p. 28).
63The question is, would the CPN (M) have received economic benefits had it not joined
the interim government? This is unlikely, not least because unlike UNITA (cf. Chapter 7),
the CPN (M) formally abolished its parallel government upon joining the interim government
and was unable to continue its main sources of funding during the interim period, meaning it
became dependent on extracting wealth from state institutions (cf. section 6.2.3).
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lifestyle indicated, this means that while joining the power-sharing interim gov-
ernment increased the economic security of CPN (M) leaders, receiving these
benefits tied these leaders’ hands to peaceful behavior also because it alien-
ated them from combatants. In other words, combatants noticed that they had
“lost everything on a personal level,” but what they had fought for was not
practiced in Kathmandu (INT-16, 05.10.2015). As the former RPP minister
Pashupati Shumsher Rana phrased it, “Comrade Prachanda has a war chest of
more than a billion rupees ... It’s just too bad for the rest of his supporters.
The whole problem with the Maoist party is that within it are the haves and
the have nots. The differences between them are quite remarkable” (in Nelson,
2012). Observing the behavior of their political leaders in the interim govern-
ment who they perceived as enriching themselves while failing to address the
needs of ex-combatants – some even argue that CPN (M) leaders tried to in-
tentionally keep an unsatisfied and potentially violent group of ex-combatants
in cantonment sites as a bargain for further negotiations (Bleie and Shrestha,
2012) – ex-combatants became increasingly frustrated and disillusioned with
their leadership. As Adhikari and Gautam (2014, p. 80) note, Maoist leaders
were accused if stealing “state resources meant for the upkeep of combatants
for several years” which led to a “sense of betrayal among former fighters.”
For instance, one international development worker remembered that ex-
combatants quickly became “disillusioned” with or felt “betrayed by Prachanda,
Bhattarai, and the leadership,” as they had been made promises by their polit-
ical leaders in order to recruit them for the PLA, which yet did not materialize
(INT-02, 22.09.2015, cf. similar statements by INT-16, 05.10.2015; INT-07,
25.09.2015; INT-16, 05.10.2015; INT-22, 10.10.2015; or INT-26, 19.10.2015).
Another development worker also established a link between ex-combatant dis-
illusionment and corruption among the CPN (M) interim representatives and
argued that intra-party mistrust and frustration started as soon as the Maoists
assumed positions in the interim government and became perceived as corrupt
as other politicians had been as before them (INT-03, 23.09.2015). And a third
development worker described how this process of intra-party splits between
combatants and the leadership particularly materialized in late 2007, when ra-
dios and computers had been installed in the cantonment sites so that cantoned
combatants were able to more intensely follow politics of the interim govern-
ment in Kathmandu, and were able to see how their leadership pursued its own
agenda but did not advocate for the ex-combatants (INT-30, 12.11.2015, cf.
a similar statement by INT-27, 19.10.2015). As Prachanda’s former chauffeur
phrased it: “The ideals that we have fought for have all been wasted... This is
not the communist spirit. This is why I decided to disassociate from Prachanda”
(in Nepali Times, 2012). With respect to this discussion, the mechanism link-
ing power-sharing interim government and post-interim peace through economic
benefits may be modified for Nepal to depict the extra step of raising the costs
of defection (cf. Figure 6.3). The mechanism thereby illustrates the limitations
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of bargaining theory, as its modeling of unitary actors does not normally assume
such intra-party dynamics.
Decreasing Uncertainty through Political Security
In Chapter 3, I proposed that a final mechanism for why power-sharing interim
government is most efficient in increasing the stability of post-interim peace is
that power-sharing reduces future uncertainty through increasing the political
security of warring parties (cf. Figure 3.3). Power-sharing (1) grants weaker-
growing parties a voice in the design on post-interim institutions (for instance
through jointly passed laws that are difficult to achieve, costly to violate, and
hard to renege on), which decreases their uncertainty about an adversary’s fu-
ture behavior. It also (2) gives weaker-growing parties the knowledge on how
to manipulate future institutions to their advantage (Manning, 2007).
Nepal confirms to this causal pattern. Joining the power-sharing interim
government awarded the CPN (M) with a position to directly influence future
laws by which it could negotiate the design of the post-interim state in a way
that reduced its fears of political marginalization. This can best be illustrated
by using the example of the implementation process of a new electoral law. Af-
ter the CPN (M) had joined the interim government in April 2007, increased
polarization between the former belligerents meant that the party announced
its resignation from the interim institutions already on 18 September 2007 in
protest over not seeing two of its central demands met. Firstly, the CPN (M)
demanded an amendment to the Interim Constitution of 2063 (2007) that would
immediately call for an end of the monarchy. Secondly, it asked for a constitu-
tional amendment that would alter the proposed mixed electoral system so that
proportional elements would be strengthened at the costs of FPTP elements
(Bhandari, 2007). This move was purely based on worries of the CPN (M) lead-
ership regarding their political security in the post-interim period: “The Maoists
became concerned about their chances at the polls” after several opinion surveys
had placed them behind both the NC and the CPN-UML, and “issued 22 pre-
conditions for their participation in the CA elections, including the immediate
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declaration of a republic and a shift to a fully proportional electoral system” –
under which they expected to do better (Freedom House, 2008). Both the NC
and the CPN-UML, however, preferred the mixed electoral system. A former
NC minister remembered,
“We did not want this proportional system by which no party will
gain majority ... [We] thought that we can give [seat] reservations
to women and backward groups, ... but [that] at the same time,
one party can form a majority government ... It was [the Maoists’]
insistence that we retain this [electoral law], probably because ...
they thought through proportional rule they will get more seats, so
they insisted on a higher number of [seats elected by a] proportional
system” (INT-23, 12.10.2015).
On 26 September 2007, NC and CPN-UML partly gave in to the Maoists’
demands and the parties resumed negotiations on reaching an agreement on
the pending issues. On 23 December 2007, they struck a 23 Point Agreement
for the Maoists to reenter the power-sharing interim government. This agree-
ment changed the text of the Interim Constitution considerably and in many
ways according to the demands of the Maoists, for instance because it increased
the number of CA members from 497 to 601, of which 335 members would be
elected through proportional representation, 240 through a FPTP system, and
26 would be nominated (United Nations Mission in Nepal, 2007).64 In addition,
the Interim Constitution was amended to read that Nepal should be a federal
republic that would be declared at the first meeting of the elected CA. Conse-
quently, the CPN (M) reentered the interim government on 30 December 2007,
being given two further minister portfolios in the expanded cabinet and occu-
pying seven posts out of a total 30 (AFP, 2008b; Communist Party of Nepal
(Maoist), 2007). CPN (M) Central Committee member “Badal” later admitted
that this process was central to the party’s decision to stick with the peaceful
electoral process: “Although our demand to adopt a full proportional repre-
sentation system for CA elections was not adopted, the number of seats to be
allocated through proportional representation increased ... We thought this was
a gain for the people” (in Ogura, 2008, p. 44). In sum, the power-sharing interim
64In specific, paragraph 63.3 of the Interim Constitution was amended from reading: “The
Constituent Assembly shall consist of ... four hundred twenty five members, out of which
four hundred and nine members shall be elected through Mixed Electoral System and sixteen
members shall be nominated ... (a) Two hundred and five members shall be elected from
among the candidates elected on the basis of First-Past-the-Post system ... (b) Two hundred
and four members shall be elected under the proportional electoral system ... considering the
whole country as one ... constituency. (c) Sixteen members to be nominated by the interim
Council of Ministers ... from amongst the prominent persons of national life,” to: “(a) One
member elected, under the first-past-the-post system, from each geographical constituency,
two hundred and forty ... based on the national census preceding the Constituent Assem-
bly elections ... (b) Three hundred and thirty-five members to be elected according to the
proportional representation system ... treating the whole country as a single constituency.
(c) Twenty-six members nominated by the Council of Ministers ... from among distinguished
persons and persons from among ethnic and indigenous groups” (Government of Nepal, 2007).
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government thus awarded the CPN (M) the with the opportunity to manipu-
late the rules of the political game to its advantage, and positively influenced
its decision to stick to peace in the long run.
Power-Sharing Interim Government and Costs of Defection
While I only argued for the link between power-sharing interim government
and peace through the mechanism of decreasing future uncertainty in Chapter
3, Nepal also offers evidence for a mechanism that links power-sharing to peace
through raised costs of defection. In Nepal, power-sharing raised the costs of
defection for the one party in the bargaining situation that remained outside of
power during and after the interim period: the royal palace. The palace had
become substantively sidelined during the interim period. Already in July 2006,
King Gyanendra was forced to take an oath of allegiance to the reinstated na-
tional parliament. In September that same year, the parliament passed a law to
tighten civilian control over the armed forces and change its name from RNA to
NA. In December, Gyanendra was “forced to pay customs tax to collect shipped
goods at the airport in a first for the embattled royal family” (MacRae, 2008).
In January 2007, Gyanendra’s head was removed from Nepal’s banknotes, and
in August, the interim government nationalized his palaces. The NA, mean-
while – long loyal to the king – was said to be “looking at the government with
resentment” while the government was “looking at security forces with suspi-
cion” (in Sengupta, 2006c). A NA major reflects on the mood within in the
NA that time: “Sometimes I think that we were one of the losers [of the peace
process], because we were fighting for the king ... Our party was very loyal to
the king. We could not save the king. That [was] good for the country perhaps,
but for us at the time, [it was] very painful” (INT-09, 27.09.2015).
From a bargaining perspective, the fact that the sidelined king and his army
“surrendered” (Bell, 2008) and did not stage another royal coup against the
newly formed and institutionally unconsolidated interim government presents a
puzzle, particularly as Gyanendra was increasingly “humiliated” in the peace
process (AFP, 2008a). Why did he not violently prevent his ousting from power?
Two factors emerge as an explanation for the lack of royal violence that had been
so common in the previous decades of Nepalese politics, and both relate to the
palace’s increasing costs of defection. Firstly, public opinion of Gyanendra was
expressively resentful not least due to popular conspiracy theories about his
involvement in the 2001 Royal Massacre and the death of his brother Birendra
(cf. above; INT-02, 23.09.2015; INT-06, 25.09.2015; INT-09, 27.09.2015; INT-
19, 09.10.2015; Ogura, 2008). Observing the deteriorating public opinion of
the monarch, the NA decided that it was rational not to take his side. As
a former CPN-UML minister remembers, while the “armed forces were very
much controlled by the royal palace [throughout history], ... the institution of
the monarchy had become so unpopular, particularly after the Royal Massacre,”
that the NA decided not to intervene (INT-25, 19.10.2015).
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Secondly, also the installation of a power-sharing interim government in-
creased the palace’s costs of defection and ultimately forced it to accept its
new position in the political system. This is because the broad coalition of the
parties and the Maoists contributed to the general perception that the country
was resolutely united against the royal palace. A former PLA deputy comman-
der points out that now that all parties “were in a common agreement and ...
on the people’s side, the NA and the monarchy ... were the representatives of
some minor ... feudal class. So if there had been a military coup, it wouldn’t
have been successful” (INT-08, 26.09.2015, cf. INT-14, 30.09.2015 and INT-
18, 06.10.2015). A NA major general agrees with this perspective, noting that
there was a strong majority in the interim government and the subsequent CA
to abolish the monarchy, so it was “not up to us [the NA] to do anything. We
could perhaps have staged a coup ... and resorted to undemocratic means, but
it was not possible for us to bring back the monarchy. So we said okay, sorry,
this is the decision of the people of Nepal, and we are the army of the people,
so we have to accept this decision” (INT-09, 27.09.2015).
6.2.2 International Interim Government
My second hypothesis held that international interim government, as opposed
to interim government without the involvement of external actors, increases the
stability of peace. I defined international interim rule as one in which members
of the international community assume political authority. I outlined that past
research has often looked at such interim government in a strict interpretation
following Doyle (2002), but that I prefer a more lenient perspective because
most present interim governments see vast degrees of international influence in
decision-making – even if this influence is not formalized in administrative struc-
tures. In Chapter 3, I then held that in the presence of commitment problems,
international interim rule increases the stability of peace by raising costs of de-
fection through two mechanisms (cf. Figure 3.3). Firstly, international interim
government increases costs of defection through physical deterrence, because
international actors can protect buffer zones during demobilization periods or
raise the costs of combat for parties that no longer only have to fight each other
but also international peacekeepers. Secondly, such interim government comes
with policy influence, meaning that every policy field advanced by an interna-
tional officer decreases a stronger party’s opportunity to marginalize a weaker
one, thus mitigating the weaker party’s commitment problem and decreasing its
likelihood to resort to war. Concurrently, in cases where international actors
do not take on interim authority, commitment problems should be exacerbated
for weaker-growing parties.
Following either a lenient or a strict understanding of the concept, Nepal
did not see any form of international interim government. The warring parties
agreed in Paragraph 9 (“Implementation and Monitoring”) of the CPA to “the
monitoring of the management of arms and the armies by the United Nations
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Mission in Nepal” (Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2006) and to have the UN
observe the CA elections. But UNMIN was established in UN Security Council
Resolution 1740 not a peacekeeping mission under the authority of the United
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), but as a smaller
political mission under the authority and management of the United Nations
Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA) (United Nations, 2007b).65 By 31
October 2007, UNMIN’s strength of staff comprised 153 military observers,
222 international civilian staff, 179 local civilian staff, and 200 UN volunteers,
making it lack both the mandate and the resources to assume a authority in
Nepal’s interim period (Center on International Cooperation, 2008).
This lack of international authority in Nepal’s interim government has two
reasons. The first reason is of regional nature, as Nepal’s southern neighbor
and regional power India “had only reluctantly come to accept the need for
any UN role, and ... certainly did not want to see a UN peacekeeping force
in a neighboring country with which it has an open border” (Martin, 2010,
p. 9).66 The second reason for UNMIN’s weak mandate is of domestic nature,
as also Nepal’s warring parties were not in favor of a deeper role for the UN
during the interim period (Center on International Cooperation, 2010). They
argued that Nepal’s state structure had not completely collapsed during the
People’s War, and believed that they consequently had enough local capacity to
manage a transition to peace (INT-24, 13.10.2015; INT-25, 19.10.201; INT-27,
19.10.2015; cf. International Crisis Group, 2008; Sisk, 2014). This perception
was particularly fueled by leading voices in the NA that had long been one of the
main troop contributors to UN peacekeeping missions worldwide, and that was
convinced to have enough expertise to guide Nepal’s peace process. A former
major general of the NA remembered how “it was very hard for us [the NA] to
accept that peacekeepers from other countries would be coming here, it was very
humiliating ... What we accepted was that they would not come in uniform,”
or with a mandate to override local decisions (INT-09, 27.09.2015).
Local Ownership as an Alternative Mechanism
Consequently, the international interim government variable does not corre-
late with the outcome in the theorized way in Nepal, and both proposed sub-
mechanism on physical deterrence and policy influence do not hold – instead,
there is evidence that the lack of physical deterrence and of policy influence mit-
igated commitment problems. In other words, a more intrusive international
role during the interim period would likely have had a much more detrimental
effect on political developments in Nepal; and it was rather substantive local
ownership of interim rule as an alternative causal mechanism that added to
65UNMIN’s mandate was originally set for a period of 12 month but extended by Resolutions
1796 (2008), 1825 (2008), 1864 (2009), 1879 (2009), 1909 (2010), 1921 (2010), and 1939 (2010).
UNMIN ceased its operations on 15 January 2011.
66See also INT-11, 28.09.2015; INT-19, 09.10.2015, INT-24, 13.10.2015; INT-25, 19.10.2015.
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peace in the long run, both on the elite as well as on the combatant level (cf.
Dahal and Bhatta, 2008).
Firstly, and on the elite level, Suhrke (2011, pp. 17, 39) argues in her rare
analysis of the UN’s role in Nepal that the notion that Nepalis should locally
own the peace process “was established early and became the centerpiece in the
political culture that surrounded the peace talks,” and that “a more prominent
international role would likely have been counterproductive by courting ... na-
tionalist reactions” among elites in the interim government (cf. Sisk, 2014). This
means that increased international authority would have negatively influenced
the mitigation of commitment problems for Nepal’s former belligerents, if the
fueling of nationalist rhetoric and policies – particularly the CPN (M) had in
the past often formulated their agenda in a “strongly nationalist frame” (Inter-
national Crisis Group, 2005, p. 5) – had prohibited the cooperation between the
parties in the power-sharing institutions. Instead, Nepal’s political elites were
not only able to take “justifiable pride in the fact that their peace process was
their own, and not imposed or mediated by any external actor” (Martin, 2010,
p. 10) – one interview partner stressed that Nepal’s peace process was completed
“with Nepali experience and Nepali knowledge” (INT-05, 24.09.2015) – but such
local ownership also helped the cooperation in the interim government. For in-
stance, a former NC minister recalled that the inclusion of CPN (M) leaders in
the interim government made all “problems” of the peace process to become the
Maoists’ problems as well, thus adding to their sense of ownership of the interim
period (INT-23, 12.10.2015). And Prachanda stated on the 23 Point Agreement
compromise that the parties arrived at in December 2007 (cf. above): “If CA
elections had not been held because we stuck to our demands, we [Maoists]
would have been blamed for the failure of the peace process. We did not want
that to happen” (in Ogura, 2008, p. 44).
Secondly, and on the combatant level, evidence suggests that stronger inter-
national authority could also have obstructed the disarmament process in Nepal,
because the process of international peacekeepers forcefully retrieving combat-
ants of their arms would likely have been perceived by the latter as “emascu-
lating” (INT-29, 03.11.2015, cf. Spear, 2002). Many interview partners in that
regard pointed out that while UNMIN would not have been in a position to
stop the Maoists had the rebels decided to remobilize for war, this was precisely
the idea of the peace process (cf. INT-09, 27.09.2015; INT-19, 09.10.2015; INT-
23, 12.10.2015; INT-24, 13.10.2015; INT-27, 19.10.2015; INT-29, 03.11.2015).
For instance, a major general of the NA remembered that ex-combatants could
always have opened the weapons storage containers had they wanted to, not
least because “UNMIN monitors were very small in number, and they were not
armed at all” (INT-09, 27.09.2015). Some also argued that UNMIN presence
was thus only meant to offer “psychological support” instead of actual physical
deterrence (INT-23, 12.10.2015 and Bleie and Shrestha, 2012). As an UNDP
program director phrases it: “I think they [UNMIN] would not have been [able
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to stop the Maoists] if there would have been a real political decision to go back
[to war]. But I think that was not the idea: ... UNMIN’s presence was ... [sym-
bolical]” (INT-24, 13.10.2015). This symbolical role meant that ex-combatants
voluntarily deposited their weapons, and kept the option to take their weapons
and leave the cantonment sites should the peace process fail – which turned
disarmament into a “personal sacrifice” for peace (cf. section 6.2.3, INT-29,
03.11.2015, INT-30, 12.11.2015). In sum, this discussion highlights the vital
role of local ownership during interim governance that has often been brought
forward by the critical peacebuilding literature on international interim govern-
ment as reviewed in Chapter 2 (e.g. Chopra, 2000; Donais, 2009; Narten, 2008;
Narten, 2009). The UNMIN success also provides an argument for the merit
of smaller “designer peace missions” that more flexibly adapt to local contexts
than extensive peacekeeping missions that tend to be heavily criticized for their
“one fits all” approach to peacebuilding (cf. Martin, 2010; Narten, 2008).67
6.2.3 Integration of Parallel Institutions
My third hypothesis in Chapter 3 reasoned that in the presence of commitment
problems, more advanced processes of integrating the parallel political and mil-
itary institutions of warring parties into the authority of an interim government
come with a higher stability of peace because of raised costs of defection. In
order to sustain in war, parties need parallel military and political institutions
to accumulate means and resources for fighting and to manage their relation
with the population. As long as these parallel institutions persist throughout
an interim period, parties retain the financial resources, popular legitimacy,
hierarchical command structures, and war-time mindsets to remobilize in the
post-interim period. Interim governments that integrate these parallel institu-
tions should consequently increase the stability of peace (cf. Figure 3.3).
Parallel Political Institutions
During the People’s War, the CPN (M) developed an extensive set of parallel
political structures in the areas under its control. As I outlined in section 6.1,
these parallel structures included the People’s Governments as well as the Peo-
ple’s Courts, the Maoists’ parallel judiciary system. These political structures
were used by the CPN (M) both for acquiring financial resources, as well as
for increasing their popular legitimacy. The party decreased its costs of war
through these structures inter alia through parallel taxation – for instance by
collecting “protection money” from the salaries of government schoolteachers
67There is also evidence that local ownership was a beneficial aspect in the interim gov-
ernment because the warring parties did not perceive the UN as a “truly neutral author-
ity” (Gisselquist, 2002), but thought that it was leaning towards the CPN (M) (cf. INT-08,
26.09.2015; INT-12, 29.09.2015; INT-19, 09.10.2015, and Center on International Cooperation,
2010). This would have impeded any international authority’s role in mitigating commitment
problems through policy influence, an aspect that I further discuss in Chapter 9.
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– and through non-monetary taxation – such as seasonal donations of parts of
the harvest from farmers (Whelpton, 2005). Forced conscription was another
mechanism to service this purpose, and the CPN (M) sent letters to families
demanding a son or daughter for the movement, threatening violence for non-
compliance (Lohani-Chase, 2008). Political education and the indoctrination of
the population living in the controlled territories were further functions the Peo-
ple’s Governments served, and “this was done with various forms of propaganda
such as mass meetings, cultural campaigns, postering and walling, pamphlets,
newspaper articles, and holding political classes” (Eck, 2010, p. 39). Controlling
territory also allowed the Maoists to set up illegal arms trafficking routes over
the Nepali-Indian border (Karp, 2013).
But while the CPN (M) often built its parallel political structures on fear,
threat, and coercion, these structures also helped the party to increase its le-
gitimacy among the rural population, such as by delivering public goods and
a cheap judicial system, or because violence against local elites immensely in-
creased their support among poor peasants (Lawoti, 2010). For instance, a
female ex-commander of the PLA remembered that after installing the People’s
Courts, justice provision in the villages became much faster and more accessible
for women in particular, and that cases of sexual violence were often solved “im-
mediately” by the Maoist court system so that women did not have to take up
the long way to the district court (INT-10, 28.09.2015; cf. INT-15, 04.10.2015;
INT-19, 09.10.2015; Pettigrew and Shneiderman, 2004). Furthermore, another
“strategy of the Maoists to assert their legitimacy as a political and administra-
tive power in the villages” was to make local NGOs acknowledge their political
authority by registering with the People’s Government and donating a yudda
kar (war tax) to the parallel structures (Lohani-Chase, 2008, p. 122). As it
signed the CPA in November 2006, the CPN (M) thus administered significant
parts of Nepal’s territory, as is illustrated in Figure 6.4 that plots all districts
in which People’s Governments had been erected in dark gray.
In the CPA, the Maoists agreed to reintegrate all territory into the con-
trol of the state and dissolve all parallel political structures upon joining the
interim government. In specific, in Paragraph 10.1 of the accord “both sides
agree not to run any structure, including those parallel to the government, in
any areas of government or state apparatus.” In Paragraph 5.2.1 the parties
furthermore compromise that “[forced] and unlawful collection of donations in
cash or kind and illegal collection of tax shall not be allowed” (Comprehen-
sive Peace Agreement, 2006). On 18 January 2007, Maoist leader Prachanda
issued a statement that “[as] per the agreement reached with the government,
our party declares that the people’s governments and people’s courts run by our
party in the past have been dissolved from today ... The interim government
will run all local-level governments in the future” (in AFP, 2007a). Overall,
the CPN (M) formally followed through with its commitment, and all inter-
view partners – regardless of party affiliation, and also from civil society and
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Notes: Data on People’s Governments from Hatlebakk (2009). Of the four indicators
measuring the strength of Maoist control, I use the indicator that is based on government
classification, which Hatlebakk reports – despite all subjectivity – as the most reliable.
the international community – agreed that Prachanda’s statement was sincere,
and that at the end of the interim government, parallel government structures
were largely disbanded (cf. also UN Office of the High Commissioner for Hu-
man Rights, 2007).68 Human Rights Watch (2008, p. 294) also reported that
throughout 2007, the People’s Courts “and other parallel government structures
have been mostly dismantled.” Having said that, particularly in the early days
of the interim period frequent reports on cheating the integration process by
local Maoist cadres persisted.69 This evidence particularly contributes to the
lack of confirmation on the mechanism of popular legitimacy (cf. below and
International Crisis Group, 2009).
68This statement was confirmed by INT-01, 22.09.2015; INT-02, 23.09.2015; INT-04,
23.09.2015; INT-05, 24.09.2015; INT-06, 25.09.2015, INT-08, 26.09.2015; INT-09, 27.09.2015;
INT-11, 28.09.2015; INT-13, 30.09.2015; INT-15, 04.10.2015; INT-17, 06.10.2015; INT-19,
09.10.2015; INT-20, 09.10.2015; INT-24, 13.10.2015, INT-26, 19.10.2015, INT-27, 19.10.2015.
69For instance, in December 2006, the Maoists were still “reported taxing peasant farmers
and businessmen as they [jockeyed] to bolster their position in the new unity government ...
and to hedge their bets in case they feel a need to resume to the war” (Rosenberg, 2006).
In January 2007, Maoist cadres reportedly prohibited the government from reestablishing a
presence in some rural districts: “Only 904 of 1,271 police posts damaged during the insurgency
have been restored, despite the government’s [January] 14 completion date. Local Maoists have
blocked work on the remaining posts” (Logan, 2007). Around the same time, concerns arose
that the CPN (M) had revived its Young Communist League (YCL), a youth organization that
was engaging in “quasi-policing activities” as a type “parallel security mechanism” (United
Nations, 2007a, p. 3) – although it is difficult to assess the YCL’s true influence – Skar (2008),
for instance, locates them somewhere in between “Boy Scouts and Paramilitary Storm Troops.”
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Affecting Financial Means I held that a first mechanism for why interim
governments that integrate the parallel political institutions of warring parties
increase the stability of peace vis-à-vis all other interim governments is that
the former raise costs of defection by limiting the financial resources parties
need to remobilize (cf. Figure 3.3). In contrast, and when facing commitment
problems caused by uncertainty of a stronger-growing party’s future behavior,
the continued existence of parallel political institutions allows a weaker-growing
party to retreat to its zones of territorial control and regroup for war. It also
enables the party to use parallel structures to acquire the financial means to
buy new weaponry through parallel taxation or natural resource extraction.
There is weak evidence that Nepal confirms to this causal mechanism. De-
spite early reports of cheating, the Maoists lost – or at least significantly reduced
– what constituted their main sources of monetary and non-monetary funding
during the People’s War when they abolished their parallel political structures
and joined the institutions of the interim government in Kathmandu. These
sources of funding during the war particularly included the parallel taxation of
teachers or farmers (reports on the extent of this yudda kar vary from consti-
tuting between five and 25 per cent of individual incomes), forced labor as well
as forced donations of food or accommodation to combatants, bank robberies
(particularly in the early days of the People’s War), extortion, as well as com-
pulsory contributions by tourists and trekkers in the Himalaya (International
Crisis Group, 2005). International fundraisers among Maoist networks in India
and Europe, the control over and extraction of natural resources (such as herbs
and timber), as well as the production and trade of drugs (such as cannabis)
constituted an additional source of income during the war – although not to
the same extent as it did in Angola or Cambodia (cf. Chapter 7 and 8) – that
the CPN (M) gave up during the interim period (US Bureau for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2005). While some reports on parallel
taxation and extortion – particularly in the Tarai – persisted throughout the
interim period, it was often unclear who was responsible for this violation of the
peace agreement or how closely violators were connected to the Maoist move-
ment or answered to the Maoist leadership. UNMIN loosely referred to such
instances as “extortion carried out by armed groups” when reporting on this
issue (United Nations, 2008, p. 8).
Having said that, while the integration of parallel political institutions thus
limited the CPN (M)’s ability for monetary gain through such structures, this
integration did not immediately increase the party’s costs of defection to an ex-
tent that made it unable to remobilize for war had it wanted to do so. This was
also because the CPN (M) had been described at the end of the war as “Nepal’s
richest political party” (International Crisis Group, 2005, p. 17). Rather, there
is some indication that formally abandoning its parallel political structures –
even if cheating was part of this process – meant that CPN (M) leaders were
gradually, throughout the interim period and beyond, becoming increasingly
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dependent on extracting additional personal wealth through their control over
state institutions, as was part of the general political culture (Bertelsmann Foun-
dation, 2008b; Pfaff-Czarnecka, 2005). This increased their utility of the out-
come PR; PG. In other words, these leaders thus benefited from sticking to
peaceful cooperation in the interim government, being set “on a path of depen-
dency where politics trumped military power” (Suhrke, 2011, p. 46). As Hisila
Yami, wife of Baburam Bhattarai, stated in 2013, “[people] gave us money ear-
lier out of fear, but they don’t do that now,” and after the Maoists had given up
bank robbery and extortion, money was “harder to come by” (in Harris, 2013).
Also therefore, the reintegration of parallel institution has been named “the one
major concession” by the Maoists (Sengupta, 2006a); and one of the factors by
which the Maoists “repeatedly tried to convey their commitment to the public
that they would remain in the peace process” (Ogura, 2008, p. 45).
Affecting Levels of Popular Support In Chapter 3, I held that a second
mechanism for why interim governments that integrate the parallel political
institutions of warring parties come with more stable peace is that such govern-
ments increase costs of defection by affecting the levels of popular support parties
need to remobilize (cf. Figure 3.3). In order to raise their expected capability to
prevail in war, parties need to maintain support from the civilian population (for
instance, because voluntary conscription is cheaper than forced conscription),
which they can acquire by providing public services through parallel adminis-
tration. As long as parties can prove that they deliver public services more
effectively than an interim government, they also keep significant legitimacy
which reduces their costs of remobilizing for war.
Nepal does not confirm to this causal mechanism. Although there is evi-
dence that levels of popular support for the Maoists were diminishing during
the interim period, this evidence is unrelated to the reintegration of parallel
governance structures. Several observers have argued that the CPN (M)’s pop-
ular legitimacy was fading after it joined the interim government. This was not
least reflected by the party’s fear that it would not do well in the 2008 elections
(cf. section 6.2.1). For instance, the International Crisis Group (2005, p. 16)
reported that the “Maoists’ early gains in public image and sympathy have not
been sustained ... [but have] significantly eroded” due to vastly increasing levels
of brutality – also against civilians – in the final years of the People’s War (cf.
Tamang, 2012). Others have argued that the “Maoist leadership faced chal-
lenges about maintaining their revolutionary image” after joining the interim
government (Ogura, 2008, p. 42). However, while both points contributed to
the CPN (M)’s raised costs of defection, both are unrelated to the process of
disbanding parallel government structures. Rather, both points connect to (1)
increasingly hostile behavior towards civilians at the end of the People’s War
(which was also threatening UNITA’s legitimacy during the interim period, cf.
Chapter 7), as well as to (2) the corruption and personal enrichment displayed
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by CPN (M) leaders in the interim government.
In addition, even though the CPN (M) formally abandoned its parallel struc-
tures, the interim government (and state institutions in the post-interim period)
did not to extend its reach throughout national territory and re-assume those
government functions and public services that had been provided by the Maoists
during the war (INT-04, 23.09.2015; The Asia Foundation, 2007; The Carter
Center, 2008). In early 2008, observers reported for instance that “little effort
has gone into making sure the state bodies meant to perform [judicial or polic-
ing] functions can regain public trust” (International Crisis Group, 2008, p. 22).
Moreover, those individuals who were running parallel government institutions
during the war were still living among the local populations during the interim
period and did not automatically lose credibility or the ability to threaten and
extort villagers (INT-01, 22.09.2015; INT-02, 23.09.2015; INT-27, 19.10.2015).
This situation represented at least part of an explanation for why the Maoists
were able to win the 2008 CA elections. As a civil society leader recalled:
“In 2006, when the Maoists entered the peace process, it was wishful
for everyone to think that things change all of a sudden and overnight
... [But the] Maoists were still strong in the villages. Of course they
gave up their arms, they dissolved the People’s Governments and the
People’s Courts, but they were still strong compared to ... the other
political parties [that] could not do anything in these villages for ten
years, so it would take time to build their strength ... in the villages”
(INT-20, 09.10.2015).
Parallel Military Institutions
In addition to integrating parallel political structures into the authority of the
interim government, the CPN (M) also agreed in the CPA to disarm before the
elections. The design of the DDR process was up for much controversy in Nepal
in the lead up to the CPA, highlighting particularly the Maoists’ commitment
problems to disarm as long as the NA would not do the same. For instance,
Prachanda had declared in March 2006 that he perceived unilateral CPN (M)
disarmament as suicidal: “If anybody is thinking of disarming the Maoists while
keeping the ‘royal’ army as it is, then they are having a suicidal dream” (in BBC,
2006). Observers thereby remarked that Prachanda’s comment was hinting “at
a deeper concern: Less than a month after helping to dislodge King Gyanen-
dra’s royal government, the Maoists ... are worried about being ... sidelined in
the new political landscape” (Sengupta, 2006b). The governing parties yet for-
mulated the disarmament of combatants as a core condition before they would
agree to let the CPN (M) join an interim government. Prime Minister Koirala
in particular categorically ruled out any “Maoist participation in an interim
government without them first laying down their arms” (in Pradhan, 2006b).
He also declared that the Maoists “cannot be given the status of a political
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party ... until they give up weapons” (in Pradhan, 2006a).
The bargain that the parties then struck in the CPA clearly displayed an
intent to mitigate commitment problems through the design of the DDR process,
with regard to three factors (cf. Subedi, 2015). Firstly, both the CPN (M) and
the NA agreed to move into “temporary cantonments” (Maoists) or back into
the barracks (NA), and to securely store and lock “with a single padlock” all of
their arms and ammunition (Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2006). Secondly,
both parties furthermore agreed to do so under UNMIN supervision, as a form
of (symbolical) third-party security guarantee (cf. above, and Suhrke, 2011;
Walter, 2002). And thirdly, both parties agreed on a double-key system by which
one PLA or NA commanders kept a key to the weapons storage containers that
were monitored by UNMIN, while the other key to each respective container
was placed with the UN.70
As with the implementation process of integrating the CPN (M)’s paral-
lel political institutions, there were also reports on party cadres cheating the
implementation of the DDR process, such as through late recruitment, or the
registration of primitive weapons instead of modern guns (AFP, 2007e; Bleie
and Shrestha, 2012; Rosenberg, 2006). But by and large, the CPN (M) kept
its commitment as negotiated in the CPA, and thus the general agreement to-
day is that (particularly in comparison to other countries), the DDR process
belongs to one of the key successes of the Nepalese peace process: “Bringing the
ex-combatants into cantonments [in the first place] ... helped the [CPN (M)] to
strategically demonstrate its commitment to the peace process” (Subedi, 2015,
p. 154), and from today’s perspective, ex-combatants “have integrated as much
as they could into the communities they started living [in]” (INT-02, 23.09.2015,
cf. INT-05, 24.09.2015; INT-23, 12.10.2015; and INT-26, 19.10.2015).
The Maoist combatants began moving into the designated seven main can-
tonment sites and 21 satellite camps in November 2006. Similar to the situation
in Angola or Cambodia (cf. Chapter 7 and 8), they faced extremely harsh liv-
ing conditions in the beginning, because the interim government was slow in
providing for warm water, electricity, showers, latrines, or any basic housing in-
frastructure (Taylor, 2006). One international development worker remembers
that this was also because decision-makers initially thought that the DDR pro-
cess would only take few weeks or months, “so there wasn’t any effort to work
70The technical details were laid out in the AMAA that regulated how weapons and ammu-
nition storage areas were to be secured inside the cantonment areas, and that displayed vast
differences of the Nepalese DDR process as compared to the one in Angola. For instance, the
AMAA regulated that (1) a solid fence with gate and lock was to surround the weapon storage
area, which itself included (2) “storage containers painted white and furnished with shelves
for safe weapons storage and easy control, and with a complete inventory,” (3) a “single lock
provided by the UN” to secure each storage container, (4) a key “held by the designated
main cantonment site commander,” (5) a “24-hour surveillance camera provided by the UN”,
(6) floodlights that “will be switched on automatically during hours of darkness,” and (7) an
“alarm system provided by the UN” and connected to sirens in the UN office that was to be
activated “if the container door is opened without a safe button having been switched off in
connection with regular inspections” (Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2006).
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on the infrastructure or on activities for the combatants” (INT-02, 23.09.2015,
cf. INT-21, 10.10.2015, cf. INT-29, 03.11.2015; INT-30, 12.11.2015). Such
initiatives would only start in mid-2007 after a then-GTZ project was set up
in the camps to improve infrastructure, health services, and vocational train-
ing for combatants (cf. below, Bleie and Shrestha, 2012; Deutsche Gesellschaft
für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, 2013). Combatants began disarming and
handing over their arms for UN inspection, recording, and storing in January
2007 (Shrestra, 2007). On 18 February 2007, UNMIN confirmed that all ex-
combatants were disarmed and registered, and deputy commander “Pasang”
reassured that the “verification of 32,000 PLA soldiers has been completed”
(AFP, 2007d). As is noted in the Peace Accord Matrix (Joshi and Darby,
2013), even though 96 weapons were retained outside the cantonment sites to
provide for the security of Maoist leaders (cf. section 6.2.1), this development
“is recognized as the complete implementation of the CPA.”
While the disarmament process thus moved on relatively swiftly, this was not
the case for the demobilization of ex-combatants, also because the CPA did not
specify a time frame by which the CPN (M) was required to demobilize. After
completing the cantonment, registration, and disarmament of ex-combatants in
early 2007 – around the time that the interim government convened in Kath-
mandu – UNMIN and the warring parties began to verify those registered ex-
combatants that were meant to be immediately demobilized and discharged, for
instance because they were deemed disqualified for reintegration. This affected,
for instance, ex-combatants who were under the age of 18 at the start of the
peace process (Bleie and Shrestha, 2012; Subedi, 2015). However, due to vari-
ous political deadlocks in the interim government, uncertainties about the fate
of discharged ex-combatants, as well as diverging interests about what combat-
ants could actually be deemed “disqualified,” the demobilization and discharge
of ex-combatants began as late as 2009. It was only completed in 2013, when
the last cantonment sites closed and 1,352 ex-combatants officially joined the
NA, while all others entered civilian lives (Martin Chautari, 2013). Thus, by
the time of the elections terminating the interim government, the Maoist com-
batants had disarmed, but not demobilized, and thus the integration of parallel
military institutions was only partially achieved. As I show below, this did yet
not reinforce credible commitment problems when the CPN (M) found itself in
a weaker-growing position, due to several reasons.
Affecting Military Infrastructures I held that a first mechanism for why
interim governments that integrate the parallel military institutions through dis-
armament and demobilization processes increase the stability of peace is that
such governments destroy the military infrastructure necessary for remobiliza-
tion. The integration process, firstly, retrieves parties of their means to prevail
in combat by collecting and destroying weapon stocks. Secondly, it weakens hi-
erarchical command structures between rank-and-file soldiers and commanders
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within armed organizations, thus increasing the costs of leaders to remobilize
for war (cf. Figure 3.3). In contrast, following interim governments that fail to
disarm and demobilize warring parties before the end of their rule, violence in
the post-interim period becomes more likely.
Nepal does not confirm to this causal pattern, because neither were weapons
sufficiently removed from the hands of the combatants, nor were command struc-
tures within the PLA dissolved. However, and closely related to my discussion
on the role of international interim government above, this aspect mitigated,
rather than exacerbated commitment problems for the CPN (M). Firstly, while
weapons were officially collected and stored in metal containers supervised by
UNMIN, these containers not only remained inside the cantonment and satellite
camps, but PLA commanders also retained a key to unlock the storage boxes.
Secondly, also war-time social bonds among ex-combatants as well as hierar-
chical command structures between ex-combatants and immediate commanders
remained intact throughout the interim period and beyond, and the cantonment
process even provided the CPN (M) with the opportunity to “better consolidate
its force in one place” and create “an environment for ‘systemic’ remobilization
of ex-combatants because ... it reinforced chain of command between combat-
ants and their commanders” (Subedi, 2015, p. 154). This also became visible
when I interviewed a former PLA deputy commander in his house in October
2015, where he introduced me to a number of ex-combatants and their families
who came to live with him after the war. Also when I asked a second former PLA
deputy commander on whether he was still in contact with any ex-combatants,
he replied “all of them have been in contact with me” (INT-08, 26.09.2015).
Finally, this finding is also in line with how the Maoist ex-combatants I inter-
viewed in Nepal described their past and current relationships with immediate
commanders (INT-21, 10.10.2015; cf. INT-30, 13.11.2015).
Having said that, “[not] a shot was fired between the two armies, and there
was not a single known case of weapons being removed from the storage con-
tainers” during and after the interim period (Martin, 2010, p. 10). Why did
the continued existence of parallel military infrastructure not exacerbate com-
mitment problems, for instance when the Maoists were fearing to lose the 2008
elections? Part of the explanation for why the suggested causal mechanism did
not come into being in Nepal is that the continued existence of military infras-
tructure provided a “safety valve” for ex-combatants that mitigated any future
uncertainty. As I argued above, the general idea of the disarmament process
was to mitigate fears among ex-combatants by keeping the possibility that they
could take their gun and leave the cantonments. Forcefully retrieving them of
their weapons would likely have been perceived as “emasculating” and as en-
dangering their personal security (INT-29, 03.11.2015, cf. Spear, 2002).71 In the
71This became particularly relevant after the discussion on disqualified ex-combatants had
triggered intense feelings of humiliation among ex-combatants, because disqualified translates
into the profoundly negative Nepali term ayogya (meaning being incomplete, handicapped, or
even useless, cf. Bleie and Shrestha, 2012).
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same vein, the continued existence of social bonds between ex-combatants and
of close relationships to their commanders also provided a sense of protection
in the interim and post-interim period. Many ex-combatants expressed their
anxiety of leaving their units and feel stigmatized by civilian communities for
their past in the rebel movement, or – in the case of female ex-combatants – for
having transgressed social norms and conceptions of what constitutes as “ade-
quate” female behavior (INT-29, 03.11.2015, INT-30, 13.11.2015, Bogati, 2015;
Ogura, 2010).
Affecting Cultures of Violence In Chapter 3, I held that a second mech-
anism for why interim governments that integrate the parallel military insti-
tutions of warring parties increase the stability of peace is that such interim
governments raise the parties’ costs of defection by adding to changing cul-
tures of violence. They do so, because even if not all weapons are collected
and hierarchical command structures disentangled at the end of the interim pe-
riod, a sufficiently advanced DDR process still decreases the social acceptance
of violence among ex-combatants and the wider population, signifies “that the
country is embarking on an era of peace” (United Nations, 2000a) and facil-
itates “ex-combatants’ attempts to distance themselves from war-time abuses
they committed or experienced” (Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010, p. 18).
This in turn should raise the costs of elites to remobilize for war. Contrariwise,
a missing DDR process should mean that no such process takes place, so that
individuals are not pushed away from the “war-time mindsets that legitimized
violence” (Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010, p. 10).
Nepal confirms this causal pattern. The decreased social acceptance of war
among ex-combatants – that was a direct result of how the disarmament pro-
cess was designed – is among the key explanations for post-interim peace in
Nepal due to three reasons. Firstly, and even though many have pointed out
the difficult job situation for former fighters in Nepal (e.g. Martin Chautari,
2013), ex-combatants were early on in the disarmament process and during the
interim period offered a vision of alternative professional livelihoods as opposed
to their military careers, which profoundly decreased their willingness to remo-
bilize for war and increased the costs of the party leadership to do so. Both
inside cantonment and thereafter, ex-combatants received vocational training as
well as schooling. Particularly younger combatants had thereby never received
a formal education before, and had only attended Maoist political education
programs. This not only offered combatants a clearer perspective on what they
wanted to do once discharged, but which also helped to normalize life in the
cantonment because it provided combatants with activities that prevented them
to leave the camps before being formally discharged, as happened with UNITA
in Angola (Bleie and Shrestha, 2012; Bogati, 2015; Deutsche Gesellschaft für
Internationale Zusammenarbeit, 2013).72 Although not all combatants describe
72The vision of alternative professional livelihoods also included options for legal migra-
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such training as useful, many say the time spent in cantonment was a chance
to “gain additional qualifications” and “advance their schooling” (Robins and
Bhandari, 2016, p. 33).
Secondly, ex-combatants were offered alternative private livelihoods as op-
posed to their military identities early on in the interim period, which contrasts,
for instance, the extreme militarization of lives under UNITA in Angola. A
key part of this pattern was the PLA’s demographic structure. The Maoist
movement recruited a particularly high number of child soldiers (Human Rights
Watch, 2007) and female combatants during the war – some numbers say that
“up to 40% of all combatant and civilian political supporters” of the Maoists
were women (Pettigrew and Shneiderman, 2004, p. 19). As the combatants
moved to cantonment in late 2006, many soon desired to get married and have
children instead of continuing to fight: “Having spent their youth in the war,
sacrificing all, it is marriage, family and livelihood that are central” (Martin
Chautari, 2013). Thus, “[numerous] arranged marriages and love marriages ...
created a vast number of family establishments from 2007 onward,” when many
female combatants became pregnant and gave birth (Bleie and Shrestha, 2012,
p. 8). This significantly increased the costs of remobilization for the Maoist lead-
ership. For instance, asked why no Maoist ex-combatant was remobilized out of
the cantonments, one international development worker noted that because ex-
combatants “were really young when they were recruited and [had] never lived
an adult civilian life, they really [wanted] to establish a family and ... basically
be part of the community” instead of returning to war (INT-02, 23.09.2015,
cf. INT-10, 28.09.2015; INT-29, 03.11.2015; INT-30, 13.11.2015, Bogati, 2015).
And when I asked an ex-combatant if he could imagine a situation in which he
would have rearmed, he replied negatively and referred to his family: “No war
with a baby” (INT-21, 10.10.2015). Thereby, this mechanism also links to the
opportunity cost argument for rebel recruitment in the wider peace and conflict
literature (e.g. Weinstein, 2005).
Thirdly, ex-combatants were offered an improved legal and logistical stand-
ing inside cantonment as opposed to the People’s War, which increased the costs
of party leaders to remobilize. Logistically, and in addition to vocational train-
ing, schooling, or leisure activities inside cantonment, observers point out that
with all difficulties at the beginning of the DDR process, ex-combatants were
content to stay in cantonments as they received more to eat than during the war
when they at times went without food for days (INT-02, 23.09.2015; INT-10,
28.09.2015, INT-21, 10.10.2015, INT-22, 10.10.2015, cf. Deutsche Gesellschaft
für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, 2013). Throughout the interim period,
tion, and many ex-combatants migrated to work in India or the Gulf countries (Bleie and
Shrestha, 2012). Several interview partners in this regard stressed that one reason for why the
Maoists did not remobilize following the interim period was that “all the ex-combatants [were]
working in Dubai”(INT-03, 23.09.2015; cf. INT-02, 23.09.2015; INT-21, 10.10.2015; INT-27,
19.10.2015). During private conversations, Nepalis also repeatedly mentioned that a common
slogan in Nepal names “Militia or Malaysia” as employment options for ex-combatants (cf.
also Haaß, Kurtenbach, et al., 2016).
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“living conditions in the cantonments greatly improved and they were trans-
formed into ... ‘communes’ rather than military camps” (Upreti and Vanhoutte,
2009, p. 170). Legally, combatants were no longer regarded as outlaws, but
felt that they were given a role in the peace process and for their country
(INT-14, 30.09.2015, cf. INT-17, 06.10.2015; INT-22, 10.10.2015; and INT-27,
19.10.2015). For instance, asking whether she recalled ex-combatants protest-
ing or rioting again being encamped (as occurred several times in Angola and
presented a major obstacle to the demobilization process, cf. Chapter 7), an
international development worker remembered,
“Actually, they were ... accepting the conditions. I think [this was]
partly because it was an improvement of their status. Before, they
were outlaws, they were guerillas, they were living underground in
the jungle in terrible conditions, going without food for days, eating
grass, it was really difficult [for them]. So the cantonments provided
them with a legal status, where they ... were by and large being taken
care of. So ... this was some form of relief” (INT-02, 23.09.2015).
6.2.4 Participation of Unarmed Actors
My final hypothesis in Chapter 3 reasoned that in the presence of commitment
problems, more advanced opportunities for the participation of unarmed actors
in interim governments come with a higher stability of post-interim peace. This
is because they enable warring parties to send costly signals of their true inten-
tions to each other that create domestic audience costs, which in turn punish
them if they renege on their peaceful bargain (cf. Figure 3.3).
Nepal does not confirm to this causal pattern, but the participation of un-
armed actors still set into motion an alternative causal mechanisms within the
bargaining framework.73 As I have outlined in section 6.1, Nepalese civil so-
ciety played a particularly prominent rule during the 2006 Jana Andolan II
that paved the way to end the monarchy and to start negotiations to a peace
agreement (Shah, 2008). “The general public, led by professionals, civil society
leaders, human rights leaders, and the civil service, formed the core of most
demonstrations and marches; party cadres and leaders were initially rarely seen
in the streets” (Freedom House, 2008). This means that “civil society had a
very significant role” in the movement also because the political parties were
“discredited” among protesters (INT-05, 24.09.2015, cf. INT-19, 09.10.2015).74
73The case of Nepal is in so far distinct as a rebel group fought against a divided government
in which political parties controlled the police as one major opponent of the Maoists on the
battlefield, while control over the RNA de facto remained with the king. This “sets a unique
example for the world” (Shah, 2008, p. 24). Because of this role of the political parties during
the war, I concentrate here on the participation of civil society in interim rule.
74One situation that is memorized by many Nepalis, that several interview partners de-
scribed, and that illustrates the vital role of civil society in the early peace process is when
during Jana Andolan II, SPA party leaders were sitting on the floor surrounded by civil soci-
ety leaders, listening to their demands on political reforms, and promising to enshrine those
reforms in the CPA (INT-04, 23.09.2015; INT-05, 24.09.2015; INT-20, 09.10.2015).
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In the CPA, the warring parties agreed to take “responsibility for resolving
any problem arising ... with the support of all political parties, civil society
and local organizations” and “sincerely” appealed to “civil society, the profes-
sional groups, the class organizations, the media, the intellectuals and the entire
Nepali people to actively participate and make successful the historic campaign
of building a new democratic Nepal and establishing lasting peace” (Compre-
hensive Peace Agreement, 2006). Also the subsequent Interim Constitution of
2063 (2007) called for the participation of civil society during the interim period.
However, while the CPN (M) had originally suggested that civil society leaders
would be broadly represented in the interim parliament – an idea was that the
interim parliament was to be composed one-third each of the Maoists, the SPA,
and civil society – this “was never going to be acceptable to the mainstream
parties: it suggested that they were only on a par with the Maoists, and many
suspected the civil society appointments would give the body a dangerously
radical tint” (International Crisis Group, 2006, p. 10).
Because of these concerns, the Interim Constitutions eventually included a
compromise by which the interim parliament would reinstate all former mem-
bers, but would additionally include 73 seats for the Maoists and 48 seats for
“members nominated by consensus from ... people-based and professional orga-
nizations, oppressed communities, backward regions, indigenous ethnic groups
... and from among women and various political personalities” (Government of
Nepal, 2007, cf. section 6.2.1,). This thus represented a commitment for institu-
tionalized participation of civil society according to my conceptualization. This
commitment was also by and large implemented (INT-15, 04.10.2015, Interna-
tional Crisis Group, 2006) – although “most of these seats were later divided
among politicians, a few did go to civil society leaders who had played a promi-
nent role in the April 2006 movement” (Shah, 2008, p. 11).75
In addition to the institutionalized participation of civil society in Nepal’s
interim government, civil society was also received opportunities for what I
termed ad hoc participation outside the formal interim government structures
in Chapter 3. It was repeatedly reported that the leaders of the CPN (M), NC,
and CPN-UML met with civil society members to consult on political reforms
during the interim period. For instance, between late March and early April
2008, civil society leaders were invited by interim representatives and security
staff (such as the chief of Nepal Police) to consult on how to prevent violence
at the polling stations during the 2008 CA elections, and the parties and civil
society eventually agreed on setting up monitoring committees comprised of
civil society leaders during the polling process (Ekantipur, 2008a; Ekantipur,
75While this decrease of institutional participation for civil society was heavily criticized by
some civil society leaders who demanded a broader representation of voices of unarmed actors
in the interim government (cf. The Himalayan Times, 2007), others commented the demands
“made in certain quarters to bring civil society representatives into the new government”
with: “We civil society members do not join governments. It is an insult to ask us to become
ministers or to allege that we work to become one” (in Shah, 2008, p. 12).
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2008b; Ekantipur, 2008c). One civil society leader in that regard remembered
that up until the first CA elections in 2008, he experienced the decision-making
process of the interim government as very consultative, and he was regularly
invited to voice his concerns and make suggestions for improvements in the
constitutional committees (INT-07, 25.09.2015; cf. also INT-15, 04.10.2015;
INT-18, 06.10.2015; INT-19, 09.10.2015; INT-23, 12.10.2015).
Some interview partners thereby did regard the participation of civil society
in interim decision-making as a costly signal by the parties that created domestic
audience costs; and argued that civil society came to represent “an unorthodox
guarantor” for transparency in the peace process: When political reforms were
debated in the interim government and discussions became polarized, civil soci-
ety representatives – although “kind of symbolic in their role” were “guarantors
for save landing” (INT-24, 13.10.2015).
Having said that, there is stronger evidence for an alternative causal mecha-
nism within the bargaining framework, in that the participation of civil society
in interim government was not so much a costly signal by the parties to create
audience costs, but instead strategically used by the warring parties to raise
their political and economic benefits and thus decrease any future uncertainty.
This mechanism came into being because over the course of the interim period,
civil society started becoming more and more aligned to and co-opted by the
former warring parties. This means that all political and economic benefits that
were supposed to go to civil society to create a domestic audience – such as re-
ceiving a voice in changing and promulgating laws and institutional reforms in
the interim government; or receiving funds by the international community –
became benefits for the warring parties in the bargaining situation.
Without exception, all interview partners argued that while civil society
had a strong momentum in the 2006 Jana Andolan II, this extraordinary role
gradually diminished during the rule of the interim government until it was
non-existent following the 2008 CA elections: “Civil society was unified and
important during the April movement but since then group and individual in-
terests have diverged” (International Crisis Group, 2006, p. 21). Instead, civil
society became – with few exceptions – virtually indistinguishable from the par-
ties represented in the interim government as well as “very politically charged”
(INT-20, 09.10.2015, cf. also INT-01, 22.09.2015, INT-15, 04.10.2015), and
thus its participation was merely to the benefit of the parties who all “used
patronage to reward their civil society supporters” (International Crisis Group,
2006, p. 21). This is not least due to the fact that many previous political
elites began to engage as civil society leaders during the interim period, and
“like a revolving door, many now in civil society were in government positions
in the past” (Shah, 2008, p. 11). As a development worker stated, civil so-
ciety “is not so strong when it comes to doing things independently of the
political parties ... There are very few NGOs that manage to stay free from
political influence ... If you give funds to them you are basically funding po-
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Table 6.2: Summary of Evidence: Case Study Nepal
Hypothesis Result
H1: Power-sharing interim govern-
ment, as opposed to any other in-
terim government, increases the sta-
bility of post-interim peace.
Supported. The causal mechanisms
on the warring parties’ political and
economic security are most convinc-
ing. Power-sharing also increased the
costs of defection for the parties.
H2: International interim govern-
ment, as opposed to any other in-
terim government, increases the sta-
bility of post-interim peace.
Not supported. Empirical evi-
dence rather points to “local own-
ership” on the elite and combatant
level as an alternative explanation
outside the bargaining framework.
H3: The more advanced the pro-
cess of integrating parallel political
and military institutions into the au-
thority of an interim government, the
higher the stability of peace.
Supported. The causal mechanisms
on ex-combatants’ war-time mindsets
and (to a lesser extent) on parallel
financing through political structures
are most convincing.
H4: The more advanced the oppor-
tunities of participation for unarmed
actors in interim governments, the
higher the stability of peace.
Weakly supported. There is yet no
evidence for the mechanism on audi-
ence costs – evidence rather suggests
participation reduced future uncer-
tainty for the warring parties.
litical parties by proxy” (INT-02, 23.09.2015; cf. INT-02, 23.09.2015; INT-04,
23.09.2015; INT-05, 24.09.2015; INT-11, 28.09.2015; INT-15, 04.10.2015; INT-
19, 09.10.2015; INT-20, 09.10.2015; INT-24, 13.10.2015; INT-25, 19.10.2015
INT-26, 19.10.2015).
6.3 Chapter Summary
This chapter discussed the question to what extent post-interim peace in Nepal
can be attributed to properties of interim government mitigating the warring
parties’ commitment problems. Throughout this chapter, I also attended to al-
ternative explanatory variables or causal mechanisms, such as the role of demo-
cratic history in negotiating and accepting power-sharing interim government,
or of local ownership instead of international authority in interim governments.
Concerning the independent variables proposed in Chapter 3, the chapter yields
several interesting conclusions (cf. Table 6.2).
Hypothesis H1 on the role of power-sharing interim government for stable
peace is supported. Particularly the mechanisms on the economic and politi-
cal security of warring parties account for empirical evidence. Power-sharing
interim government decreased uncertainty for the CPN (M) by increasing its
political security, as it enabled the party to negotiate a conceivably more fa-
151
vorable electoral law. More generally, it also enabled the Maoists to show the
other political parties that it was capable of participating in national gover-
nance, thus lending itself as a future coalition partner. Power-sharing interim
government also decreased uncertainty for the CPN (M) by increased its eco-
nomic security, as it enabled party leaders to control and loot state resources
through corruption. Power-sharing interim government also added to peace by
increasing costs of defection, an alternative causal mechanism not envisioned in
Chapter 3. For CPN (M) leaders, the corruption displayed in the interim govern-
ment and beyond alienated them from increasingly disillusioned and frustrated
ex-combatants. This increased the rebel leaders’ costs of remobilization. For
the one party outside the agreement – the royal palace – power-sharing interim
government added to the perception of the king and his subordinate army that
the country was strongly united in the peace process. These increased costs are
part of an explanation for why the king accepted his political marginalization
and did not, for instance, repeat his actions of earlier years and stage a royal
coup. The proposed mechanism on power-sharing increasing the physical secu-
rity of warring parties does not hold for Nepal, because I cannot establish the
necessary temporal precedence of cause to effect in that relationship.
Hypothesis H2 on the role of international interim government for stable
peace is not supported. The international interim government variable does not
correlate with the outcome in the theorized way in Nepal, and the absence of
international authority did not exacerbate, but mitigate commitment problems.
Firstly, on an elite level, it enabled cooperation in the power-sharing interim
government without any nationalist rhetoric, and it provided particularly the
CPN (M) with a sense of ownership over reforms. Secondly, on a combatant
level, it contributed to perceptions that disarmament was a voluntary “sacrifice”
for peace and the country – a term repeatedly used by my interview partners –
rather than a forced process. Thus, local ownership emerges as an alternative
explanation for peace.
Hypothesis H3 on the integration of parallel political and military institu-
tions is supported. Even though Maoist cadres often cheated the integration of
parallel political institutions in the early days of the interim period and through
continued parallel taxation and extortion, the Maoists eventually gave up on
parallel political structures. Thereby, they also gradually became dependent on
extracting future economic gain through controlling formal state institutions.
This becomes visible by the growing corruption they displayed. Further, even
though the integration of military institutions failed to truly strip ex-combatants
of their arms or dismantle the Maoists’ command structures, the process still
increased the costs of defection (as predicted in Chapter 3). This is because the
process offered combatants a vision of alternative (1) professional and (2) pri-
vate livelihoods, as well as (3) an improved legal and logistical situation inside
cantonment.
Hypothesis H4 on the role of the participation of unarmed actors in interim
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rule is supported, although evidence suggests a different causal mechanism be-
tween independent and dependent variables. Rather than affecting signalling
behavior of the warring parties, the participation of civil society decreased fu-
ture uncertainty for the parties. This is because by co-opting and politicizing
civil society, all political and economic benefits that were supposed to go to
civil society to create a domestic audience – such as receiving a voice in institu-
tional reforms; or receiving funds by the international community – turned into
benefits for the warring parties instead.
In sum, post-interim peace prevailed in Nepal. Although its surprising vic-
tory in the 2008 elections was certainly among the reasons for why the CPN (M)
successfully and peacefully integrated into the political scene, two aspects re-
lated to institutional design and reform properties of the interim government are
particularly relevant in explaining mitigated commitment problems and stable
peace. Firstly, the Maoists could use their participation in the power-sharing in-
terim government to secure both economic and political benefits that mitigated
commitment problems by reducing future uncertainties about their survival in
the post-interim state. It also made their weaker-growing position in the post-
interim period – that culminated into their defeat in the 2013 elections – a very
comfortable one (cf. INT-29, 03.11.2015). Secondly, at the end of the interim
period and in the time thereafter, the costs of defection for the Maoist leader-
ship had become so high that they lacked the opportunity to remobilize. This
is not least because both the leadership’s behavior in the power-sharing interim
government and the design of the integration of parallel military institutions
process had changed intra-party dynamics between Maoist elites and combat-
ants, had alienated many rank-and-file soldiers from the political leadership,
and had provided ex-combatants with visions of alternative private and profes-
sional livelihoods: “In 2008, they [the Maoists] had come so far that they did
not want to fight the war anymore, especially the ex-combatants would not fight
anymore” (INT-30, 13.11.2015). A NA lieutenant general remembers,
“Many people ask me if [ex-combatants] will take up their weapons
again. My answer is that [they] will not ... because they were so
badly used by their political leaders. They gave their lives, but they
got nothing in return. Will they again go to war to make somebody




Interim Rule in Angola
In March 2016, José Eduardo dos Santos made international headlines by un-
expectedly announcing that he would step down as President of Angola come
2018, a position that he has held since September 1979 as one of the longest-
ruling leaders in the world (BBC, 2016). While dos Santos and his party –
the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola or People’s Movement for the
Liberation of Angola (MPLA) – issue a tight grip over politics in Angola today,
their rule was bitterly contested by insurgents of the União Nacional para a
Independência Total de Angola or National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola (UNITA) until 2002 (Freedom House, 2015). That year, UNITA’s leader
Jonas Savimbi was killed in battle. UNITA had started its violent campaign
against the MPLA directly after Angola’s independence in 1975, and it took 26
years until a window for peace opened for the first time in 1991, when the war-
ring parties signed the Bicesse Accords. In this peace agreement, they agreed on
a 16-months interim period in which the MPLA would act as caretaker interim
government until elections in September 1992 determined the future government
of Angola. After all observers – including the warring parties themselves – had
been certain that UNITA would stand as a winner of those elections, it was dos
Santos and the MPLA that managed to gain most votes. Almost immediately,
UNITA remobilized for war.
This chapter explores whether violence in Angola’s immediate post-interim
period was the result of credible commitment problems; and to what extent
properties of interim government in Angola failed to mitigate such commit-
ment problems. I proceed in three steps. Section 7.1 gives a brief overview of
Angola’s history, beginning with the war of independence against Portugal’s
colonial regime and continuing with the ensuing civil war between the former
independence movements. The section ends with a closer look at the negoti-
ations leading up to the signing of the Bicesse Accords in 1991, in which the
warring parties agreed on the interim government under analysis. In section 7.2,
I attend to each property of interim government as outlined in Chapter 3, and I
investigate how the design of each property was linked to the re-intensification
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of armed conflict following the 1992 election. In this section, I also study any
alternative explanatory variables and mechanisms for armed conflict in Angola.
Section 7.3 summarizes my findings and concludes this chapter.
7.1 Angola: Three Decades of War
When their warring parties signed the Bicesse Accords in May 1991, most citi-
zens of Angola – among the countries with the lowest median age in the world
– had known nothing but war. The younger history of armed conflict in An-
gola can thereby be roughly divided into three phases. Firstly, Angola’s war
of independence against the Portuguese colonial regime between 1961 and 1974
that resulted in the signing of the Alvor Accords and Angola’s ensuing indepen-
dence in November 1975. Secondly, the first phase of Angola’s civil war fought
between the former national liberation movements – MPLA, UNITA, and ini-
tially also the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola or National Front for
the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) – between 1975 and 1991 that resulted in
the Bicesse Accords, an interim government, and elections in September 1992.
And thirdly, the second phase of Angola’s civil war between the re-escalation
of violence following the 1992 elections and Savimbi’s death in 2002; a phase
that was repeatedly broken up by several fragile periods of relative peace, for
instance after the parties signed the 1994 Lusaka Protocol. As the case study
under analysis in this dissertation focuses on the 1991-92 interim government
that followed the Bicesse Accords, the ensuing overview briefly outlines the key
events of Angola’s decolonization war and then concentrates on the initial period
of the civil war until Bicesse, while neglecting all developments thereafter.
7.1.1 Introducing the Warring Parties
When Angola’s war of independence started in 1961 as an armed struggle of
three liberation movements against Portugal’s colonial regime, Portugal had
been present in the region for centuries. The first Portuguese settlers had arrived
in 1483, initializing both the Christianization of the region and the export of
slaves and ivory. By 1575, Portugal had built widespread coastal settlements
around Luanda that had developed into the primary slave trade market for the
sugar plantations in its colony of Brazil (Birmingham, 2015). In 1836, Portugal
then abolished this transatlantic slave trade. This move that coincided with the
country consolidating its territorial occupation of Angola by establishing a more
thoroughly institutionalized colonial administration and by using Portuguese
Angola – a colony rich in diamonds or timber – as its chief exporter for oil,
coffee, or rubber (Malaquias, 2007; Ohlson, 1998; Tvedten, 1997).
Until the mid-twentieth century, Portuguese rulers manifested their admin-
istration of Angola on a social hierarchy system that is described by some as
“Portuguese apartheid” (Loffman, 2009). While the white population stood on
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top of the social hierarchy (with white Portuguese settlers born in Portugal
being superior to white Portuguese born in Angola), colonial authorities relied
on the bureaucratic services of the mestiço and, to a lesser extent, the assim-
ilado communities. The former were non-whites of mixed Angolan-Portuguese
parentage, a biographical detail that was the result of the skewed gender ratio in
Angola’s urban areas during the colonial period when a “shortage of white Por-
tuguese women” had ”led to numerous relationships between Portuguese men
and African women” (James, 2011, p. 99). Assimilados were black Angolans
who aimed at achieving better education and employment and therefore aban-
doned their indigenous culture, learned Portuguese, and adopted colonial social
customs. As the colonial legal framework regulated the highest possible job level
for non-whites, assimilados occupied often mid-level jobs in the administration
(Malaquias, 2007).76 This segregation of educated Angolans from the rest of the
society – rural peasants or indigenas, who made up 90 percent of the population
but lacked any political rights (Götz, 2002) – is not least one of the reasons for
why Angola’s decolonization struggle began much later as compared to other
African states (cf. Birmingham, 2015; Tvedten, 1997).
In the second half of the twentieth century, the rapid rise in world coffee
prices turned Angola into Africa’s largest coffee producer. This encouraged a
significant increase in white immigration to Angola (Cornwell, 2000). For in-
stance, by 1960, the white settler population in Uíge – Angola’s main province
for coffee production – was six times larger than in 1950; and Angola’s total
settler population increased from 80,000 in 1950 to 350,000 in 1974 (Sogge,
1992). As the white population grew, mestiços and assimilados were soon out-
numbered and had to compete with settlers for government jobs. Particularly
mestiços began to lose earlier privileges, which added to growing antagonism
as it emphasized a primacy of white interests (Cornwell, 2000). Portugal’s re-
sponse to the intensifying protests among mestiços was violence; and its growing
repression did not help to appease the situation but triggered the beginning of
the colonial war (Ohlson, 1998; Pearce, 2015). This war – as a direct result
of growing social tensions and mestiço, assimilado and indigena divisions – was
fought by three movements: the MPLA, the FNLA, as well as UNITA.
As the oldest liberation movement of the three, the MPLA was founded in
1956 as a merger group of three organizations: the Communist Party of Angola,
the Party of the United Struggle for Africans in Angola, and the Movement
for the Independence of Angola. The MPLA’s early leader – formally elected
by party members in 1962 – was Agostinho Neto, who became Angola’s first
President upon independence and who ruled until he died in 1979 in Moscow
and was replaced by José Eduardo dos Santos. Above all, the MPLA was an
“urban, multi-racial, intellectual, and socialist” group (Ohlson, 1998, p. 66).
76Some describe the lines between the two groups as fluid. For instance, Tvedten (1997,
p. 28) writes that “assimilados made up only 80,000 of the total population ... and most of
them were mestiços.” Similarly, Götz (2002) notes that almost 90 percent of mestiços achieved
the status of assimilados, but only one percent of the black population did.
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Table 7.1: Key Dates and Events in Angola’s History
1956 The MPLA is founded as Angola’s oldest liberation movement, a
party that would come to rule Angola from independence until today
1966 Jonas Savimbi returns from military training in China with its own
liberation movement: UNITA. The Angolan parties increasingly fight
the repression by the Portuguese colonial authorities
1974 Portugal’s Caetano is ousted by a military that favors decolonization,
which eases negotiations for Angola’s independence
1975 Angola is declared independent, the MPLA assumes power, and
UNITA mobilizes for a civil war against MPLA rule
1979 MPLA leader Augustinho Neto dies and José Eduardo dos Santos
becomes the MPLA’s – and Angola’s –President
1987 The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale results in high numbers of casualties
for both sides, which opens room for peace negotiations
1988 The New York Accords regulate the withdrawal of South African and
Cuban forces from Angola, monitored by UNAVEM I
1991 Savimbi and dos Santos sign the Bicesse Accords that call for an
interim period and general elections, monitored by UNAVEM II
1992 UNITA is defeated in the general election and Savimbi immediately
remobilizes his party to fight the ruling MPLA
1994 The warring parties sign the Lusaka Protocol, but this agreement
only leads to several fragile periods of relative peace
2002 Savimbi is killed in battle. Shortly thereafter, UNITA signs a cease-
fire agreement and integrates into the rule of the MPLA
Its chief support base was made up of Luanda’s educated mestiço community
and of ethnic Mbundus, although it also included Ovimbundus in leading po-
sitions (Pereira, 1994; Tvedten, 1997).77 Due to its popular standing among
mestiços, the rivaling FNLA tended to label the MPLA as a non-African elite
movement “that wants independence in order to take the place of their ‘fathers’
(the whites)” (in Götz, 2002, p. 54). To UNITA, the MPLA “was led by the
mixed-race offspring of the erstwhile colonisers” (Pearce, 2015, p. 13) and was
thus “just another European import product” (Spikes, 1993, p. 10).
From its early days onwards, the MPLA was not only a military movement
but strongly emphasized its political and ideological goals of gaining control
over the administration of Angola and starting a national transformation project
that would make Angola a socialist state (Malaquias, 2007). In its own words,
the “laying down of People’s Democracy and Socialism as goals to be attained
implies qualitative leaps in the politico-ideological and organizational sphere, so
that the vanguard organization may play its full role in the leadership of society”
77Angola’s main ethnic groups are the Bakongo, Mbundu, and Ovimbundu. In 1986, the
Bakongo constituted around 13 percent of Angola’s population, while the Mbundu made up
23 and the Ovimbundu approximately 39 percent of the population (Götz, 2002).
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(People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola, 1979). To this end, the MPLA
developed tight ideological linkages to the Soviet Union, many of its cadres
received Soviet military training, and the party was also financially supported
both by Cuba and by the Soviet Union which significantly contributed to its
battlefield capacity towards the end of the independence strive (Birmingham,
2015). In 1974 alone, the Soviet Union supplied the MPLA with logistic material
worth over 300 million US Dollar, and Cuba deployed 12,000 soldiers in order
to ensure the MPLA would win the struggle for independence (James, 1992;
Ogunbadejo, 1980). In 1975, UNITA leader Savimbi commented on these Cuban
troops with “everyone was so weak that after 6 months it [the war] would have
ended” and “it was the Cubans’ entry ... which altered the entire context” (in
Radu, 1990, p. 128).
As one of the MPLA’s rivals in Angola’s struggle for independence, the
FNLA was founded in 1962 against the background of a second stream of nation-
alism that was based in Angola’s rural north among ethnic Bakongos and local
coffee farmers (Cornwell, 2000; Marcum, 1983; Pearce, 2015).78 The FNLA, led
by Holden Hoberto, was itself a successor movement to the Democratic Party
of Angola and the Union of People of North Angola – an organization founded
in 1957 and later renamed into the Union of People of Angola, in order to (for-
mally) assume a more national role. Compared to the urban, multi-ethnic, and
elitist MPLA that envisioned the political overhaul of Angola and the creation
of a socialist state, the FNLA has been called a rural, regionalist, and ethno-
nationalist organization that lacked strong ideological goals, and that mostly
included indigenas in its ranks (James, 2011; Ohlson, 1998). Because of this
regional background in Angola’s north and the dominance of ethnic Bakongos,
the FNLA turned insignificant after Angola’s independence. This was both due
to political changes – more Bakongo parties began to organize in the early 1990s
(Götz, 2002) – and military events, as it was decimated by the MPLA’s armed
wing Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola or People’s Armed
Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) in the 1970s. In 1985, the FNLA
was described as soldiers roaming “the bush dressed in rags,” going “into battle
armed with only two bullets each” (Radu, 1990, p. 130).
In 1962, upon its foundation and when it was still a force to be reckoned
with for the MPLA, the FNLA had created the Angolan Revolutionary Gov-
ernment in Exile in Kinshasa, then Leopoldville (Heywood, 1989; Malaquias,
2007; Spikes, 1993). Foreign Minister of this government in exile was Jonas
Savimbi, an ethnic Ovimbundu from Angola’s Bié province who would soon
become critical of the FNLA’s persistent ethnic ambitions, its “flagrant ... trib-
alism” and Bakongo dominance (Savimbi, 1972), and who would thus found a
third stream of nationalism in Angola. Savimbi announced his resignation from
both the government in exile and the FNLA in 1964, and, after briefly flirting
78In 1960, as the Mbundu population that backed the MPLA constituted about 24 percent
of the population, the Bakongo (who represent also the largest ethnic group in the neighboring
Republic of Congo) accounted for 12 percent (Wright, 1997).
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with joining the MPLA – that denied him a leadership position and only offered
him to join as a rank-and-file soldier (Ohlson, 1998) – he in 1965 traveled to
China with a band of followers to receive military training. In 1966, Savimbi re-
turned to Angola with his own movement: UNITA. While UNITA resembled the
FNLA in its success of building a rural, ethno-nationalist support base among
Ovimbundu farmers in southern and central Angola, a key difference to the
FNLA were UNITA’s ideological ambitions (Birmingham, 2015; Ohlson, 1998).
UNITA emphasized both a “black power” rhetoric that highlighted the struggle
of indigenas in the colonial history and adopted Maoist mobilization strategies,
such as attributing great importance to political organization, popular support
and education, and economic self-reliance (Potgieter, 2000).79
Angola’s war for independence was thus unique among other decoloniza-
tion struggles in that there existed no single, unified movement for liberation;
but instead the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA “battled each other more than the
Portuguese” and failed to form a joint front line against the colonial authori-
ties (James, 1992, p. 45).80 As a result, no movement made significant gains
against the colonial power. By 1974, the groups had spent most of their military
resources against each other. Help came from developments within Portugal,
where the military ousted Marcelo Caetano on 25 April 1974 and immediately
signaled its willingness to grant Angola independence, not least because the of-
ficers staging the coup “better knew than anyone that the colonial wars were
unwinnable” and thus favored decolonization (Pearce, 2015, p. 31). The war-
ring parties signed the Alvor Accords on 15 January 1975 and Portugal agreed
to proclaim independence on 11 November 1975 by handing over power to a
unified national and transitional power-sharing government, in order “to end its
colonial history in an acceptable way” (Tvedten, 1997, p. 36).
The Alvor Accords failed. The leaders of the three independence move-
ments – Savimbi, dos Santos, and Roberto – were extremely antagonistic, and
nothing about the foregoing independence war had generated a remote willing-
ness among them to cooperate in a power-sharing national government (Ohlson,
1998). Instead, as the groups assembled in Luanda in January 1975, “person-
ality, ideological, and ethnic conflicts quickly arose” (James, 1992, p. 7), and
“insecurity, distrust, fear and hatred burst out in full now that the parties could
openly campaign for internal and external support” (Ohlson, 1998, p. 69). The
79Having said that, confusion over what UNITA actually stood for reigned throughout its
active years. For instance, UNITA received support both from Maoist China as well as from
the United States – “Savimbi called upon Maoist ideas as readily as he presented himself to
Western backers as dedicated to the free market” (Pearce, 2012, p. 459) – and while UNITA
emphasized tribalism and black power, it joined forces with South Africa’s apartheid regime
on the battlefield. As Tanzania’s first President Julius Nyerere paraphrased it, Savimbi may
best be described as a “political opportunist” (Marcum, 1983).
80For instance, while the MPLA did most of the fighting against the Portuguese, the FNLA
and UNITA regarded the MPLA as their main enemy; and although UNITA recurrently
denounced the MPLA as collaborators of the colonial administration (Cornwell, 2000), the
commander in chief of the Portuguese military said that “it was understood that Portuguese
and UNITA forces would not fight against each other” (in Malaquias, 2007, p. 69).
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power-sharing government formed by the peace agreement was thus barely func-
tioning, although it is said that Portugal used its de jure existence to distance
itself from the violent events unfolding in Angola at the time (Pearce, 2015).
Consequently, an ever rising number of Cuban soldiers were arriving in An-
gola throughout 1975 in order to train MPLA cadres and to assist them in com-
bat. By July, the MPLA was strong enough to force the FNLA – “supported
by a Zairian army lacking professionalism” – and UNITA – “backed by a South
African army lacking the political will to fight” – out of Luanda (Malaquias,
2007, p. 71). On 10 November 1975, the last Portuguese troops departed from
Angola, and a day later, the Portuguese High Commissioner granted Angolans
their independence. Agostinho Neto reacted immediately and declared that
“[in] the name of the Angolan people,” the MPLA “solemnly proclaims the
independence of Angola before Africa and the world” (People’s Movement for
the Liberation of Angola, 1978b). The next day, UNITA’s Savimbi declared
the independence of the Democratic People’s Republic of Angola in the city of
Huambo (Pearce, 2015). This marked the beginning of Angola’s civil war.
7.1.2 From Civil War to General Elections
In a seamless transition, the decolonization struggle thus turned into a civil war
between UNITA and the MPLA over controlling Angola’s government, after
the FNLA gradually disappeared from the scene as a military force (Ohlson,
1998). Until the mid-1980s, UNITA was able to gain control over significant
parts of Angolan territory. While the MPLA controlled Luanda “and little
else” (Malaquias, 2007, p. 39), UNITA was in charge of several south-eastern
provinces, including Huambo, Angola’s second largest city. As Pearce (2015,
p. 39) writes, Angola was literally “divided into what the press and the Por-
tuguese authorities termed ‘zones of influence’: a euphemism for outright con-
trol” by one of the movements. Although the area under its control was only
sparsely populated, UNITA managed to create “basic insecurity in around 80
percent of the country,” with detrimental effects on the life and socioeconomic
situation of the majority of Angola’s population (Tvedten, 1997, p. 38). In order
to sustain control over its Terras Libres de Angola, UNITA thereby established
an extensive system of parallel government that provided basic social services to
the population it administrated, including the creation not only of 22 secondary
and almost 700 primary schools “with 7,127 teachers and 224,811 students”
(Potgieter, 2000, p. 262), but also centrally managed collective farms, a health
care system with six hospitals and 1,989 clinics, as well as a national provisional
capital in Jamba (Brittain, 1998; Pearce, 2015).
To manage this parallel administrative system, UNITA set up a broad politi-
cal leadership structure, including a Party Congress that met every four years to
select the decision-making Central Committee and Political Bureau, and to for-
mulate policy for the controlled territories. In all meetings of the Congress, Sav-
imbi was naturally reelected as President and Commander in Chief of UNITA’s
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armed wing, Forças Armadas de Libertação de Angola or Armed Forces of the
Liberation of Angola (FALA). UNITA also founded a youth wing – the Revo-
lutionary United Youth of Angola (JURA) – and the Angola Women’s League
(LIMA), and maintained an administrative council (that inter alia included Sav-
imbi’s wife Ana Isabel Paulino Savimbi) and an external mission with offices in
Portugal, Germany, the UK, Senegal, or at the UN (National Union for the To-
tal Independence of Angola, 1991). All in all, UNITA tried to establish itself as
“an alternative state model for Angola” (Heywood, 1989, p. 48) – with success:
during the 1980s, Angola essentially had two governments.81
The first phase of Angola’s civil war culminated in the six-months long Battle
of Cuito Cuanavale in 1987 and 1988, a former Portuguese military base held
by the FAPLA and Cuban troops that UNITA desperately wanted to control in
order to achieve a strategic advantage in the fight against the MPLA government
(Birmingham, 2015). For several months, no side was able to defeat the other,
but each party was reporting high numbers of casualties. Then, UNITA and
South Africa had to retreat from the city in the spring of 1988, which turned
Cuito Cuanavale into “a symbol across the continent that apartheid and its
army were no longer invincible” (Brittain, 1998, p. 36). But also the MPLA had
experienced heavy losses. Hence, for the first time, room for negotiations opened
and Angola’s warring parties embarked on a peace process that would last for
several years. On 22 December 1988, Angola, South Africa, and Cuba signed
the New York Accords that regulated the withdrawal of South African and
Cuban armies from Angola monitored by the United Nations Angola Verification
Mission I (UNAVEM I), a peacekeeping mission that had been authorized by UN
Security Council Resolution 626 two days earlier (United Nations, 1988). The
New York Accords thus “removed the international character of the Angolan
conflict without bringing it to an end,” because it had little to do with the
violent struggle between the warring parties (Ottaway, 1998, p. 135).
But strongly pressured by the international community, the warring parties
engaged in further peace negotiations and for the first time, Savimbi and dos
81Why was the MPLA in the initial years of Angola’s civil war able to consolidate its power
and drive UNITA and FNLA forces out of Luanda but then lost ground so quickly against
UNITA? Part of an explanation is the involvement of foreign powers during the Cold War that
turned the conflict into an international affair. In 1975, the MPLA had the strongest external
backing and received weaponry, training, and on-the-ground support from the Soviet Union
and Cuba. This made the party prevail over the FNLA – with financial help from the US and
on-the-ground support from Zaire – and UNITA, fighting with Chinese weapons and the help
of South African troops (Malaquias, 2007). But during the 1980s, intensified operations of the
African National Congress (ANC) and the Southwest Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO)
in Angola were used by South Africa’s apartheid government as an excuse to launch several
invasions into Angola, arguing that it feared the MPLA government would offer support to
the ANC or SWAPO (Birmingham, 2015). While South Africa’s advances helped UNITA to
make territorial and military gains against the MPLA, it was changing US foreign policy that
made the difference. The 1976 Clark Amendment had long prohibited closer US assistance to
Angola’s rebels, but the amendment was repealed in 1985 as a new policy under the Reagan
administration advocated backing anti-Marxist strives in Africa as the US did not wish “to
see the MPLA lead the nation-building process in Angola, fearing a socialist-style regime with
close ties with the Soviet bloc” (El-Khawas, 1977, p. 36).
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Notes: Figure based on data from the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (Sundberg
and Melander, 2013) displaying the number of battle-related deaths per month for the
UNITA – MPLA dyad. The rule of the interim government is shaded in gray.
Santos shook hands and announced the verbally concluded Gbadolite Agreement
at the Summit Conference of African Presidents in June 1989. This ceasefire
agreement however collapsed immediately, not least because confusion reigned
over what had actually been decided on in the meeting (James, 1992): The
MPLA declared that Savimbi had fully agreed to all points of dos Santos’ peace
plan – which would inter alia have required UNITA to respect the Angolan
constitution and the MPLA’s one-party rule (Foreign Ministry of Angola, 1990).
Savimbi yet objected in a The New York Times opinion peace, reasoning that it
would have been “silly” for him to surrender to the MPLA that way (Savimbi,
1989). The MPLA’s reaction: “Savimbi is lying” (Foreign Ministry of Angola,
1990). Likewise, UNITA’s Washington representative Macos Samondo stated
that the MPLA “thought the cease-fire was an end in itself,” while UNITA
“thought the cease-fire was a means to achieve ... continued dialogue toward a
government of national unity” (in James, 1992, p. 245).
Despite the hostile atmosphere between the two party leaders, their meeting
in Gbadolite was not the end of Angola’s peace process. Especially the MPLA
was under intense pressure after the collapse of the Soviet Union meant an end
to its financial support. On 31 May 1991, Savimbi and dos Santos met in Lisbon
in order to sign the Bicesse Accords. This peace agreement provided inter alia
for the disarmament and demobilization of both standing armies and the cre-
ation of an integrated national army with guaranteed posts for UNITA, as well
as an interim period governed by the incumbent MPLA that would culminate
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in multi-party general elections monitored by the United Nations Angola Verifi-
cation Mission II (UNAVEM II). The latter had been created the day before in
UN Security Council Resolution 696 (United Nations, 1991b; United Nations,
1991c). The pressure that the MPLA was facing internationally was thus also
reflected in the one-sided concessions it had to agree on with Bicesse: At the
meeting in Gbadolite two years earlier, it had vehemently insisted on retaining
a one-party state and the constitution of Angola, while it had to agree with
Bicesse to constitutional changes and multi-party politics that would for the
first time allow UNITA to participate in national elections.
Peace after Bicesse was brief. While the 16 months between the signing
of the peace agreement and the holding of national elections are described as
“the most spectacular period of optimism and freedom that Angola had ever
witnessed” (Birmingham, 2015, p. 109), the UN Secretary General’s Special
Representative to Angola Margaret Anstee (1993, p. 495) also notes that while
“there were sixteen brief months of comparative peace ... after elections which
the United Nations certified as ‘generally free and fair’, civil war broke out
again, of a ferocity worse ... than at any time in the previous thirty years.”
These elections to determine the post-interim President and National Assembly
of Angola were held on 29 and 30 September 1992. All observers, including
Savimbi and the MPLA, had been certain that UNITA would win the vote.
After all, it was 1991 and “all over the world socialist parties which had run
one-party states, such as MPLA, were being rejected by their people after years
in power” (Brittain, 1998, p. 46). At a campaign rally in early September 1992,
Savimbi had declared that he would “easily” take 75 percent of the presidential
vote (in Ellis, 1992), and he had also announced that if “UNITA does not win
the election, it has to be rigged,” and if elections were rigged, “I don’t think we
will accept them” (in The Toronto Star, 1992). UNITA thus left no doubt that
a vote for the MPLA was a vote for war – “Savimbi himself suggested as much
... ten days before the election” (Maier, 1997, 12f.).
The elections themselves, monitored by UNAVEM II and 400 additional in-
ternational monitors, were conducted peacefully and without larger disruptions
(cf. a similar situation in Cambodia, Chapter 8). To the surprise of many, both
the vote to the parliament and the presidential vote resulted in a MPLA victory
(Fortna, 2003a). In the legislative elections held under a system of proportional
representation, the MPLA received 54 percent of the vote and 129 of 220 seats
in the parliament, while UNITA gained 34 percent and 70 seats. In the presiden-
tial vote, dos Santos gained 49.6 and Savimbi 40.1 percent (Clemente-Kersten,
1999).82 As official results were published on 3 October, Savimbi claimed fraud
82Results also showed that while regional and ethnic patterns of voting remained, this was
not the key factor that determined voting behavior. While Savimbi gained the majority
of Ovimbundu votes and many Bakongos in Angola’s north cast their vote for the MPLA
(Heywood, 1998; Ottaway, 1998), an MPLA-commissioned research team conducted a survey
in August 1992 in which, in response to the question “In choosing who to vote for President,
do you think it is very important ... that your candidate be from your region or province?”,
65 per cent of respondents replied that it was “not at all important” (Pereira, 1994, p. 18).
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and declared on UNITA’s radio station Voz da Resistência do Galo Negro or
Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel (VORGAN):
“We would like to draw the MPLA’s attention to the fact that there
are men and women in this country who are ready to give up their
lives so that the country can redeem itself. As far as we are concerned,
it will not depend on any international organization to say that the
elections were free and fair” (in Maier, 1997, p. 13).
On 5 October, UNITA pulled its generals out of the joint army that had
been hastily created only days before the vote, and its soldiers began attacking
MPLA troops (Ohlson, 1998). On 16 October the UN issued the final election
results and Special Representative Anstee declared the vote free and fair. She
also noted that in accordance with the electoral law – that required the President
to be elected by an absolute majority – a second round of presidential elections
would have to take place in due time, as neither Savimbi nor dos Santos were
able to gain the necessary 50 percent. This second round never took place: by
November 1992, Angola’s civil war had resumed in full scale.
7.2 Interim Government in Angola
I highlighted in Chapter 6 the limitations of applying bargaining theory to cases
such as Nepal, where adhering to the unitary actor assumption or two-player
games would result in overlooking important dynamics in how interim govern-
ments contribute to long-term peace after war. On the contrary, UNITA’s
remobilization in the post-interim period is a classic bargaining breakdown due
to prevailing commitment problems. To recall, I conceptualized intrastate con-
flict in Chapter 3 as a bargaining failure caused by the presence of commitment
problems that arise if expected shifts in the relative distribution of power make
stronger-growing parties unable to uphold an efficient peaceful deal in future
(Powell, 2006). In such situations, it becomes rational for weaker-growing par-
ties to rather sooner than later resort to war.
At the time of signing the Bicesse Accords, Angola’s warring parties had
publicly announced their commitment to uphold the terms peace agreement. In
a speech before Angola’s parliament in May 1991, President dos Santos high-
lighted how neither party was “in any condition to reject the accords now with-
out being totally discredited” (in Amado, 1991a), thus emphasizing the role of
domestic and international audience costs. Also Savimbi affirmed his commit-
ment to uphold the bargain reached in Portugal: “What I wanted to do here
was to state ... before the international community that we ... will do our ut-
most, absolutely our utmost, so that these accords may be fully implemented”
(in Weimer and Fandrych, 1995). But when UNITA lost the 1992 elections and
power had shifted to the MPLA, UNITA had no guarantees that it would not
be marginalized or eliminated in the post-interim period. This was not least
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because the MPLA had for decades resisted the introduction of multi-party
politics and had only agreed to constitutional changes following intense inter-
national pressure at the end of the Cold War.83 Dos Santos had also moved
back and forth over the years with regard to whether he would allow Savimbi
to participate in a post-interim coalition government which would guarantee
the latter’s political survival, and dos Santos had both declared that he would
not accept any international pressures “which aim is the formation of a so-
called coalition government” (in Brooke, 1988), and had pledged his readiness
for forming a coalition after the 1992 elections (Finn, 1994).
As a result, it became rational for UNITA to remobilize for war. Following
the setup of Figure 3.2 in Chapter 3, UNITA had two options in the aftermath of
its electoral defeat: It could either have accepted the MPLA’s victory and peace-
fully integrate into the post-interim opposition; or it could not have accepted
its defeat and remobilize for war. We know that UNITA chose remobilization
and thus war followed for both – but what would have happened if UNITA had
accepted the electoral result, laid down its weapons, and had reintegrated into
the state? In that case, the MPLA would have had two options: It could either
have reconciled with UNITA, offer Savimbi amnesty, and allow him to peace-
fully participate in post-war politics; or it could have executed Savimbi and
his cadres for having violently challenged its authority in the first place, which
would have made the MPLA the dominant actor in the new state. UNITA’s
highest preference would have been a future state in which it is the dominant
actor – previous research has argued that Savimbi’s aspiration was obtaining
absolute political power and control over the Angolan state and its resources
(Pearce, 2010). Its second highest preference would have been a situation in
which it is offered amnesty but does not have to pay the costs of further war,
and its least favorable outcome would have been execution.
Savimbi knew that the MPLA would not allow him a peaceful and valuable
integration into post-interim politics. Not only were the MPLA’s commitments
to let Savimbi participate in a post-interim coalition government non-credible
from the start – after dos Santos repeatedly altered his positions on the topic
and only committed to Savimbi’s participation following international pressure
(Finn, 1994) – but the MPLA could never have committed to uphold this bargain
had UNITA fully disarmed and demobilized. This is because facing the choice
between executing Savimbi or forgiving him, the MPLA would have chosen the
former option: Now that UNITA had demobilized, power would have shifted
even further to the MPLA’s advantage and the latter’s payoff for eliminating
UNITA would have been higher than its payoff for granting Savimbi amnesty.
The MPLA thus had incentives to renege on the bargain.84 UNITA knew this
83As the election winner, the MPLA was gaining in strength not least by being increasingly
regarded as the legitimate Angolan government by the international community. For instance,
even the US opened a Liaison Office in Luanda in 1992, and President Bill Clinton formally
recognized the MPLA government in early 1993 (cf. Pearce, 2015).
84Similar concerns were voiced should UNITA win the elections: “There are fears that should
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– after all, several rumors persisted about the MPLA’s attempts to kill Savimbi
– and consequently remobilized, because its payoffs for further war (in which it
had a chance of winning) were higher than those for definite execution.
But commitment problems can be overcome (Walter, 2002). Why did insti-
tutional and procedural features of the foregoing interim government fail to mit-
igate commitment problems for the warring parties (or even exacerbate them),
and how precisely did this lead to the re-escalation of war in the post-interim
period? The ensuing sections analyze these links. I thereby attend to each
hypothesized property of interim government of Chapter 3 sequentially – (H1)
power-sharing and (H2) international interim government, (H3) the integration
of parallel institutions, and (H4) the participation of civil society and political
parties. I structure each section in three parts. Firstly, I very briefly review
the theoretical causal mechanism for each property of interim government. Sec-
ond, I describe the respective provisions as decided upon in the 1991 Bicesse
Accords. Thirdly, I outline the process of its implementation, present an anal-
ysis on how this process of events and actions affected the causal mechanisms
between each property of interim rule and war in the post-interim period, and
discuss competing explanations and limitations of my theoretical argument.
7.2.1 Power-Sharing Interim Government
Following Shain and Linz (1995) seminal work on interim governments, I formu-
lated in Chapter 3 a distinction between power-sharing interim government and
interim periods in which only one party holds executive and legislative power. I
consequently held that in the presence of commitment problems, power-sharing
interim governments should be more likely to lead to stable post-interim peace
as they come with physical, economic, and political benefits of cooperation that
decrease future uncertainty for weaker-rowing parties (cf. Figure 3.3 on page
34). In contrast, revolutionary or caretaker interim governments should rein-
force commitment problems among those warring parties that are left outside
executive or legislative power during the interim period.
Both warring parties had in the lead up to the Bicesse Accords rejected the
option of a period of power-sharing before elections, although joint rule “could
have secured minimum standards of impartiality” in preparing for the vote or
alleviated the winner-takes-all nature of the peace process (Messiant, 2004).
In the 1991 Bicesse Accords, UNITA and the MPLA consequently negotiated
an incumbent caretaker interim government and agreed that the ruling MPLA
would remain in power until elections.85 In the early days of the interim pe-
Savimbi win one of the first casualties would be democracy” (in Windrich, 1992, p. 169).
85While no power-sharing was thus negotiated for the interim executive or legislative, an-
other element of cooperation was implemented for the interim period, as the parties agreed
to form the Joint Political-Military Commission (JPMC) to monitor the peace process. This
commission included delegates from the MPLA, UNITA, the US, the Soviet Union, Portu-
gal, and the UN. It was not created to replace the MPLA caretaker government and had no
legislative or executive functions, but at times seemed like a de facto government, further
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riod, executive power thereby rested exclusively with President dos Santos, who
was at the time of the peace accords also serving as Angola’s Prime Minister,
President of the National Assembly, and Chairman of the MPLA (Fritscher,
1991). The party had merged all posts in December 1978, when it had formally
adopted a Marxist-Leninist program, introduced a socialist one-party state, and
promulgated a constitution that asked the Angolan President to also be “the
President of the MPLA” and “represent the Angolan nation” (People’s Move-
ment for the Liberation of Angola, 1978a). When it formally accepted the move
towards multi-party democracy, the MPLA had to separate these posts, and
dos Santos appointed Fernando Jose Franca Van-Dunem as Prime Minister on
19 July 1991. The last parliamentary elections to Angola’s National Assembly
had thereby taken place on 9 December 1986 – when the MPLA was the sole
legal political party and consequently occupied all 289 seats in parliament – and
this was therefore also the case in the caretaker interim legislative.86
Decreasing Uncertainty through Physical Security
I argued that a first mechanism for why power-sharing interim government is
more apt to increase the stability of post-interim peace than caretaker interim
governments is that power-sharing reduces future uncertainty through increas-
ing the physical security of warring parties (cf. Figure 3.3). It does so, because
joining power-sharing institutions requires parties, firstly, to come out of hid-
ing in the remote periphery and join the interim institutions in the capital –
which means they have to reveal their organizational structure to each other
(making it more difficult to remobilize for war), and which turns them into eas-
ier targets for enemy troops (reducing future uncertainty about the opponent’s
behavior). Secondly, power-sharing interim governments also mean that rebel-
leaders-turned-politicians receive state bodyguards and international attention,
further increasing their physical security (cf. Binningsbø and Dupuy, 2010).
This mechanism does not hold for Angola. Even though the warring parties
did not implement a power-sharing interim government, the theorized process
was still set into motion: UNITA (partially) came out of hiding, established new
national headquarters in Luanda (installed yet a number of its own bodyguards
to protect Savimbi in the capital), and received massive degrees of international
and domestic publicity and news coverage.
Cuban troops had withdrawn from Angola by May 1991. In line with the
contributing to the parallel structures of authority during the interim period and to confusion
over who was responsible for what tasks (Malaquias, 1995). The JPMC met for the first time
on 17 June 1991; and on 10 September, UNITA suspended its participation. Head of the
UNITA delegation Salupeto Pena proclaimed UNITA believed the MPLA was not demobi-
lizing and was hence “not committed to implementing the peace agreements” (AFP, 1991f).
While UNITA resumed its posts on 17 September, these fights meant that the JPMC was an
“admirable compromise” but a generally ineffective and unsatisfactory body (Anstee, 1993).
86In 1986, members of parliament had been indirectly elected by electoral colleges set up in
all 18 provinces of Angola, and provincial assembly members had been selected by citizens in
communities and work places (Inter Parliamentary Union, 2015).
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1988 New York Accords, their departure was monitored by UNAVEM I and
was even completed a month ahead of schedule. After President dos Santos had
returned to the capital on 1 June 1991, the way was paved for Savimbi to move
UNITA’s headquarters from Jamba to Luanda. On 16 June 1991, UNITA sent
a delegation of 65 guerrillas to Luanda that would join the JPMC (cf. Footnote
85 and Amado, 1991d). One week later, the rebels held their first public rally
in Luanda since the onset of the civil war in 1975 in front of 10,000 supporters
(Amado, 1991e) – previously unthinkable and a clear sign that the rebel group
and its followers were coming out of hiding. The (MPLA-controlled) national
television also broadcasted scenes of UNITA and MPLA soldiers “fraternizing”
in Luanda (Fritscher, 1991). In July 1991, UNITA then officially set up its new
national headquarters at the Hotel Turismo in Luanda, but retained some of its
parallel institutions in Jamba (cf. below and Maier, 1997).
Savimbi, who had originally scheduled his move to Luanda for July 1991,
arrived in the capital on 28 September (Amado, 1991c). He had however refused
to accept any official state bodyguards for his protection (cf. Chapter 6 on the
similar situation of the CPN (M) in Nepal). A week before his arrival, one
hundred “heavily armed rebel soldiers” had thus been sent to Luanda to act
as Savimbi’s bodyguards and provide for his security in the capital that was
still in the hands of MPLA troops (Amado, 1991b). Even though Savimbi did
not assume an official role in the interim government, international political
and media attention to his presence in the capital became enormous, also be-
cause many international observers – particularly in the US – were convinced
that he would dominate the coming national elections (Malaquias, 2007). As
a result, Savimbi – who was described as very charismatic and eloquent with
international media (Ames, 1992) – received also significant TV coverage during
his highly publicized visits to the US (Windrich, 1992). Furthermore, and due
to its long established networks and external missions in Western Europe and
the US (cf. section 7.1), UNITA was also able to pursue its own media campaign
by publishing opinion pieces in several outlets (Samakuva, 1992; Savimbi, 1989).
Decreasing Uncertainty through Economic Security
In Chapter 3, I argued that a second mechanism for why power-sharing interim
government is more apt to increase the stability of post-interim peace than
caretaker interim governments is that power-sharing reduces future uncertainty
through increasing the economic benefits for warring parties (cf. Figure 3.3). It
does so, because in war-torn states, individual access to wealth and resources is
usually determined by control of or loyalty to the government, and thus either
side to a conflict must fear to be economically marginalized if the other side
fully controls a transition to peace. By rewarding weaker-growing parties with
cabinet or legislative positions, power-sharing interim governments enable them
to control (or loot) the resources ascribed to their post and thus lower their
incentives to acquire such benefits by violent means (cf. Haaß and Ottmann,
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2015; Tull and Mehler, 2005). Contrariwise, caretaker interim governments
should only award the party in power with access to wealth, public goods, and
resources; making it rational for the outside party to remobilize for war.
Angola does not confirm to this causal pattern. Again, even though UNITA
did not receive any power-sharing guarantees during the interim period, the pro-
posed mechanism came into being and UNITA had the opportunity to enrich
itself by looting resources due to the continued existence of its parallel polit-
ical institutions in the periphery. As I show below, this highlights significant
interactions between interim institutional designs and the integration of paral-
lel political institutions into the authority of interim government; an aspect I
attended to in Chapter 3 but did not find any support with regard to my full
sample (cf. Chapter 4).
As noted above, most observers were certain that UNITA would win the
elections scheduled for September 1992, not least because of the departure of
socialist parties from office all over the world. Also the MPLA was aware of
this trend. This became visible when in July 1991, corruption in the caretaker
interim government reached new levels as officials had started to “buy cars and
to ensure a comfortable living standard in the event of an UNITA defeat in the
elections” (Maier, 1991) – and thus behaved very much like interim elites in
Liberia would 12 years later (Haaß and Ottmann, 2015; Human Rights Watch,
2005; International Crisis Group, 2003a). In January 1992, the MPLA caretaker
legislative tried to ever more secure the interim government’s access to resources
as it passed a new Mining Law 1/92. This law revoked previous legislation
(which had banned the private possession of diamonds) and now legally allowed
“senior members of the government to take stolen and smuggled diamonds out
of the country” (Dowden, 1992a) – which is precisely what my proposed causal
mechanism would predict for caretaker interim governments. Consequently and
in February 1992, MPLA interim authorities – preparing for an eventual UNITA
victory in the upcoming elections – were reportedly “on the run” and “stealing
large chunks of the country’s wealth as they go,” such as the “proceeds of the
sale of a 10-per-cent share in an oilfield” (Dowden, 1992a).87
Having said that, economic benefits directly resulting from passing the new
law were also available to UNITA, the party outside the interim institutions,
thus disproving my proposed causal mechanism. Firstly, while Mining Law 1/92
legally enabled MPLA interim authorities to privately engage in diamond trade,
the law “backfired” because it also opened the door for UNITA – and literally
everyone else – to engage in diamond mining and smuggling (Finkel, 1992a). As
a result, and while the interim government managed to retain control over oil
revenues, diamond revenue became a major source of funding for UNITA, thus
significantly decreasing its cost of future combat (cf. below, Le Billon, 2001a).
Secondly, UNITA was able to engage in the informal acquisition of economic
87This behavior did not, as Le Billon (2001a, p. 63) notes, undermine public support for the
government and provide UNITA with an advantage for the upcoming elections, as a popular
graffiti during the interim period paraphrases: “The MPLA steals, UNITA kills.”
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benefits through diamond smuggle because it refused to reintegrate its parallel
administered territories into the control of the MPLA caretaker government. Be-
cause it also refused to disarm and demobilize, UNITA was able to use its arms
to pressure an estimated 150,000 unauthorized diamond miners (garimpeiros)
into helping them in the mining and smuggling business, for instance by set-
ting up patrolling forces in diamond abundant areas (Finkel, 1992a; Malaquias,
2007). Diamond trade was such an enormous economic benefit and financial
resource for the rebels that it replaced all other external sources of funding that
had waned after the end of the Cold War (Malaquias, 2007). It was not least
a a key determinant for UNITA’s ability to remobilize for war because it also
maintained UNITA’s internal stability (Le Billon, 2001a, p. 71).88 I further
attend to the role of diamonds for UNITA’s financial situation below.
Decreasing Uncertainty through Political Security
In Chapter 3 I argued that a third mechanism for why power-sharing interim
government is more apt to increase the stability of post-interim peace than
caretaker interim rule is that power-sharing reduces future uncertainty through
increasing the political security of warring parties (cf. Figure 3.3). Power-
sharing firstly, grants weaker-growing parties a voice in the design of post-
interim institutions (for instance through jointly passed laws that are difficult
to achieve, costly to violate, and hard to renege on) which decreases their un-
certainty about the enemy’s future behavior. Secondly, it gives weaker-growing
parties the knowledge on how to manipulate future institutional rules to their
advantage (Manning, 2007). Contrariwise, in caretaker interim governments the
party in power may unilaterally pass laws that secure its own political survival
but increase fears of marginalization among the party left outside of power.
There is weak evidence that Angola confirms to this causal pattern. The case
shows how the MPLA used its unilateral grip on the interim legislative to pass
laws for the post-interim period that secured its own survival, but made peaceful
politics more difficult for UNITA. It is yet difficult to secure evidence confirming
that UNITA had not remobilized had it been part of a power-sharing interim
government. This becomes visible with regard to the drafting and implementa-
tion of the Political Parties Law 15/91. Observers have generally described the
Bicesse Accords as “very sketchy” (Ottaway, 1998, p. 137) in terms of provi-
sions regulating the interim period, because the agreement merely stated “that
1 September to 30 November 1992 will be the period within which free and fair
elections should be held in Angola” and that until that date the MPLA would
act as caretaker government (United Nations, 1991b). The warring parties thus
only agreed to “fundamental principles of democracy” for the interim period but
88UNITA’s ability to use diamonds to fund its violent campaign against the state was only
inhibited after UN Security Council Resolution 864 of September 1993 placed international
sanctions on the rebel activities (United Nations, 1993) – cf. the situation in Cambodia, where
such sanctions were already authorized during the interim period (Chapter 8).
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these were stated in very general terms, “and no mechanisms were put in place
to continue negotiations” or allow the parties to work together in governing
Angola (Ottaway, 1998, p. 137).
With regard to implementing the laws necessary for Angola’s first multi-
party elections, the MPLA-controlled parliament had already passed the Polit-
ical Parties Law 15/91 on 11 May 1991 in order to pave the way for the Bicesse
Accords – the law explicitly allowed for opposition parties and called for an
end of the one-party state. On the surface, this law was precisely what UNITA
had demanded during the peace process and in the lead up to the Bicesse Ac-
cords. As I outlined above, the rebels had previously rejected the terms of
the 1988 Gbadolite Agreement that would have required UNITA to integrate
into a MPLA-controlled one-party state. On a closer look, however, the law
was unilaterally drafted and passed by the MPLA legislative to include several
paragraphs that favored the political survival of the MPLA following the 1992
elections at the expense of parties outside the interim government.
Firstly, the law outlawed ethnically-based political parties and required that
parties present membership numbers in each province in order to register. This
requirement strongly favored the traditionally multi-ethnic MPLA and was more
difficult to achieve for UNITA – a party with a dominant ethnic Ovimbundu
base – or parties operating in northern Angola among the ethnic Bakongo pop-
ulation, such as the FNLA (cf. section 7.1 and Tomasevski, 1994). Secondly,
the law demanded that parties must present at least 3,000 signatures of civilian
supporters in order to register for elections. Civilians signing up to support a
party had to produce a number of photocopies and stamps that were “difficult
to come by in Luanda and nearly impossible to get in the provinces” controlled
by UNITA (Maier, 1991). Thirdly, the relatively low number of required signa-
tures at the same time was meant “to facilitate the emergence of various political
parties to dilute UNITA’s electoral base” and the anti-MPLA vote (Malaquias,
1995, p. 296). Fourthly, some argue that the law constituted a clear victory
for the MPLA because the party could demonstrate “that it was not afraid to
move its contest with UNITA into the political arena,” thereby using the law
“to significantly weaken UNITA by bringing into the same arena many other
political formations that could complicate UNITA’s claim to be MPLA’s only
real opposition” (cf. below, Malaquias, 2007, p. 138).
The process of events and actions that followed the implementation of the
Political Parties Law 15/91 highlights how the behavior of the caretaker interim
government increased antagonism and mistrust between the parties as well as
UNITA’s fear of marginalization in the post-interim period. Although UNITA
agreed in the Bicesse Accords under Section IV (“Political Rights to be Exer-
cised By UNITA”) to “satisfy the formal requirements for its registration as a
political party pursuant to the Political Parties Law of the People’s Republic
of Angola” (United Nations, 1991b), it had not filed all necessary documents
for registration by October 1991. Consequently, President dos Santos publicly
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requested that the rebels comply with Law 15/91 (as well as with all further
regulations issued by the interim legislative regarding the elections), so that the
interim government would be able to move forward with the electoral process
(Brittain, 1998). In February 1992, UNITA reported that it had submitted two
of the necessary documents required for registration, but the interim government
argued in response that the rebels had still failed to hand in the compulsory
3,000 signatures of supporters, which it interpreted as a sign that UNITA was
trying to impede a smooth electoral process (Permanent Mission of Angola,
1992). UNITA immediately reacted to this statement and argued that all de-
lays in the electoral process were not the fault of the rebels, but of the interim
government. Savimbi himself thereby accused the MPLA of trying to push back
elections that could end its grip to power as it “had not yet issued an election
code for multiparty legislative and presidential elections” (AFP, 1991d). And
on 26 March 1992, UNITA’s UK representative Samakuva furthermore argued
in a letter to The Guardian that the “main factor seriously threatening to delay
the elections” was not UNITA’s fault in not submitting necessary documents
for registration, but “the government’s failure to finalize the laws vital to good
governance, these being the Law on Political Parties, the Electoral Law and the
law guaranteeing freedom of the press” (Samakuva, 1992).
Some have argued that had Angola’s interim government included a power-
sharing formula for UNITA – any arrangement that would have forced the par-
ties to work together on key legislation and enabled them to communicate pri-
vately instead of through public media and campaign statements – it would
have helped them to develop confidence and trust in the true intentions of the
adversary, aided them to use a more appeasing language behind closed doors,
and thereby mitigated fears of marginalization and commitment problems (cf.
Fortna, 2003a). Ottaway (1998, p. 146) has also reasoned in this regard that
power-sharing would “have provided a valuable training opportunity for UNITA
... that had no experience in governing a country and would undoubtedly have
benefited from early exposure to the problems of administration.” This could in
turn have increased UNITA’s chance of political survival by showing prospective
voters that it was capable of running a national government.
But any argumentation along these lines misses out on three aspects. Firstly,
UNITA did have the opportunity to demonstrate its ability to govern a larger
territory because it never reintegrated its parallel political institutions into the
authority of the interim government (cf. below). It did however not use its
opportunity because it acted increasingly predatory, repressive, and violent to-
wards the population living under its control. Secondly, any argument calling
for power-sharing interim government as a determinant for peace in Angola ig-
nores that neither UNITA nor the MPLA were willing to consider joint rule
during peace negotiations in the first place, not for the interim period, and
certainly not for the post-interim period. This is because both parties were ex-
tremely centralized, hierarchical, and populist organizations led by strong men
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convinced that they would win an election (Anstee, 1993; Heywood, 2000; Ott-
away, 1998).89 UNITA was actually convinced that it would be more beneficial
for its long-term political survival if it stayed outside the formal interim gov-
ernment institutions. As Pereira (1994, p. 15) phrases it, the MPLA “wanted
to retain control over the state, while [UNITA] was convinced that the Luanda
régime would become so unpopular by being unable to meet the economic ex-
pectations of the population that it was better to remain in opposition.” And
thirdly, while one may imagine a hypothetical situation in which Savimbi could
have used a participation in a power-sharing interim government to manipulate
the electoral rules so that he would not have lost the 1992 elections, it is difficult
to imagine dos Santos accepting to lose this vote after over 25 years in power;
and it is more likely that the MPLA had then remobilized for civil war.
7.2.2 International Interim Government
My second hypothesis held that international interim rule, as opposed to interim
government without the involvement of the international community, increases
the stability of post-interim peace. I defined international interim government as
one in which members of the international community assume political authority
in some or all policy matters. I outlined that past research has often looked at
such interim government in a strict interpretation following Doyle (2002), but
that I prefer the more lenient perspective of Guttieri and Piombo (2007) who
reason that most present interim governments see vast degrees of international
influence in decision-making – even though this influence may not be formalized
in administrative structures. In Chapter 3, I then held that in the presence of
commitment problems, international interim rule increases the stability of peace
through the mechanism of raising costs of defection via physical deterrence, as
well as by the means of policy influence (cf. Figure 3.3). Concurrently, in
cases where international actors do not take on any kind of interim authority,
commitment problems should be exacerbated for weaker-growing parties.
By signing the Bicesse Accords in 1991, UNITA and the MPLA agreed to
offer international actors – and in particular the UN – an influential role dur-
ing the rule of Angola’s interim government, allowing me to classify Angola
as international interim government under a lenient understanding of the con-
cept, albeit not under a strict definition (cf. Chapter 4). In specific, and in
accordance with Bicesse, the UN Security Council adopted its Resolution 696
on 30 May 1991 to authorize the United Nations Angola Verification Mission
II (UNAVEM II) for an initial period of 17 months (United Nations, 1991c).
UNAVEM II’s initial mandate included the verification of the Bicesse Accords,
as well as the monitoring of the ceasefire and of the Angolan national police
89In June 1991, Savimbi stated in this regard that “the new political system should give
strong powers to a head of state elected for a five-year term” (Ames, 1991), and both Savimbi
and dos Santos regarded the elections “as a chance to win at the ballot box what they could
not win on the battlefield: legitimate power to rule Angola alone” (Fortna, 2003a, p. 75).
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during the interim period. The mandate was enlarged on 24 March 1992 in Se-
curity Council Resolution 747 to comprise also the observation and verification
of presidential and legislative elections, as well as to increase the number of
personnel on the ground for this purpose (United Nations, 1992d). UNAVEM
II was quickly deployed – likely due to its small size as compared to previous
peacekeeping operations in Namibia or Cambodia (cf. Chapter 8). Already on
2 June 1991, military observers arrived in five of what would be the six regional
headquarters of UNAVEM II in Saurimo, Luena, Menongue, Huambo, Lubango,
and Luanda. In the weeks thereafter, UNAVEM II deployed further military
observers to 46 assembly areas or cantonment sites in which the warring parties
would disarm and demobilize (cf. below) and assumed its seat in the JPMC
to oversee the implementation of the ceasefire (cf. Footnote 85). On 25 Octo-
ber 1991, UNAVEM II was fully staffed and included 350 military observers,
89 civilian police officers, 14 medical staff, 54 international civilian personnel,
and 41 local civilian personnel (United Nations, 2000b). These numbers were
increased following Resolution 747 and at the end of the interim period, UN-
AVEM II comprised 126 civilian police officers, 87 international civilian officers,
155 local staff as well as 400 additional electoral observers deployed to Angola
to oversee the electoral registration and polling process.
Tying Hands through Physical Deterrence
In Chapter 3 I argued that a first mechanism for why international interim
government is more apt to increase the stability of post-interim peace than any
other interim government is that international authority increases the warring
parties’ costs of defection through physical deterrence (cf. Figure 3.3). It does
so, firstly, because the military components associated with international in-
terim government bring large numbers of troops that place physical constraints
on the warring parties’ ability to break a deal (for instance by implementing
buffer zones for the disarmament and demobilization of those parties). Sec-
ondly, parties do no longer only have to fight their enemy but also have to
spend valuable resources fighting peacekeepers. Thirdly, the high financial and
human costs that come with assuming authority in war-torn states assure parties
that the international community has a strong interest in upholding a bargain
and achieving a positive outcome of the peace process.
Under a lenient definition that conceptualizes Angola as an international
interim government, the case does not confirm to this suggested causal pattern.
Even though UN Special Representative Anstee had optimistically announced
UNAVEM II’s foreseen function of tying the hands of the warring parties to
peaceful behavior – “[any] party will have to think twice about deviating from
the peace process due to the strong reaction which will result from the interna-
tional community” (in AFP, 1992g) – UNAVEM II’s mandate (and the manner
of its implementation) did not actually increase the warring parties’ costs of
defection. Firstly, the number of UN personnel was too few to control the
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territory of Angola and impose real constraints on the behavior of the parties.
Namibia, for instance, a country of similar size that saw stable post-interim
peace following the rule of its UNTAG international interim government, had
seen a peacekeeping operation of 4,493 personnel of all ranks, which was more
than five times the size of UNAVEM II (cf. Maier, 1997). Even though 400
additional electoral observers were fielded during the polling period at the end
of interim rule, those were still far too few to check the over 6,000 polling sta-
tions set up throughout the country, as head of UNDP Paulo Baldan remarked
in the summer of 1992 (IPS, 1992). Secondly, UNAVEM II was also lacking
the material resources to demobilize the Angolan warring parties and increase
their costs of defection during and after the interim period (Fortna, 2003a). For
instance, when UNAVEM II began to staff the cantonment sites in September
1991 as foreseen by Bicesse, a UN officer in the central province of Malanje
stated that among the key logistical obstacles in UNAVEM II’s operation were
the few vehicles available to actually bring troops to the designated assembly
areas – and if there was a car, there was usually no fuel (Finkel, 1991c).90
This lack of mandate and resources directly affected the perception of the
warring parties, and particularly UNITA, that the international authority UN-
AVEM II represented would not increase its costs of defection in case it wanted
to remobilize for armed combat against the MPLA. A year into the rule of
the interim government, both warring parties (as well as the public) knew that
international actors would not punish any violation of the peace agreement,
and they started to exploit this situation to defect from the negotiated bargain
struck in the Bicesse Accords. Firstly, both parties repeatedly exploited the
lack of resources the UN faced in Angola, knowing that their reluctance to send
combatants to cantonment sites would not result in any penalty by the UN,
and also knowing that combatants deserting from the harsh living conditions
in the assembly areas would not be punished either (cf. below). As a result,
UNAVEM II announced in early 1992 that 35,000 previously detained troops
had left the cantonment sites again (AFP, 1992a).
Secondly, UNITA exploited the lack of mandate of UNAVEM II (that for-
bid peacekeepers to use force other than for self-protection) and immediately
after the 1992 elections began killing prominent supporters of the MPLA while
explicitly stating that the UN was not in a position to stop them. Thereby,
UNITA is said to have expressively wanted to demonstrate “that even the best
known, the best educated, the most loved of local leaders, and whites” were
not protected against UNITA, and “that no one in the UN or the international
community could or would protect anyone” (Brittain, 1998, p. 62).91
90Furthermore, once combatants arrived in the designated assembly areas, UNAVEM II was
unable to provide for the necessary amounts of food, which not only contributed to riots within
the cantonment sites, but also made fully mobilized soldiers desert from the assembly areas to
steal food from the farmers in neighboring areas (cf. below). As Director of the World Food
Program Ramiro da Silve said, “[soldiers] will not stay in the camps if they have nothing to
eat .... Without guaranteed food, they will form banditry groups” (Finkel, 1991b).
91Not least, the UN’s failure to increase UNITA’s costs of defection deepened mistrust
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Notes: Conflict data from the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (Sundberg and Me-
lander, 2013), peacekeeping data from the International Peace Institute (2015). Conflict
data display the number of battle-related deaths per month, peacekeeping data all UN
military, police and civilian personnel deployed. Interim period shaded in gray.
That a lack of mandate and resources directly contributed to why Angola
does not confirm to the causal pattern between international interim government
and peace is also visualized in Figure 7.2. This figure displays the number of
battle-related deaths in Angola between 1989 and 2002 (dashed line), as well
as the number of UN peacekeeping troops deployed (solid line).92 The graph
thereby clearly shows the high intensity of Angola’s civil war until the signing of
the Bicesse Accords in 1991, after which intrastate violence dropped significantly
only to spike again following the electoral defeat of UNITA in the fall of 1992.
Following fragile periods of peace and remobilizations for war in the second half
of the 1990s, civil war in Angola finally came to an end with Savimbi’s death
in 2002. Figure 7.2 also displays that there exists a clear negative correlation
between the number of UN peacekeeping personnel on the ground and battle-
related deaths. In periods when more UN troops were deployed to Angola, fewer
battle-related deaths occurred. This is not to assume any causal relationship
– peacekeeping troops may have deterred violent combat between the warring
against international actors in Angola that UNAVEM II was not up to its job (Ottaway,
1998). For instance, when in September 1992 an expatriate working in Angola spotted a man
jogging in the streets and commented: “He must be from UNAVEM II ... They are the only
ones with time to run” (IPS, 1992). UN electoral observers were also frequently criticized for
being overpaid, not speaking Portuguese (let alone local languages), having little knowledge
of Angolan social customs or little interest in the job (IPS, 1992).
92These include all troops deployed on the ground during UNAVEM I, UNAVEM II, as well
as during all subsequent UN peacekeeping and political missions in Angola.
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parties; but violent combat could also have lead to the UN withdrawing its
personnel for security reasons.
Observers of the Angolan peace process thereby agree that that a stronger
mandate during the interim period that would have allowed UNAVEM II to
actively disarm and demobilize the warring parties and to penalize the parties
in cases of non-compliance with the terms of the Bicesse Accords would have
contributed also to stable peace in the post-interim period: “[Had] the United
Nations been empowered, and able, to disarm both sides before the elections,
the possibilities of a return to hostilities would have been seriously curtailed”
(Anstee, 1993, p. 500). And had UNAVEM II been mandated to “act as a
deterring factor within the framework of traditional peacekeeping, defined ...
as keeping the antagonists away from each other through measures – such as
monitoring the cease-fire, controlling buffer zones and military encampment
sites, investigating arms flows – that could have prevented the resumption of
fighting” following the 1992 elections (Malaquias, 2007, p. 90).93
Tying Hands through Policy Influence
In Chapter 3 I argued that a second mechanism for why international interim
government is more apt to increase the stability of post-interim peace than
any other interim government is that international authority increases costs of
defection for warring parties through policy influence. It does so, because every
policy field advanced by a neutral international officer decreases a stronger-
growing party’s ability to use this position for factional interest and thus to
pursue politics that marginalize a weaker-growing party. This reasoning thus
goes hand in hand with previous studies on peacekeeping that stress the UN’s
role as “as truly neutral authority” (Gisselquist, 2002, p. 12).
Also this causal mechanism does not come into being in Angola. Not only
was UNAVEM II never endowed with any de jure policy influence in the first
place – due to the MPLA’s objection and the international perception of Angola
as an “easily resolvable” case of war – but the UN was also never regarded as
a “truly neutral authority” that could solve commitment problems. Generally,
when the Bicesse Accords were signed, Angola was “not viewed as a particularly
difficult peacekeeping case” (Fortna, 2003a, p. 74) – after all, its predecessor
UNAVEM I had succeeded in monitoring the Cuban withdrawal a month ahead
of schedule, the Cold War and its ensuing external support to the warring
parties had ended, and the Angolan conflict was also regarded as a non-ethnic,
non-secessionist war “easily” to be solved by holding elections (cf. MacQueen,
2000). Furthermore, although UNITA had in the talks leading up to the Bicesse
93Having said that, Figure 7.2 may also be interpreted in favor of an alternative causal
mechanism, i.e. had UNAVEM II retained the high number of personnel as deployed during
the interim period, peace would have prevailed in the post-interim period – or, more generally,
that it is not important whether international actors assume authority during the interim
period, but whether such actors stay on and keep a military and political presence in the
post-interim period. I further attend to this alternative mechanism in Chapter 9.
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Accords demanded “a large UN presence with far-reaching powers,” the ruling
MPLA had strongly objected this proposition “on the grounds that this would
prejudice Angola’s national sovereignty” (Anstee, 1993, 496, cf. Chapter 6 on
the same reasoning among RNA elites in Nepal).
It is difficult to assess whether, had UNAVEM II been mandated to influence
policy in the interim period, UNITA’s commitment problems would have been
mitigated and it would not have resorted to war. Greenhill and Major (2007,
p. 21) suggest as much, arguing that the “primary responsibility for implemen-
tation of the [Bicesse] protocol was assigned to the local parties rather than to
UNAVEM II” which “exacerbated already extant commitment problems.” But
the events and actions taken by UNITA immediately after the elections leave
strong doubt for this theoretical pattern. This doubt is not least grounded in
the observation that UNITA never perceived UNAVEM II as what the mis-
sion presented itself as – a “neutral, sufficiently accountable, comprehensively
multilateral and reasonably transparent” authority to mitigate the parties’ com-
mitment problems (Aksu, 2013, p. 160). For instance, as quoted above, Savimbi
announced on 3 October 1992 on VORGAN that “it will not depend on any in-
ternational organization to say that the elections were free and fair” (in Maier,
1997, p. 13). He also “dismissed entirely the views of nearly 800 foreign election
observers” stating that UNAVEM II had been biased all along, had participated
in the MPLA’s electoral fraud, and that he had “all the data concerning the
violation and theft of votes, which we will steadily provide to the national and
international opinion” (Noble, 1992). A few days later, VORGAN also claimed
that international observers only called the elections free and fair as they were
bribed by the MPLA government with “money, diamonds and mercury” (in
The Guardian, 1992). These observations imply that increased policy input
by the UN during the interim period would not have mitigated commitment
problems, because the UN was not perceived as the “truly neutral authority”
(Gisselquist, 2002, p. 12) that mitigates commitment problems by reducing the
insecurity produced by the anarchic institutional environment of war-torn states
(cf. Chapter 8 on the similar situation in Cambodia).
7.2.3 Integration of Parallel Institutions
My third hypothesis in Chapter 3 reasoned that in the presence of commit-
ment problems, more advanced processes of integrating the parallel political
and military institutions of warring parties into the authority of an interim gov-
ernment come with more stable post-interim peace spells by raising the costs
of defection. It does so, because in order to sustain in war, parties need par-
allel military and political institutions to accumulate means and resources for
fighting and to manage their relation with the population. As long as these
parallel institutions persist throughout an interim period, parties retain the
financial resources, popular legitimacy, hierarchical command structures, and
cultural mindsets to remobilize for war in the post-interim period. Interim gov-
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ernments that integrate these parallel institutions should consequently increase
the stability of post-interim peace (cf. Figure 3.3).
Parallel Political Institutions
As I have outlined in section 7.1, UNITA developed an extensive system of par-
allel political structures in the areas under its control before signing the Bicesse
Accords. These structures included a parallel education system for thousands
of students, a healthcare system including a two hundred fifty-bed hospital in
Jamba, a comprehensive agricultural program with centrally managed farms to
provide food for civilians and combatants alike, as well as a political leadership
structure with several ministries and a party secretariat (Brittain, 1998; James,
1992; Pearce, 2015; Potgieter, 2000). These parallel institutions were also devel-
oped because early UNITA ideology – inspired by Maoist mobilization strategies
– had focused on the “political indoctrination of the masses rather than the de-
velopment of a strong military force” (James, 1992, p. 100). As visualized in
Figure 7.3, the rebels administered a significant amount of territory when they
signed the Bicesse Accords and virtually represented a second government of
Angola. However, UNITA formally agreed to reintegrate all parallel structures
into the control of the caretaker interim government and to accept this gov-
ernment’s authority during the period leading up to the 1992 elections: Under
Section IV of the Bicesse Accords (“Political Rights to be exercised by UNITA
following the Cease-Fire”), UNITA agreed to the “extension of the Central Ad-
ministration to those areas of Angola that are presently beyond the range of its
authority” (United Nations, 1991b).
This commitment was not credible: UNITA did not follow through with
the bargain struck in the Bicesse Accords and refused to reintegrate its parallel
political structures. Instead, it represented a parallel authority to the MPLA
government throughout the entire interim period, “left ambiguous the question
of where real power was to lie in the transitional period up to the elections,”
hindered the electoral registration process in the areas under its control, and re-
peatedly blamed the interim government for any failures (Brittain, 1998, p. 45).
On 1 July 1991, observers were still optimistic that UNITA would integrate
its parallel political structures into the authority of the caretaker interim gov-
ernment, because UNITA’s parallel capital of Jamba “celebrated the historic ar-
rival of the first government delegation to visit the rebel headquarters” that day
(AFP, 1991c). After this symbolic visit, no further actions were however taken
to reintegrate UNITA’s parallel administration. In October 1991, the rebels
still controlled 24 municipalities and 162 communes in south-eastern Angola,
showing “no sign of returning them to government administration as required
by Bicesse” (Brittain, 1998, p. 50). When the situation had not changed by
March 1992, MPLA Minister of Territorial Administration Lopo do Nascimento
demanded that the warring parties “put a final date on extending territorial
administration so that we can start registration” for the elections (Brittain,
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Figure 7.3: Parallel Rebel Government in Angola
Terras Libres de Angola
Established (1991)
Not Established
Notes: Shaded areas display municipalities in which UNITA announced parallel political
structures as of 1991 that covered a municipality in full or in part. Data on rebel govern-
ments was taken from the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (1991)
itself, thus areas under rebel influence may be overrepresented.
1992a). Directly responding to do Nascimento’s remark, UNITA’s UK repre-
sentative Samakuva stated in a letter to The Guardian that it was not UNITA’s
fault but the interim government’s “incompetence” that explained why the lat-
ter was “extremely slow to deploy into the southern areas,” and that “various
elements of the population throughout the entire country refuse to accept some
government administrators who have in the past been identified as ruthlessly
suppressing them” (Samakuva, 1992).
In May 1992, the interim government formally began registering voters for
the upcoming election (Smith, 1991). By June only fourteen of 80 planned
electoral registration centers had yet opened and had only registered about one
percent of all voters (AFP, 1992e).94 In July, the interim government was able
to sent its officials to more registration centers throughout Angola and also to
areas controlled UNITA. However, this personnel had to quickly retrieve back
to MPLA territory after the rebels kidnapped registration officials or burned
their cars, stole electoral registers, and generally used violence to enforce the
flight of the MPLA administration and the cancellation of the electoral registra-
tion (Brittain, 1998). In August, Angola’s Ambassador to the UK José Alves
Primo (1992) wrote to The Independent that the government was “unable to
94The MPLA had initially planned to staff electoral registration centers with demobilized
FALA soldiers but abandoned the plan after protests by the international community arose.
Centers were staffed with teachers and civil servants instead (Bayer, 1992).
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extend the central administration to the whole country in order to register the
electorate” due to UNITA’s “continued illegal occupation of some places, where
representatives of the government and of newly formed political parties have
been subjected to extreme intimidation and even physical violence.”
Affecting Financial Means In Chapter 3, I held that a first mechanism for
why interim governments that integrate the parallel political institutions of war-
ring parties increase the stability of post-interim peace vis-à-vis all other interim
governments is that the former raise costs of defection by limiting the financial
resources warring parties need to remobilize (cf. Figure 3.3). In contrast, and
when facing commitment problems caused by an uncertainty of the adversary’s
future behavior, the continued existence of parallel political institutions allows
parties to retreat to their zones of territorial control and regroup for war. It
also allows them to use parallel structures to acquire the financial means to buy
new weaponry through parallel taxation as well as through managing natural
resource extraction.
Angola confirms to this causal pattern. UNITA’s ability to manage the ex-
traction and sale of natural resources by means of controlling parallel political
institutions during the rule of the interim government is one of the central ex-
planations for why it was able to remobilize for war in the fall of 1992. Firstly, as
a result of UNITA’s ongoing administration of large parts of Angolan territory,
Jonas Savimbi had the opportunity to immediately flee to Luanda’s airport and
then take off to rebel-held Huambo when the election results were announced in
September 1992. Interim Minister of Territorial Administration do Nasciminto
quickly commented this move with: “If he’s gone to Huambo, it is a declaration
of war” (in Brittain, 1992c, p. 57). Secondly, its ongoing parallel administration
of Angola allowed UNITA to acquire the financial means for remobilization by
looting and smuggling natural resources, but not so much by taxing civilians
living in the zones under its control (McGreal, 1991). Parallel taxation gen-
erally only played a marginal role in determining UNITA’s financial situation
because such taxation did not take a monetary form. After all, the rebels never
established a monetary system in the areas they administered, meaning that a
whole generation grew up “not knowing what money is” (AFP, 1991c). Instead,
civilians were expected to donate their time to work on collectively managed
farms and were paid in food or salt (Pearce, 2015).
But retaining its set of parallel political institutions throughout the interim
period enabled UNITA to preserve and further develop its means of financ-
ing armed combat by introducing parallel patrolling forces at diamond mines,
and exchanging looted diamonds for weapons at the international borders with
Zambia and Namibia that were under its control. “In the post-Cold War era,
diamond smuggling from rebel controlled areas took place within a context
of unprecedented worldwide proliferation of light weapons” and “Angola’s dia-
monds helped to fuel the war by providing the rebels with the means to prolong
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the conflict” (Malaquias, 2007, pp. 110, 123).95 Having said that, my theoretical
argument in Chapter 3 strictly isolates the causal mechanism of raising costs
of defection by relinquishing the means of financing armed combat from raising
such costs by losing the opportunity to deliver public services more effectively
than an interim government, thus affecting levels of popular support. As I show
next, these mechanisms are interlinked in Angola.
Affecting Levels of Popular Support I held that a second mechanism
for why interim governments that integrate the parallel political institutions of
warring parties increase the stability of peace is that such interim governments
increase costs of defection by affecting the levels of popular support parties
need to remobilize (cf. Figure 3.3). This argument builds on the idea that
in order to raise their expected capability to prevail in war, warring parties
need to maintain support from the civilian population (e.g. because voluntary
conscription is cheaper than forced conscription), which they can acquire by
providing public services through parallel administration. Consequently, as long
as warring parties can prove that they can deliver public services more effectively
than an interim government, they also keep significant popular legitimacy which
reduces their costs of remobilizing for war.
There is only weak evidence for this causal mechanism in Angola. A key ex-
planation for why the case does not more strongly confirm to the causal pattern
is that UNITA used its parallel political institutions for looting natural resources
to improve its financial situation. It thereby exchanged persuasive with preda-
tory behavior. UNITA had initially created its parallel structures precisely in
order to build popular legitimacy: when Savimbi started the movement in 1964,
he was convinced that “the population under UNITA control had to be sat-
isfied that the insurgent administration was as effective as the government’s”
bureaucracy (James, 1992, p. 98). He further was said to believe “that provid-
ing services was essential in establishing a political relationship with people”
(Pearce, 2015, p. 96).
As long as the rebels were dependent on financing their violent campaign
against the MPLA through external funds as well as the help of the civilian
population to support the rebellion – e.g. by donating their work force of
farms, thus cultivating food for soldiers – they also ensured that civilians were
satisfied with the rebel administration by providing basic social services (Pearce,
2015).96 As a result, and until 1991, many residents of UNITA-administrated
95I attended to the role of natural resources as an alternative explanatory variable for peace
in Chapter 5, particularly because this variable is not held at constant in my most similar
system design. Diamond mining and smuggling does represent an important explanation for
why UNITA could return to war, but the explanation follows a mechanism in which parallel
political and military structures represent a core first step: Without upholding troops it did
not disarm and demobilize, UNITA could not have set up armed parallel patrolling forces at
diamond mines; and without its continued parallel administration of border regions, UNITA
could not have smuggled diamonds in exchange for weapons.
96For instance, as a former village director recalls, teachers and nurses “lived at the bases
and left the bases to help the people in the villages,” and they were paid in food or salt, and
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areas expressed their support for the movement explicitly because of the parallel
government structures that the rebels had created, and they regarded these
parallel institutions as underpinning UNITA’s credibility in seeking national
aspirations for governing Angola (Pearce, 2012). This decreased the costs of
war for UNITA, not least because UNITA had provided the population also
with a “perception of fear and threat so as to convince people that they needed
UNITA as a defender” of basic order and security (Pearce, 2015, p. 103).
To some extent, UNITA was eager to prove its ability to provide basic ser-
vices in order to maintain popular legitimacy also during the interim period.
This was to prove to prospective voters “the weakness of the Luanda govern-
ment” (James, 1992, p. 100) and to demonstrate its “persuasive capabilities”
during the interim period (cf. Pearce, 2015, p. 102). Firstly, in its parallel educa-
tion system, UNITA teachers refused to use schoolbooks printed by the interim
government. One teacher was quoted in early 1992 with “we cannot use those
books,” stating he could not teach students the words of the MPLA (in Finkel,
1992c). Secondly, in its parallel healthcare system, UNITA denied government
doctors access into administrated areas. The rebels also refused to distribute
the yellow United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) vaccination
cards that were inscribed with “Angolan Ministry of Health,” forcing UNICEF
to print special vaccination cards for rebel territories (Finkel, 1992c). UNICEF
representative Marli Pinto thus protested in February 1992 that UNITA was
asking UNICEF “for help in supplying their own health clinics,” while UNICEF
was supposed to be working with the interim government (in Finkel, 1992c).
And thirdly, in its parallel economy, UN officials warned in early 1992 that
UNITA’s centrally managed farms were not enough to feed all civilians living
under rebel control, to which UNITA responded with a demand that UN food
aid was delivered into its areas so that it could label and distribute it itself in
order to increase its legitimacy among prospective voters (Brittain, 1992c).97
But the relationship between UNITA and the civilian population under its
control also changed during the interim period. As a result, UNITA’s contin-
ued provision of public services did not positively affect its public legitimacy
vis-à-vis the MPLA interim government, thereby decreasing its costs of remo-
bilization. This step in the proposed causal mechanism fails to come into being
in Angola because UNITA no longer assumed its wealth and organizational
strength through external financial support and local aid of the population. In-
stead, UNITA resorted to smuggling diamonds out of the areas it administrated,
thereby missing out on positioning itself “as the natural political alternative to
the governing MPLA” (Malaquias, 2007, p. 111) while its behavior towards the
all “[medicine] was free and pupils didn’t have to pay for classes” (Pearce, 2012, p. 458).
97UNITA’s demand was thereby also linked to its strategy to keep the civilian population in
the areas it governed. This is not least in order to retain close control over prospective voters
and because controlling an even more sparsely populated territory would have reduced the
viability of its claim to be a true alternative to the MPLA interim government (cf. Chapter
8 on a similar mechanism unfolding in Cambodia, and Brittain, 1992c).
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civilian population grew increasingly predatory (Pearce, 2012):
“For the rebels – no longer dependent on the population for food and
other necessities because such essential goods could now be purchased
abroad with diamonds and flown into rebel controlled areas – people
became both dispensable and disposable. Consequently, ... control
of resources, not people, became the rebels’ primary concern. ...
UNITA used its substantial diamond revenues to undertake a funda-
mental military reorganization away from its traditional posture as
a guerrilla army into a more conventional disposition in preparation
for delivering a last victorious blow against government forces and
finally seizing power” (Malaquias, 2007, p. 111).98
This amounted to a situation immediately after the 1992 elections, when
UNITA remobilized for war and a citizen of Huambo remembered that “UNITA
killed, it didn’t recruit anyone new” because it was not in need of any further
support – it had money from natural resource extraction, and everyone living
under its control was already a solider (cf. below and Pearce, 2015, p. 130). This
situation and the resulting behavior of UNITA also lead to an almost paradoxi-
cal situation in Angola from the lens of bargaining theory. If UNITA’s ultimate
goal was to achieve full and unrestrained political power (cf. Pereira, 1994), it
should have favored to reach such goal by winning elections (and then aban-
doning any structures of political accountability), but without paying the costs
of further war. However, while the continued control over its parallel political
institutions and with that the means to loot natural resources, smuggle them
over the border, and sell them to acquire further weaponry contributed to its
ability to fight in war, it significantly decreased its ability to secure political
survival (or even political dominance) through a less costly electoral process.
Ultimately, UNITA’s hostile behavior towards the civilian population provoked
growing skepticism among potential voters regarding UNITA’s credibility as
a legitimate national government. This becomes not least visible in that the
MPLA was able to win several of the provinces controlled by UNITA, such as
gaining 53.14 percent of the parliamentary votes in Moxico. Thus, UNITA’s
behavior transformed the rebel group’s “assets (its arms and the ‘culture’ as-
sociated with them) into liabilities: its arrogance, its blatant retention of its
weapons, and its thirst for revenge” (Messiant, 2004).
Parallel Military Institutions during Angola’s Interim Period
UNITA and the MPLA also agreed in the Bicesse Accords to disarm and de-
mobilize their respective military forces and create a joint national army before
98This aspect of resource rents and public legitimacy of parallel rebel governments points to
studies on political dynamics in resource-rich countries that have found that if governments do
not rely on citizens for tax revenues because natural resources provide them with a guaranteed
source of government income, such governments are often characterized by authoritarian and
non-accountable political structures of authority (Robinson, Torvik, et al., 2006).
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holding elections. In specific, the terms of the peace agreement stated that
at the time of elections, “only the Angolan Armed Forces shall exist” and all
“members of the present armed forces of each party who do not become mem-
bers of the Angolan Armed Forces shall be demobilized prior to the holding of
elections” (United Nations, 1991b). The deal moreover outlined 48 designated
cantonment sites for the MPLA and UNITA respectively, and regulated that
all forces should be assembled at the latest 60 days following the ceasefire.
The parties did not follow through with the bargain they struck in the Bicesse
Accords. They began moving their troops into the designated cantonment sites
in June 1991, a process that was set to be completed by August that same year.
But on 14 September 1991, UNITA Representative to the JPMC Elias Salupeto
Pena argued that three months “after the formal signing of the Angolan peace
accords, we have come to contest that we do not have a single government sol-
dier in any concentration area” (in Finkel, 1991a). UNITA itself claimed by
November 1991 that it had concluded the process of cantonment and that all
of its troops were now in the assembly areas overseen by UNAVEM II. The
UN, however, only listed 26,968 cantoned UNITA combatants out of an esti-
mated 49,800, as well as 68,666 government soldiers out of an estimated 115,640.
The UN furthermore noted that many “combatants” that UNITA had sent to
cantonment included elderly, children or unarmed peasants instead of guerrilla
fighters (Malaquias, 2007) – increasing fears at the time that Savimbi was really
building a “secret army” in Jamba (cf. below and Brittain, 1998).
Those soldiers and combatants that had moved into the cantonment sites
began disarming in April 1992, months behind schedule (Dowden, 1992b). By
June 1992 – when armed forces should have already been fully demobilized and
reintegrated into civilian life or into the national army, had the Bicesse Accords
been accordingly implemented – an estimated 85 percent of UNITA’s troops, as
well as 37 percent of soldiers loyal to the MPLA were still encamped (Fortna,
2003a; Ottaway, 1998). By September 1992, and one week before the national
elections, only 10 per cent of UNITA forces had been completely demobilized,
while up to 47,000 remained in the assembly areas as fully organized and disci-
plined units that had access to an array of light and heavy weapons not turned
over to the UN (Brittain, 1992b). Two days before the elections, UNITA was
reported to have “tipped the security equation further in its favor by sending
its personnel to areas formerly under MPLA control and hiding arms caches to
support an offensive” (Fortna, 2003a, p. 76). In sum, UNITA thus entered the
general elections of 1992 with most of its parallel military structure “strength-
ened by eighteen months of preparation” (Maier, 1997, p. 11).
Affecting Military Infrastructures In Chapter 3, I held that a first mech-
anism for why interim governments that integrate the parallel military insti-
tutions of warring parties increase the stability of peace is that such interim
governments destroy the military infrastructure necessary for remobilization.
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They do so, because such integration through disarmament and demobilization
programs, firstly, retrieve parties of their means to prevail in combat by col-
lecting and destroying weapon stocks. Secondly, they also weaken hierarchical
command structures between rank-and-file soldiers and military commanders
within armed organizations, thus increasing the costs of such leaders to remo-
bilize for war (cf. Figure 3.3). In contrast, and following interim governments
that fail to disarm and demobilize warring parties before the end of their rule,
violence in the post-interim period becomes more likely.
Angola confirms to this suggested causal pattern. The poorly realized disar-
mament and demobilization process neither removed UNITA’s means of fighting
nor weakened its command structures, and this directly reduced the rebels’ costs
of remobilizing in 1992. Firstly, the warring parties kept their weapons through-
out the interim period. In the early days of the rule of the interim government,
when those troops that were send to canton arrived at the designated sites, they
were even allowed to keep their weapons when operating inside the camp, in or-
der to increase the individual perceptions of safety for each soldier. As UNITA
deputy intelligence chief Zacarias Meoldombe commented: “Soldiers are going
to say: ‘My gun is my security and I won’t leave it while the situation is not
resolved.’ We have to explain that it is OK to leave their guns, that they are
exchanging their guns for a ballot” (in McGreal, 1991).99
When UNITA combatants however began to continuously violate the terms
of the peace agreement, such as by moving out of the camps to threaten civilian
communities in search for food, UNAVEM II began to more actively disarm
combatants and store their weapons inside the cantonment sites. Having said
that, secure weapon storage was impossible to implement in the remote areas of
Angola where most buildings were makeshift grass huts or self-made tents, and
thus soldiers had easy access to their guns at all times (Fortna, 2003a; Niekerk,
1992). Furthermore – and demonstrating how cheating the DDR process was
directly used by Savimbi and his cadres to remobilize in the fall of 1992 –
while the “most obsolete of UNITA weapons were handed over to teams of
international inspectors,” the rebels stored military equipment “in arms dumps
strategically chosen around the provinces by Savimbi himself” so that the rebels
would have access to these weapons come the day remobilization was necessary
(Birmingham, 2015, p. 110).
Secondly, the warring parties retained their internal command structures
throughout the interim period. Instead of breaking up these hierarchical struc-
tures, the Angolan cantonment process actually resulted particularly for UNITA
in retaining intact military units. This was aided by the almost paradoxical sit-
uation that the warring parties were supposed to form a joint and integrated
national army, but in reality kept their respective forces in separate cantonment
sites and with separate identities (Finkel, 1992c): “Both FAPLA and UNITA
99Even in September 1992, a UNDP representative asserted both sides were “not confident
enough to fully give up their weapons and soldiers before the election” (in Finkel, 1992b).
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soldiers retained their different uniforms and different loyalties” throughout the
rule of the interim government (Pearce, 2015, p. 127). This meant particularly
for UNITA that party elites were able to exercise an extremely strict and hier-
archical control over combatants – Savimbi was quoted with the remark that if
at any time “any UNITA soldier fires a shot without an order, it will be his last
shot. ... If we catch you firing your gun, you will not move again from that very
spot” (in Pearce, 2015, p. 48). This was more so than in the MPLA – and some
observers note that the military infrastructure of the MPLA had disintegrated
to a larger extent than the one of UNITA, also because the MPLA had made
an attempt to demobilize “in the hopes of finally winning the international re-
spectability and US diplomatic recognition which had eluded them for so many
years” (Brittain, 1998, p. 59).
As a result, and when he lost the 1992 elections, Savimbi could mobilize his
forces directly out of the cantonment sites. Three days after election results were
officially announced on 3 October 1991, journalists reported from four provinces
that UNITA combatants were pouring out of the cantonment sites with their
“weapons in hand,” immediately started attacking MPLA soldiers and moving
“seamlessly back into the war mode” (Brittain, 1998, p. 58). While this is a
direct result of the continued existence of UNITA’s military infrastructure, the
ease with which the rebels remobilized is not least also explained by the fact that
they had not been forced to integrate their parallel political institutions into the
authority of the interim government. Some accounts say that administrating
significant territory allowed UNITA to build what was then referred to as a
“secret army” – a 20,000 men strong, fully mobilized faction that was stationed
both in Jamba and at the Angolan-Namibian border and that was prepared to
return to combat would Savimbi not win the election (Brittain, 1998).
Affecting Cultures of Violence In Chapter 3, I held that a second mech-
anism for why interim governments that integrate the parallel military insti-
tutions of warring parties increase the stability of peace is that such interim
governments raise the parties’ costs of defection by adding to changing cultures
of violence. They do so, because even if not all weapons are collected and hi-
erarchical command structures disentangled at the end of the interim period,
a sufficiently advanced DDR process still decreases the social acceptance of vi-
olence among ex-combatants, signifies “that the country is embarking on an
era of peace” (United Nations, 2000a), and facilitates “ex-combatants’ attempts
to distance themselves from war-time abuses they committed or experienced”
(Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010, p. 18). This in turn should raise the
costs of elites to remobilize for war. Contrariwise, a missing DDR process should
mean that no such process takes place, so that individuals are not pushed away
from the “war-time mindsets that legitimized violence” (Schulhofer-Wohl and
Sambanis, 2010, p. 10).
Angola confirms to this causal pattern. Many accounts on Angola’s political
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developments between the signing of the Bicesse Accords and the 1992 elections
generally stress the extreme militarization of Angolan society after more than
15 years of war, in which conflicts were generally known to be resolved through
violence. This is also because in UNITA territory, the lines between who was a
civilian and who was a member of the military became blurred due to military
conscription and abduction that often affected children younger than 18 years,
who grew up never knowing anything else than owning a gun: “In UNITA zones,
... there was no possibility of imagining an alternative to joining the army”
(Pearce, 2015, p. 118). A UNAVEM II commander commented this persisting
culture of violence throughout the interim period with: “What dominates in
Angola is the single-option response: if you don’t like something, you point a
weapon at it” (in Maier, 1997, p. 4).100
This culture of violence particularly affected UNITA and its cadres, and
aided Savimbi’s remobilization of its troops in 1992 (cf. Beinart, 1992; Brinkman,
2000). Already in March 1992, Miguel Maria N’Zau Punka – a previous Sec-
retary General of UNITA who had deserted during the interim period – stated
that the Bicesse Accords and interim period had not changed much about the
perceptions and behavior of Savimbi, and that UNITA “still uses violence and
intimidation as a political system and lies as a strategy” (in Finkel, 1992d).
And one day before the elections, a Western diplomat commented that he does
not believe that large-scale warfare will break out again, but that “there will
be violence because Angola is a very violent country” and that the parties only
knew “the power of the gun” (in Manthorpe, 1992).
Later, also UNITA’s Samakuva argued that the interim period had failed to
introduce a transition “from the culture of war to a culture of peace” within his
party (in Samakuva and Vines, 2013, p. 5). How this made it easier for Savimbi
to remobilize his combatants only becomes evident in comparison with Nepal:
At the end of the interim period, UNITA’s combatants had never assumed any
other occupation than that of being soldiers with guns; this was the only pro-
fessional identity they knew to select; and using arms was the only means many
of them knew to solve personal or political conflicts (Pearce, 2015, p. 119). In
Nepal, contrastingly, ex-combatants had received vocational training from 2007
onwards inside cantonment; had gotten married and had started families. When
the interim period ended, ex-combatants knew not only their life as soldiers, but
could imagine civilian livelihoods as well.
100In the second phase of the civil war, Pawson (1999) describes this as: “Years of fighting
have created little more than an accepted culture of violence. In Malanje, for example, many
people say they become angry when UNITA are not lobbing shells into the center of town.
As absurd as this might seem, the sad truth is that here, silence breeds fear and fear breeds
tension. As far as Malanjinos are concerned, when bombs are raining down at least they know
where they stand. For them, running to the nearest shelter is part of everyday life.”
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7.2.4 Participation of Unarmed Actors
My final hypothesis in Chapter 3 reasoned that in the presence of commitment
problems, more advanced opportunities for the participation of unarmed actors
in interim governments come with a higher stability of post-interim peace. This
is because they enable warring parties to send costly signals of their true inten-
tions to each other that create domestic audience costs, which in turn punish
them if they renege on their peaceful bargain (cf. Figure 3.3). In contrast, when
interim governments fail to create domestic audience costs that punish parties
who renege on previously struck peaceful bargains, post-interim violence be-
comes more likely (cf. Fearon, 1994).
Angola does not confirm to this causal pattern. Even though there exists a
positive correlation between the independent and dependent variable – i.e. no
unarmed actors participated in interim governance, and post-interim violence
persisted – no causal relationship can be detected. Rather, UNITA expressed
feeling threatened by the idea of opening up interim decision-making to domes-
tic audiences. In that regard, the Angolan case also points to an interesting
theoretical interaction of the participation variable with the explanatory factor
of democratic history.
The warring parties had only agreed to vague regulations concerning the
participation of political parties during the interim period in the Bicesse Ac-
cords, and the agreement left the participation of civil society untouched. In
Attachment II (“Fundamental Principles for the Establishment of Peace in An-
gola”), the accord states that the “Angolan Government will hold discussions
with all political forces in order to survey their opinions concerning the proposed
changes in the Constitution” and “will then work with all the parties to draft
the laws that will regulate the electoral process” (United Nations, 1991b).
But no such participation of unarmed actors in interim decision-making was
realized in practice. This is also because the history of non-democratic rule
in Angola did not allow for the organization of a viable civil society or strong
political opposition parties. Firstly, the MPLA’s one-party state had never
allowed for public organizational sphere outside the MPLA party structure.
While some women’ and religious organizations as well as labor unions had
developed towards the end of the colonial period in the early 1970s, the MPLA
quickly absorbed all organizations that had been in the hands of civil society
the moment it assumed power in 1975. It confiscated all church property and
radio stations controlled by the church (Chatham House, 2005), merged all
labor unions and women organizations into its party structure, and turned all
youth organizations into “nurseries for MPLA cadres” (cf. Pearce, 2015, p. 71).
This destruction of civil society even reached traditional customs and informal
institutions, such as councils of elders at the village level that were sidelined and
replaced by elected village committees (Tvedten, 1997). UNITA did the same in
the areas it governed – and thus a Catholic priest recalls that “[people] couldn’t
choose. The movement that was there controlled everything” (in Pearce, 2015,
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p. 72). As a result, most “civil society” organizations that existed in Angola at
the time of the Bicesse Accords had strong links to the MPLA, and many civil
society leaders were in fact were former MPLA bureaucrats (Chatham House,
2005). For instance, the Angolan Action for Development that was founded in
1989 as Angola’s first non-church civil society organization was led by members
of the MPLA political elite in Luanda (Human Rights Watch, 1999).
Secondly, over 15 years of MPLA rule also had not allowed for any opposition
parties in the socialist system. However, in order to pave the way for the
Bicesse Accords, the Angolan National Assembly had to allow the formation of
opposition political parties in legislation passed on 26 March 1991 (Becker, 1991;
Maier, 1997). On 1 June 1991, President dos Santos then announced during a
broadcast on the Radio Nacional de Angola that the warring parties not only
“count on the contributions of an organized civil society” during the interim
period because they regarded such input as “necessary to calm existing emotions
arising from the cruel and devastating war.” He also stated that both the MPLA
and UNITA “would like to see the political parties play their true role in the new
multi-party system in the country” and “would like to see debates and political
struggle replace the language of weapons” (in Weimer and Fandrych, 1995). As
a result of these de jure changes, a number of political parties started to organize
during the interim period – much according to the role Paris (2004), Söderberg-
Kovacs (2008), or Papagianni (2008) perceive for interim governments in peace
processes. Most of the new parties were thereby founded by business men and
intellectuals in Luanda, without having any programmatic profile despite their
strict nonalignment with UNITA and the MPLA (Becker, 1991). In October
1991, 13 new opposition parties that wanted to contest in the upcoming general
elections announced the creation of a National Council of the Opposition, “to
be heard in matters of electoral legislation” (Clemente-Kersten, 1999, p. 66).
However, on 1 November 1991, the MPLA caretaker interim government
blatantly “refused to call a national conference to work out the ground rules for
the transition process to elections,” thereby dismissing “the calls from emerg-
ing opposition parties” to convene such conference “on the grounds that it was
both unnecessary and dangerous to the peace process,” for instance because it
would automatically lead to the dissolution of the interim legislature and the
destabilization of the interim government (Malaquias, 2007, p. 161). Instead of
thus sending a costly signal that it intends to allow for an open and transpar-
ent interim period by creating a domestic audience for its decision-making, the
MPLA interim government opted only for very vague consultative mechanisms.
For instance, it asked representatives of newly founded political parties to ex-
amine laws that the interim government had already submitted to the interim
parliament (Maier, 1997).101 In addition, the participation of political parties
101For instance, in August 1992 the interim parliament( without consulting any other political
forces) amended the constitution so that it provided for a unitary presidential system in the
post-interim period that would place all political power in the hands of the central government
in Luanda (Ottaway, 1998). Such a system that is often regarded as ill-suited for countries
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without a history of armed insurgency was complicated by the fact that few op-
position parties had offices in Luanda – let alone in other parts of Angola – and
even fewer had access to the MPLA controlled media or could use the officially
allotted ten minutes each day on the Radio Nacional de Angola due to their lim-
ited financial or human resources (Ottaway, 1998). As a result, political parties
formed during the interim period were thus strikingly unimportant in the 1992
elections, and voters could only make an informed choice between the MPLA
and UNITA. In sum, there was “no role for key civic voices such as churches,
civil society organizations, other political parties, traditional authorities, aca-
demics or key personalities in Angola who had knowledge and understanding of
the conflict” during the interim period (Comerford, 2007, p. 16).
Having said that, there is no evidence that this missing participation of
political parties and civil society in interim decision-making in any way affected
the behavior of the warring parties so that it increased commitment problems
and contributed to UNITA’s remobilization for war. This is also because UNITA
itself did not want any deeper participation of civil society and political parties
in interim decision-making (and as a “check” on the rule of the MPLA). UNITA
did not regard such participation as a costly signal by the government but as
an existential threat to its own role in Angola’s transition.
While dos Santos only stated that the convening of a national conference that
would give unarmed actors a voice in interim decision-making would mean the
“dissolution” of parliament, Savimbi was more blunt on this topic and called na-
tional conferences “civilian coup d’états” (Malaquias, 2007, p. 161). His position
is explained by to two aspects. Firstly, Savimbi was against the participation of
unarmed actors in interim decision-making because this would have threatened
his party’s unique position as the only viable alternative to the MPLA interim
government in the upcoming vote. Any additional political party actively in-
volved in politics in the interim period would have weakened UNITA’s position
vis-à-vis the interim government (Malaquias, 2007; Pearce, 2015). Secondly,
Savimbi was also against the participation of unarmed actors because he was
guided by the belief that there were two qualitatively different groups of po-
litical parties in Angola: the “traditional parties” of the MPLA, UNITA and
the FNLA – that had been established to fight colonial rule in the 1960s – as
well as the partidecos or newer parties that were “created to take advantage
of the new era of multi-partyism” and that he regarded as “simply irritating
encumbrances” on his way to power (Malaquias, 2007, p. 161).
emerging out of civil war (cf. Reilly and Nordlund, 2008; Reilly, 2008). Ottaway (1998, p. 139)
thereby notes that – besides unconcealed political unwillingness – “great time pressure” to
meet the September 1992 deadline for the elections may be among the key explanations for
why changes to the constitution and the adoption of laws for the post-interim period were
not negotiated with outside political parties and civil society actors, which points to the
alternative explanatory variable of interim government duration. Generally, many observers
point out that the interim period in Angola had been too brief to have a real impact on peace
and achieve all that was necessary; and should have been conditional on the implementation
of key reforms (Anstee, 1993; Fortna, 2003a; Maier, 1997; Tvedten, 1997).
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The aspects in turn shed light on a causal mechanism that diverges from the
theoretical framework as proposed in Chapter 3 and that relates to the issues of
selection bias and interaction effects that I have attended to in Chapter 4. Al-
though my quantitative analysis in Chapter 4 did not find statistical significant
and correlational evidence that the participation of civil society and political
parties in interim rule is more likely in countries with a history of democracy, the
Angolan case points to the importance of this factor – particularly in comparison
with civil society participation in Nepal’s interim government (cf. Chapter 6).
Among the key reasons for why unarmed actors were not given a stronger role
during the rule of the interim government was also that no viable civil society or-
ganizations or political opposition parties existed when the interim government
convened. However, this aspect also points to a second factor: the unfamiliarity
with the participation of unarmed actors in decision-making turned such partic-
ipation into a threat, rather than a mitigation of commitment problems through
domestic audience costs. That means in cases without a history of armed in-
surgency, the participation of unarmed actors in interim decision-making may
even reinforce commitment problems and motivate a weaker-growing party to
return to arms rather sooner than later, for instance before it fears being “out-
performed” by new political parties. Methodologically, this reasoning points to
a thus far unaddressed interaction effect between a history of democratic rule
and the participation of civil society and political parties. I address this further
in Chapter 9.
7.3 Chapter Summary
This chapter discussed the question to what extent the absence of post-interim
peace in Angola can be attributed to properties of interim government failing to
mitigate the warring parties’ commitment problems. Throughout this chapter,
I have in that regard also attended to alternative explanatory variables, in par-
ticular the role of democratic history or of natural resource rents. Concerning
my independent variables as proposed in Chapter 3, the chapter yields several
interesting conclusions (cf. Table 7.2).
Hypothesis H1 argued that power-sharing interim government increases the
stability of post-interim peace; while revolutionary or caretaker interim govern-
ments should exacerbate commitment problems of warring parties. The An-
golan case study provides weak empirical supported for this hypothesis. The
caretaker interim government failed to mitigate commitment problems for the
UNITA rebels, because it did not include mechanisms that could have decreased
UNITA’s future uncertainty by providing for its political security. Instead, it
enabled the caretaker MPLA to unilaterally pass electoral legislation to ensure
its own political survival, for instance by trying to dilute the UNITA vote in the
1992 election. Angola provides no empirical evidence for the proposed causal
mechanisms linking power-sharing to physical or economic security.
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Table 7.2: Summary of Evidence: Case Study Angola
Hypothesis Result
H1: Power-sharing interim govern-
ment, as opposed to any other in-
terim government, increases the sta-
bility of post-interim peace.
Weakly supported. There is some
empirical evidence for the mechanism
on the political security of warring
parties, but not for the others.
H2: International interim govern-
ment, as opposed to any other in-
terim government, increases the sta-
bility of post-interim peace.
Not supported. UNAVEM II of-
fered neither physical deterrence nor
policy influence. While this could
call for longer or more substantive
international authority, the UN was
also not perceived as neutral, which
added to commitment problems.
H3: The more advanced the pro-
cess of integrating parallel political
and military institutions into the au-
thority of an interim government, the
higher the stability of peace.
Supported. Mechanisms on mili-
tary infrastructure, war-time mind-
sets, and parallel financing are most
convincing. The legitimacy mecha-
nism is undermined by resource trade
as a means of parallel financing.
H4: The more advanced the oppor-
tunities of participation for unarmed
actors in interim governments, the
higher the stability of peace.
Not supported. The variables cor-
relate in the expected way, but there
is no causal evidence. A lack of
democratic experience turned the hy-
pothetical participation of unarmed
actors into a threat, rather than mit-
igating commitment problems.
Hypothesis H2 argued that international interim government, as opposed to
any other interim government, increases the stability of post-interim peace. The
Angolan case does not provide support for this hypothesis. The case represents
an international interim government according to the lenient definition of the
concept (cf. Chapter 4), and the weakly mandated and staffed UNAVEM II
mission neither offered substantial physical deterrence to increase the warring
parties’ costs of defection from the terms of the peace agreement, nor did it
encompass any policy influence. This does yet not necessarily provide support
for conceptualizing international interim government in the strict version and
according to the definition by Doyle (2002), because evidence suggests that
increased levels of international interim authority could also have exacerbated
commitment problems. This is not least because the UN was not perceived as
a neutral political authority by the warring parties.
Hypothesis H3 argued that more advanced processes of integrating parallel
political and military institutions into the authority of an interim government
come with a higher stability of peace, while a lack of such integration should
exacerbate commitment problems. This hypothesis is supported for Angola.
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Firstly, the lack of integration of UNITA’s parallel political administration dur-
ing the interim period offered the rebel group an opportunity to extract and
trade diamonds, as well as to manage non-monetary tax and forced labor sys-
tems in the areas under its control. This decreased UNITA’s costs of defection
from the terms of Bicesse by providing it with funding for further combat. Sec-
ondly, the lack of integration of UNITA’s parallel military institutions meant
that the rebel group had full access to weapons and an intact system of hier-
archical command structures at the end of the interim period. It also meant
that UNITA combatants were not able to envision any professional alternatives
to military careers. This decreased UNITA’s costs of defection from the terms
of Bicesse, as it offered its leader Savimbi a standing military organization to
remobilize following the 1992 elections.
Finally, Hypothesis H4 argued that more advanced opportunities for the
participation of unarmed actors in interim decision-making come with a higher
stability of peace, while a lack of participation should exacerbate commitment
problems. Even though a lack of participation opportunities for unarmed actors
positively correlates with an absence of post-interim peace in Angola, I find no
causal empirical support for my theoretical argument. This is because instead of
perceiving a (hypothetical) participation of unarmed actors as a costly signal by
the MPLA caretaker interim government, UNITA perceived such participation
as an existential threat to its own long-term political survival. One reason is
that any additional political or civic actor involved in decision-making processes
during the interim period could have weakened UNITA’s position as the only
political alternative to the ruling MPLA. Based on this observation, I hypothe-
sized that the effect of the participation variable may be conditional on whether
or not a country has a history of democratic rule: in countries lacking demo-
cratic history, the creation of domestic audiences through the participation of
unarmed actors becomes a threat, rather than a mitigation of commitment prob-
lems for warring parties inexperienced in competing under political pluralism.




Interim Rule in Cambodia
Much like many Angolans have only ever known the rule of the MPLA, also
Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen has served in his position for over thirty
years, balancing “politically motivated violence, control of the security forces,
manipulated elections, massive corruption, and the tacit support of foreign pow-
ers” (Human Rights Watch, 2015a, p. 1). Hun Sen came to power in 1985 –
six years after Vietnam’s overthrow of the regime of the Party of Democratic
Kampuchea (PDK) or “Khmer Rouge” – and his rule was from the start vio-
lently contested by three rebel groups: the toppled PDK, the royalist Front Uni
National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique et Coopératif or
National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative
Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), and the republican Khmer People’s National Liber-
ation Front (KPNLF).102 In 1991, an internationally sponsored peace agreement
was meant to end Cambodia’s civil war by calling for a 21-months long interim
period terminating in elections. But the PDK abandoned disarmament already
during the interim period, and while the actual polling process proceeded in rel-
ative calm, the PDK remobilized in the post-interim period to fight the elected
government of Prince Ranariddh’s FUNCINPEC and Hun Sen’s Cambodian
People’s Party (CPP). In 1997, conflict between the CPP and FUNCINPEC
over integrating defected Khmer Rouge cadres escalated in clashes that killed
at least 32 people. Hun Sen ousted Ranariddh and manifested his power in Cam-
bodia’s politics until the present day, thereby effectively ending the country’s
short democratic experiment.
This chapter investigates to what extent the absence of post-interim peace
in Cambodia is the result of credible commitment problems among the warring
parties; and how properties of interim government failed to mitigate such com-
mitment problems. I proceed in three steps. Section 8.1 offers a brief overview
102The name “Khmer Rouge” was coined by Prince Sihanouk, but not used by the PDK
itself. Due to the proliferation of the alias, I use it here interchangeably with PDK. Many
PDK cadres are also best known under their nom de guerre (e.g. “Pol Pot” for Saloth Sar),
and I use assumed names when they are more common than original names.
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of Cambodia’s violent history that focuses on political developments since 1975,
when the communist Khmer Rouge marched into Phnom Penh to proclaim
“Democratic Kampuchea,” a regime responsible for one of the worst genocides
in human history. Section 8.2 analyzes if and how each property of interim
government was linked to the parties’ credible commitment problems and the
absence of post-interim peace in Cambodia. In this section, I also study any
alternative explanatory variables and mechanisms that account for continued
intrastate armed conflict in Cambodia. Section 8.3 summarizes my findings and
concludes this chapter.
8.1 Cambodia: From Genocide to Civil War
From the time of its independence in 1953, Cambodia was “characterized by po-
litical unrest and violence” (Edwards, 2004, p. 56). This section briefly sketches
the main events in Cambodia’s history before independence. I then focus on
four periods of violence in the second half of the 20th century (cf. Chambers,
2015): the years of political neutrality (1953 to 1969), the military dictatorship
under Lon Nol (1970 to 1975), the “Democratic Kampuchea” regime (1975 to
1978), and the civil war against the rule of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea
(PRK) (1979 to 1991). The section concludes by discussing the peace process
that culminated in the signing of the peace agreement in October 1991, and the
ensuing violence that characterized Cambodia’s post-interim period.
8.1.1 Funan, Chenla, and French Indochina
In the early history of South-East Asia, ethnic Khmers – the identity group
that still accounts for approximately 90 percent of Cambodia’s population to-
day – were among the first people that began to build political institutions
and establish centralized kingdoms.103 The earliest known of such kingdoms
103Compared to Nepal or Angola, a “rather high degree of ethnic homogeneity” exists in
Cambodia (Vickery, 1986, p. 2). Besides the demographically, culturally, and politically
dominant Khmer, the country is home to both indigenous and non-indigenous ethnic minori-
ties, although a lack of population surveys makes it difficult to quantify the number and size
of ethnic groups (Asian Development Bank, 2002). Indigenous minorities – around 20 groups
variously called “ethnic minorities, hill tribes, highlanders, highland people, indigenous peo-
ple” or Khmer Loeu (“Highland Khmer”) – often populate the remote mountainous provinces
of Cambodia (Asian Development Bank, 2002, p. 3). Among the main non-indigenous minori-
ties are Chinese Cambodians, Cham people, and Vietnamese. Persisting Vietnamese influence
on Cambodian society throughout the centuries is thereby vital to understand not only anti-
Vietnamese violence before and during the rule of the PDK, but also the motivation of the
factions in Cambodia’s civil war. After Vietnam had conquered significant parts of Cam-
bodian territory during the 17th and 18th century in a quest for regional power, and had
co-administered Cambodia in the early 19th century, this influence grew further during the
French protectorate. This was also because ethnic Vietnamese had better access than Cam-
bodians to French education and thus occupied high positions in Cambodia’s civil service
(Simbolon, 2002). In 1951, 250,000 ethnic Vietnamese were estimated living in Cambodia
(Amer, 1994). But following Cambodia’s independence in 1953, this number declined as vi-
olence against Vietnamese communities arose and “virtually all Vietnamese were expelled or
killed in 1970-9” (Vickery, 1986, p. 2). For instance, in 1970 alone, the Lon Nol government
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Table 8.1: Key Dates and Events in Cambodia’s History
1863 Seeking help against regional aggressions of Siam (Thailand) and
Champa (Vietnam), Cambodia becomes a French Protectorate
1941 French authorities install Norodom Sihanouk as the new king, who
follows his maternal grandfather Sisowath Monivong on the throne
1955 Two years after Cambodia’s independence, Sihanouk abdicates in
favor of his father and in order to seek political office. He becomes
Prime Minister and later Head of State.
1970 Sihanouk is ousted in a coup d’état by his Prime Minister Lon Nol
1975 After 5 years of fighting the Lon Nol regime, the Khmer Rouge cap-
ture Phnom Penh and proclaim “Democratic Kampuchea”
1979 Vietnam invades and installs the PRK. The regime is fought by the
Khmer Rouge, Sihanouk’s FUNCINPEC, and the KPNLF
1991 The PRK – now renamed SOC – and the rebels sign the Paris Agree-
ments and agree on an interim period and national elections
1992 The UN Security Council authorizes UNTAC for the interim period,
but the mission fails to disarm the Khmer Rouge
1993 FUNCINPEC wins elections while the CPP comes in second; Hun
Sen and Prince Ranariddh form a coalition government
1997 The Khmer Rouge give up their violent campaign against the gov-
ernment; Hun Sen ousts Prince Ranariddh in a coup d’état
1998 The CPP wins elections and manifests its power until today
– Funan – reigned from the first to the sixth century, when it was succeeded
by its northern neighbor – Chenla – which existed between the sixth and the
early ninth century. Chenla controlled large areas of what are today Cambo-
dia, Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand (Cœdès, 1966; Stark, 2006). In 802, internal
fighting among local lords in Chenla enabled King Jayavarman II’s ascension to
the throne. Jayavarman II would rule for 48 years and unite the multiple states
in the region. His “Khmer Empire” marked the beginning of a “Golden Age”
for the Khmer people, who now resided for the first time as a unified nation in
the predecessor state to modern Cambodia (Chandler, 2009; Sodhy, 2004).
The Khmer Empire survived until 1431 when it fell to Siam, the predecessor
state to what became Thailand in 1939 (Corfield, 2009; Widyono, 2008). Cam-
bodia now lost much of its regional power and territory. Continued external
threats by Siam and Champa (today Vietnam), as well as domestic succession
disputes and civil wars added to its weakening political and economic position
(Chandler, 2009; Sodhy, 2004; Vickery, 2004). By the early 18th century, Cam-
bodia had become a semi-independent state and subordinate to its powerful
“slaughtered thousands of ethnic Vietnamese” and expelled 200,000 more (Peou, 2007, p. 61),
labeling “the entire Vietnamese community as communist as a pretext for the mass detention,
‘ethnic cleansing’ and slaughter of civilians” (Tully, 2006, p. 157).
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neighbors (Vickery, 1986). By the early 19th century, the Vietnamese even
directly administered Cambodia, “placing puppets on the throne and striving
to assimilate the Khmers, whom they regarded as ‘barbarians’, into Vietnamese
culture” (Tully, 2006, p. 10). Historians consider the period between the 15th
and the 19th century as Cambodia’s “Dark Ages,” or “a period of economic,
social, and cultural stagnation when the kingdom’s internal affairs came increas-
ingly under the control of its aggressive neighbors” (Ross, 1987).
Seeing its sovereignty existentially threatened, the Cambodian court turned
to France to seek protection from regional aggressions. France had previously
shown a growing interest in colonizing the region, not least due to its rivalry
with Great Britain, that controlled India and parts of Southeast Asia (Cor-
field, 2009). On 11 August 1863, French officials and King Norodom I signed
the “Treaty of Friendship, Trade, and French Protection,” and France began
to deploy local governors to Cambodia (Chandler, 2009). These governors only
had narrow impact in the early years of the protectorate, but France soon be-
gan to tighten its control over Cambodia in order to create a “de facto colony
(Tully, 2006, p. 10). In 1887, France made Cambodia part of the Union In-
dochinoise Française (French Indochina Union) and ruled it through a colonial
administrator situated in Hanoi (Chandler, 2009).
Despite an early rebellion against tightening French rule, no major protests
against French authorities evolved in the coming decades, making Cambodia
“one of the few colonized countries in the region without an independence move-
ment” (Becker, 1998, p. 43). This was also because the French had done very
little to transform the economy, had largely focused on collecting taxes, and
had only started late in building an education system outside Buddhist pagoda
schools (Becker, 1998; Kiernan, 2008b). Hence, a Khmer nationalist elite only
became organized in the late 1930s, most of them graduates from Cambodia’s
newly-founded first high school, the Lycée Sisowath (Vickery, 1986).
This rising nationalism among Cambodia’s educated elite coincided with
the start of World War II, and in the summer of 1940, France fell to Germany.
This military defeat on the European continent also weakened France’s colonial
rule in Indochina. The Vichy Administration soon lost significant amounts
of Cambodian territory to Thailand. From 1941 onwards, Cambodia was also
occupied by German ally Japan, until France reimposed its protectorate in 1945
(Ross, 1987). But with Cambodia’s occupation by Thailand and Japan, the
French had effectively failed in their most basic raison d’être, and the reason
for why their rule was welcomed by Cambodians in the first place: to protect
the country from its aggressive neighbors and regional powers (Becker, 1998).
After World War II, Cambodian opposition to French rule grew within the
course of the First Indochina War, which would pave the road for Cambodian
independence declared on 9 November 1953 and confirmed by France at the
1954 Geneva Conference (Keller, 2005).
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8.1.2 Introducing the Warring Parties
When Cambodia became independent, Norodom Sihanouk had been its king for
12 years. Sihanouk, who would later lead the FUNCINPEC rebels during Cam-
bodia’s 1979-1991 civil war – had followed his maternal grandfather Sisowath
Monivong on the throne in 1941. The French had chosen him over his father
Norodom Suramarit in the belief that he “would be a docile puppet,” easily
manipulated, and pliable to French interests (Tully, 2006, p. 106).104 Following
independence, Sihanouk soon aspired to pursue a political career. In 1955, he
abdicated from the throne in favor of his father, became known as Prince Si-
hanouk, founded the Sangkum Reastr Niyum (“Popular Socialist Community”),
and called for elections (cf. Hughes, 2001). Realizing “that elections conferred
legitimacy on those who won them,” Sihanouk “wanted to make sure that his
power would be enhanced, not challenged,” so he pressured opposition parties
to join Sangkum as a political umbrella movement and effectively turned Cam-
bodia into a one-party state (Tully, 2006, p. 129). Sangkum captured all seats
in the 1955 elections and Sihanouk became Prime Minister. When his father
died in 1960, Sihanouk – not willing to relinquish power – introduced a con-
stitutional amendment that made him head of state, while his uncle Monireth
became chairman of a regency council.
Following this constitutional amendment, domestic politics became more
polarized and resistance against Sihanouk grew (Keller, 2005). From the left,
he was opposed by the communist Krom Pracheachon (“People’s Group”) that
had in 1955 been one of the few parties refusing to join the Sangkum movement
(Chandler, 2009; Vickery, 1986). It was the political right, however, that proved
to be a more immediate danger to Sihanouk’s political survival. In 1970, Si-
hanouk’s experiment of keeping Cambodia a non-aligned state was undermined
by the escalating Vietnam war, not least because part of its territory was used
by Northern Vietnamese troops as safe havens, and the US had issued an unde-
clared bombing campaign. On 18 March, right-wing military leaders ousted the
prince in a coup d’état. Supported by the US, these leaders swiftly abolished the
monarchy and instead installed an authoritarian regime under General Lon Nol,
a previous Prime Minister under Sihanouk (Curtis, 1993; Peou, 2007). Unlike
Sihanouk, Lon Nol was a “staunch anti-Communist” (Sodhy, 2004, p. 155) and
he allowed the US to bomb the North Vietnamese forces’ Ho Chi Minh Trail
that lead through Cambodia’s countryside.
104 It is said that Sihanouk thereby initially surpassed France’s best expectations, “preferring
to chase girls and watch films than worry himself with affairs of state or nationalist politics”
(Tully, 2006, p. 106), as well as being “little more than a carefree lycée student ... fond of
horses, ice cream, and the cinema” (Becker, 1998, 43f.). Observers of Cambodia’s peace pro-
cess in 1991 still describe him as “a pampered blueblood, fond of French wine and cuisine, who
entertains diplomats with his singing and bores them with Grade B movies he has directed”
(Gray, 1992). But Sihanouk was not only “[unpredictable], ebullient, mercurial, autocratic,
[and] self-indulgent” but also a “a master politician and leader who frequently changed al-
legiances but always tried to preserve the unity of his country,” as the BBC argued in the
obituary that followed his death in 2012 (BBC, 2012).
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Sihanouk, meanwhile, sought exile in Beijing to plot his return to power.
On 23 March 1970, he announced the formation of the Front Uni National
du Kampuchéa or National United Front of Kampuchea (FUNK), a political
umbrella organization in which Sihanouk’s royalist supporters joined forces with
the communist “Khmer Rouge” to remove Lon Nol from power (Tully, 2006).
While it is said that Sihanouk did not like this coalition with the PDK, he
realized that it would keep “his name on the forefront of Cambodian affairs”
(The Independent, 1991). By 1972, the Khmer Rouge controlled the resistance
against Lon Nol, “but for the sake of international respectability continued to
operate behind the facade of Sihanouk’s coalition” (Chandler, 1992, p. 2).
Who were the Khmer Rouge? The movement’s roots stretch back to the
Krom Pracheachon formed in the 1940s (Chandler, 1992; Etcheson, 1987). In
the 1960s, several young communists known as the “Paris Group” had gained
control over the party structures. This group consisted of graduates of the
Lycée Sisowath who had met as students in Paris in the 1950s. Among them
were Saloth Sar – who later became known as “Pol Pot” and would serve as
Prime Minister of Cambodia from 1976 to 1979 – and his wife Khieu Ponnary,
as well as Son Sen (Defense Minister), Ieng Sary (Foreign Minister), and Ieng
Thirith (Minister for Social Affairs). As the US bombing campaign of the Ho
Chi Minh Trail pushed Vietnamese troops deeper into Cambodian territory
until they controlled significant border areas, the Khmer Rouge was provided
with a “powerful boost” in its violent campaign against the state and the Lon
Nol regime (Jones, 2006, 188f.). The party managed to gradually solidify its
grip onto the countryside in the early 1970s. In the areas under its control, it
established regional collectives as a parallel system of governance, commonly
referred to as the process of collectivization (Chandler, 1992). These collectives
would later serve as a model for the regime the party imposed in 1975, and for
the manner by which it would manage its relations to the civilian population
during the civil war (cf. below and Brown, 1998; Frings, 1994).
In 1975, the Vietnam war ended with South Vietnam’s capitulation and a
communist victory. So did the war between FUNK and the Lon Nol regime. On
17 April 1975, Khmer Rouge cadres marched into Phnom Penh, executed most
of the ruling elite, and proclaimed “Democratic Kampuchea.” This regime was
built on “cynical deception and stupefying violence” (Kiernan, 2008b, p. 4) and
envisaged to create “a communist agrarian society whose achievements would
rival the glories of the ancient Angkor Empire” (Curtis, 1993).
Within hours of assuming power, the Khmer Rouge began to evacuate all
cities and force the entire urban population to the Cambodian countryside
(Chandler, 2009; Keller, 2005). In May 1975, the PDK proclaimed a new con-
stitution that provided for a People’s Representative Assembly responsible for
electing a government and appointing a judiciary. The constitution made Si-
hanouk head of state, but he was kept under house arrest in his palace while
(in his own words) being “completely cut off from the outside world” and see-
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ing many of his closest family members killed by the new rulers (in Schier and
Schier-Oum, 1985). Sihanouk would resign in 1976 to once more seek exile
in Beijing, prompting the PDK to announced a new cabinet that made Khieu
Samphan President (“Chairman of the Presidium”), while Pol Pot was named
Prime Minister (Chandler, 1992; Kiernan, 2008b).
The PDK also used its short time in power to implement a radical social
transformation project that would confiscate all private property, abolish all cur-
rency, and destroy all factories, industrial equipment, hospitals, or any means
of a modern civilization. The party closed all schools and markets, outlawed
trade, divided families, and converted Buddhist pagodas into dining halls or
storage units (Curtis, 1993). Local traditions, religious beliefs, and all forms of
earlier ways of life were forbidden (Keller, 2005; Kiernan, 2008b). The regime
was responsible for the death of millions of Cambodians through hard and col-
lective labor, having almost nothing to eat, or having virtually no modern med-
ical facilities to turn to in a country where Malaria and malnutrition remained
widespread (Becker, 1998). The PDK furthermore made both dissent as well as
smaller crimes like hiding food punishable by death, and particularly targeted
and executed former government officials, as well as anyone with a higher edu-
cation such as doctors, lawyers, or people speaking a foreign language (Brown,
1998; Peou, 2007). The result was “one of the worst genocides ... in recorded
history” that killed almost 1.7 million Cambodians (Jones, 2006, p. 195).
8.1.3 Civil War and Peace Negotiations
It was Vietnam that ended the rule of the PDK, after PDK cadres had repeatedly
entered Vietnamese territory to attack villages in the neighboring country. On
25 December 1978, Vietnamese troops entered Cambodia. On 7 January 1979,
they reached Phnom Penh, chased the PDK forces to the Cambodian-Thai
border, and installed the PRK: a pro-Vietnamese satellite regime that was in
1989 renamed State of Cambodia (SOC). The PRK on the one hand reminded
many Cambodians of the aggressive politics Vietnam had historically executed
towards its Western neighbor, but on the other hand provided them with at least
a small guarantee that Pol Pot would not regain power (Chandler, 1992). The
leadership of the PRK was largely made up of former Khmer Rouge officials
who had earlier defected and taken refuge in Vietnam (Amer, 1995; Jones,
2006; Sodhy, 2004). Among this elite were Heng Samrin, who was appointed
President, and 26-year-old Hun Sen, “who became the world’s youngest foreign
minister” and was promoted to the post of Prime Minister on 14 January 1985
(Human Rights Watch, 2015a, p. 22). While the new leadership reinstalled
hospitals, schools, markets, and family life, Heng Samrin and Hun Sen still
became the heads of a “virtually unchecked” socialist one-party state (Peou,
2007, p. 62). The entire political system, its administration, and its security
forces were fully controlled by the sole ruling party, the People’s Revolutionary
Party of Kampuchea (PRPK) (renamed Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) in
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Notes: Conflict data by the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (Sundberg and Me-
lander, 2013) show battle-related deaths per month. The UCDP data set only includes
information from 1989 onwards, thus previous years of the civil war cannot be plotted.
The interim period is shaded in gray.
1993). What the new regime lacked was international recognition – and internal
control over the Cambodian territory (Keller, 2005).
Vietnam’s imposition of the PRK immediately gave rise to an armed re-
bellion by three opposition forces. Firstly, the PDK and its armed wing, the
National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK) regrouped in 1980 in order
to fight the new regime, and it would control territory along the Thai border
during the civil war (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2016). Secondly, in 1981,
the still-exiled Prince Sihanouk founded FUNCINPEC and the party’s armed
wing National Army for an Independent Kampuchea (ANIK) to seek his return
to power. FUNCINPEC was a royalist party led by Sihanouk’s son Ranariddh
that drew on those forces that had supported the royal government in the 1950-
60s and that represented Cambodia’s aristocratic elite (Amer, 1995). Towards
the end of the civil war, FUNCINPEC would constitute of an army of roughly
10,000 combatants that controlled a small territory in the north-western region
of Cambodia (Keller, 2005). Thirdly, also the KPNLF and its armed wing,
the 5,000 combatant strong Khmer People’s National Liberation Armed Forces
(KPNLAF) mobilized against the PRK. The KPNLF was a republican, conser-
vative, and middle class movement that had been founded by Son Sann – a pre-
vious Prime Minister under Sihanouk in 1967 and 1968 – and that represented
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those forces who helped to overthrow Sihanouk in 1970 (Doyle, 1995). The
KPNLF later changed its name to Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP)
to contest in the 1993 elections.
By the early 1980s, Cambodia’s intrastate conflict had turned into one of
the most intractable armed conflicts in the world, “despite the fact that race,
religion or nationality” did not play a major role and the conflict primarily pit-
ted ethnic Khmer against ethnic Khmer (Curtis, 1993). In June 1982, when it
became apparent that no rebel faction by itself was able to overthrow the PRK –
and the 200,000 Vietnamese troops stationed in Cambodia to support the regime
– the three opposition movements formed the Coalition Government of Demo-
cratic Kampuchea (CGDK). The CGDK was a parallel political authority that
was “neither a coalition, nor a government, nor democratic” (Kiernan, 2008a,
p. 318). It was headed by Prince Sihanouk as President, Son Sann as Prime
Minister, and Khieu Samphan as Vice President (Amer, 1995; Chandler, 1992;
Erlanger, 1991b; Kroef, 1990). This “very strange alliance” (Ledgerwood, 1994,
p. 3) or “marriage of convenience” (Hughes, 2003, p. 118) of a royal, a republi-
can, and a communist rebel group was financially backed by China, the US, and
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and controlled about one
third of Cambodian territory by December 1983 (Schier and Schier-Oum, 1985).
Chinese media reported that the PDK in particular retained a functioning par-
allel administration system “complete with producing collectives” throughout
the country, while the PRK only controlled Phnom Penh and some provincial
capitals. The PDK had itself claimed earlier: “[Our] proletarian state adminis-
tration from the cooperative level upward throughout the country still remains
intact” (in Kroef, 1979, p. 733).
Internationally, the CGDK was recognized as the legitimate successor to
the PDK government and awarded with Cambodia’s seat in the General As-
sembly (Kroef, 1990). The international community thus went from “branding
the Khmer Rouge as communist monsters to embracing them as Cambodia’s
legitimate representatives” over the Hanoi-backed PRK (Jones, 2006, p. 201).
Internally, however, Cambodia’s rebel government was far from being united,
and parallel structures of authority remained within the coalition. Each of the
CGDK leaders – Sihanouk, Sann, and Samphan – retained full authority over
their respective organization, the coalition failed to formulate a joint political
program (Raszelenberg and Schier, 1995). It instead resembled “a loose federa-
tion” operating out of refugee camps at the Thai border, and was only united by
the desire to force the Vietnamese out of Cambodia through forging a “People’s
War” (Kroef, 1990, 204f.).105
Given its internal divisions, the coalition did not mitigate the weakness of
the rebel groups vis-à-vis the PRK. By the mid-1980s, no end to the war was
105 Reports also persisted that the PDK attacked the other two rebel groups (Schier and
Schier-Oum, 1985), and while the KPNLF and FUNCINPEC were “united in their distaste
for the Khmer Rouge,” they still clashed over other political issues, not least since Son Sann
had been a close follower of Lon Nol (Mezzera et al., 2009).
205
in sight. At that time, the international community increasingly began to make
proposals on how to settle the conflict and put growing pressure onto the warring
parties to arrive at a deal. It took until 1987, however, until Hun Sen met with
Sihanouk for the first time (Keller, 2005; Sodhy, 2004). This new opportunity to
discuss an end to Cambodia’s civil war also opened up because of “Sihanouk’s
advancing age, Hun Sen’s desire to obtain international recognition,” military
exhaustion, the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, as well as easing East-West
tensions towards the end of the Cold War (Doyle, 1995, p. 21).
Peace talks between the rebel factions and the PRK – now renamed the
State of Cambodia (SOC) – intensified with two meetings in Jakarta, where the
warring parties started to discuss the question of how an interim government
for Cambodia’s transition could look like and if the Khmer Rouge were to be
granted a role in such government (Keller, 2005). In 1989, the parties met
for the first time in Paris – but after weeks of negotiations, they fell short on
signing a peace agreement as they could not agree on a power-sharing formula
for such interim government (Findlay, 1995). With increasing pressure from
an international community, further meetings in Paris eventually resulted in
the signing of the Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the
Cambodia Conflict (commonly referred to as the “Paris Agreements”) on 23
October 1991. The Paris Agreements formally sought to “turn the battlefield
into a ballot-box” (Peou, 2007, p. 34) by (1) calling a ceasefire into place, (2)
requiring the parties to partially demobilize before free and fair elections were
held, and (3) making them agree to install the United Nations Transitional
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) as well as (4) the interim Supreme National
Council (SNC), a domestic organ “under which power would be split almost
equally between the warring parties” (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2016).
On 31 October 1991, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution
781 that welcomed the accords, and Cambodia formally entered its interim
period (United Nations, 1991d).
Peace after Paris was brief. While Birmingham (2015) has argued that
the signing of the peace accords in Angola brought unprecedented optimism to
a society that had suffered from decades of war, no such optimism was visi-
ble in Cambodia. For instance, an Associated Press (AP) news report (titled:
“Despite peace treaty, peace will be hard to achieve in Cambodia”) quoted a
KPNLF signatory who called the Paris Agreements “peace-on-paper” (Gray,
1991a). The New York Times called the peace agreement a “cause for alarm”
and cited a diplomat who voiced his concern that the setup of the interim gov-
ernment contained no credible guarantees that the Khmer Rouge would not
return to full political power in Cambodia (Shenon, 1991b). The Paris Agree-
ments thus only managed to bring a “semi-peace” to Cambodia (Hall Macleod,
2006, p. 51). While during the interim period that followed the accords, episodes
of intrastate armed conflict between the warring parties significantly dropped
(cf. Figure 8.1 and Thayer, 1992b), other forms of violence persisted. Regular
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features of daily life in Cambodia were mob violence (for instance by angry
citizens attacking Khmer Rouge leaders upon their return to Phnom Penh, cf.
section 8.2.1), violence against civilians (for instance by PDK cadres against
ethnic Vietnamese, cf. footnote 103), or later PDK attacks against UNTAC
peacekeepers (cf. section 8.2.2).
Having said that – and to the surprise of many observers – the actual polling
process for elections terminating the rule of the interim government took place
in an astonishingly peaceful environment and went forward without any larger
reports of disruption or clashes. The registration of political parties had begun
in August 1992, and the registration of eligible voters in October the same year.
Balloting took place between 23 and 27 May 1993 at 1,430 polling stations
throughout the country. UN monitors oversaw the voting process, except in a
few Khmer-Rouge controlled areas, where UNTAC had been denied access (cf.
section 8.2.3). Despite earlier threats by the PDK to violently disrupt the vote
and their call on citizens to boycott the elections, 4.2 million Cambodians – or
an overwhelming 89.56 percent of registered voters – voted for representatives
of a 120-member Constituent Assembly (CA) (Hall Macleod, 2006). Civilians
living under PDK control reportedly traveled to other zones in order to cast their
vote – where registration for the elections had as a result at times surpassed 100
percent of eligible voters – and the PDK did not prevent them to do so and did
not attack any polling stations, “in complete contradiction to expectations,”
as head of the UNTAC Election Component Reginald Austin commented (in
Cumming-Bruce, 1993b). On 29 May, the UN officially declared the election
free and fair.
Neither Peace nor Democracy in Cambodia’s Post-Interim Period
Final election results were announced on 10 June 1993 and showed that no
party had managed to obtain an absolute majority in the CA. Instead, and
to the “shock” of Hun Sen and his Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) – the
successor party of the ruling PRPK that remained virtually indistinguishable
from the administrative structure of the SOC – FUNCINPEC came out as the
winner of the elections (International Crisis Group, 1998, p. 6). FUNCINPEC
gained 45 percent of the vote and 58 seats in the CA, while the CPP only
won 38 percent of the vote and 51 seats. Son Sann’s BLDP received 10 seats,
and the Mouvement pour la Libération Nationale du Kampuchéa or Movement
for the National Liberation of Kampuchea (MOULINAKA) – a FUNCINPEC
splinter group that dissolved in 1998 – one seat in the CA (Hall Macleod, 2006;
Keller, 2005). The party that had been formally created by the Khmer Rouge
in November 1992 (the “Cambodian National Unity Party”) had ended up not
registering for the 1993 elections, being fully aware of its extremely “limited
popular appeal” (Cumming-Bruce, 1992, cf. section 8.2.1).
With this electoral result, FUNCINPEC was neither in a position to rule
outright and alone – as all previous political parties had done in Cambodia –
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nor was the CPP ready to relinquish power to its political opponents. After all,
the 1993 elections had been the first time that multiple parties had realistically
competed for power at the ballot box in Cambodia, and also the first time that
an incumbent party had as a result been defeated (Chambers, 2015): “Having
no experience with contested elections, or cohabitation with opposition parties,
the CPP was concerned about its future” (Un, 2005, p. 210). The reaction of
the CPP was immediate. Having failed to disarm and demobilize, Hun Sen
could use his party’s control over a standing army, a loyal police force, and a
fully functioning parallel SOC administrative system to threaten with violence
and secession and thereby blackmail his way into a coalition government with
FUNCINPEC (Bartu and Wilford, 2009; Hall Macleod, 2006). Initially resist-
ing these threats, FUNCINPEC eventually agreed to a coalition with the CPP
after Sihanouk had issued significant pressure on the parties: Prince Ranariddh
became First Prime Minister, Hun Sen was named Second Prime Minister, and
both men were additionally named “Co-Ministers” of Defense and the Interior
(Doyle, 1995; Findlay, 1995).
FUNCINPEC and the CPP thus entered a complex and complicated system
of joint rule that failed to provide any form of political stability for the coun-
try’s citizens, and that could not prevent that violence persisted throughout
Cambodia’s post-interim period (Hall Macleod, 2006; Hughes, 2003). Not only
did the PDK remobilize against the elected government and continue its violent
campaign against the state until it disintegrated in 1998 and its last active lead-
ers surrendered in 1999 (Keller, 2005; Peou, 2007). But also relations between
the two national coalition partners CPP and FUNCINPEC further deteriorated
in the early post-interim period, with one source of such tensions particularly
being the upcoming 1998 elections.
Already in 1996, FUNCINPEC – “alarmed” that it had little influence in
the civil administration of Cambodia’s countryside, which it found decisive in
determining the winner of the 1998 vote (Doyle, 1995, p. 92) – had demanded a
share of local district offices, which the CPP was not ready to give (Barma, 2006;
Mezzera et al., 2009). This was not least because after its bitter defeat in the
1993 elections, the CPP was concerned to lose power completely to its coalition
partner in 1998, as it knew that it was “deeply unpopular in the country as a
whole: only 20 percent said they supported Hun Sen’s party” according to a
1997 opinion poll (Doyle, 2001, 91f.). Its waning support was aided by the new
Sam Rainsy opposition party “emerging as a serious threat” to CPP dominance
in Cambodia’s politics (Human Rights Watch, 2015a, p. 37).
Tensions escalated in the spring of 1997, when up to 1,000 soldiers loyal to ei-
ther one of the coalition partners clashed in Phnom Penh (Hall Macleod, 2006).
During that time, a grenade attack on a Sam Rainsy opposition rally in Phnom
Penh for which the CPP was widely held responsible left at least 16 people dead
(Human Rights Watch, 2015a). On 5 July 1997, Hun Sen, the CPP and the
forces it controlled managed to violently enforce the departure of Ranariddh
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and FUNCINPEC (as well as the opposition Sam Rainsy party), a move that
became widely denounced by the international community. UN Special Rep-
resentative of the Secretary-General for Human Rights in Cambodia, Thomas
Hammarberg, strongly condemned “the violent coup d’état of 5-6 July which
has displaced the lawfully-elected government of Cambodia,” arguing that the
overthrow of Ranariddh “by armed force violates the Cambodian Constitution
and international law and overturns the will of the Cambodian people in the
1993 UN-sponsored election” (UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights, 1997). Unimpressed, Hun Sen returned to the office of Prime Minister
– and the CPP has manifested its control over Cambodian politics ever since
(Bartu and Wilford, 2009; Human Rights Watch, 2015a).
8.2 Interim Government in Cambodia
The PDK’s mobilization against the elected FUNCINPEC-CPP government can
be conceptualized as a bargaining breakdown due to prevailing commitment
problems. In the lead up and immediately after the 1993 elections, the PDK
was growing weaker and had no guarantees against its elimination would it lay
down its arms and join a peaceful post-interim order. Firstly, the PDK became
politically and economically isolated. After the party had enjoyed a certain
degree of international legitimacy throughout the 1980s – when the CGDK oc-
cupied Cambodia’s seat in the UN General Assembly – it was isolated during the
peace process as the international community increasingly awarded the Hanoi-
backed PRK with diplomatic legitimacy (Chapon, 1991; Kroef, 1990; Roberts,
2001).106 This growing political isolation of the Khmer Rouge also meant that
China reduced and eventually stalled its financial and military support to the
party’s strive. China also reportedly pressured the PDK leadership to join the
negotiated settlement in Paris (Nerciat, 1991b). As Greenhill and Major (2007,
p. 32) argue, leaving the PDK behind was “relatively easy” for China, because
“by the time of the Cambodian election, the balance of power had so shifted in
favor of the UN and its SOC/CPP partner.” In November 1992, the UN Security
Council also authorized an economic embargo against the PDK after the faction
had stalled the disarmament and demobilization process. In Security Council
Resolution 792, the UN demanded that the PDK “fulfill immediately its obliga-
tions under the Paris Agreements” and called on the international community
to take measures that “prevent the supply of petroleum products to the areas
occupied by any Cambodian party not complying with the military provisions
of those Agreements” (United Nations, 1992e). Although these sanctions were
weakened by significant violations at the Thai border, they imposed real costs
106For instance, the US, France, and the UK, “who once supported the resistance factions
(including the PDK) to contain Soviet influence in the region, were now apprehensive that
the PDK might regain power after the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops” (Wang, 1996, p. 9).
The US also lifted its trade embargo against the SOC in early 1992.
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on the PDK and further isolated it from the other parties in the peace process
(cf. section 8.2.3 and Cortright and Lopez, 2002)
Secondly, the PDK was growing weaker because it had nothing to gain from
a peace process that focused on creating a liberal-democratic political order
through elections (Peou, 2000; Peou, 2007; Richmond and Franks, 2007). It had
“acceded to a peace agreement that required disarmament and demobilization,
but its nearly exclusive source of power was its military might” (Greenhill and
Major, 2007, p. 32). Because of its treatment of the Cambodian population
during its 1975-1978 rule and during the civil war, the PDK knew that it would
not stand a chance in the 1993 elections. This became particularly obvious
when former President of the Pol Pot regime and PDK interim representative
Khieu Samphan was violently attacked in November 1991 and driven out of
Phnom Penh by an angry mob of citizens (cf. section 8.2.1). As Brown (1998,
p. 97) argues, by being pressured to agree to elections, the PDK was “placed in
a no-win situation. If they took part, they would commit political suicide. If
they did not take part, they would become outlaws whom the new government
could eventually wear down and destroy.”
Following the setup of Figure 3.2 on 31, the PDK thus had two options: it
could either have accepted that its past behavior prevented it from gaining power
in the 1992 elections and peacefully integrate into the post-interim opposition;
or it could not accept this situation and remobilize for intrastate conflict. We
know that the PDK chose the latter strategy and continued its violent campaign
until 1998. But what would have happened had the PDK accepted the elections,
laid down its weapons, and peacefully reintegrated into the post-interim state?
In that case, the new government would have had two options: It could either
have reconciled with the PDK, offer the party leadership amnesty, and allow
them to peacefully participate in post-interim politics (the PR; PG outcome in
Figure 3.2); or it could have tried to prosecute and eliminate the PDK and
become dominant over the entire Cambodian territory (the ER; DG outcome).
The PDK’s highest preference would have been a situation in which it is offered
amnesty and political survival but does not have to pay the costs of further war,
while its least favorable outcome would have been its elimination.
According to the bargaining model of Chapter 3, while the government could
have rightfully argued that it preferred a situation in which the PDK peacefully
integrates into the opposition to a situation of continued war (its preferences
ranked PG > WG), it would not have been able to uphold this commitment
once the PDK had laid down its arms; because power would have shifted even
further away from the PDK and the government would have had incentives to
renege. The PDK knew this: “Almost as soon as the initial election results were
broadcast over UNTAC radio, the CPP regime began wielding its most trusted
tools – force and fraud – in order to remain in power and derail the transition to
democracy” (Jeldres, 1993, p. 112). And on 26 May 1993, Sihanouk made sure
that the party had no credible guarantees against its marginalization in the post-
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interim period. That day, Sihanouk withdrew his original commitment to let
the PDK participate in a post-interim “Coalition Government of National Unity
and Reconciliation” that he had envisaged earlier during the interim period.
This was followed by the new government turning to further actions against
the PDK, such as with the decision of the newly elected National Assembly
on 7 July 1994 to outlaw the PDK and criminalize “mere membership in the
political organization or military of the Khmer Rouge” as well as stipulate “the
confiscation of all property under Khmer Rouge control” (Human Rights Watch,
1995, p. 113). This move reflected the determination of Ranariddh and Hun Sen
(and likely significant parts of the international community) not to allow the
Khmer Rouge “any form of participation” in any future government (Grundy-
Warr, 1994, p. 90). The new law also finalized the PDK’s outcast position in
Cambodian politics. The continued use of violence thus became rational for
the PDK, as continued conflict gave it the opportunity to retain control over at
least small parts of Cambodian territory and with it the possibility of economic
and political survival.107
But commitment problems can be overcome (Walter, 2002). How did in-
stitutional design and reform features of Cambodia’s interim government fail
to mitigate commitment problems for the warring parties (or even exacerbate
them), and how did this lead to conflict in the post-interim period? The ensuing
sections analyze these links, and I thereby attend to each hypothesized property
of interim government of Chapter 3 sequentially – (H1) power-sharing and (H2)
international interim government, (H3) the integration of parallel institutions,
and (H4) the participation of civil society and political parties. I structure each
section in three parts. Firstly, I briefly review the theoretical causal mechanism
for each property of interim government. Secondly, I describe the respective
provisions as decided upon in the 1991 Paris Agreements. Thirdly, I outline the
process of its implementation, present an analysis on how this process of events
and actions affected the causal mechanisms between each property of interim
rule and conflict in the post-interim period, and discuss competing explanations
and limitations of my theoretical argument.
107Besides the situation of the PDK, there is also a merit to look at a second dimension
by which the Cambodian case highlights the role of commitment problems; an argument that
focuses on the decision-making of the CPP. It is conceivable that the CPP unexpectedly found
itself in a weaker-growing position (1) after FUNCINPEC won the 1993 elections and (2) after
the Sam Rainsy party was threatening its power in the lead-up to the 1998 elections, and thus
experienced a sudden shift in the relative distribution of power which made it plausible for Hun
Sen to violently overthrow Ranariddh in 1997 and consolidate the CPP’s position in power.
Having said that, and as I will show in section 8.2.3, this argument is less convincing, not
least because while power shifted nominally at the center of Cambodian politics in 1993, real
power remained with the CPP, also because the interim government had failed to integrate
the parallel administrative system of the SOC (cf. Barma, 2006).
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8.2.1 Power-Sharing Interim Government
Chapter 3 formulated a distinction between power-sharing interim government
and interim periods in which only one party holds legislative and executive
power. I held that in the presence of commitment problems, power-sharing
interim governments should be more likely to lead to stable peace as they come
with physical, economic, and political benefits that decrease future uncertainties
for weaker-rowing parties (cf. Figure 3.3 on page 34).
The question of whether or not the warring parties should share power during
the interim period had been a major obstacle to overcome in Cambodia’s peace
negotiations (United Nations, 2003a). Driven by the demands of the PDK, the
CGDK rebel coalition had throughout the 1980s formulated the convention of a
power-sharing interim government as a key demand to put its signatures under-
neath a peace agreement. It had also argued that the Khmer Rouge could not
be excluded from institutions of joint rule. Hun Sen’s SOC, however, had “flatly
rejected” the very idea of sharing power with the PDK and had voiced concerns
that power-sharing would inevitably help the PDK to return to political power
(Hall Macleod, 2006). This concern was supported by several members of the
UN Security Council who “were opposed to including the PDK in an interim
government due to its notorious record of human rights violations in the late
1970s” (Wang, 1996, p. 8). Inviting a UN transitional administration to guide
Cambodia’s transition to peace yet required that Cambodians created a legit-
imate sovereign entity, because its Charta prevented the UN from installing a
trusteeship over a member state. Thus, the SOC eventually agreed to institu-
tionalize a power-sharing interim body (Doyle, 1995).
Consequently, and in Section III of the Paris Agreements, the warring par-
ties and the international community negotiated to form the power-sharing SNC
(Barma, 2006).108 The agreement foresaw the SNC to be “the unique legitimate
body and source of authority in which, throughout the transitional period, the
sovereignty, independence and unity of Cambodia are enshrined,” and the agree-
ment asked the SOC to “represent Cambodia externally and occupy the seat of
Cambodia at the United Nations” (United Nations, 1991a). The agreement fur-
thermore designated the SNC to have twelve members – six from the SOC, and
two each of FUNCINPEC, the KPNLF, as well as the PDK – and it declared
Prince Sihanouk President of the SNC, “in recognition of his role as former king
108Technically, the SNC existed already during the peace process as a venue for negotiations
between the parties, but it never met in Cambodia. It was founded on 10 September 1990
in Jakarta, and it had held several meetings outside Cambodia: in Bangkok (17 September
1990), Paris (21 December 1990), Jakarta (3 June 1991), Pattaya (23 June 1991), Beijing (15
July 1991) and Pattaya (25 August 1991) (Nerciat, 1991a; United Nations, 1991a). Following
the peace accord, it was installed in Phnom Penh as Cambodia’s interim body. Because of the
high degree of authority that UNTAC assumed during Cambodia’s interim period, the existing
literature is divided on whether or not the SNC counts as a full power-sharing government.
In this dissertation and in creating my data set (cf. Chapter 4), I follow the majority of the
quantitative literature (e.g. Hoddie and Hartzell, 2003; Jarstad, 2010; Joshi and Darby, 2013;
Joshi, Quinn, et al., 2015) and code Cambodia as a case of power-sharing; while, for instance,
Högbladh (2011) does not classify it as such.
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and prime minister and as the only leading figure acceptable to all Cambodian
parties” (Doyle, 1995, p. 27). Having said that, the Paris Agreements limited
the powers of the SNC in so far that while UNTAC was bound to comply with
any policies formulated by the SNC – provided there was a consensus among
its members and that the policy was consistent with the objectives of the peace
process – the Special Representative of the Secretary-General remained the final
authority in theater when it came to determine whether SNC policy was to be
implemented (United Nations, 1991a, cf. below).
Decreasing Uncertainty through Physical Security
In Chapter 3, I argued that a first mechanism for why power-sharing interim gov-
ernment is more apt design to increase the stability of post-interim peace than
all other interim governments is that power-sharing reduces future uncertainty
through increasing the physical security of warring parties (cf. Figure 3.3).
Joining power-sharing institutions requires warring parties, firstly, to come out
of hiding in the periphery and join interim institutions in the capital – meaning
they have to reveal their organizational structure to each other, making it more
difficult to remobilize for war. Secondly, power-sharing frequently also means
that rebel-leaders-turned-politicians receive state bodyguards and international
attention, further increasing their physical security.
Cambodia does not confirm to this causal pattern due to two reasons. Firstly,
while joining the power-sharing SNC did make all rebel leaders return to Phnom
Penh in the early interim period and join institutional politics in the capital, this
move decreased rather than increased the physical security of the weaker-growing
PDK. This is because the move to Phnom Penh made the party vulnerable to
(likely SOC-instigated) mob attacks, which in turn contributed ever more to
its mistrust of the SOC and thus to an eventual bargaining breakdown and the
PDK’s return to combat (cf Sanderson and Maley, 1998).
The SNC had already formed as a venue for negotiations for the parties
before it was officially installed as an interim body (cf. Footnote 108). In June
1991, while meeting in Pattaya, the rebels agreed that they would return to the
Cambodian capital as soon as the power-sharing SNC was installed as an interim
government. Sihanouk in particular had repeatedly depended his return to
Cambodia on the installation of the SNC “in our motherland” (in AFP, 1991a).
At the same time, the rebels insisted that SNC members would take their own
guards to Phnom Penh and refused being provided official bodyguards by the
SOC (Thayer, 1991a). This was chiefly due to concerns of the Khmer Rouge
leadership who – similar to the CPN (M) in Nepal – only wanted to return to the
capital under strong protection by soldiers drawn from their own army, as they
did not trust the SOC police to be willing or able to guarantee their security
(AFP, 1991b; McCarthy, 1991). Unlike Nepal, however, where rebel leaders
returned to the capital months before the power-sharing interim government
convened to demonstrate their commitment to the peace process, Cambodian
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rebels only returned to Phnom Penh to attend the first meeting of the SNC on 23
November 1991. The KPNLF arrived on 12 November and Sihanouk two days
later, among public celebrations for the long-exiled king (Thayer, 1991b). In a
much different fashion, PDK leaders returned to the capital on 16 November,
being “mobbed” by journalists as they were escorted from the airport, while
citizens were largely unaware of the event because authorities had expected
mass protests (Corfield, 2009; Gray, 1991b).
On 27 November 1991, PDK interim representative to the SNC and former
President of the State Presidium in the Pol Pot regime Khieu Samphan was then
attacked and nearly killed in his new Phnom Penh home; while SOC police offi-
cers were unable (or unwilling) to protect him from this mob violence (Shenon,
1991a). Some observers argue that the attack was orchestrated by members
of the SOC government or even masterminded by Hun Sen himself, who had
however not anticipated such violent escalation (Pokempner, 1992). Corfield
(2009, p. 109) yet also notes that “there were enough people who hated Khieu
Samphan to take part in the attack, regardless of government involvement or
encouragement.” Following the attack, Samphan escaped to Thailand and re-
mained absent for the SNC meeting in Phnom Penh on 20 December 1991, and
he would only sporadically return to the capital.
Secondly, Cambodia also does not confirm to the suggested causal pattern
because the PDK’s move to the capital was not a credible commitment to peace
that revealed any organizational structures in the first place. This is not least
because the PDK (and all other parties) retained its parallel administration of
controlled territories throughout the interim period (cf. section 8.2.3). This
means that after its leaders no longer felt their physical security safeguarded in
Phnom Penh and increasingly mistrusted the SOC’s commitment to a peaceful
solution of the Cambodian conflict, PDK leaders could retreat to the areas under
their party’s control. Specifically, on 13 April 1993 and thus shortly before the
elections terminating the interim government, it was reported that the PDK
representatives in the interim SNC had completely reneged on Cambodia’s peace
process, because “all Khmer Rouge officials in the capital appeared to have left”
and the PDK office in Phnom Penh was closed (McNulty, 1993). Days later,
the party sent a letter of withdrawal to the UN, saying that they no longer felt
safe in the capital and thus returned to their administrated areas (Wang, 1996).
More generally, this situation highlights the interaction between power-sharing
interim government and the integration of parallel political institutions that I
touched upon in Chapter 3 and that I also noted for the case of Angola. I
further discuss this in Chapter 9.
Decreasing Uncertainty through Political Security
I held that a second mechanism for why power-sharing interim government
increases the stability of post-interim peace is that it reduces future uncer-
tainty through increasing the political security of warring parties (cf. Figure
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3.3). Power-sharing, firstly, grants weaker-growing parties a voice in the design
of post-interim institutions (for instance through jointly passed laws that are
difficult to achieve, costly to violate, and hard to renege on) which decreases
their uncertainty about the enemy’s future behavior. Secondly, it gives parties
knowledge on how to manipulate future institutional rules to their advantage.
Cambodia also fails to confirm to this causal pattern. One reason is that the
high levels of international authority during its interim period meant that the
warring parties could not use the power-sharing arrangements to safeguard (or
manipulate) their long-term political security – even though there is some evi-
dence that they tried. Remember that in Chapter 6, I showed that the political
security mechanism represents a key explanation for peace in Nepal, because the
CPN (M) was able to push the other parties in the power-sharing interim govern-
ment to revise the electoral law to its advantage. I also demonstrated in Chapter
7 how Angola’s MPLA caretaker interim government passed electoral legislation
that threatened UNITA’s political survival in the post-interim period. At the
same time, I argued in Chapter 3 that I expect international interim government
to mitigate commitment problems because every policy field that is advanced
by a neutral international interim officer decreases the stronger-growing party’s
ability to use its position for factional interest, which strengthens the belief of
a weaker-growing party that the post-interim order will be one that is more
attractive than a costly war (cf. section 8.2.2).
In Cambodia, the presence of both power-sharing and international interim
government meant that UNTAC’s authority prohibited warring party leaders in
the power-sharing SNC to use joint rule as a way to manipulate laws to their
advantage and increase their political security. As with Nepal and Angola, this
aspect of political security can be highlighted by looking at interim decision-
making concerning electoral legislation.
I argued above that the very fact that the interim government was to ter-
minate in elections was perceived by the PDK as a major threat to its political
security – Brown (1998) even calls it the party’s “political suicide” – because
the party was fully aware of its very limited popular appeal should it come
to such vote. This is also why it did not end up registering for the elections
(Cumming-Bruce, 1992). In 1992, one observer directly related this aspect to
perceptions on the future political survival of the party, arguing that Khmer
Rouge “commanders must prepare for the future because I don’t think they
can live in Cambodia after everything has changed ... People are very angry
at [the Khmer Rouge]; nobody loves them” (in Stier, 1992).109 But the PDK’s
perception of being threatened by a popular vote could have been mitigated
by negotiating an extensive set of laws during the power-sharing interim period
that would have provide for the survival of the Khmer Rouge in the post-interim
109Some argue that the fact that the PDK perceived the elections as a threat to its survival
begs the question whether the liberal democratic polity that the international community had
imagined for Cambodia – that included elections as a central ingredient – was a problem,
rather than a solution in building post-war peace (Richmond and Franks, 2007).
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period, even if an electoral victory was out of sight. Leaving domestic and inter-
national unwillingness regarding such safeguards aside, such laws theoretically
could have included, for instance, designing stronger proportional elements in
the electoral law or eliminating election thresholds for the minimum share of
votes a party requires to secure parliamentary representation, so that even few
votes for the PDK would result in seats in the post-interim CA. This is not
least important, because even though decisions of the SNC could be overridden
by UNTAC and elections were closely monitored by the latter as well, a more
powerful (or any) position in the CA would have given the PDK more control
over the constitution-making process and thus increase its political security.
The electoral law had already been a major hurdle in the negotiations before
the signing of the Paris Agreements. In September 1991, SOC Foreign Min-
ister Hor Namhong called the electoral system the only obstacle in reaching a
settlement, as the parties could not agree on whether Cambodia should have a
proportional or First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) electoral system (United Nations,
2003b). While the rebels were in favor of a proportional system, the SOC called
for a majority system that favors larger parties. In the Paris Agreements, the
parties then negotiated elections to be held “on a provincial basis in accordance
with a system of proportional representation on the basis of lists of candidates
put forward by political parties.” Eligible to cast their vote were “Cambodians,”
which the accord defined as every person “who either was born in Cambodia
or is the child of a person born in Cambodia” (United Nations, 1991a). How-
ever, by designing most constituencies to be rather small – with a number of
single-member districts (cf. Gallup, 2002) – the electoral system still had a “ma-
joritarian effect” (Nohlen et al., 2001, p. 18). In addition, the provisions were
perceived to now extend voting rights also to Chinese and Vietnamese residents
in Cambodia (Minority Rights Group, 1995). During the interim period, the
PDK thus began to strongly oppose the implementation of this bargain that the
parties had arrived at in Paris.
The party reasoned that by allowing ethnic Vietnamese to vote, the law
would give a clear advantage to the Hanoi-backed SOC, and thus directly
threaten its own political survival – the PDK had a history of violent attacks
against ethnic Vietnamese (Amer, 1995). For instance, Khieu Samphan said
with regard to the electoral law on 10 June 1992: “At stake here is the issue
of a ‘Cambodian’ Cambodia, and not a ‘Vietnamized’ Cambodia where foreign-
ers were to be given the right to take part in the elections” (in Colm, 1992).
The party also alleged that “there were one million illegal Vietnamese migrants
who had come to [colonize] Cambodia and support the CPP in the forthcoming
elections” (Thayer, 2012, p. 64).
To increase its future political security, the PDK tried to make use of its
position in power-sharing and attempted to push the other parties represented
in the SNC to insert Khmer nationality into the electoral law (Amer, 1994;
Amer, 1995; Colm, 1992; Un, 2005). This move can be interpreted in two
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ways. Firstly, and resembling the CPN (M)’s strategies to use its participation
in Nepal’s power-sharing interim government to change electoral legislation to
its own advantage, the PDK’s move can be seen as the party’s attempt to use
the power-sharing SNC for political benefits that prevent its marginalization
in the post-interim period (cf. Amer, 1994): “Former parties to the CGDK ...
attempted to limit the number of ethnic Vietnamese who could take part in the
planned general elections,” which became “most evident in the discussion prior
to the adoption of the Electoral Law in 1992” (Amer, 2006, p. 392).
Secondly, and rather than attempting to actually change the electoral law,
the PDK may also have resorted to racist language as a strategy to attract
voters in the upcoming elections (Hughes, 2002). The UN Secretary-General,
however, “after careful consideration in view of the support expressed for the
two proposals by Prince Sihanouk” (Amer, 1995, p. 33), instructed his Special
Representative not to approve these amendments. Akashi himself commented
on the process of arriving at a final electoral law that there was “a strong push
... to insert Cambodian citizenship or nationality (as a criteria for voting) – a
radical modification from the Paris Accords ... We have to refrain from creating
racial undertones to such a matter” (in Colm, 1992). While the other parties
in the SNC eventually accepted Akashi’s decision and adopted the finalized
electoral law (cf. United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, 1993),
this example thus not only highlights how international authority during interim
rule can impede the pattern by which power-sharing interim government adds
to the political security of warring parties. In Cambodia, it also meant that in
contrast to increasing the political security of the Khmer Rouge, it advanced
the party’s isolation among the other factions in the SNC. This finding could
thus indicate a possible interaction effect between the two institutional designs
features of interim government, in that power-sharing only has a negative effect
on the hazard of armed conflict in cases where international actors are absent.
I address this point further in Chapter 9.
Decreasing Uncertainty through Economic Security
In Chapter 3 I held that a final mechanism for why power-sharing interim gov-
ernment increases the stability of post-interim peace is that power-sharing re-
duces future uncertainty through increasing the economic benefits for warring
parties (cf. Figure 3.3). In war-torn states, individual access to wealth is usually
determined by control of the government, and thus either side to a war must
fear to be economically marginalized if the other side fully dominates a transi-
tion to peace. By rewarding weaker-growing parties with cabinet or legislative
positions, power-sharing interim governments enable them to control (and loot)
the resources ascribed to their post and thus lower their incentives to acquire
such benefits by violent means (cf. Haaß and Ottmann, 2015).
There is no evidence in the primary and secondary literature on Cambodia
that the case confirms to this causal pattern. As during the rule of Angola’s in-
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terim government (cf. Chapter 7), this lack of evidence is explained by the fact
that the warring parties could rely on extracting economic benefits through the
continued control of parallel political structures and did not need the partici-
pation in the power-sharing SNC to secure such benefits. This becomes obvious
with regard to the securing of economic benefits in three ways.
Firstly, particularly the PDK continuously secured economic benefits and
prevented its economic marginalization by trading and smuggling natural re-
sources – particularly timber and gems – out of its administrated areas along
the Cambodian-Thai border. I discuss this mechanism further in section 8.2.3.
Secondly, particularly the SOC government was said to secure economic benefits
through corruption during the interim period, but it did not need to rely on the
institutions of the interim government to do so (as, for instance, warring parties
in Liberia, cf. Chapter 3). Instead, the SOC could sell off state assets that it
controlled; use its control over the police force to evacuate citizens from their
houses in Phnom Penh and rent them to arriving members of the international
community (who would pay much higher rents); and demand bribes, parallel
taxes, and payments from workers and students living in SOC controlled areas
during the interim period (cf. Hughes, 1996; Sanger, 1991). Thirdly, all parties
could use the influx of foreign aid during the interim period to secure eco-
nomic benefits and lower their costs of defection. Yet, while Haaß and Ottmann
(2015) highlight how foreign aid to power-sharing interim institutions in Liberia
and Aceh helped to “buy off” warring parties, aid was not channeled through
the power-sharing SNC to the parties in Cambodia. Instead, it was channeled
through each parties’ parallel institutions. For instance, the Khmer Rouge even
protested the influx of foreign aid during the interim period and insisted that
such aid would only strengthen the “Phnom Penh government” of the SOC –
not the power-sharing SNC (AFP, 1992c). This highlights the role of parallel
structures of political authority in this regard. Having said that, emergency aid
to refugee camps under the parallel control of the PDK also aided the party’s
economic security and decreased its costs of defection (cf. below). I further
attend to the interplay of parallel institutions and power-sharing with regard to
economic benefits in Chapter 9.
8.2.2 International Interim Government
My second hypothesis in Chapter 3 held that international interim government,
as opposed to interim government without a direct involvement of the inter-
national community, increases the stability of post-interim peace. I defined
international interim government as one in which members of the international
community assume political authority in some or all policy matters. I outlined
that existing research has often looked at such interim government in a strict
interpretation following Doyle (2002), but that I prefer the more lenient perspec-
tive of Guttieri and Piombo (2007) who reason that most interim governments
see vast degrees of international influence in decision-making – even though this
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Notes: Figure based on data from the International Peace Institute (2015).
influence may not be formalized in administrative structures. In Chapter 3, I
consequently theorized that in the presence of credible commitment problems,
international interim government increases the stability of peace through the
mechanism of raising costs of defection via physical deterrence, as well as by
means of policy influence (cf. Figure 3.3).
Cambodia saw an international interim government in the strict and lenient
understanding of the concept.110 In Section II of the Paris Agreements, the
parties invited the UN Security Council to establish UNTAC “with civilian and
military components under the direct responsibility of the Secretary-General
of the United Nations.” They further delegated “all powers necessary” to UN-
TAC to ensure the implementation of the agreement, which included placing
all “administrative agencies, bodies and offices which could directly influence
the outcome of elections” under UN supervision (United Nations, 1991a). This
meant that the interim government oversaw the policy fields of foreign affairs,
national defense, finance, public security, as well as information. However,
Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General Yasushi Akashi de facto
refused to use UNTAC’s full administrative authority and was instead eager to
engage the power-sharing SNC in decision-making (cf. Croissant, 2008; Mezzera
et al., 2009). This not least resulted in the problematic distribution of political
authority as discussed in section 8.2.1.
110Doyle (2002) himself classifies the UNTAC operation as a UN “administrative author-
ity,” a type of international interim government where domestic institutions retain legislative
authority while the UN takes over civil administration (cf. Croissant, 2008).
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Setting up the international interim government was flawed from the start.
While the UN Security Council had in Resolution 717 of 16 October 1992 al-
ready authorized the establishment of the United Nations Advance Mission in
Cambodia (UNAMIC) that was to be deployed immediately after the signing of
the Paris Agreements to help the warring parties maintain the fragile ceasefire,
the new UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali announced the appoint-
ment of Yasushi Akashi as his Special Representative in Cambodia only two
months into the interim period on 9 January 1992 (Hall Macleod, 2006; Jennar,
1994; United Nations, 2003a).
On 28 February 1992, the UN Security Council then authorized in Resolu-
tion 745 the deployment of UNTAC for a period of 18 months, and decided that
the mission should be comprised of seven key components: one military com-
ponent and six civilian components dealing with issues human rights, elections,
civil administration, police, the repatriation of refugees, and economic rehabil-
itation (United Nations, 1992c). The total number of international personnel
was set at around 20,000 members of staff (cf. Figure 8.2). 308 members were
employed in the civil administration component, 3,600 as civilian police mon-
itors, and 72 persons formed the election component (United Nations, 2003b).
Election personnel was additionally supplemented by 4,000 Cambodian civilian
staff during the electoral registration phase in 1992, as well as by 1,000 inter-
national and 56,000 Cambodian observers during the actual polling process in
1993 (Amer, 1995). All in all, this meant that once the UNTAC mission was
fully deployed, it assumed an “unprecedented degree of transitional authority”
in Cambodia (Doyle, 1995, p. 13), virtually took over governing the country
(Lewis, 1992), and thus represented the most expensive, comprehensive, and
intrusive UN operation at this point in history (Wang, 1996).
Tying Hands through Physical Deterrence
In Chapter 3, I argued that a first mechanism for why international interim
government is more apt to increase the stability of post-interim peace than any
other type of interim government is that international authority increases the
warring parties’ costs of defection through physical deterrence (cf. Figure 3.3).
Firstly, military components associated with international interim government
bring large numbers of troops that place physical constraints on the warring
parties’ ability to break a deal (for instance by implementing buffer zones for
disarmament and demobilization). Secondly, parties do no longer only have
to fight their enemy, but also have to spend valuable resources fighting peace-
keepers. Thirdly, the high financial and human costs that come with assuming
authority in war-torn states assure parties that the international community
has a strong interest in upholding a peaceful bargain.
Cambodia does not confirm to this causal pattern. Observable evidence
thereby points to issues of late deployment and early withdrawal as explana-
tions for why UNTAC was unable to increase costs of defection through physical
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deterrence, highlighting the aspect of temporality in interim governments I out-
lined in Chapter 3. Firstly, the international interim government failed to raise
the warring parties costs of defection because it was deployed late in Cambo-
dia’s interim period, a fact that has been thoroughly noted in the case litera-
ture (e.g. Doyle, 1995; Doyle, 2001; Findlay, 1995; Mersiades, 2005; Roberts,
1998). Reasons for the late deployment of international personnel are plenty,
and particularly include the unprecedented size of the mission and the dragging
bureaucratic and budgetary planning within the UN. For instance, the UN was
reported to have done “very little substantial advance planning for UNTAC al-
though diplomats and officials in the negotiating process were able to foresee an
agreement as early as August 1991” (Wang, 1996, p. 16).
By August 1992 – ten months into the 18-month-long interim period – only
half of the roughly 1,000 civil administrators had arrived in Cambodia. While
the international interim government did for a short time during the interim
period manage to create a degree of stability that was previously unforeseen in
Cambodia and increase the costs of remobilization for the warring parties to
some extent by effectively standing in the way of PDK combatants attacking
the other parties – causing the death of 4 military observers, 41 other mili-
tary UN staff, 16 civilian police officers, 5 international civilian staff and 16
local staff of the UNTAC mission (United Nations, 2003b) – this was by no
means enough to create true physical deterrence. “UNTAC had no stomach for
fighting between factions resistant to disarmament and its peacekeeping troops”
(Richardson and Sainsbury, 2005, p. 287). Instead, slow deployment negatively
affected the perception of the parties in the bargaining situation of how the in-
ternational interim government would raise their costs of defection. The PDK
in particular “decided not to lay down their arms because they saw how slowly
UN troops were being deployed and decided UNTAC was not taking control of
the situation” (Ledgerwood, 1994, p. 8).
More specifically, this means that observing the late deployment of interna-
tional authority to Cambodia, the PDK had determined early on in the interim
period that UNTAC was not going to significantly (1) raise its own costs of
defection from the bargain struck in Paris and prevent it from remobilizing for
war. In fact, UNTAC’s insistence in sticking to the resolution of Cambodia’s
underlying conflict through popular elections may have been one of the reasons
for why the PDK remobilized for combat in the first place (cf. Richmond and
Franks, 2007). It also had (2) determined that UNTAC would not help the PDK
to protect itself from the attacks of others – it had lost this trust after Khieu
Samphan was attacked in November 1992 as the international community had
yet failed to deploy UNTAC forces.111 This becomes also visible as the PDK
111The PDK had already called for fastened UN deployment immediately following the attack
against Khieu Samphan in the beginning of the interim period, and observers warned in early
1992 that although the Paris Agreements “succeeded in bringing an end to the fighting” the
accords would fail if UNTAC would not establish its presence soon, given the sharp decline in
the parties’ mutual trust as a consequence of the attack on Khieu Samphan (Thayer, 1992b).
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– and the other warring parties – had already consolidated its parallel political
and military institutions as UNTAC personnel arrived in Cambodia (cf. section
8.2.3 and Pokempner, 1992; Wang, 1996). The PDK was neither punished for
defecting from the Paris bargain or penalized for refusing to disarm and demobi-
lize, nor was it disciplined for trying to disrupt the campaigning period leading
up to the May 1993 elections (Becker, 1998).112
Secondly, UNTAC was not only unable to substantively raise the costs of
defection for the warring parties because the parties were well aware of the fact
that UNTAC personnel would withdraw soon following the 1993 elections. Most
of the electoral component staff already left in June 1993, and military troops
were gradually withdrawn between August and November 1993 (Amer, 1995).
This points to the issue of temporality in interim governments that I discussed
at length in Chapter 3. The eventual withdrawal of UNTAC failed to mitigate
commitment problems in the long run as it increased the warring parties’ per-
ception that any hypothetical raised costs of defection through international
interim government would expire immediately after the inauguration of the CA
(cf. Hall Macleod, 2006). As an UNTAC military observer noted, the PDK had
quickly “cracked the code” and “learned that the UN’s a paper tiger” that would
not represent any deterrence for defection in the long run (in Cumming-Bruce,
1993a). And another observer of the peace process in Cambodia noted that
Cambodian factions knew “that UNTAC was going to leave anyway. There
was a calendar; there was a clear statement that UNTAC would not be there
forever” (Carney and Choo, 1993, p. 42). And Joshi (2013, p. 367) calls the im-
mediate withdrawal of UNTAC forces a major flaw in the design of international
authority in Cambodia, and argues that post-conflict societies require a longer
deployment of such authority to ensure that “former rivals will continue to have
faith after the mission is withdrawn.” Yet, as Chesterman (2005a, p. 174) notes,
the “counterfactual is hypothetical, as there was no willingness before or after
the vote for UNTAC to remain beyond the completion of its mandate.”
Tying Hands through Policy Influence
In Chapter 3, I argued that a second mechanism for why international interim
government is more apt to increase the stability of post-interim peace than
any other interim government is that international authority increases costs of
defection for warring parties through policy influence (cf. Figure 3.3). I held
that every policy field advanced by a neutral international officer decreases a
112Is there evidence for the alternative mechanism, i.e. that had UNTAC been deployed
more quickly, peace would have prevailed in Cambodia? The majority of the cited literature
argues as much, although Pokempner (1992, p. 7) reasons that “[even] had the deployment
of the UN in Cambodia begun on the day of the Paris Accords, such a schedule would have
been extremely optimistic for a country with minimal communications and electricity whose
dilapidated roads are barely passable for motor vehicles in dry season, and impassable for
the five months of monsoon rains each year.” This argumentation points to an alternative
mechanism of interim government duration (cf. also Buerger, 1994; Choo, 1995) that I also
briefly discussed for Angola in Chapter 7.
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stronger-growing party’s ability to use this position for factional interest and to
pursue politics that marginalize a weaker-growing party. This reasoning thus
goes hand in hand with previous studies on peacekeeping that stress the UN’s
role as “as truly neutral authority” (Gisselquist, 2002, p. 12).
Cambodia does not confirm to this causal pattern, because UNTAC’s strong
policy influence (1) meant that the parties could not use the power-sharing SNC
to safeguard political benefits to increase their long term survival – an interac-
tion that I discussed above – and (2) failed to mitigate commitment problems
because the parties did not perceive UNTAC as a “truly neutral authority.”
During the rule of the interim government, the “creation of laws and proce-
dures regarding elections was a critical function granted” to the international
interim government (Doyle, 1995, p. 29). For instance, the electoral law was
even colloquially called the “UNTAC electoral law” (Peou, 2000). In Chapter 3,
I argued based on past research if international actors serve as a neutral arbiter
“to whom each side can take its concerns and complaints about the other,” this
should allow “for increased communication between the sides and a reduced risk
of a preemptive return to arms” (Flores and Nooruddin, 2011, p. 488).
International policy influence yet did not mitigate but exacerbate commit-
ment problems particularly for the weaker-growing PDK, because the party –
and the other factions – did not perceive UNTAC as a neutral authority to turn
to as conceptualized by the existing literature. Instead, parties perceived “a
lack of impartiality on the part of external sponsors of UNTAC” (Peou, 2002,
p. 518). For instance, an aid worker observed during the interim period that the
SOC had no confidence in the UN system as such and UNTAC in particular,
because it had perceived it for 12 years to be on the side of the rebel factions,
after the UN had granted Cambodia’s General Assembly seat to the CGDK
coalition (in Eng, 1991a). Neither did the Khmer Rouge perceive UNTAC as a
neutral force. I mentioned above how its leaders felt that the UN was not pro-
tecting them sufficiently from violent attacks due to UNTAC’s late deployment
to Cambodia. Instead, the PDK elite argued that the international interim gov-
ernment was biased towards the SOC, not least after the UN Security Council
imposed an oil embargo on PDK territory on 30 November 1992.113 Reflect-
ing this suspicion of the PDK towards UNTAC, on 7 December 1992 Khieu
Samphan told the press as a reaction to the sanctions against his party that in
“certain provinces ... certain elements of UNTAC have not hesitated to openly
collaborate with the Vietnamese and their puppets” and that UN peacekeepers
had “penetrated” into Khmer Rouge zones “followed by the Vietnamese forces
and their puppets who come to attack our villages” (in AFP, 1992b). A PDK
radio broadcast further accused UNTAC of having “joined hands with the Yuon
aggressors and their puppets ... in realizing their strategy to annex Cambodia
113International actors were well aware how this embargo could be perceived by the Khmer
Rouge and had raised concerns that sanctions would drive the party further away from the
peace process – UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali had, for instance, asked the
Security Council on 20 November 1992 to refrain from imposing sanctions (Spielmann, 1992).
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and the Cambodian race” (“Yuon” is a pejorative for Vietnamese in Khmer, lit-
erally translating into “savage,” cf. Pokempner, 1992, p. 8). And on 2 January
1993, the party argued “UNTAC has not been neutral” but “totally, bluntly,
and shamelessly siding with Vietnam and its puppets” (in Reid, 1993).114
8.2.3 Integration of Parallel Institutions
My third hypothesis reasoned that in the presence of commitment problems,
more advanced processes of integrating parallel institutions of warring parties
into the authority of an interim government come with higher stability of peace
by raising costs of defection. In order to sustain in war, parties need parallel mil-
itary and political institutions to accumulate means and resources for fighting
and to manage their relation with the population. As long as these structures
persist throughout an interim period, parties retain the financial resources, pop-
ular legitimacy, command structures, and war-time mindsets to remobilize in
the post-interim period. Interim governments that integrate parallel institutions
should consequently increase the stability of peace (cf. Figure 3.3).
Parallel Political Institutions
The establishment of parallel political institutions during Cambodia’s civil war
goes beyond the installation of rebel government as with the Maoist People’s
Governments in Nepal or with UNITA’s Terras Libres de Angola (cf. Chapter
6 and 7). In Cambodia, parallel structures of government existed at several
levels until 1991. As outlined above, Cambodia de facto had two governments
at the international level from 1982 onwards: while the PRK controlled around
70 to 90 percent of national territory during the civil war (depending on the
source of information, cf. Kroef, 1979), the CGDK rebel coalition was interna-
tionally recognized and occupied Cambodia’s seat in the UN General Assembly
(cf. section 8.1.2). Within Cambodia, rebel factions set up parallel adminis-
trations to regulate their relationship with the civilian population in the areas
under their control, although the existing case literature suggests that public
service provision and institutionalization of these structures was carried out to
a significantly lesser degree than in Angola or Nepal.
114There is also evidence that the international interim government’s policy influence failed to
raise costs of defection for parties because a “major limitation of UNTAC’s mandate was that
it did not include any democratic institutional engineering that went beyond the electoral
arena” (Croissant, 2008, p. 657) and that its authority to draft laws was not extended to
other areas of civil administration (Doyle, 1995; Mezzera et al., 2009). From a bargaining
perspective this argument yet points to inconclusive results. On the one hand, the failure of
deeper institutional engineering by UNTAC during the interim period, in particular in the
realm of administrative reform, contributed to the CPP’s violent rise to power in the post-
interim period by not increasing its costs of defection through an integrated and controlled
civil bureaucracy. On the other hand, and as with Nepal, where the absence of international
ownership in the interim period and during the institutional reform process added to peace,
a further international involvement would likely have polarized the parties involved in power-
sharing and have pushed the PDK even further to the margins.
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Particularly the PDK yet tried controlling every aspect of the everyday lives
of civilians even after it had been forced out of power in 1979. The party became
known to set up mandatory political reeducation and indoctrination programs
in the villages under its control also during the civil war (Erlanger, 1991a;
Sopheak and Clayton, 2007). These structures also served to closely administer
marriages, the political administration of rural areas, as well as the village
economy, and in particular the production of rice and other food (Grundy-Warr,
1994). In that regard, the administration of rice production and distribution
in its zones of control significantly contributed to the PDK’s ability to wage a
war against the central PRK government, because it provided a valuable source
of nutrition for PDK soldiers (Human Rights Watch, 1995). To complete its
parallel economy, the PDK also threatened to withdraw the Cambodian riel
completely from its zones of control in exchange for its own currency (Channo
and Colm, 1992). In sum, a “steady goal of the Khmer Rouge [during the civil
war had] been the destruction of the government’s administrative structures
throughout the village, commune and district level,” to which end it sought to
replace such structures formally or informally, indoctrinated ordinary civilians,
imposed forced labor in the zones of its control, and reigned with “what appeared
to be a deliberate policy of terror” (Human Rights Watch, 1995, p. 24).
The Paris Agreements did not serve as a blueprint for the reintegration of
parallel political structures but preserved and extended parallel structures of
authority of all warring parties for the interim period. It did so by asking the
parties only to refrain “from any deployment, movement or actions which would
extend the territory they control” (Jennar, 1994; United Nations, 1991a). At
the national level, the peace agreement asked the parties both to form the SNC,
as well as to place “all administrative agencies, bodies, and offices” under the
direct and supervision of UNTAC (United Nations, 1991a). This introduced at
least two further avenues of parallel authority that added to “double, sometimes
even threefold structures” of power during the interim period (Croissant, 2008,
p. 661): (1) between the SOC and UNTAC, (2) between the SNC and the SOC,
and (3) between the interim institutions in the capital and parallel structures
in rebel zones of control. For instance, while UNTAC was tasked to supervise
and control the existing SOC administration, even in Phnom Penh – “where
a central administrative apparatus was still functioning” and where UNTAC
concentrated most of its work at – the SOC “administered around UNTAC,”
allowed international interim authorities to control its bureaucrats only when
it “wished to be controlled,” and made sure that “the actual chain of policy
bypassed UNTAC, whose officer was kept busy watching an official without
function while the real decisions were made elsewhere, out of UNTAC’s sight”
(Doyle, 1995, 43f.).115 Because the SOC had feared that dismantling its ad-
115Reasons for why UNTAC was unable to exercise the degree of control it would have needed
to actually transform Cambodia’s civil administration are plenty, and include that the few UN
officials assigned to head 21 provincial administration offices established throughout Cambodia
could not control a SOC bureaucracy of over 200,000 employees (Findlay, 1995; Roberts,
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ministration would facilitate the PDK’s return to power, it also de facto refused
to transfer authority over its bureaucracy to the SNC but kept such authority
“largely intact” (Ledgerwood, 1994, p. 2).
Consequently, political elites of all parties kept the perception throughout
the interim period that the design of Cambodia’s interim government had meant
for them to retain parallel political institutions. Prince Sihanouk, for instance,
was a strong proponent of preserving the “two rival governments of Phnom Penh
and the tripartite resistance coalition” throughout the interim period instead of
inaugurating a joint SNC with full powers (AFP, 1991e). He also argued that
both governments should be allowed to “continue to function, each in its own
zones, with their own administrations, ... flag, national anthems, ... constitu-
tions, [and] laws” (ibid.). And SOC Foreign Affairs Minister Hour Namhong
added,
“[The] SNC has no legal basis, nor does it have the institutional basis
of a government, even a ‘de facto’ one ... [It] has unequivocally been
decided that the two governments in place will continue to administer
their respective zones of control ... until the nomination of a new
government after the general election ... There should not be any
misunderstandings ... The SNC has its seat in Phnom Penh ... [but]
the government of the SOC runs the country” (Hughes, 1996, p. 25).
As a result, after 18 months of interim government in Cambodia, the parties
had not only preserved but even advanced their respective parallel administra-
tions. For instance, “the territory to which the UN was prohibited access by the
Khmer Rouge had [even] more than doubled” as compared to the beginning of
the interim period (Jennar, 1994, p. 145). Some even say that the PDK managed
to increase its territorial administration from five to 20 per cent of Cambodia’s
territory during the interim period (Richardson and Sainsbury, 2005). As dur-
ing the civil war, FUNCINPEC and KPNLF were thereby not attempting “to
control daily life ... as minutely as the Khmer Rouge” and had most admin-
istrative tasks executed by military personnel in their small zones of control,
but the PDK increasingly infiltrated SOC territory where it then “set up a
shadow administration loyal to itself” (Pokempner, 1992, pp. 24, 42). Such par-
allel structures of political authority also continued to exist in the post-interim
period (AFP, 1992d; Downie and Kingsbury, 2001). For instance, after Cam-
bodia’s elected National Assembly voted to outlaw the PDK in 1994, the party
established on 11 July 1994 the “Provisional Government of National Union
and National Salvation of Cambodia” in the Pailin and Preah Vihear provinces
at the Cambodian-Thai border, with Khieu Samphan as Prime Minister and
Son Sen as his Deputy – the two Khmer Rouge leaders who had represented
2001), or that few of those UN officials sent to the provinces were Khmer speakers. This lack
of manpower and “lack of knowledge of Cambodian history, culture or language” allowed the
SOC to “shield its bureaucracy from effective supervision” (Croissant, 2008, p. 660).
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the party in the power-sharing SNC during the interim period (Human Rights
Watch, 1995; Mehta, 1996).
Affecting Financial Means In Chapter 3, I held that a first mechanism
for why interim governments that integrate the parallel political institutions of
warring parties increase the stability of post-interim peace is that they raise
costs of defection by limiting the financial resources parties need to remobilize
(cf. Figure 3.3). In contrast, and when facing commitment problems caused
by an uncertainty of a stronger-growing party’s future behavior, the continued
existence of parallel political institutions allows a weaker-growing party to not
only retreat to its zones of territorial control and regroup for war, but also to use
parallel structures to acquire the financial means to buy new weaponry through
taxation as well as managing natural resource extraction.
Cambodia confirms to this causal pattern. Particularly the PDK’s ability to
manage the extraction and sale of natural resources and implement a parallel
taxation system by means of controlling parallel political institutions during the
rule of the interim government is one of the central explanations for why the
party was able to return to armed combat in the early 1990s. This becomes
visible with regard to two aspects. Firstly, while the Khmer Rouge’s “Maoist
inspired leaders [had] punished free-market commerce by death” during the Pol
Pot regime, during the interim period the party began to function “to a large
degree as a business venture,” granting lucrative concessions to Thai companies
that were involved in gem-mining and the timber trade in the rebel territories
(Shenon, 1992). This meant that the PDK used its parallel administration of
Cambodian territory and its control over border areas to implement a parallel
taxation system that is said to have resulted in 10 to 20 million USD income
per month throughout the interim period (Cortright and Lopez, 2000; Gennino,
1992; Koning and Capistrano, 2007). In June 1992 alone, for instance, compa-
nies from Thailand were reportedly paying 40,000 USD per day “to mine for
rubies around the Khmer Rouge headquarters of Pailin” (Grundy-Warr, 1994,
89f.). In addition to natural resource extraction, smuggling, and trading, the
PDK could also use its parallel administration of several refugee camps along
the Thai-Cambodian border to acquire money through retrieving international
aid (as well as food or medicine) directed to these camps, in order to finance its
continued strive against the government (Grundy-Warr, 1994; Vickery, 1988).
This parallel finance system directly affected the PDK’s ability to remobi-
lize against the government, meaning that the continued existence of parallel
administration and the management of natural resources it enabled failed to de-
crease costs of defection for the rebels. This is because the PDK used the money
extracted through the parallel taxation of resources to purchase weapons and
continue its violent campaign (Cortright and Lopez, 2000; Shenon, 1992). In
late 1991, Pol Pot argued that the “resources [in our liberated and semi-liberated
zones] absolutely must be [utilized] as assets” (in Global Witness, 2002, p. 17).
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While UN sanctions in late 1992 specifically aimed at weakening the PDK’s abil-
ity to use its parallel administration for resource trading, violations against the
international embargo never completely shut down the border trade (Cortright
and Lopez, 2002). This points more generally to the role of natural resources
as a competing explanatory variable for continued conflict in Cambodia’s post-
interim period, a variable that is thoroughly discussed by previous research (e.g.
Le Billon, 2000; Le Billon, 2001b; Ross, 2004). Le Billon (2000) in that regard
however particularly points out the importance of parallel administration of ter-
ritory and a population by the PDK and the links to how this enabled the party
to retrieve natural resources: By inviting Thai companies to secure log supply
from Cambodia, the PDK was able to impose a parallel taxation system largely
directed at Thai businessmen that helped them to strengthen their “shadow
state,” as well as to “increase territorial control and thus financial revenue” (Le
Billon, 2000, p. 789).
Secondly, the continued existence of parallel political structures also failed
to increase the PDK’s costs of defection because it enabled the party to forcibly
enlist the population living under its control. This provided the rebels with a
larger fighter base to draw upon, and it was often reported conscripting children
“at the earliest age possible” (Pokempner, 1992, p. 41). To achieve this end, the
PDK also used its parallel administration of refugee camps to forcibly relocate
emigrated Cambodians into its zones of control (Nerciat, 1992; Vickery, 1988). It
thereby considered and penalized civilians who refused its orders as “‘traitors’
if they did not go [back] to rebel zones in Cambodia” (Eng, 1991b). This
forced repopulation of the areas under under their administration also decreased
the PDK’s costs of defection because it created “a labor force with which to
continue the lucrative border trade, and a supply of soldiers and porters” for
the resumption of armed combat against the government (Pokempner, 1992,
p. 34): Throughout the interim period, the PDK could use the population it
controlled to “drain human and material resources” away from the SOC and
“influence and coerce people to supply food” for its soldiers (Grundy-Warr,
1994, pp. 87, 89).116
Finally, and while I have focused on the role of parallel political institutions
in failing to increase the PDK’s costs of defection, parallel structures are also
part of an explanation why the CPP could blackmail its way into a coalition
government in 1993 and carry out its 1997 coup d’état. As the other parties, the
SOC government that controlled civil administration in most of rural Cambodia
and “sought to retain the loyalty of its armed forces and political functionar-
116Having said that, it is also possible to imagine a competing causal mechanism for the
parallel political administration of territorial zones during the interim period, and argue that
the warring parties used the practice of enforced relocation to create an electorate for the May
1993 election – and thus decrease its future uncertainty. For instance, observers argued in late
1991 that the PDK aimed at maintaining control over the refugees and their voting behavior
“in anticipation of future elections” (Eng, 1991b), and Prince Sihanouk later argued that he
had heard the PDK wanted to extend its parallel administration “so as to enable it to win at
least 30 of the 120 seats in the new legislature” (in Pokempner, 1992, p. 37).
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ies” throughout the interim period (Hall Macleod, 2006, p. 84). As a result,
in SOC areas, the party could use its bureaucracy to subject opposition parties
to extreme harassment, enforce “legislative or administrative regulation of ex-
pression and association,” maintain “political dossiers on citizens,” or restrict
“movement through an identity card system” (Pokempner, 1992, p. 12). The
continuation of parallel administration throughout the interim period failed to
decrease costs of defection for the CPP in the post-interim period because it
meant that real power remained with the party (even though FUNCINPEC had
won the majority of votes in 1993). This was not least because the SOC con-
trolled tax collection and could use a standing army to force its way into the
post-interim government (Amer, 1995; Doyle, 2001). As Barma (2006, p. 145)
argues, had UNTAC stood up to the SOC – “had it effectively prized the reins
of administrative apparatus from the SOC and not instead relied on the SOC to
administer the country before the elections were held – it may have prevented
the ... later dominance of the CPP.”
Affecting Levels of Popular Support I further held that a second mech-
anism for why interim governments that integrate the parallel political institu-
tions of warring parties increase the stability of post-interim peace is that such
interim governments increase costs of defection by affecting the levels of popu-
lar support parties need to remobilize (cf. Figure 3.3). In order to raise their
expected capability to prevail in war, warring parties need to maintain support
from the civilian population (e.g. because voluntary conscription is cheaper
than forced conscription). They can acquire such support by providing pub-
lic services through parallel administration. Consequently, as long as warring
parties can prove that they can deliver public services more effectively than an
interim government, they also keep significant popular legitimacy which reduces
their costs of remobilizing for war.
Cambodia does not confirm to this causal pattern. There is no evidence
in the case literature that the warring parties sought to increase their popular
legitimacy through the provision of public services. Instead they reigned with
“what appeared to be a deliberate policy of terror” (Human Rights Watch, 1995,
p. 24). While there is very weak observable evidence that parallel authorities of
the various Cambodian factions assisted villagers in the production and distri-
bution of rice during the interim period (but often for the benefit of soldiers, cf.
Pokempner, 1992), the prevailing description of parallel administration through-
out Cambodia’s interim period is that parties controlled the populations living
under their control by establishing systems of fear and forced obedience. For
instance, Hughes (1996, p. 86) concludes that the interim period “left in place
an abusive and secretive administrative structure ... [and] reign of terror of
secret police and military units” of the SOC.
Having said that, one could conclude from this observation that the Cambo-
dian case demonstrates an important theoretical precondition to my argument
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that warring parties even need to prove their legitimacy to a civilian popula-
tion through public service provision. Such argument requires that a civilian
population is also aware of the demands that it can pose to a (parallel) gov-
ernment and administrative structure in the first place, i.e. that civilians have
experience in what public service provision by a legitimate government looks
like. In Cambodia, the “reign of terror” by the warring parties did however not
start during the country’s civil war or during the rule of the interim govern-
ment, but the history of violence against and exploitation of civilians through
government goes back to the brutal rule of the Khmer Rouge between 1975 and
1978 and to the imposed one-party state of the PRK during the 1980s. In that
regard, Cambodia also stands in stark contrast to Angola, where – although
the country was equally ruled by authoritarian and predatory elites since its
independence – UNITA was due to its Maoist ideology in its early days eager to
provide public services to increase its popular legitimacy, and only during the
interim period demonstrated increasingly vicious behavior toward civilians (cf.
Chapter 7). The Cambodian case may thus also demonstrate that the causal
mechanism between interim governments failing to integrate parallel institu-
tions and the absence of post-interim peace is conditional to some extent of a
history of democracy or of strong statehood before the outbreak of war.
Parallel Military Institutions
The integration of parallel military structures through the disarmament and
demobilization of warring parties had been a major issue in Cambodia’s peace
process. Negotiations between the international community and the parties
had long focused on the question of how many of the Cambodian troops on
the ground would be disarmed and demobilized during the interim period and
before the 1993 elections. For instance, an early UN proposal for a road map
to peace foresaw the complete disarmament and demobilization of all parties
before the elections, a plan that was vehemently opposed by the SOC that
feared that the PDK would never follow through with complete demobilization
and consequently threaten the power of the central government (Gray, 1991c).
In the Paris Agreements, the warring parties thus arrived at a compromise
and agreed to disarm and demobilize 70 percent of their forces before the 1993
elections, while the remaining 30 percent were to be cantoned or confined to the
barracks during the electoral process (Doyle, 1995). In specific, the terms of the
accord read that the parties would “undertake a phased and balanced process
of demobilization of at least 70 per cent of their military forces ... prior to the
end of the process of registration for the elections” and to “demobilize all their
remaining forces before or shortly after the elections and, to the extent that full
demobilization is unattainable, to respect and abide by whatever decision the
newly elected government that emerges ... takes.” The agreement furthermore
assigned UNTAC to “supervise the regrouping and relocating of all forces to
specifically designated cantonment areas” and, after the forces had entered the
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cantonments, to “initiate the process of arms control and reduction,” as well as
take “necessary steps regarding the phased process of demobilization” (United
Nations, 1991a).
The Paris Agreements thus never foresaw the complete integration of parallel
military structures into the authority of the interim government in the first place,
and even the partial disarmament and demobilization plan that the parties had
agreed upon in Paris eventually failed. Only on 9 May 1991 – more than six
months into the interim period – UNTAC Lieutenant General John Anderson
announced that the cantonment, disarmament, and demobilization of all parties
would begin on 13 June 1991 and involve 200,000 troops and 250,000 militia
men. The PDK immediately reacted to this announcement and declared that it
would postpone the cantonment, disarmament, and demobilization of its armed
wing NADK until UNTAC had created what the party called the two necessary
preconditions for it to join the demobilization process: Firstly, to ensure the
withdrawal of all Vietnamese forces from Cambodia (which UNTAC said was a
precondition already fulfilled) and secondly, to completely dismantle the SOC’s
parallel structures and transfer all powers to the SNC – which UNTAC was never
supposed to do according to the terms of Paris (Amer, 1995; Doyle, 1995).
On 10 June 1992, the PDK saw that UNTAC would not meet its demands,
and refused to send its troops to the designated cantonment sites. This meant
that the other parties that had started to dismantle their parallel military struc-
tures (and had disarmed almost 55,000 soldiers according to UNTAC estimates)
ceased the process as well (cf. Table 8.2 and Wang, 1996). On 15 November
1992, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali announced that it was no longer
feasible to move forward with the DDR process (United Nations, 1992b). On
30 November, Security Council Resolution 792 confirmed that the 1993 election
would go forward as planned and without completing the demobilization of the
warring parties (United Nations, 1992e).117
The interim government failed to even partially integrate parallel military
structures into the central authority because it neither foresaw any penalties
against non-compliance with the disarmament and demobilization process, nor
did it implement any incentives for following through with such an undertaking.
While some argue the PDK never intended to disarm in the first place and “used
unattainable demands to justify their disengagement from the process” (Ferry,
2014, p. 133), the interim government failed to make such non-compliance ex-
tremely costly, as using force to coerce the PDK into compliance was beyond
UNTAC’s mandate (Croissant, 2008; Wang, 1996; Westendorf, 2015). For in-
stance, because the PDK could use its parallel zones of control to earn money
through timber and gem trade, the international interim government failed to
make conditional foreign aid an attractive monetary alternative for the party
(Brown, 1998; Doyle, 1994).
117This is in stark contrast to, for instance, the case of Mozambique, where a dragging
DDR process meant that elections were continuously postponed until the warring parties had
disarmed and demobilized (Flores and Nooruddin, 2011).
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Table 8.2: Overview of the DDR Process in Cambodia
Faction Forces (1991) Cantoned % Cantoned
SOC 131,000 42,368 32.34
KPNLF 27,800 6,479 23.31
PDK 27,000 0 0.00
FUNCINPEC 17,500 3,445 19.69
TOTAL 203,300 52,252 25.70
Information taken from Wang (1996). The numbers should only be understood as rough
estimates, not least because of the number of “ghost soldiers” in the armies’ ranks (cf. below).
In that regard, the integration of parallel military structures also failed be-
cause combatants were not given incentives to remain in the cantonment sites,
as local conditions and international resources were insufficient in allowing for
a decent livelihood of combatants while awaiting their disarmament and demo-
bilization, similar to the situation in Angola. Neither were the battalions of
UNTAC’s military component adequately staffed and equipped with the neces-
sary material resources to disarm and demobilize the warring parties. UNTAC
had initially “required that all battalions should arrive in Cambodia with 60
days’ self sufficiency without resupply,” but some units “arrived with 850 men
with just rucksacks and rifles” (Wang, 1996, p. 43) – nor were local physical
and logistical conditions anything but disastrous. The international interim
government had, for instance, difficulties in providing adequate shelters, suffi-
cient food, or any medical care for combatants. It also was reluctant to offer
any vocational training or activities, and cantonment sites were lacking fresh
water supply, so that many initially cantoned soldiers left the sites in search
of food or water. This was also because a large part of the costs of the DDR
program – “including expenditures on regrouping, cantonment, disarmament,
and demobilization” – was meant to be borne by the warring parties, “a pol-
icy that overlooked the destitution of these armed groups” (Bartu and Wilford,
2009, p. 2). As one UNTAC General pointed out, “even had [the PDK] agreed
to disarm, we would have had major problems in carrying out the operation
because it had been so badly prepared at the technical and psychological level”
(in Wang, 1996, p. 44).118
Affecting Military Infrastructures In Chapter 3, I held that a first mech-
anism for why interim governments that integrate the parallel military insti-
tutions of warring parties increase the stability of peace is that such interim
118Some also argue that the integration of parallel military structures also failed due to
internal dynamics of the PDK and “disunity” within its ranks (Findlay, 1995, p. 51), although
there is only scant information on this issue. Observers note that “the PDK was not a
monolithic body but was divided on the issue of the peace process from the very beginning”
(Wang, 1996, 46f.). While moderate forces within the party regarded a compliance with
the politics of the interim period – such as joining the SNC and implementing a partial DDR
process before elections – as a way to retain some power in the post-interim period, hard-liners
within the PDK were not interest in such arrangements (cf. Frost, 1992; Kiernan, 1992).
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governments destroy the military infrastructure necessary for remobilization.
Integration through disarmament and demobilization programs, firstly, strip
parties of their means to prevail in combat by collecting and destroying weapon
stocks. Secondly, it weakens hierarchical command structures between rank-
and-file soldiers and military commanders within armed organizations, thus in-
creasing the costs of leaders to remobilize for war (cf. Figure 3.3). In contrast,
following interim governments that fail to disarm and demobilize parties before
the end of their rule, violence in the post-interim period becomes more likely.
Cambodia confirms to this causal pattern. The interim government’s inabil-
ity to retrieve the factions from their means and structures to prevail in combat
stands as one of the main explanations for post-interim violence in the country.
Firstly, the case literature overwhelmingly agrees that the failure of the interim
government to disarm particularly the PDK not only positively contributed to
the party’s own opportunity structure to remobilize against the elected FUNC-
INPEC-CPP government in 1993 by failing to raise the PDK’s costs of defection.
It also exacerbated rather than mitigated commitment problems of the other par-
ties to lay down their weapons (e.g. Doyle, 1995; Findlay, 1995; Peou, 2007).
For instance, Croissant (2008, p. 660) reasons that the failure “to disarm and
demobilize aggravated the security dilemma, particularly for the opposition fac-
tions,” because “[political] and military tensions, and attacks on UNTAC staff,
increased ... [and] led UNTAC to restrict its presence more and more to the
capital city.” Such commitment problems are also highlighted in the remarks of
the warring parties or international observers during the interim period. When
the PDK refused to proceed with disarmament on 10 June 1992, FUNCINPEC’s
Ranariddh the same day told reporters that he would as a consequence also “not
allow his army to be disarmed in light of the Khmer Rouge refusal” (Thayer,
1992a). KPNLF ex-combatants who had already moved to the cantonment sites
also voiced concerns, and one is quoted with: “Everyone wants to come here [to
cantonment] to lay down their weapons. They do not want to fight. But all the
soldiers are worried because not far from here the Khmer Rouge are gathering”
(in Eng, 1992b). As a result, UNTAC even returned some of the weapons to
FUNCINPEC, KPNLF, and the SOC that had previously been collected, be-
cause the factions demanded they retain the right to self-defense against the
PDK (Peou, 1997).
The actions of the various rebel factions equally highlighted their difficul-
ties to commit to disarmament as it became obvious that the PDK would not
follow through with its own commitment. For instance, it was reported that
the factions that had originally agreed to disarm more and more resorted to
cheating in anticipation of the PDK’s non-compliance with the Paris bargain,
and stopped sending their combatants to the cantonment sites but presented
the UN “untrained teenagers with old, often useless weapons, while superior
forces and cashes of weapons remained in the field” (Berdal and Leifer, 1996,
p. 43). Dobbs (1992) describes a KPNLAF cantonment ceremony with:
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“The guerillas brought an array of largely ancient and rusting car-
bines, assault rifles, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenade launch-
ers and mortars ... most of which would probably be more dangerous
to the user than the target. ... Dien Del, a legendary figure in ... the
KPNLAF, voiced concern at the Khmer Rouge attitude and admitted
that his forces were keeping back some of their better equipment and
men for self defense. ‘If UNTAC can protect us 100 percent, we
wouldn’t need soldiers out of cantonment,’ he said.”
Secondly, there is evidence for that hierarchical structures and social bonds
within the warring parties remained intact at the end of the interim period. A
clear goal of the demobilization process in Cambodia was to weaken command
structures within the warring parties and form a unified and integrated national
army by the end of the interim period (Findlay, 1995). But no neutral and
central command structure of an integrated army developed (Croissant, 2008)
and the PDK in particular remained well organized (Frost, 1992): “Remaining
intact [following the interim period, was] virtually all of the important [Khmer
Rouge] political leadership and most of its military command structure. These
include party supremo Pol Pot, his second in command Nuon Chea, chief of the
general staff Ta Mok, and Defense Minister Son Sen” (Thayer, 1996), and all
of them were determined to maintain an intact military infrastructure (Frost,
1992; Richardson and Sainsbury, 2005).
The goal to weaken command structures was not only obstructed by the
unwillingness of the parties to stick to the Paris bargain, but also by the realities
of the disarmament and demobilization process. For instance, all four factions
came to demand a larger number of cantonment sites than originally foreseen,
because combatants wanted to remain within their units and close to their home
villages, so that they could visit their families and help with rice farming (on
agricultural leaves for cantoned combatants, cf. Bartu and Wilford, 2009). Not
only does this highlight the problems of implementing DDR processes in societies
where the line between soldiers and civilians becomes blurred – throughout the
civil war and the interim period, particularly SOC soldiers were organized to
help farmers on the field, meaning that when “they had to leave their village to
enter the cantonment sites ..., the disarmament would disrupt the normal social
and economic life of Cambodia” (Wang, 1996, p. 41). It also meant that at all
stages of the disarmament and demobilization process, units would proceed to
be under the control of their respective commanders at the cantonment sites.119
As Branigin (1993) notes, the PDK leadership would later directly “remobilize
fighters who had returned to peasant farming in Khmer Rouge zones” (cf. also
Burdman, 1993). This continued existence of military infrastructure on the
interim period was thus directly related to conflict in the post-interim period:
119This points to issues pointed out in the wider DDR literature on multiple identities of com-
batants and the role of guns in some societies (Spear, 2002), showing that DDR in Cambodia
was “not simply a military issue, but a social problem as well” (Wang, 1996, p. 75).
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Two “direct consequences of the failed disarmament were the intensification of
NADK’s direct attacks on the UNTAC military and the fighting between the
SOC and the PDK” (Wang, 1996, p. 71).
Affecting Cultures of Violence In Chapter 3, I held that a second mech-
anism for why interim governments that integrate the parallel military institu-
tions increase the stability of peace is that such governments raise the parties’
costs of defection by adding to changing cultures of violence. They do so, be-
cause even if not all weapons are collected and command structures disentangled
at the end of the interim period, a sufficiently advanced DDR process decreases
the social acceptance of violence among ex-combatants, signifies “that the coun-
try is embarking on an era of peace” (United Nations, 2000a) and facilitates
“ex-combatants’ attempts to distance themselves from war-time abuses they
committed or experienced” (Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010, p. 18). This
should raise the costs of elites to remobilize for war. Contrariwise, a missing
DDR process should mean that no such process takes place, so that individuals
are not pushed away from the “war-time mindsets that legitimized violence”
(Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010, p. 10).
Cambodia confirms to this causal pattern. Similar to the situation in An-
gola, the missing integration of parallel military institutions failed to create a
symbolic end to war and made cultures of violence persist throughout the in-
terim period. This contributed to the PDK’s ability to remobilize against the
FUNCINPEC-CPP government following the 1993 elections (cf. Eng, 1992a).
As with Angola, many accounts on Cambodia’s political developments between
the Paris Agreements and the 1993 elections generally stress the militarization
and gun culture of Cambodian society and the belief that political disagreements
should be resolved through the use of violence. For instance, Wang (1996, 74f.)
notes that even had the disarmament process “been a success for the regular
forces of the four factions, weapons control outside of the cantonment sites”
would not have been easy, because the “war-seasoned Cambodians developed
a sort of gun-culture and were very reluctant to give up their weapons,” and
because interviews with both civilians and combatants confirmed that “nobody
thought the elimination of guns was a good idea, regarding them as a symbol
of power and pride” as well as a “necessity under constant ... bandit attack.”
As Poulton (2001, p. 80) later notes, this “gun culture” means that “[wealthy]
industrialists still travel with openly armed bodyguards” or that soldiers carry
“their official weapons when off duty for illegal hunting or to threaten rivals in
karaoke bars,” meaning that if Cambodia was “to obtain long-term peace and
prosperity, the rule of law must replace the rule of the gun.” This also directly
affected the perspective of combatants during the interim period, for instance
one is quoted with
“Speaking of soldiers, there is nothing better than having guns with
us. If a soldier doesn’t have guns, we wouldn’t call him a soldier.
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In the shop, if anybody dares to cough ... we will let them taste it
immediately because guns are used for shooting – it doesn’t matter
where. Without guns, we wouldn’t be able to get pretty girls. So
if guns were eliminated, of what things could I be proud?” (in The
Phnom Penh Post, 1992).
This visualizes the continued existence of wartime identities and cultures
of violence among combatants throughout the rule of the interim government,
decreasing the costs of party leaders to remobilize for war. As noted above, this
situation was also aided by the fact that while UNTAC designated 14 million
USD for vocational programs that would train demobilized combatants to get
a job other than one as soldiers for the warring parties, UNTAC was report-
edly reluctant to actually engage in such programs (Bartu and Wilford, 2009;
Wang, 1996). In this regard, Findlay (1995, p. 114) also notes that UNTAC
did not provide for “the early integration of the military into civilian life and
an early start to vocational training” as originally perceived, because budgetary
restraints caused the UN to concentrate on security in the cantonment sites. Of
the few of the forces that were actually cantoned (cf. Table 8.2), even fewer thus
received literacy and vocational training designed to help demobilized combat-
ants to find employment (or read the electoral ballot), and this training came
relatively late in the interim period (Chopra, 1994).
8.2.4 Participation of Unarmed Actors
My final hypothesis in Chapter 3 reasoned that in the presence of commitment
problems, more advanced opportunities for the participation of unarmed actors
in interim governments come with a higher stability of post-interim peace. This
is because they enable the warring parties to send costly signals of their true
intentions to each other that create domestic audience costs, which in turn
punish them if they renege on their peaceful bargain (cf. Figure 3.3 on page
34). In contrast, when interim governments fail to create domestic audience
costs that punish parties who renege on previously struck peaceful bargains,
post-interim violence becomes more likely (cf. Fearon, 1994).
Cambodia does not confirm to this causal pattern. Even though there ex-
ists a positive correlation between the independent and dependent variables –
i.e. no unarmed actors participated in interim decision-making between 1991
and 1993, and post-interim violence persisted – no causal relationship can be
detected. Instead, and similar to the case of Angola, the weaker-growing PDK
rather expressed feeling threatened by the idea of opening up interim decision-
making to broader domestic audiences. The missing participation of civil society
and political parties without a history of armed insurgency is at least partly ex-
plained by the fact that Cambodia’s history of war and non-democratic rule
had never allowed for the organization of viable, strong, and independent civil
society organizations or opposition parties in the first place. “Historically, Cam-
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bodia has not been characterized by a strong tradition of civic engagement,” its
social fabric was long “based on informal organizations such as pagoda ... com-
mittees, and social interaction [was] deeply embedded in kinship and patronage
networks” (Dosch, 2012, p. 1071). This situation was further negatively af-
fected by the PDK’s rise to power in 1975, whose “wicked leaders destroyed
the country’s state, political, and civil society institutions,” which were only
marginally rebuilt during the subsequent rule of the PRK that yet had little
time or interest to institutionalize a critical civil society or political opposition
(Peou, 2007, p. 137). For instance, in rebuilding civil society after the Khmer
Rouge regime, the PRK particularly focused on the revival of Buddhism but
at the same time ensured that Buddhist leaders remained politicized and sup-
portive of the Vietnamese satellite regime, so that the latter could rule virtually
unchecked (Hughes, 1996; Human Rights Watch, 2015a).
The Paris Agreement did not foresee any participation of civil society or
political parties in interim rule, and no such participation was thus implemented
during the interim period. As Becker (1998, p. 512) notes, the “only Cambodians
brought to the negotiating table and given legitimacy were those with guns,”
reflecting a belief in the international community that if the war had to end, the
“armies had to be bought off with a seat at the table” while it was unnecessary
to include the wider population in the interim institutions.
During the rule of the interim government, one of UNTAC’s premises was to
strengthen civil society. It has been said that there was significant progress in
the reemergence of alternative voices to the warring parties, which was inter alia
“reflected in the establishment and expansion of political parties, the media, ...
professional and religious associations, trade unions, academic institutes, think-
tanks, and human rights groups” (Downie and Kingsbury, 2001, 44ff.). For in-
stance, the first of hundreds of new local Cambodian civil society organizations
were founded in 1991 with the help of the international interim government
(Dosch, 2012), and “traditional Buddhist organizations began to reestablish
their role as spiritual guides and community organizers in the countryside” in
1991 and 1992 (Doyle, 2001, p. 106). And on 13 May 1992, a Buddhist peace
march – that had begun in a refugee camp along the Thai-Cambodian border
– arrived in Phnom Penh to strengthen popular confidence in the peace pro-
cess and the upcoming elections, something that would have been a “political
impossibility” before the signing of the peace agreement (AFP, 1992f).
As a result, civil society increasingly demanded a higher level of participation
in the affairs of the interim government. For instance, shortly after Khieu
Samphan had been driven out of the capital in November 1992, Cambodians
took the streets of Phnom Penh in large numbers to demonstrate against a return
of the PDK to the capital and to demand that their voices are heard by the
SOC and SNC. But instead of addressing the concerns of protesters and making
room for their participation in Cambodia’s interim politics, the SOC police fired
into the crowds, thereby killed several protestors, and passed legislation on 27
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December 1991 that would restrict any further demonstrations.120 As The New
York Times (1991) argued on 25 December 1991,
“Inclusiveness, the world was told only two months ago, was the key
to peace in Cambodia... [but not] much attention was paid to includ-
ing independent representatives of the Cambodian public. After all,
how could there be any robust independent thinking? During two ter-
rifying decades of war, genocide and foreign occupation, Cambodians
had focused their energies solely on physical and cultural survival.
Or so it seemed. But no sooner did an initial UN team arrive in
Phnom Penh ... than Cambodians took the streets by the thousands,
... demanding a greater role in their own political future.”
In sum, the interim government thus did not include any ad hoc or in-
stitutionalized forms of participation for unarmed actors without a history of
armed insurgency. Such participation theoretically could have involved “supple-
menting the Supreme National Council with other bodies, such as one for civil
society” that would have included “Buddhist monks, nongovernmental organi-
zations, and other representatives of society outside the state” to “participate
in the decision-making process, at a minimum through formally recognized con-
sultative channels” (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, p. 311). There is however no
detectable causal link between this lack of participation and the absence of post-
interim peace. This is also because the warring parties itself did not regard such
participation as a costly signal but as an existential threat to their own role in
Cambodian politics.
Firstly, the weaker-growing PDK strongly objected to the participation of
civil society or political parties, because it perceived the “dispersion of the
Khmer Rouge vote resulting from the emergence of new political parties” as a
serious threat to its own political survival (Azimi, 1995, p. 83). As a result,
and just like the other warring parties, the PDK continuously obstructed even
the slightest development of civil society or political party institutions through
intimidation and violence in its zones of political and territorial control (Hughes,
1996). Secondly, also the stronger-growing SOC/CPP rejected the participation
of civil society and political parties during interim decision-making because it
similarly regarded such participation as a threat to its own rule. Downie and
Kingsbury (2001, p. 54) thereby highlights the role of democratic history in this
regard, noting that as “Cambodia did not have a history of legitimate political
opposition within a democratic context, ... without sufficient exposure to such a
context, the SOC/CPP did not know how to act and react to opposition parties
in the 1993 elections,” saw “opposition parties as the enemy, and reacted as
120The restrictive policies towards civil society also meant that political party and civil society
building came to a halt as soon as UNTAC had left in the post-interim period. For instance,
except for those parties that had developed out of the armed groups of the civil war, “virtually
all the political parties that contested the 1993 elections folded or went into hibernation” in
the post-interim period (Downie and Kingsbury, 2001, p. 52).
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they had for the previous thirteen years, by persuading them to defect, by
using propaganda, or by resorting to violence.”121 As a result, while more
than 20 political parties ended up contesting in the 1993 elections, only the
warring parties truly “mattered” and none of them brought new elites to power.
Instead, each of the warring parties was led by “officials of former governments
that brought Cambodia corruption, bungling and often violent repression,” had
“taken its turn in ruining Cambodia,” and when in power, “tried by one means
or another to wipe out the opposition” (Eng, 1993).
Similar to Angola (cf. Chapter 7), this discussion sheds light on a coun-
terfactual causal mechanism from the one proposed in Chapter 3, that would
indicate that an the unfamiliarity with the participation of unarmed actors in
decision-making turns such participation into a threat, rather than a mitigation
of commitment problems through domestic audience costs. That means in cases
without a history of armed insurgency, the participation of unarmed actors in
interim decision-making may even reinforce commitment problems and motivate
a weaker-growing party to return to arms before it is “outperformed” by new
political parties. I address this further in Chapter 9.
8.3 Chapter Summary
This chapter discussed the question to what extent the absence of post-interim
peace in Cambodia can be attributed to properties of interim government failing
to mitigate the warring parties’ commitment problems. Overall, the chapter has
shown that some limitations with regard to the bargaining theory framework
exist. For instance, the multi- rather than two-player nature of the Cambodian
conflict may have added to perceived threats of marginalization and thus to the
belligerency of the PDK. Nevertheless, the chapter has also shown that among
the main reasons for why the Cambodian interim government was unable to
bring about durable peace is that the bargain struck in the Paris Agreements
“had not even foreseen the possibility of non-compliance” of the warring parties
– that is, the possibility of their defection from the deal (Wang, 1996, p. 83). Had
the interim government been awarded from the start with clearer “definitions
of [such] non-compliance” and of mechanisms that penalize it, it “would have
been in a much stronger position to handle or even preempt the problem” of
defection and alleviate any existing commitment problems (ibid.). Concerning
my independent variables, the chapter in that regard yields several interesting
conclusions.
Hypothesis H1 argued that power-sharing interim government increases the
121This was also because while Cambodians voted in a number of elections, the 1993 elections
were the first that even allowed more than one political party to participate. In 1955, 1958,
1962, and 1966, Sihanouk’s Sangkum movement was the only party allowed to participate in
the elections; in 1972, Lon Nol’s Social Republican Party won all seats, in 1976, only FUNK
participated and drove home a complete victory, and in 1981, the PRPK won every available
seat “in a legislative election, which only it was allowed to contest” (Chambers, 2015, p. 186).
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Table 8.3: Summary of Evidence: Case Study Cambodia
Hypothesis Result
H1: Power-sharing interim govern-
ment, as opposed to any other in-
terim government, increases the sta-
bility of post-interim peace.
Not supported. Power-sharing rule
failed to advance the physical, eco-
nomic, or political security of parties,
also because high degrees of interna-
tional authority and the continued
existence of parallel institutions im-
peded the causal mechanisms.
H2: International interim govern-
ment, as opposed to any other in-
terim government, increases the sta-
bility of post-interim peace.
Not supported. The terminality
and perceived bias of UNTAC in-
creased, rather than mitigated the
parties’ commitment problems, and
thus UNTAC failed to include any
substantive physical deterrence.
H3: The more advanced the pro-
cess of integrating parallel political
and military institutions into the au-
thority of an interim government, the
higher the stability of peace.
Supported. The causal mechanisms
on military infrastructure, war-time
mindsets, and parallel financing re-
main the most convincing. No ev-
idence exists for the mechanism on
popular legitimacy.
H4: The more advanced the oppor-
tunities of participation for unarmed
actors in interim governments, the
higher the stability of peace.
Not supported. The variables cor-
relate in the expected way, but there
is no causal evidence. A lack of
democratic experience turned the hy-
pothetical participation of unarmed
actors into a threat, rather than mit-
igating commitment problems.
stability of post-interim peace; while revolutionary or caretaker interim govern-
ments should exacerbate commitment problems of warring parties. The Cam-
bodian case study does not provide empirical support for this hypothesis. The
power-sharing SNC that convened for the interim period failed to have an impact
on the behavior of the warring parties for at least two reasons. Firstly, although
there is some evidence that the warring parties attempted to use their participa-
tion in the SNC to decrease future uncertainty over their political survival in the
post-interim period, they were prohibited from doing so by the strong interna-
tional interim authority exercised by UNTAC. The parties’ attempts to increase
their political security included efforts to change electoral legislation to bolster
the rebels’ position vis-á-vis the SOC in the post-interim Constituent Assembly
(Amer, 1994), as well the resort to racist rhetoric against ethnic Vietnamese
during SNC negotiations over electoral legislation as a strategy to attract vot-
ers (Hughes, 2002). Secondly, the power-sharing SNC also failed to impact the
behavior of the warring parties because the continued existence of parallel po-
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litical institutions provided the parties with alternative sources of physical and
economic security.
Hypothesis H2 argued that international interim government, as opposed to
any other interim government, increases the stability of post-interim peace. The
Cambodian case does not provide support for this hypothesis. The international
interim authority exercised by UNTAC failed to have a substantive impact on
the behavior of the warring parties due to at least two reasons. Firstly, UNTAC’s
late deployment and early departure failed to raise any costs of defection from
the terms of the Paris Agreements, because the parties were aware that any
hypothetical physical deterrence by UNTAC would disappear with the end of
the mission’s mandate. Thereby, the Cambodian case study highlights the issue
of temporality in interim institutional designs that I discussed in Chapter 3.
Secondly, UNTAC also failed to impact the behavior of the warring parties
because the latter did not perceive the mission as a neutral political authority
(Peou, 2002). Rather than mitigating commitment problems, UNTAC’s policy
influence thus likely contributed to the PDK’s perception of its marginalization
and isolation during the interim period.
Hypothesis H3 argued that more advanced processes of integrating parallel
political and military institutions into the authority of an interim government
come with a higher stability of peace, while a lack of such integration should
exacerbate commitment problems. This hypothesis is supported for Cambodia,
and a lack of integration affected the behavior of the warring parties by two
means. Firstly, the failure to integrate parallel political institutions during the
interim period enabled all warring parties to pursue parallel systems of financ-
ing their violent campaigns, such as through corruption, extortion, taxation, or
forced labor and recruitment. The PDK in particular used its parallel adminis-
tration of territory along the Cambodian-Thai border, as well as its control over
refugee camps, for forced conscription as well as to implement a parallel trade
and taxation system for natural resources. This decreased its costs of defection
by allowing it to fund further combat as well as to increase its military force.
Secondly, the failure to integrate the PDK’s parallel military institutions meant
that the rebel group had full access to weapons, an intact system of hierarchical
command structures, as well as an established military culture at the end of
the interim period. This not only decreased the PDK’s costs of defection and
remobilization, but it also exacerbated commitment problems of the other war-
ring parties that, seeing the PDK not being penalized for its breaking with the
bargain of Paris, also began rearming.
Finally, Hypothesis H4 argued that more advanced opportunities for the
participation of unarmed actors in interim decision-making come with a higher
stability of peace, while a lack of participation should exacerbate commitment
problems. Even though a lack of participation opportunities for unarmed actors
positively correlates with an absence of post-interim peace in Cambodia, I find
no causal support for my argument. This is because instead of perceiving a
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(hypothetical) participation of unarmed actors as a costly signal, the PDK in
particular was said to have perceived such participation as a threat to its own
long-term political survival and a dispersion of its vote (Azimi, 1995). As for
the Angolan case, I hypothesized based on this observation that the effect of the
participation variable may be conditional on whether or not a country has a his-
tory of democratic rule: in countries lacking democratic experience, the creation
of domestic audiences through the participation of unarmed actors in interim
rule becomes a threat, rather than a mitigation of commitment problems, to
which warring parties do not know how to react (cf. Downie and Kingsbury,




The previous chapters on interim government in Nepal, Angola, and Cam-
bodia have highlighted both similarities and differences in how properties of
interim government mitigated, failed to mitigate, or even exacerbated com-
mitment problems of warring parties; and how such properties by that means
influenced the stability of post-interim peace. This chapter complements these
within-case analyses by discussing my results in a comparative perspective. The
aim of this comparison is to understand how properties of interim government
link to peace by drawing on inferences that move beyond the within-case level.
The chapter thereby offers me the opportunity to perform four tasks in particu-
lar. Firstly, this chapter allows me to reflect on conceptual and methodological
fallacies with regard to my dependent variable that the within-case analyses dis-
closed. Hence, section 9.1 briefly discusses issues in studying post-interim peace
in a mixed-method research design. Secondly, this chapter offers me the oppor-
tunity to stipulate which properties of interim government and combination of
properties are most closely linked through what mechanisms to the outcome of
interest. Thus, section 9.2 discusses comparatively how interim governments in-
fluenced the warring parties’ future uncertainties, costs of defection, or audience
costs in the three cases. Thirdly, and building on Lieberman (2005) who sug-
gests that case studies in mixed-method research designs are fruitful approaches
to discover new variables or variable interactions, this section also fits several
additional regression models to study interaction effects that my within-case
analyses suggested. It also discusses alternative explanations and mechanisms
that affected the outcome in the three cases. Finally, the chapter elaborates on
limitations of the bargaining theory argument that the case studies disclosed.
9.1 The Quality of Post-Interim Peace
Throughout this dissertation, I have repeatedly attended to the theoretical con-
ceptualization and empirical measurement of various variables that are relevant
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to explain the link between interim governments and peace. I have also ad-
dressed the issue of construct validity with regard to the independent and control
variables in my statistical models. This refers to the issue of how well statistical
indicators capture underlying theoretical concepts (cf. Chapter 5, Shadish et al.,
2002). Before I thus turn to systematically comparing the extent to which each
property of interim government has contributed to the outcome in the three
case studies, let me briefly discuss the issue of concept validity with regard to
the measurement of my dependent variable, the stability of post-interim peace.
Recall that I defined peace in Chapter 1 following a negative tradition, and
that I operationalized the concept in Chapter 4 as the absence of more than
25 battle-related deaths resulting from intrastate conflict per calendar year.
I have explained in that regard that while such conceptualization and opera-
tionalization has in the past faced critique from qualitative scholarship, issues
of conceptual clarity and the specification of causal pathways make it a common
and accepted measurement in quantitative research (cf. Gerring, 1999).
Having said that, from the perspective of this dissertation it is vital not to
ignore that existing studies have frequently pointed out that while direct battle
between two warring parties may not recur in all post-conflict societies, many
of such societies still experience other types of violence, such as violent crime
or gender-based, domestic violence (cf. Kurtenbach and Wulf, 2012; Manjoo
and McRaith, 2011). Calling these societies “peaceful” not only means using a
flawed terminology, because the actual quality of peace for the everyday life of
civilians is very low. In addition, this simplification can mask that while warring
parties do not have the desire or opportunity to return to war – for instance
because their costs of defection are too high – other types of violence may be
directly linked to their past and present interests or behavior, both during a
war and during the rule of interim governments.122
This becomes visible with regard to Nepal’s post-interim period. I treated
Nepal as a “success” case of my qualitative research design where stable peace
persisted throughout the post-interim period according to my operationalization
(cf. Chapter 5). I demonstrated in Chapter 6 how the interim government in
Nepal substantively contributed to the end of intrastate armed conflict between
the CPN (M) and government security forces through a mix of decreasing the
Maoists’ future uncertainty and increasing their costs of defection. By that
matter, the quality of life of Nepal’s citizens in the post-interim period was
substantially different from that of citizens in Angola and Cambodia, where
armed conflict re-escalated after relatively peaceful elections had been held.
Having said that, this does not mean that politics in Nepal since the 2006
122For instance, domestic violence is often on the rise only after civil war has ended, not
least because combatants that are accustomed to the resolution of conflict through the use of
force are returning home to their families, or because alcoholism among severely traumatized
men remains widespread. Similarly, while warring parties may not have the resources to
remobilize for war, some may make use of criminal activities with the specific political interest
to destabilize a newly elected post-war or post-interim government (Westendorf, 2015).
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peace agreement have been marked by a complete absence of any type of vi-
olence; and such violence was related to the rule of the interim government
and the behavior of the former warring parties. In 2007, after it became obvi-
ous that the Interim Constitution promulgated by the CPN (M) and the SPA
would not fully address the demands of Madhesis – such as their request to delin-
eate federal provinces according to identity and create an autonomous Madhesh
province – clashes between armed Madhesi activists and Maoist cadres resulted
in at least 30 deaths. This was also because the Maoists had during the People’s
War recruited many Madhesis into their ranks with the promise of fighting for
identity-based federalism (International Crisis Group, 2016). The violence that
ensued has been classified as a non-state conflict (cf. Uppsala Conflict Data
Program, 2015b). In 2015, polarization over the new constitutions – again over
provisions for federalism – resulted in clashes between unarmed Madhesis and
Nepal security forces that killed over 50 individuals (cf. Human Rights Watch,
2015b). Again, many protesters have named as their grievance that the peace
process has further marginalized the already marginalized Madhesis. This is
because it has since the interim period ensured the continued dominance of the
traditionally ruling elites, and the political survival of the leaders of the former
warring parties (Strasheim and Bogati, 2016).
Two conclusions can be drawn from this example. Firstly, from a policy
perspective, this discussion links to the question of what actually constitutes
as a success or failure in peace processes (cf. Campbell, 2007). This is not
limited to the case of Nepal, as it can be argued that there are also some
drawbacks with regard to calling Angola and Cambodia complete “failures”
of interim rule. Even though armed combat between the warring parties re-
escalated in both countries, it should not be ignored that the 16 months between
the signing of the Bicesse Agreement and the 1992 elections have been described
as “the most spectacular period of optimism and freedom that Angola had ever
witnessed” (Birmingham, 2015, p. 109). In the same vein, it has been argued
that the picture of the Cambodian interim government is also “far from all
bad” (Doyle, 1995, p. 32). After all, Cambodians were for the first time in
history truly independent, received the chance to vote in their first free and
fair elections, and repatriated a large number of refugees (ibid.). Both interim
governments thus managed to at least temporally improve the lives of citizens
in each country.123 In that regard, this discussion underpins the argument that
the traditional emphasis of defining successful peace processes through positive
and negative notions of peace may be too limited (cf. Westendorf, 2015).
Secondly, and within empirical peace and conflict research, the discussion
on other types of violence in Nepal’s post-interim period helps to demonstrate
that those properties of interim government that mitigate commitment prob-
123Although given Cambodia’s history of “bloodthirsty dictatorship and civil war,” some
have pointed out that the bar for what constitutes as success and improvement was extremely
low, and it has been said Cambodians also accept Hun Sen’s authoritarianism and corruption
“because strongman rule is a lesser evil than mass murder” (McCargo, 2005, p. 106).
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lems between warring parties previously engaged in intrastate conflict can at
the same time be still linked to risks of other types of violence. One could,
for instance, argue more generally that if power-sharing interim governments
mitigate commitment problems by ensuring the long-term political survival of
warring parties, such deals can at the same time lead to situations in which
groups left outside an agreement feel sufficiently marginalized and threatened
in their survival, and thus turn to violence to make their grievances heard.
Although it is outside the scope of this dissertation to at length explore all
precise causal mechanisms that connect properties of interim governments to all
other types of violence in the post-interim period, Table A.11 in Appendix A
offers some preliminary statistical evidence of this issue. In Table A.11, I esti-
mate four additional Cox PH models to complement my analysis of Chapter 4.
These additional models explore the link between properties of interim govern-
ment and hazards of one-sided violence (Model 1 and 2) and non-state conflict
(Model 3 and 4) in the post-interim period. The sampling strategy and coding
rules for all independent and control variables as outlined in Chapter 4 apply.
However, I now understand peace in Model 1 and 2 as the number of days peace
lasts until an episode of one-sided violence occurs in the post-interim period.
One sided violence is defined as the use of armed force by a government or rebel
group against civilians that results in at least 25 deaths per calendar year (data
from the UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset v. 1.4, Eck and Hultman, 2007).
In Model 3 and 4, I operationalize peace as the number of days peace lasts until
an episode of non-state conflict occurs. Non-state conflict is understood as the
use of armed force between two groups neither of which is the government of a
state (data from Sundberg, Eck, et al., 2012).
The results reported in Table A.11 show that properties of interim govern-
ment are generally better predictors of risks of intrastate armed conflict between
two organized warring parties than of one-sided violence or non-state conflict in
the post-interim period. In Table A.11, the coefficients associated with the insti-
tutional designs of power-sharing and international interim government are not
statistically significant. More advanced processes of integrating parallel institu-
tions into the authority of an interim government predict longer peace spells if
understood as the absence of one-sided violence, but the coefficient is no longer
statistically significant when peace is understood as the absence of non-state
conflict. The participation of unarmed actors in interim rule – one of the most
substantive explanations for peace in my main analysis in Chapter 4 – is not
a statistically significant predictor for risks of one-sided violence or non-state
conflict. In sum, these results mean that my inferences on how properties of in-
terim governments impact post-interim peace are limited to one particular type
of violence: the recurrence of intrastate armed conflict between two warring
parties. However, the results at the same time strengthen my theoretical argu-
ment from Chapter 1, in that different types of organized violence are explained
by different predictor variables and follow different causal pathways.
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9.2 Why Interim Governments Matter
I now discuss comparatively the extent to which properties of interim govern-
ment affected the stability of peace in the three cases and via the proposed
causal mechanisms. I begin with elaborating on the role of the institutional de-
signs of power-sharing and international interim government. I then complete
this perspective by comparing the impact of the reform features of integrating
parallel institutions and allowing for the participation of unarmed actors. I also
discuss alternative explanatory variables and mechanisms in this regard. In spe-
cific, I below attend to five of such alternative, case specific explanations within
and outside the bargaining framework: (1) the role of power-sharing interim
governments in increasing costs of defection, rather than decreasing future un-
certainties; (2) the role of local ownership, instead of international authority
during interim rule; (3) the role of civil society participation in decreasing fu-
ture uncertainties for warring parties, rather than creating audience costs; as
well as the effect of (4) democratic history and of (5) natural resources in on
post-interim peace. The section concludes by discussing the limitations of the
bargaining argument that my case studies revealed, and presents first attempts
to address these limitations.
9.2.1 Institutional Designs of Interim Governments
Power-Sharing Interim Government My first hypothesis in Chapter 3
argued that power-sharing interim government, as opposed to any other in-
terim government, increases the stability of post-interim peace. Taken together,
the quantitative and qualitative findings of this dissertation demonstrate that
whether or not warring parties come together in power-sharing rule during the
interim period is not an overly robust predictor of stable peace in the post-
interim period. This is mostly because the effect of power-sharing is highly
conditional on the situations it appears in.
My quantitative analysis in Chapter 4 already demonstrated that the vari-
able measuring the presence of a power-sharing interim government does not
have a statistically significant effect on the outcome. It also showed that this
lack of statistically significant evidence is explained by the fact that power-
sharing is particularly likely to follow the signing of peace agreements. Previous
research has established that peace agreements result in more difficult post-
conflict peace periods, for instance because all parties retain sufficient resources
to attack one another (Licklider, 1995; Walter, 2002). Comparing only cases of
interim governments that followed peace agreements, the variable comes with
the expected negative and statistically significant coefficient.
My three qualitative case studies built on this finding and focused on inves-
tigating the links between properties of interim government and post-interim
peace following the singing of peace agreements. In my case studies, I demon-
strated that power-sharing interim government substantially contributed to
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stable peace in Nepal. At the same time, Angola shows weak empirical evi-
dence that a lack of interim power-sharing exacerbated commitment problems
for UNITA. Interim power-sharing did not help in curbing post-interim armed
conflict in Cambodia. Viewed in comparison, and concerning the explanatory
power of causal mechanisms, my case studies come with three core findings.
The first finding is that the causal mechanism regarding the political security
of warring parties is most convincing one. This mechanism argued that power-
sharing interim government mitigates commitment problems through decreasing
uncertainty for warring parties, by granting them a voice in the design of post-
interim laws and institutions, as well as the knowledge on how to manipulate
such laws to their own advantage. In Nepal, participation in the power-sharing
interim government allowed the CPN (M) to push for changes in the electoral
law after it became concerned about its chances at the polls, and it succeeded in
revising the legislation so that proportional elements were strengthened. Par-
ticipating in the power-sharing interim government also more generally enabled
the Maoists to position and to suggest themselves as future coalition partners
for the other political parties. In Angola, there is some empirical evidence that
the MPLA used its grip onto the caretaker interim government to design elec-
toral legislation that would impede UNITA’s chances in the 1992 vote, thereby
threatening the long-term political survival of the rebels. This is however only a
weak explanation for UNITA’s remobilization, also because the counterfactual
argument remains a hypothetical one: neither UNITA nor the MPLA had been
willing to credibly consider joint rule during the peace negotiations. In Cambo-
dia, there is some evidence that parties attempted to use their participation in
power-sharing to decrease future uncertainty over their political survival, either
through actually altering electoral legislation or through using communication
within the SNC for racist propaganda as a strategy to attract votes. However,
such mechanisms were prohibited by the strong international interim authority
exercised by the UNTAC mission, for instance because UNTAC retained the
final decision over the electoral law.124 In sum, my finding on the role of power-
sharing as a mechanism for political survival supports how previous work has
portrayed its role in peace processes (cf. Manning, 2007), but it opposes studies
that have treated power-sharing predominantly as a mechanism for economic
gain (e.g. Haaß and Ottmann, 2015).
124Can this finding be generalized? If power-sharing interim governments add to peace
in the post-interim period because weaker-growing parties can manipulate future laws to
their advantage; and if the simultaneous assumption of political authority by international
actors prohibits such manipulation, then power-sharing interim governments may have a more
pronounced effect on peace in situations where international actors are absent from the interim
period. I empirically test this proposition by adding an interaction term to my statistical
models. In Table A.10 in Appendix A, Model 1 adds the interaction term power-sharing x
international interim government (lenient operationalization) to my fully specified model from
Chapter 4. Model 2 repeats this exercise with the strict operationalization of international
interim government. Hence, the effect of power-sharing interim government is now interpreted
as the unique effect of power-sharing on the hazard of conflict only when international actors
do not assume any political authority during the interim period. The results in Table A.10
do however not confirm an interaction effect for the whole sample.
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Table 9.1: Overview of Qualitative Evidence
Variable and Mechanism Nepal Angola Cambodia
Power-Sharing IG: Physical Security – – –
Power-Sharing IG: Economic Security ++ – –
Power-Sharing IG: Political Security ++ + –
International IG: Physical Deterrence – – –
International IG: Policy Influence – – –
Parallel Inst.: Financial Resources + ++ ++
Parallel Inst.: Popular Legitimacy – + –
Parallel Inst.: Military Infrastructure – ++ ++
Parallel Inst.: War-time Mindsets ++ ++ ++
Participation: Audience Costs – – –
Note that ++, +, and – indicate strong, weak, and no causal evidence, respectively.
The second and related finding of my case studies is that the mechanism on
how power-sharing increases the economic security of warring parties is highly
conditional on the value of other properties of the interim government. The
mechanism argued that interim power-sharing mitigates commitment problems
through decreasing uncertainty for warring parties, because it rewards them
with the opportunity to loot resources ascribed to power-sharing offices. This
should in turn lower their incentives to acquire economic gain by violent means.
In Nepal, participation in the power-sharing interim government significantly
raised the economic security of CPN (M) leaders. The Maoist elites were re-
ported to have engaged in corruption and the assumption of exactly those luxuri-
ous lifestyles that they had fought against during the People’s War. This added
to stable post-interim peace not least because it turned any weaker-growing po-
sition rebel leaders found themselves in during the post-interim period – such as
when Maoist leader Prachanda lost his parliamentary seat in the 2013 elections
– a very comfortable one. In Angola, however, UNITA secured its economic sur-
vival even though the rebels were not part of any power-sharing deal during the
interim period. One explanation for this situation is that UNITA continued its
parallel political administration of territory throughout the rule of the interim
government. This enabled the rebels to engage in diamond smuggle over the
international borders it controlled. In Cambodia, participation in the power-
sharing SNC became equally irrelevant for decreasing long-term uncertainties
over economic survival for the warring parties, because the parties could secure
such survival through corruption, extortion, resource trade and taxation in their
parallel political institutions. In sum, my finding adds to the broader academic
debate on power-sharing after intrastate armed conflict by highlighting the con-
ditional nature of power-sharing institutions. It further reiterates the results
from my statistical analysis on the conditionality of the power-sharing effect. I
attend to my contributions to this literature further in Chapter 10.
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The third finding of my case studies on the role of power-sharing is that,
rather than only decreasing future uncertainties for the warring parties, power-
sharing interim government can also add to peace by increasing the costs of
defection for parties both inside and outside the deal for joint rule. Nepal demon-
strates this causal mechanism through two aspects. Firstly, power-sharing in-
terim government in Nepal increased the CPN (M)’s cost of defection by weak-
ening the relationship between rebel leaders and ex-combatants. When CPN
(M) leaders began to secure their long-term economic survival by engaging in
corruption and looting of state resources through their control over posts in the
power-sharing government, their actions frustrated and disillusioned CPN (M)
combatants. During the rule of the interim government and thereafter, the gap
between elites and combatants widened, which increased the Maoist elites’ costs
in remobilizing combatants. As one NA general phrased it: “Will they [the ex-
combatants] again go to war to make somebody rich, make somebody Prime
Minister? No” (INT-12, 29.09.2015). I attend to this aspect further below. Sec-
ondly, power-sharing interim government in Nepal also increased the costs of
defection for the one party outside of joint rule: the royal palace. This was be-
cause power-sharing added to the perception of the palace and its traditionally
subordinate army that the country was strongly united in the peace process. In
sum, this finding links to previous research that has argued that by offering rebel
groups a participation in power-sharing, governments can increase the rebels’
costs of remobilization. They do so by weakening rebel leaders’ claims to rank-
and-file soldiers that the government is not acting in their interest (Mukherjee,
2006). At the same time, my finding yet also point to limitations of strictly
adhering to the underlying assumptions of bargaining theory. I attend to such
limitations below.125
International Interim Government My second hypothesis argued that in-
ternational interim government, as opposed to any other interim government,
increases the stability of post-interim peace. Taken together, my quantitative
and qualitative findings show that whether or not international actors assume
political authority during the interim period is also not an overly robust pre-
dictor of stable post-interim peace. My statistical analysis in Chapter 4 already
demonstrated that the variable measuring the presence of an international in-
terim government does not have a statistically significant effect on the outcome
across coding versions or model specifications. I argued that this is likely the re-
sult of a selection effect, in that international interim government is particularly
likely to follow high intensity armed conflicts, as well as conflicts that ended in
peace agreements. Thus, international actors are most likely to assume political
authority in interim governments that appear in difficult cases of peacebuilding.
My case studies again built on this finding and focused on investigating the
125I refrain from discussing the causal mechanism on the physical security of warring parties
here, because none of my case studies showed empirical support for this mechanism.
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links between properties of interim government and post-interim peace in in-
terim governments that followed the singing of peace accords as well as high
intensity civil wars. In my case studies, I demonstrated that contrary to theo-
retical expectations, the lack of international authority during Nepal’s interim
government did not exacerbate commitment problems and was not followed by
internal conflict. I also showed that both in Angola – an international interim
government following the lenient definition of the concept (cf. Chapter 4) – and
in Cambodia – an international interim government following the strict concep-
tualization – international interim authority did not help in curbing post-interim
violence. Overall, and bearing in mind that my cases all followed particularly
difficult starting positions for (international) interim government, the case stud-
ies come with two core findings.
The first finding is that the ability of international interim governments to
raise the warring parties’ costs of defection through physical deterrence is lim-
ited by their late deployment and early departure, amongst other issues.126 For
instance, I found that the expected withdrawal of UNTAC from Cambodia in
the post-interim period already exacerbated the warring parties’ commitment
problems during the interim period. This is also because this expectation con-
tributed to the warring parties’ perception that any hypothetically raised costs
of defection as a result of the international interim government would expire
immediately after the termination of such interim government. The belief was
that “UNTAC was going to leave anyway” and “would not be there forever”
(Carney and Choo, 1993, p. 42). As a result, when the PDK abandoned the
internationally supervised disarmament and demobilization process, it became
rational for the other parties to do the same, knowing that after UNTAC’s with-
drawal they would not be protected against the PDK’s military advances. A
similar situation appeared in Angola. This empirical finding thus supports my
theoretical argument concerning the temporality of interim institutional designs
(cf. Chapter 3). It shows that under the circumstances of pending international
withdrawal in the post-interim period, international interim governments fail to
mitigate commitment problems. In that regard, my finding also links to research
that has advised against the use of elections terminating an interim government
as an “exit strategy” for international actors that want to demonstrate foreign
policy success at home (Caplan, 2005; Chandler, 2000; Reilly, 2015). I attend
to this finding in terms of policy recommendations again in Chapter 10.
The second – and perhaps contradictory – finding is that rather than inter-
national authority in interim governments, it is local ownership during interim
periods that can make a difference for stable post-interim peace. While there is a
lack of a universally accepted definition of what constitutes as local ownership in
peace processes, the concept is usually understood in terms of the relationship
between international and domestic actors, as well as the degree to which the
126Others have, for instance, noted the lack of cultural competences and language skills
as limitations to the impact of international interim governments on societal developments
(Autessere, 2014; Croissant, 2007; Doyle, 1995).
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latter have a voice in designing and implementing reforms in peace processes
(Donais, 2009; Narten, 2008; Reich, 2006). I demonstrated in my case study
on interim government in Nepal that local ownership in interim rule can be
understood as an alternative mechanism to mitigate the warring parties’ com-
mitment problems by two means. Firstly, on the elite level, local ownership can
enable deeper cooperation between elites represented in power-sharing interim
governments, for instance because elites do not become tempted to engage in
nationalist, polarizing rhetoric (cf. Suhrke, 2011). Secondly, on the combatant
level, local ownership can contribute to the perception that disarmament and
demobilization is each combatant’s voluntary “sacrifice” for the peace process,
rather than a forced process implemented by international soldiers. My inter-
view partners in Nepal also pointed out that increased international ownership
of the disarmament process would likely have been perceived as emasculating
and threatening in a society where gun ownership was long regarded as a cen-
tral element of male identity (INT-30, 12.11.2015). While there was no evidence
in my case studies on the Angolan and Cambodian interim governments that
would reiterate these two mechanisms, previous research has pointed out con-
flicting processes in the international community’s attempts to export liberal
peacebuilding models to local contexts in both cases (Pearce, 2010; Richmond
and Franks, 2007).127
9.2.2 Reform Processes in Interim Governments
Integrating Parallel Political Institutions My third hypothesis in Chap-
ter 3 argued that more advanced processes of integrating parallel institutions
into the authority of an interim government come with a higher stability of
peace, while a lack of integration should exacerbate commitment problems. My
quantitative and qualitative results strongly support this hypothesis. Firstly,
they show that integrating the parallel political institutions of warring parties
is a strong predictor of stable peace in the post-interim period. My statistical
analysis in Chapter 4 already demonstrated that the variable measuring the
integration of parallel institutions comes with a substantive, negative, and sta-
tistically significant coefficient across model specifications. Robustness checks
additionally demonstrated that interim governments that integrate parallel po-
litical institutions in particular reduce risks of intrastate armed conflict in the
post-interim period by 54 percent.
My case studies reinforced this finding. I demonstrated that the integration
127As an additional empirical result, I found no support for the policy influence mechanism
in the three case studies. In all cases, the fact that international actors were not perceived
as a neutral authority emerges thereby as the main explanation. In Angola, UNITA claimed
that UNAVEM II was helping the MPLA to win the 1992 elections. In Cambodia, the PDK
claimed that UNTAC was siding with the PRK, and this perception may even have raised
the party’s commitment problems as it felt further isolated in the peace process. And in
Nepal, the parties justified their objection against a deeper international involvement during
the interim period arguing that the political UNMIN operation was not impartial but siding
with the Maoists (United Nations Mission in Nepal, 2010).
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of parallel political institutions is part of the explanation for stable peace in
Nepal. In Angola and Cambodia, the continued existence of parallel political
institutions is directly related to armed conflict in the post-interim period.
Overall, the central finding of my case studies is that the mechanism regard-
ing the financial resources of warring parties, rather than the one concerning
their popular legitimacy, accounts for a causal explanation of peace.128 To recall,
the financial resource mechanism held that interim governments integrating the
parallel political institutions of warring parties increase their costs of defection,
because such governments limit the parties’ ability to finance a continuation
of their violent campaigns. In Nepal, even though Maoist cadres cheated the
integration of People’s Courts and Governments in the early days of the in-
terim period by continuing with parallel taxation and extortion, the Maoists
gradually became dependent on extracting future economic gain through their
participation in state institutions. This also becomes visible by looking at the
growing corruption that the party displayed once it joined mainstream politics.
In Angola and Cambodia, UNITA and the PDK continued their parallel po-
litical administration of substantive portions of the national territory and the
civilian population throughout the interim period. This failed to increase the
rebel groups’ costs of defection and thus made their remobilization for armed
conflict possible in three ways.
Firstly, the parallel political administration of territory throughout the in-
terim period allowed the rebel groups to force the population under their control
into providing labor, as well as other monetary or non-monetary types of sup-
port for their violent campaigns. Secondly, the parallel political administration
allowed the rebels to forcefully conscript the population under their control to
fight in their respective armies. Thirdly, the parallel political administration
allowed the rebels to manage the extraction and sale of natural resources over
the international borders they controlled, including the smuggling of diamonds
(Angola) or timber (Cambodia). Both rebel groups used the money earned from
resource trade to buy arms for their strive. Thus, control over parallel political
institutions belonged to the central explanations for why UNITA or the PDK
could continue their violent campaigns in the post-interim period.
Related to this first finding is that the case studies demonstrated how nat-
ural resources are part of an explanation for the prevalence of armed conflict
in Angola and Cambodia. However, this aspect does not change my results.
Recall that when I discussed my case selection strategy in Chapter 5, natural
resource rents (as percentage of GDP) was one of two variables I could not hold
at constant for the otherwise most similar cases Nepal, Angola, and Cambo-
dia. While Angola’s natural resource rents were at almost 48 percent of the
country’s GDP in the first year of the post-interim period, Nepal’s rents were
128This public legitimacy mechanism failed to contribute to an explanation for post-interim
peace, for instance because interim governments were unable or unwilling to extend their public
service provision into previously rebel held territory (as in Nepal), or because parties did not
need to provide public services for remobilization purposes (as in Angola or Cambodia).
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at approximately 5 percent and Cambodia’s rents at approximately 8 percent.
Natural resources have in the past been identified as an important factor in
explaining the occurrence of civil war (Ross, 2003; Ross, 2004). My case stud-
ies, however, firstly demonstrated that the statistical measurement of natural
resource rents is not a good assessment of the underlying process it aimed to
capture, i.e. how natural resource looting decreases the costs of mobilization
during civil wars (Le Billon, 2001b). This is not least because even though the
Cambodian GDP comprises low levels of resource rents as compared to Angola,
looting and smuggling of timber and gems was central in how the PDK financed
its violent campaign (Le Billon, 2000). My case studies secondly demonstrate
that natural resources also enter the theoretical framework not so much as an
independent variable, but as one step within the causal mechanism connecting
the integration of parallel institutions to post-interim peace. This is because
without the continued parallel administration of territory, parties would have
lacked the ability to manage the extraction and sale of natural resources.
Integrating Parallel Military Institutions My quantitative and qualita-
tive findings furthermore show that whether or not interim governments manage
to integrate the parallel military institutions of warring parties into their au-
thority is a strong predictor of stable post-interim peace. My robustness checks
in Chapter 4 already demonstrated that the variable measuring the integra-
tion of parallel military institutions has a substantive effect on peace: interim
governments that integrate parallel military institutions through disarming and
demobilizing warring parties reduce the risk of armed conflict in the post-interim
period by 94 percent as compared to interim governments that fail to do so. This
also means that after approximately four years into the post-interim period, al-
most thirty percent of interim governments without an integration of parallel
military institutions are at war again, while most of those interim governments
that integrated military institutions remain at peace.
My case studies support this finding. I demonstrated that the integration of
parallel military institutions is a central part of explaining stable peace in Nepal,
while in Angola and Cambodia, the continued existence of parallel military
institutions is directly related to conflict in the post-interim period. Both causal
mechanisms thereby receive support, with some limitations.
My first finding is that the causal mechanism concerning the military in-
frastructure of warring parties is a necessary, but not a sufficient explanation
for peace. Drawing this mechanism, I argued that interim governments that in-
tegrate the parallel military institutions of warring parties into their authority
mitigate the parties’ commitment problems by increasing their costs of defec-
tion. They do so in two ways. Firstly, they strip parties of their means to prevail
in combat by collecting and destroying weapon stocks. Secondly, they weaken
command structures within hierarchical military organizations, making it more
difficult for leaders to remobilize combatants (cf. Themnér, 2011). There was
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no empirical evidence for this mechanism in Nepal, where combatants retained
access to their weapons at all times. Command structures also remained intact
throughout the interim period. I have reasoned that there is instead merit in
considering the counterfactual argument to my initial idea, i.e. that the access
to, rather than the removal of arms and command structures can mitigate fears
for ex-combatants concerning their marginalization and provide them with a
personal safety valve. For some ex-combatants in Nepal, access to mid-level
commanders from during the war provided them with civilian job opportunities
in the post-conflict period, for instance as drivers or interpreters. Particularly
female combatants also benefited from drawing on war-time social networks in
the post-conflict period, as they faced stigmatization for having transgressed
what is considered “adequate” female behavior (Bogati, 2015). In Angola and
Cambodia, on the other hand, continued access to arms as well as lingering
command structures within UNITA and the PDK were among the key expla-
nations for why the parties could remobilize for armed conflict. For UNITA,
this remobilization process even occurred at times directly out of the canton-
ment sites that had been meant to dissolve the military organization. For the
PDK, lingering command structures and the continued parallel administration
of territory meant that the party could directly “remobilize fighters who had
returned to peasant farming in Khmer Rouge zones” (Branigin, 1993).
The second finding is that the causal mechanism regarding war-time mind-
sets within warring parties is part of the explanation of the outcome in all three
cases. This mechanism argued that even if not all weapons are collected or
command structures are destroyed, a sufficiently advanced DDR processes still
raises the costs of defection by lowering the acceptance of violence among ex-
combatants and helping them to envision civilian livelihoods (Schulhofer-Wohl
and Sambanis, 2010). In Nepal, even though the integration of parallel mil-
itary institutions failed to strip combatants of their weapons or to dismantle
command structures, the process still managed to increase the costs of defec-
tion for the CPN (M). This is because it provided ex-combatants with a vision
of alternative professional and private livelihoods, as well as with an improved
legal and living situation in cantonment sites. Specifically, this was achieved
by offering vocational training and schooling programs in the cantonment sites,
by improving the cantonments’ logistical conditions (such as showers, latrines,
or access to medical care), and by giving ex-combatants the opportunity to get
married and start families within cantonment.
This is not to say that DDR in Nepal was a complete success – I mentioned,
for instance, the dragged time frame of the process, and the need of many
combatants to seek employment abroad due to the lack of such employment at
home. It however highlights relative differences particularly in comparison with
Angola and Cambodia. In these latter cases, the failed disarmament process
meant that the majority of combatants did not move away from only being able
to imagine their professional roles as soldiers. For instance, in UNITA zones
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of control, “there was no possibility of imagining an alternative to joining the
army” (Pearce, 2015, p. 118), and years of fighting had “created little more than
an accepted culture of violence” among the Cambodian factions (Pawson, 1999).
This facilitated the remobilization of fighters for the party leaderships. Insuffer-
able living conditions in the cantonment sites also explained why combatants of-
ten left before undergoing the disarmament and demobilization process. In sum,
this is an important finding that underpins previous results on DDR processes
that while it is often not feasible, possible or desirable to collect all weapons and
disintegrate all command structures; sufficiently advanced DDR processes can
still help curbing violence. They can do so by enabling ex-combatants’ access
to “civilian symbols of masculine prestige, such as education, legal income, or
decent housing” early on in the interim period (Theidon, 2009, p. 18).
The Participation of Unarmed Actors My final hypothesis argued that
more advanced opportunities for the participation of unarmed actors in interim
decision-making come with a higher stability of peace, while a lack of participa-
tion should exacerbate commitment problems. Taken together, the quantitative
and qualitative findings of this dissertation have thus far demonstrated mixed
results regarding whether or not this variable is a viable predictor of stable
post-interim peace. In my statistical analysis, the variable was associated with
a robustly negative and statistically significant coefficient. Both the ad hoc
participation of unarmed actors – for instance in national conferences – as well
as their institutionalized participation – through receiving seats in the interim
government – decreased the hazard of armed conflict in the post-interim period
across model specifications. Robustness checks showed that following interim
governments that offer civil society or political parties without a history of
armed insurgency seats in the interim government, armed conflict risks drop
by 92 per cent. Notably, opportunities for participation appear independently
of the context the interim government appears in, and are not predicted – for
instance – by a history of democratic rule (cf. Table 4.9 on page 81).
The participation variable also correlates with the outcome in my case stud-
ies in the expected manner. Nepal’s interim government included both ad hoc
and institutionalized opportunities for the participation of civil society, and
peace lasted in the post-interim period. In Angola and Cambodia, no unarmed
actors were included in interim decision-making, and armed conflict persisted.
I did however not find empirical evidence for the causal pattern I suggested
in Chapter 3. To recall, I argued that interim governments that allow for the
participation of unarmed actors should enable the warring parties to send costly
signals of their true intentions to each other that create domestic audience costs.
This should mitigate commitment problems because such audiences then pun-
ish those warring parties that renege on a peaceful bargain in the post-interim
period (cf. Nilsson, 2012). Evidence from Nepal however suggests that rather
than creating audience costs, the participation of civil society in the interim in-
256
stitutions added to decreasing future uncertainties for the warring parties. This
is because civil society became over the course of the interim period more and
more co-opted by the warring parties and extremely “politically charged” (INT-
20, 09.10.2015), as the warring parties began to use their patronage networks to
“reward their civil society supporters” (International Crisis Group, 2006, p. 21).
This however also meant that all political and economic benefits that were as-
cribed to civil society became political and economic benefits ascribed to the
warring parties instead. For instance, votes of civil society leaders in the interim
parliament for laws and regulations became more votes for the respective war-
ring party they supported, and international funds to civil society organizations
became funds for the warring parties “by proxy” (INT-02, 23.09.2015). While
this aspect does certainly not explain stable post-interim peace in Nepal by it-
self, it added to how the CPN (M) increased its future political and economic
security through participating in the interim government. By that means, my
finding from Nepal still supports the results of my statistical analysis.
Also in Angola and Cambodia, the lack of participation of unarmed actors
correlates with the outcome – armed conflict in the post-interim period – in
the expected way. However, this does not translate into any causal evidence
in these cases. Instead, I demonstrated that rather than perceiving any (hypo-
thetical) participation of unarmed actors in interim rule as a costly signal by
the MPLA or the SOC, UNITA and the PDK felt threatened in their future
political survival by the idea that civil society or political parties without a
history of armed insurgency could participate in interim rule. UNITA leader
Savimbi called the idea of a national conference that would have consulted with
civil society on future laws a “civilian coup d’état” (cf. Malaquias, 2007, p. 161)
and was guided by the belief that such participation would threaten UNITA’s
unique position in Angola as the only viable alternative to the MPLA caretaker
interim government (Pearce, 2015). Similarly, the PDK was argued to have
perceived such participation as a threat to its own long-term political survival,
because it understood the emergence and participation of new political parties
as the “dispersion of the Khmer Rouge vote” (Azimi, 1995, p. 83).
Some have argued, with reference to the situation in Cambodia, that the
perception of participatory mechanisms as a threat, rather than a mitigation of
commitment problems, may be caused by the inexperience of warring parties
in reacting to political pluralism and competition (cf. Downie and Kingsbury,
2001). I have noted in Chapter 7 and 8 that one could generalize from these
observations that the relative effect of the participation variable on hazards of
armed conflict in the post-interim period is different for countries with a his-
tory of democratic rule than for countries without such democratic experience.
To test whether such conditional effect exists for my sample, I introduce an
interaction term participation x history of democracy in Model 3 (lenient opera-
tionalization) and Model 4 (strict operationalization) of Table A.10 in Appendix
A. The interaction term is however not statistically significant. The effect of
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the participation variable on the hazard of armed conflict does also not change
as compared to the models without the interaction effect.
To further validate this result, I additionally ran my original Cox PH models
from Table 4.3 (Chapter 4, page 62) – that do not include any interaction terms
– on a subset of cases that lack any democratic experience. This serves once
more to test whether or not the effect of unarmed actor participation in interim
governments is different when warring parties are inexperienced in democracy. It
is not. Results – not reported in any table – show instead that contrary to what
my case studies of Angola and Cambodia suggested, interim governments that
allow for the participation of unarmed actors in reform processes still decrease
risks of armed conflict in the post-interim period by 78 per cent when they
appear in countries that lack a history of democratic rule.
Figure 9.1 provides a further visual interpretation of the links between par-
ticipatory mechanisms in interim governments, democratic history, and post-
interim peace. The graph shows the predicted survival probability for all possi-
ble value combinations of the participation and the democratic history variables
(cf. Chapter 4 for the specific coding rules). The graph suggests thereby that
interim governments with institutionalized opportunities for the participation of
unarmed actors that convene in countries with a history of democratic rule have
the highest survival probability (Scenario “Participation 2, Democracy 1”). The
case of Nepal, for instance, represents such an interim government. However,
this curve is very similar to the one of interim governments with institutional-
ized opportunities for participation that convene in countries without a history
258
of democratic rule (“Participation 2, Democracy 0”).
In sum, the divergence between my statistical finding and the lack of evi-
dence for my proposed causal mechanism in the qualitative case studies may
thus be due to two reasons. Firstly, the lack of empirical evidence for the sug-
gested audience costs mechanism may simply indicate that this mechanism is
not an adequate portrayal in how civil society and unarmed political parties in-
fluence the success or failure of peace processes after intrastate armed conflict.
This would link to previous theoretical work that finds little empirical evidence
for the audience costs argument (cf. Hegre, 2014). For instance, Downes and
Sechser (2012) call audience costs an “illusion of democratic credibility,” and
Trachtenberg (2012) notes that it is difficult to name a single empirical case
in which audience costs played out as a causal mechanism. It would further
support the empirical literature that has conceptualized civil society partici-
pation in post-conflict countries as a factor that more generally contributes to
the wider legitimacy of the peace process, rather than as one that affects the
behavior or belligerency of the warring parties (cf. my discussion in Chapter
3). Secondly, the divergence between my quantitative and qualitative finding
on the participation variable could also suggest that the statistical indicators
used to measure participation – or those used to measure democratic history –
are invalid predictors of the true underlying theoretical concepts. I discussed
such concerns for the participation variable in Chapter 4. I attend to this issue
with regard to the implications for future research on the topic in Chapter 10.
9.2.3 Limitations of Bargaining Theory
Game-theoretical models – such as the framework that I proposed in Chapter
3 – have been both hailed (Healy, 2016) and criticized (Schmitter, 2009) in
their power to explain complex social phenomena like peace after war. Sev-
eral recent applications of game theory have additionally pointed out the utility
of process-tracing in particular for testing the theory’s underlying assumptions
and proposed strategic interactions (e.g. Goemans and Spaniel, 2013; Kuehn,
2013). In Chapter 7, I have in this regard highlighted how bargaining models
and their focus on commitment problems are a particularly apt theoretical ap-
proach to study the remobilization of UNITA following Angola’s interim period.
In Chapter 6 and 8, I however also noted how the cases Nepal and Cambodia
demonstrate some of the weaknesses of the standard bargaining model of war as
promoted in the wider literature (e.g. Fearon, 1995b; Walter, 2002). Following
previous studies that have pointed out the difficulties in rigorously testing all of
bargaining theory’s assumptions and in overcoming the simplifications of bar-
gaining models (e.g. Driscoll, 2012; Gartzke, 1999; Lake, 2010), my within-case
analyses suggest two key limitations to the utility of the bargaining argument.
Unitary Actor Assumption Firstly, my within-case analyses show the lim-
itation of bargaining theory modeling intrastate armed conflict as a strategic
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interaction between unitary actors, such as between sovereign states, or govern-
ments and rebel groups. Particularly my case study on Nepal’s interim govern-
ment has disclosed how the unitary actor assumption simplifies or masks im-
portant dynamics that help to explain how commitment problems are mitigated
and how interim governments add to peace. As I have explained above, Nepal’s
power-sharing interim government mitigated commitment problems precisely
because it changed intra-party dynamics between CPN (M) elites and combat-
ants. After witnessing that their representatives in the interim government were
only interested in political survival and personal economic gain while neglect-
ing the grievances of combatants, the latter became increasingly frustrated and
disillusioned. This ultimately made the CPN (M) less belligerent and the peace-
ful resolution of Nepal’s conflict easier to achieve, b because such intra-party
dynamics increased the CPN (M)’s costs of defection.129
This observation links to the wider peace and conflict literature that has in
the past adhered to benefits of loosening the unitary actor assumption for the
analysis of armed combat. This aspect has however mostly been discussed in
studies concerned with states in international crises (e.g. Barbieri and Schnei-
der, 1999; Fearon, 1994; Filson and Werner, 2004). For instance, Lake (2010)
has noted that the “much criticized unitary actor assumption” (Barbieri and
Schneider, 1999, p. 388) of bargaining theory is misleading for studying the case
of the 2003 US intervention in Iraq. This is because internal politics within both
the US and Iraq did not only violate the assumption, but also – and contrary
to Nepal – increase the belligerency of the players so that a peaceful resolution
of the interstate armed conflict became more difficult to achieve.
Few studies have thus far investigated how intra-party dynamics affect cred-
ible commitment problems for parties engaged in intrastate conflict. Most of
them have focused on explaining variance in civil war duration and outcome
(Cunningham et al., 2009; Cunningham et al., 2013), or in civilian victimiza-
tion during civil war (Wood, 2014). The insights from Nepal however suggest
that it is also theoretically and empirically fruitful to inspect how intra-party
structures and dynamics affect warring party behavior and decision-making also
after the formal termination of a civil war. A thorough empirical test of this
argument would certainly require a dyadic data structure, instead of an em-
pirical model that assesses the presence of armed conflict on the country or
conflict level, as in this dissertation (cf. Chapter 4). However, I can approach
this argument to some degree by adding an additional control variable to my
Cox PH models that assesses the concept of rebel group cohesion in order to see
whether interim governments following conflicts with less cohesive rebel groups
are linked to longer peace spells.130 Results reported in Model 4 of Table A.12
129Even though evidence is much weaker, some selected sources also report on intra-party
splits within the PDK (Findlay, 1995; Thayer, 1996) and UNITA (Brittain, 1998).
130To capture this variable, I use the centcontrol measure from Cunningham et al. (2013)
and create a binary indicator that assesses whether or not at least one rebel group engaged in
the intrastate armed conflict with the government had a central command structure.
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(Appendix A) suggest as much and offer initial support of the evidence from
Nepal, as indicated by the positive and statistically significant  coefficient.
This indicates that interim governments following conflicts with cohesive rebel
groups face a higher risk of conflict recurrence in the post-interim period, for
instance because such rebel groups find it easier to remobilize. Because this
broad measure can yet only be understood as an approximation of the underly-
ing concept of intra-party dynamics in peace processes, further research on the
topic is required (cf. Chapter 10).
Two Player Games Secondly, my within-case analyses highlighted the limi-
tations of bargaining theory that models intrastate armed conflict as two player
games. This simplification fails to adequately portray the situation in Nepal or
Cambodia, where multiple players were involved in the respective civil wars and
subsequent interim periods. This includes three rebel groups against one gov-
ernment in Cambodia, and one rebel group against a fragmented government
comprised of the royal palace (backed by the army) and several political parties
(in control of the police force) in Nepal.
I have argued that this simplification may overlook key sub-mechanisms in
the suggested causal patterns of how interim governments contribute (or fail
to contribute) to peace after war. In order to understand why peace lasted
in Nepal, I illustrated in Chapter 6 the benefit of analyzing how the power-
sharing interim government mitigated not only commitment problems of the
parties participating in joint rule through decreasing their future uncertainty.
I also showed that joint rule between the CPN (M) and the SPA furthermore
increased the costs of defection from the peace process for the party outside of
the deal: the royal palace (cf. above). In Chapter 8, I then discussed that while
the PDK entered the loose CGDK coalition with the two other rebel groups
during the civil war against the PRK regime; FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF
arguably moved closer to Hun Sen’s government with the signing of the 1991
Paris Agreements and during the rule of the power-sharing SNC. For instance,
all parties but the PDK came to agree on holding elections in order to determine
a legitimate post-interim government. It is feasible to imagine that this political
isolation of the PDK may have exacerbated the party’s perception of becoming
marginalized in the peace process and thereby added to its difficulties to commit
to a peaceful solution to the conflict (cf. Cunningham, 2011).
In that regard, my findings link to past research on multiple rebel groups
in war and peace that have demonstrated the difficulties in buying off several
warring parties at once to establish durable peace (Fjelde and Nilsson, 2012;
Nilsson, 2006; Nilsson, 2008). From a bargaining perspective, Lake (2010) has
also previously argued that the analytical simplification of two-player games
overlooks important dynamics in how conflicts become violent, for instance be-
cause multiple actors involved in a bargaining situation hear the same signal,
but interpret it differently (cf. also Driscoll, 2012). I can again test whether
261
or not the number of warring parties engaged in an armed conflict has any ef-
fect on the duration of post-interim peace in my sample. To do so, I add an
additional control variable to my Cox PH models that counts the number of
rebel groups engaged in an armed conflict with a government (data taken from
Gleditsch, Wallensteen, et al., 2002; Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015). The
variable ranges from one rebel group (such as in Nepal) to eight rebel groups
(Afghanistan). Results reported in Model 3 of Table A.12 (Appendix A) do how-





Interim governments remain common institutional features in many war-torn
societies. The recent interim governments in Ukraine and South Sudan, as well
as the negotiations for a prospective interim government in Syria are cases in
point. In the academic community, it is widely accepted that these short-term
institutions have substantial effects on long-term political developments in the
societies they rule (e.g. Donini, 2007; Manning, 2007; Rothchild, 2007; Shain
and Berat, 1995). However, and despite their real-world significance, a number
of theoretical, empirical, and methodological shortcomings in previous peace and
conflict research have left us in the dark about why some interim governments
are followed by stable peace in the post-interim period, while others are not.
This dissertation has sought to address these shortcomings by answering the
following research question: After intrastate armed conflict, what properties of
interim governments increase the stability of post-interim peace?
I have argued that peace and conflict research has neglected interim govern-
ments in theoretical frameworks that focus on permanent institutional designs,
as well as in methodological approaches that pool together both institutional
types within one data set. I have also argued that those studies that specifically
focus on the patterns and effects of interim governments overwhelmingly rest
on evidence gathered through under-theorized and non-comparative case stud-
ies. Thus, their findings are difficult to generalize. This literature also tends
to concentrate on studying the institutional designs of interim governments as
explanatory variables, while neglecting the variety of reforms such governments
implement, as well as the modi operandi by which they do so. By this means,
the literature strictly follows the typology of interim governments by Shain and
Linz (1995) and may not recognize all underlying explanatory variables or causal
processes that link interim governments to stable post-interim peace. This is
particularly so, because the Shain and Linz typology was developed within de-
mocratization research and not with a specific focus on situations where interim
governments follow large-scale intrastate armed conflict.
I began to address these shortcomings by incorporating existing research
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on interim governments into a standard bargaining model. This model framed
intrastate conflict as a bargaining failure due to the presence of credible com-
mitment problems. I have then highlighted that it is possible to imagine a
counterargument to the “traditional” approach of the literature that has de-
picted power-sharing and international interim governments as increasing the
stability of peace. This counterargument reasons that this traditional institu-
tional design approach neglects the temporality of such designs – a factor that
may exacerbate, rather than mitigate commitment problems.
Consequently, I have complemented this approach by incorporating two fur-
ther sub-fields of peace and conflict research into my theoretical framework.
Firstly, by borrowing from studies concerned with the role of non-state actors,
I have argued that as long as the parallel war-time institutions of warring par-
ties persist throughout an interim period, parties retain the financial resources,
popular legitimacy, military infrastructure, and war-time mindsets to remobi-
lize in the post-interim period. Interim governments that implement reforms to
integrate such parallel institutions should thus increase the stability of peace.
Secondly, by borrowing from studies concerned with the role of unarmed actors,
I have argued that as long as interim governments fail to create domestic audi-
ence costs that punish warring parties reneging on a peaceful bargain, violence
also becomes more likely. Interim governments that allow for the participation
of unarmed, domestic audiences in reform processes – such as civil society rep-
resentatives or political parties without a history of armed insurgency – should
thus increase the stability of post-interim peace.
I have empirically tested this framework by using a mixed-method research
design that combines statistical survival analysis with process-tracing in and a
comparative analysis of three case studies. In my quantitative analysis, I have
used a novel data set of a sample of all interim governments that followed at
least one year of intrastate armed conflict since 1989, and that terminated by
2012. This temporal constraint allowed me to assess the stability of post-interim
peace for at least two years. My qualitative case studies, selected under a most-
similar system design, included the interim governments of Nepal (2006-2008),
Angola (1991-1992), and Cambodia (1991-1993).
I did not find any statistical support for hypothesis H1 on the peace-conducive
effect of power-sharing interim government. The coefficient was not statistically
significant at conventional levels throughout model specifications. I showed that
this is likely due to a selection effect, as power-sharing interim governments tend
to appear more often following peace agreements, and the latter have been iden-
tified to result in unstable peace after war (Licklider, 1995; Walter, 2002). If
a sub-sample of only those interim governments that were negotiated in peace
agreements is studied, power-sharing arrangements come with the expected neg-
ative effect on the hazard of armed conflict in the post-interim period. Building
on this finding, my case studies compared three interim governments that fol-
lowed peace agreements, in order to tease out the effect that power-sharing deals
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can have in these situations. My main finding from the within- and between-
case analyses was that the most important mechanism in how power-sharing
interim government links to peace is that of political security. This means that
warring parties use their participation in power-sharing interim rule to design or
manipulate laws that decrease any future uncertainty about their survival in the
post-interim period. In interim governments without any power-sharing deals,
the party in control over the interim institutions may pass laws that threaten
the political survival of its adversary. The case studies also demonstrated that
the peace-conducive effect of power-sharing is highly dependent on the situation
it appears in, for instance on whether or not parties can safeguard their survival
through parallel institutions (cf. below).
I found mixed evidence for hypothesis H2 on the role of international interim
government for post-interim peace. In my statistical analysis, the coefficient as-
sociated with the variable was negative throughout model specifications and
coding versions, but its statistical significance was not robust. Again, this is
at least partly the result of selection issues, as international interim govern-
ments tend to appear more frequently after high-intensity civil wars and peace
agreements. Building on this finding, none of my case studies supported the
idea that international interim governments increase the stability of peace. In
that regard, I found support for my theoretical argument that the temporality
of international interim governments is at least part of the explanation for why
they fail to raise the costs of defection for the warring parties. My case study of
Nepal’s interim government additionally suggested that local ownership during
interim rule, rather than international authority, can be an alternative driver
of peace outside the bargaining framework.
I found strong support for hypothesis H3 on the integration of parallel polit-
ical and military institutions into the authority of interim governments. In my
statistical analysis, the variable came with a negative and statistically signifi-
cant coefficient throughout model specifications. Robustness checks additionally
demonstrated that this effect is substantive: Interim governments that integrate
parallel political institutions into their authority – such as rebel governments –
reduce risks of armed conflict in the post-interim period by 54 percent. Interim
governments that integrate parallel military institutions through disarming and
demobilizing the warring parties reduce such risks even by 94 percent as com-
pared to interim governments that fail to do so. My case studies supported this
finding. They also demonstrated that the mechanisms concerning the warring
parties’ financial resources and war-time mindsets are the strongest explana-
tions. This means that interim governments integrating the parallel political
institutions of warring parties reduce risks of future war because they strip par-
ties of their means of financing a violent campaign (such as through parallel
taxation or natural resource trade), and that interim governments integrating
parallel military institutions reduce risks of future war because they help com-
batants to envision alternatives to military careers.
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I found mixed support for hypothesis H4 on how the participation of unarmed
actors in interim government increases the stability of peace. In my statistical
analysis, the variable came with a robustly negative and statistically significant
coefficient. I showed, for instance, that interim governments that offer seats
to civil society or political party representatives reduce armed conflict risks by
92 percent as opposed to interim governments that only comprise the warring
parties. My case studies did not mirror this finding. Although the participation
variable correlated with the outcome in my case studies in the expected manner,
I did not find evidence for the suggested causal pattern on domestic audience
costs. In Nepal, there was instead some evidence that the participation of
civil society decreased future uncertainties for warring parties. In Angola and
Cambodia, the hypothetical participation of unarmed actors was perceived as
a threat, rather than a mitigation of commitment problems by weaker-growing
parties that were inexperienced in competing with a political opposition. I have
hypothesized that, generalizing from these observations, the relative effect of
participation on the hazard of armed conflict could be different in countries with
a history of democratic rule than in countries without such history. Additional
survival models did yet not provide support for an interaction effect.
In sum, and reflecting on how my empirical findings support my theoreti-
cal argument, this dissertation has illuminated three key aspects. Firstly, the
reforms implemented by interim governments provide for a better explanation
for long-term peace as compared to the institutional designs of such govern-
ments. While the peace-conducive effects of power-sharing and international
interim governments remain conditional on the situation these designs appear
in as well as limited by their temporality, whether or not interim governments
integrate the parallel institutions of warring parties raises those parties’ costs
of remobilization in the long run. Secondly, mechanisms regarding the warring
parties’ raised cost of defection provide for a more powerful causal explanation
as compared to any reduced future uncertainties or audience costs. This is in
line with previous findings (cf. Downes and Sechser, 2012; Trachtenberg, 2012).
However, my case study on Nepal also showed that costs of defection and de-
creased uncertainty are mechanisms that can closely interact in how they affect
the behavior of warring parties (cf. also Mattes and Savun, 2009). Thirdly,
Nepal also supported previous studies in showing that it is fruitful to relax the
unitary actor assumption of bargaining theory (cf. Barbieri and Schneider, 1999;
Filson and Werner, 2004). Such reformulation of theory can help expand expla-
nations of how (interim) institutions mitigate commitment problems and avoid
bargaining breakdowns and war. I attend to how future research can address
this aspect further below.
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10.1 Contributions and Limitations
Based on these findings, my dissertation comes with a number of theoretical,
empirical, and methodological contributions – and limitations – that link to
the existing debate on interim governments, as well as to other debates in the
wider peace and conflict literature. In terms of theory, this dissertation has
(1) complemented existing institutional design approaches to studying interim
governments with two additional explanatory variables on reform processes in
such governments, and (2) formulated a bargaining argument that combines all
explanatory variables under one theoretical roof. These are key contributions
to the peace and conflict literature for at least two reasons.
Firstly, with the help of my bargaining framework I could demonstrate that it
is theoretically – and empirically – fruitful to study “static” institutional designs
in combination with more “dynamic” reform processes after war. In the current
literature, these two explanations for peace are often separately dealt with and
hardly integrated in joint theoretical frameworks or empirical research designs.
A good example for this lack of combination and integration is the academic
debate on DDR processes after intrastate armed conflict. Studies on DDR
have in the past remained remarkably disconnected from analyses that focus on
how the design of post-conflict political institutions shapes prospects for long-
term peace. This is also more generally the case for scholarship that analyzes
the statutory and non-statutory security sectors of war-torn states (Ansorg,
Haass, et al., 2013). While the study of post-conflict political institutions as
causes for peace – such as the role of power-sharing governments, post-conflict
democratization, or electoral system designs – is increasingly theory-driven and
methodologically advanced (see, e.g. Hegre and Nygård, 2015; Walter, 2015), the
debate on DDR processes remains overwhelmingly policy-oriented and focuses
on deriving “lessons learned” from a few prominent cases. Another focus in
this debate is to formulate “good practice” guidelines for international actors
engaged in post-conflict peacebuilding, DDR, and Security Sector Reform (SSR)
(e.g. Bryden and Scherrer, 2012; Gamba, 2003; Muggah, 2010). Such studies are
thus able to identity the nuanced and idiosyncratic mechanisms of how DDR
processes successfully contribute to peace after war in single cases, but they
lack the ability to draw generalizable conclusions and also often focus on the
technical aspects of DDR, rather than on the political dynamics and structures
DDR is embedded in.
This dissertation has thus not least demonstrated the value of “bringing
politics back in,” as I studied disarmament and demobilization as part of how
interim governments integrate the parallel institutions of warring parties into
their authority. My case studies have suggested that the peace-conducive effect
of power-sharing governments, for instance, also depends on the availability of
parallel political and military structures to the warring parties. In that way,
this dissertation illuminates both the scholarly discussion on the institutional
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causes for peace after war (Ansorg and Kurtenbach, 2017; Hegre and Nygård,
2015; Strasheim and Fjelde, 2014; Walter, 2015; Wolff, 2011), as well as the
literature on technical reforms in post-conflict societies.
Secondly, this dissertation has also contributed to theory-development in the
peace and conflict literature by discussing the utility of the bargaining frame-
work for the study of war and peace. On a general theoretical level, the disser-
tation has demonstrated that bargaining theory can be a promising approach
to study the role of interim governments after armed conflict. It has thereby
added to the prevalent discussions highlighting that arguments originally devel-
oped for the analysis of interstate wars (in Fearon, 1995b; Powell, 2006) can
be fruitfully applied to study the behavior of governments and rebel groups in
intrastate conflict. The dissertation however also links to a growing number
of recent studies that have adhered to the limitations of bargaining theory in
portraying the empirical reality of violent conflict, as well as to the necessary
modifications that would help link the theory more closely to this reality (cf.
Driscoll, 2012; Hegre, 2014; Lake, 2010). Most importantly, I have demon-
strated that strictly adhering to bargaining theory’s unitary actor assumption
can mask important processes in how interim governments causally connect to
peace. My case study on Nepal has disclosed how power-sharing interim gov-
ernments can mitigate commitment problems by changing intra-party dynamics
between party elites and combatants, increase elites’ costs of remobilization,
and make a party less belligerent. I have proposed the idea that, generalizing
from this observation, less cohesive rebel groups may have a harder time remo-
bilizing in the post-interim period, and I found support for this claim when I
added a measure of rebel group cohesion as an additional control variable to my
regression. My crude empirical test of how the presence of non-unitary actors is
linked to peace after war can however only be seen as an approximation of the
underlying relationship, and more research is needed on this issue (cf. below).
In terms of methodological contributions to the peace and conflict literature,
this dissertation has (1) presented the first statistical data set that specifically
coded information on properties of interim government. By means of building
this data set, I also (2) departed from the typical sampling strategy of previous
studies that have concentrated largely on studying the stability of peace follow-
ing the signing of peace agreements (e.g. Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007; Jarstad,
2010; Joshi and Darby, 2013). Mukherjee (2006) has previously critiqued this
sampling strategy, and I have demonstrated that – with the exception of power-
sharing – the effects of other properties of interim government do not depend
on whether or not warring parties have put their signatures under negotiated
accords. Furthermore, this dissertation has also (3) integrated the statistical
analysis into a mixed-method research design in order to allow for identifying
both generalizable as well as non-generic results in how interim governments
contribute to peace. These are all key contributions to the literature, not least
because they allow me to present first quantitative results concerning variables
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that have in the past predominantly been studied in qualitative research. An
example is the role of integrating the war-time parallel political institutions of
warring parties, our evidence of which is thus far largely based on case study
research (e.g. Barter, 2015; Hoffmann, 2015; Mampilly, 2011).
I have also demonstrated that qualitative case studies are a useful approach
to identify concrete issues of concept validity in statistical research. This has
not only allowed me to contribute to the application of mixed-method research
in the study of peace and conflict (cf. Thaler, 2015). It has also enabled me
to utilize my case studies to more concretely show the limitations of merely
conceptualizing and operationalizing peace as the absence of intrastate armed
conflict, as has become the standard approach in the quantitative literature.
I have demonstrated that this standard approach neglects that other types of
violence may be directly linked to the behavior of warring parties in the interim
government. Using non-state conflict and one-sided violence to operationalize
my dependent variable, I have then verified for my full sample that any inferences
on how properties of interim governments impact post-interim peace are limited
to explaining the recurrence of intrastate armed conflict. However, this at the
same time strengthens my initial theoretical argument that different types of
violence are explained by different variables and follow different causal pathways.
This finding links my dissertation to recent discussion on the quality of peace
and various types of violence in war-torn societies (e.g. Westendorf, 2015).
A limitation with regard to the mixed-method research design concerns the
aspect of unarmed actors participating in interim government. I have summa-
rized above that my statistical and qualitative findings diverge on questions
about whether and how the participation of unarmed actors in interim rule
contributes to stable post-interim peace. While the variable was one of the
most robust explanatory factors for peace in my regression models, this was not
mirrored by my case studies. I have reasoned in Chapters 4 and 9 that one
explanation for the lack of congruence of quantitative and qualitative results
could be that the statistical coding of participation that I presented in this dis-
sertation is an inefficient measure of the underlying concept. I could not solve
the discrepancy in quantitative and qualitative findings in this dissertation, but
I discuss below how this presents avenues for future research.
In terms of empirical contributions to the peace and conflict literature, it is
valuable to highlight that this dissertation has also (1) presented newly collected
qualitative data on Nepal’s peace process. The interview data on the dynamics
of the early days of this peace process is of scholarly use beyond the scope of this
dissertation, not least because it helps to advance our understanding for why
the country continues to be affected by other types of post-conflict violence even
though the warring parties did not remobilize for war (cf. Strasheim and Bogati,
2016). For instance, I have presented a link in Chapter 9 between how warring
party elites consolidated their political power in the long run through their
participation in the interim government and grievances that drove the 2015-2016
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anti-constitution protests, which killed over 50 people. Many protesters stated
that they felt betrayed by the Maoist elites for neglecting the political promises
they had made to minorities once they joined mainstream politics during the
interim period . In that way, and by presenting new empirical evidence for the
case of Nepal, my dissertation also illuminates the literature on the institutional
causes for peace after war that has overwhelmingly studied African cases in the
past (e.g. Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010; Lemarchand, 1994; Lemarchand, 2007;
Mehler, 2009; Tull and Mehler, 2005; Zanker et al., 2015).
Finally, this dissertation has also contributed to the comparative area studies
literature by (2) conducting a cross-regional comparison of the three cases, which
still constitutes – as I have argued in Chapter 5 – “the exception to the rule”
in analyzing polities and politics in the Global South (Basedau and Köllner,
2007, p. 112). For instance, the Angolan peace process in particular has in the
past predominantly been studied in comparison with similar developments in
lusophone Africa, such as Mozambique (e.g. Bekoe, 2005; Pearce, 2010). Thus,
my cross-regional approach has also helped me to ensure that no cultural, area-
specific factors underlie the stability of post-interim peace in my cases.
10.2 Policy Recommendations
My findings also allow me to formulate several concrete policy recommendations
to international actors promoting peace in societies torn apart by armed conflict.
Recall that I have argued in the introductory chapter to this dissertation that
the international community has attributed an impressive amount of global
financial assistance to post-conflict institutional reform in recent years. This
strategy is based on a belief that institutions can be reformed so that they
inspire peaceful inter-group relations. It is also not least guided by the fact that
unlike many other features of war-torn societies that are difficult to influence
from the outside, institutional designs and reforms provide a vital opportunity
to shape desirable outcomes. Interim governments thereby remain a core part
of international peacebuilders’ institutional “toolkit” to promote peace after
violent conflict. The most recent illustration of this is the case of Syria, where
UN-brokered negotiations in early 2016 have attempted to negotiate an interim
government that would guide a transition to peace.
The first implication for policy that my findings suggest is that in planning
and implementing the rule of interim governments following intrastate armed
conflict, international actors should not exclusively focus on the institutional
designs of such governments. They often do so, while neglecting the “wide range
of potential measures” that allow warring parties to “share influence, as well as
balance that influence with mre roles for noncombatants [or] civilian political
actors” (Nixon and Hartzell, 2011, p. 4). For instance, the Syrian peace plan
that was presented on 18 December 2015 in UN Security Council Resolution
2254 included as its two core propositions (1) to set up a power-sharing interim
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government that would draft a new constitution, as well as (2) to invite the
UN to assume authority of administering elections that would terminate such
interim government. In specific, the resolution expressed support for
“... a Syrian-led political process that is facilitated by the United
Nations and, within a target of six months, establishes credible, in-
clusive and non-sectarian governance and sets a schedule and process
for drafting a new constitution, and further expresses its support for
free and fair elections, pursuant to the new constitution, to be held
within 18 months and administered under supervision of the United
Nations” (United Nations, 2015).
The results in this dissertation however suggest that these two institutional
designs of interim governments are not enough to explain why some interim
governments are followed by long-term peace in the post-interim period while
others are not. The results also disclosed that particularly the effect of power-
sharing interim government is highly conditional on the situation it appears
in. Power-sharing should thus not be treated as a general blueprint for inter-
national efforts to promote peace – although it has been in the past (Zanker
et al., 2015).131 As comparing my case studies on interim rule in Nepal and
Cambodia verifies, for power-sharing to contribute to ending violent conflicts, it
is important that the participation in joint rule is also truly a commitment to or
a gain from the peace process. Thus, parties should not have access to parallel
structures to secure their political or economic survival, otherwise power-sharing
can become meaningless. This is a key problem also in the Syrian case, where
the Islamic State is just one of several armed groups that have erected parallel
government structures in the areas under their control (cf. Kalyvas, 2015).
Nor is establishing an international interim government a blueprint for efforts
to promote peace after war. My findings have reiterated what others have
argued before me: The international community’s use of elections as an “exit
strategy” from their engagement in war-torn states entails potential dangers to
peace processes (cf. Chandler, 2000). If warring parties know that any raised
cost of defection resulting from physical deterrence by an international interim
government is going to disappear in the post-interim period, this can exacerbate
rather than mitigate commitment problems. One implication from this result
would advise the more gradual reduction of international personnel in the post-
interim period. Such reduction should thus not be based on the successful
completion of singular events – such as elections – but on more profound changes
in underlying conflict-inducing conditions of war-torn states. For instance, as
Collier (2009, p. 15) has argued, “economic development may be the true ‘exit
strategy’ for international peace-keeping.”
131By no means does this imply that power-sharing arrangements for the interim period are
not important at all. For instance, coming to terms on a power-sharing formula early on in
the course of peace negotiations could make it easier for warring parties to subsequently agree
to disarm and demobilize in exchange for receiving cabinet posts.
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Another vital policy implication that my findings relate to concerns the role
of parallel institutions during interim periods. My findings have particularly
illustrated that whether or not interim governments integrate the parallel mil-
itary institutions of warring parties through disarmament and demobilization
processes is one of the most important explanations for stable peace in the post-
interim period. On the one hand, this means that international actors should
envision to substantially advance a DDR process early on in the interim period in
order to address any lingering military infrastructure parties need to remobilize
for war. This includes the swift setup of cantonment sites, the adequate staffing
of such sites, as well as the early collection and disposal of arms. It also means
that living conditions inside cantonment must not be as insufferable as to make
fully armed and mobilized combatants leave again, such as in search for food.
Beyond the case studies analyzed in this dissertation, previous research has in
that regard pointed to the case of Mozambique as a “best practice” example for
this process (cf. Flores and Nooruddin, 2011). In Mozambique, elections termi-
nating the interim government were delayed several times until combatants of
the RENAMO rebel group were disarmed and demobilized. When RENAMO
lost the 1994 elections against the incumbent FRELIMO party, it had no other
choice than to accept its electoral defeat and a seat in the political opposition.
This is in sharp contrast particularly to the situation in Angola.
On the other hand, it is often not possible or even desirable to completely
strip warring parties of their arms during the interim period, or to disintegrate
their command structures. My case studies have suggested as much and thereby
support previous research on the topic (e.g. Myrttinen, 2003; Spear, 1999; Thei-
don, 2009). For instance, the case of Nepal shows that access to commanders
can help ex-combatants integrate into new civilian communities after the end
of war, or find civilian jobs in the post-conflict period. This means that – in
the same vein as the institutional designs of interim governments – there is no
blueprint of how parallel military institutions should be integrated in the after-
math of armed conflict. Some of my interview partners in Nepal in that regard
mentioned that they felt frustrated when they perceived that UNMIN came with
“lessons learned” from DDR in several African countries, even though those had
not been “clear cut success stories” (INT-12, 29.09.2015).
The good news in this regard is that even if not all weapons are collected by
the end of the interim period, and even if not all hierarchical command struc-
tures between commanders and ex-combatants have disintegrated, adequately
designed DDR processes can still increase the stability of post-interim peace.
They do so by addressing what I called the war-time mindset of ex-combatants,
i.e. how closely combatants still identify with their roles from during the war
(cf. Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010). My findings imply that international
actors engaged in promoting peace after war should ensure that ex-combatants
early on in a peace process can start to envision alternative private and profes-
sional livelihoods as opposed to their military careers. Most notably, this means
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that international actors should implement schooling or vocational training in-
side cantonment.132 From a broader development perspective, this finding yet
also means that international actors should support government programs that
create decent job opportunities for ex-combatants, or offer them legal options
for economic migration. I have cited the phrase “Militia or Malaysia” that re-
spondents in Nepal used to describe the possible job opportunities of Maoist
ex-combatants in that regard. If such opportunities to live a decent civilian life
are lacking, the presence of a pool of unemployed young men trained in the use
of arms can substantively decrease the cost of remobilization for warring party
leaders (cf. Collier, Elliott, et al., 2003).
Another policy recommendation based on my findings is that international
actors should also promote the integration of parallel political institutions into
the authority of an interim government. As Riyad Hijab, a member of the Syrian
opposition, has reasoned with regard to the continued parallel administrations
set up by various rebel groups throughout Syria: “[If] one milk carton cannot go
[into a besieged area, how] can there be a political transition” to peace (in Black,
2016)? However, there is an important caveat to this policy recommendation:
Parallel political institutions can and do provide vital public services that an
interim government may be unwilling or unable to provide (cf. Englebert and
Tull, 2008). For instance, I have elaborated on how the Maoist People’s Courts
added to the CPN (M)’s popularity during Nepal’s civil war, because their judi-
cial work was perceived as more efficient and cheaper than the services offered
by the regular government district courts. Particularly women were said to
have benefited from these parallel structures because the Maoist courts strictly
punished rape, domestic violence, or men taking child brides (Lohani-Chase,
2008). Thus, in order to avoid perpetuating or even causing new violence by
dismantling widely legitimate governance structures, international actors must
always embed strategies that integrate the parallel institutions of warring par-
ties in wider efforts to ensure public service provisions to a civilian population
in war-torn states.
A final policy implication of my research concerns the role of unarmed actors
in interim governance. Although my case studies could not verify how precisely
the participation of civil society and political parties in interim decision-making
adds to peace, my statistical analysis strongly suggested that it does. For in-
ternational actors engaged in the promotion of peace after war, this finding
indicates that they should promote the inclusion of civil society and political
parties without a history of armed insurgency during interim rule. They should
equally strengthen the capacity of these actors to become true domestic audi-
ences that can hold warring parties accountable for their behavior, and that can
ensure transparent decision-making in the interim period.
132Some of my interview partners in Nepal have discussed the downsides of offering such
services inside cantonment, especially if a civilian population does not have the same access
to such opportunities (cf. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, 2013).
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10.3 Avenues for Future Research
This dissertation also opens up several avenues for future research on interim
governments in war-torn societies, as well as on related topics. Generally, both
my quantitative and my qualitative findings point to the conditionality of in-
stitutional designs. This means that institutions do not work in isolation, but
deeply interact with existing formal or informal institutional structures as well
as with other context factors in war-torn societies. While studies in peace
and conflict research increasingly attend to such conditionality (e.g. Pospieszna
and Schneider, 2013), it still represents a relatively new approach to studying
post-conflict institutions that needs more systematic analysis and generalizable
findings (cf. Ansorg and Kurtenbach, 2017; Basedau, 2017). Such findings could
also help formulate more precise policy recommendations on which institutional
configurations work best under what context conditions.
Most notably, my case studies have suggested two specific conditionalities
that present promising avenues for future research. Firstly, the impact of power-
sharing arrangements on peace after war may depend upon how a participation
in power-sharing institutions alters intra-party dynamics, such as in Nepal. This
aspect has not been addressed in previous research on the topic, not least be-
cause many statistical analysis on post-conflict power-sharing institutions refer
to the standard bargaining model with unitary actors as a theoretical explana-
tion (e.g. Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Mattes and Savun, 2009). In that way,
this aspect thus calls for more research that takes into account the structure
of warring parties in examining how power-sharing arrangements – or other in-
stitutional formations – affect warring party behavior after war. This could be
implemented in qualitative case study research designs that trace causal mecha-
nisms linking warring party structures, institutions, and post-conflict outcomes.
Recent data collections yet also allow for statistical tests of this issue (Cunning-
ham et al., 2009; Cunningham et al., 2013).
Secondly, my findings also suggest that the peace-conducive effect of power-
sharing deals is conditional on whether or not warring parties integrate parallel
institutions. Particularly my case study on the Cambodian interim government
revealed that as long as warring parties have access to economic gains through
their control over parallel political structures, they lack incentives to peacefully
cooperate in formal state institutions. In the worst case, this can render power-
sharing interim governments meaningless institutional façades rather than struc-
tures with a substantive impact on local political developments (cf. the notion
of post-conflict “Potemkin States” in Bliesemann de Guevara and Kühn, 2010).
This aspect then calls for more research on how the peace-conducive effect of
formal (interim) institutions is conditional on the patterns of and dynamics
within parallel war-time institutions of warring parties.
Because – as I have argued above – scholarship on parallel political institu-
tions has thus far been mostly informed by qualitative analysis (but see Sabates-
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Wheeler and Verwimp, 2014), this would also call for a more substantive data
collection on the properties of parallel structures that warring parties set up
during the course of armed conflict. Such data collection could include, for in-
stance, more nuanced information on the types of public services warring parties
offer to gain popular legitimacy (such as parallel judicial systems, healthcare, or
education). It also could include information on the types of finance mechanisms
warring parties implement (such as monetary and non-monetary taxation, ex-
tortion, or resource trade), as well as on the depth of their institutional control.
Especially since parallel political institutions by warring parties have been de-
cisive in how rebel groups in recent cases of civil war manage their relationship
with the civilian population – think of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, as well
as the self-proclaimed parallel administrations of the Donetsk People’s Republic
in Ukraine – generalizable results on the role of parallel political institutions in
war and peace would also be of highest policy relevance.
Finally, my dissertation also opens up avenues for future research on the
role of unarmed actors in interim governments specifically, as well as in post-
conflict peace processes more generally. I have noted above that I only found
mixed support for my hypothesis on how the participation of unarmed actors
in interim government increases the stability of post-interim peace. While the
variable was one of the most robust explanations for peace in my Cox PH models,
this finding was not mirrored by my case studies. I have furthermore reasoned
that one explanation for this lack of congruence is that the statistical coding
of participation that I presented in this dissertation is an inefficient measure of
the underlying concept of such participation. Generally, there has thus far been
very little statistical research on the role of civil society and political parties in
peace processes (a notable contribution is Nilsson, 2012). While the debate on
civil society has vastly been dominated by qualitative research (cf. Belloni, 2008;
McKeon, 2005; Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006; Pouligny, 2005; Wanis-St. John and
Kew, 2008), the role of unarmed political parties in post-conflict politics is hardly
addressed in the literature at all. Most research has in that regard focused on
rebel-to-party transformation instead of on parties without any history of armed
insurgency (Ishiyama and Batta, 2011; Ishiyama and Marshall, 2015; Söderberg-
Kovacs and Hatz, 2016).
My dissertation thus provides a starting ground for promising future re-
search on the topic. Firstly, it proves that more statistical research is needed on
the role of unarmed, civic actors in order to develop more efficient indicators to
measure the participation of civil society and political parties in interim govern-
ments, as well as in the wider peace process. Such research, together with new
data collection, could further disaggregate the form of participation by unarmed
actors and not only ask if unarmed actors participated through ad hoc measures
in reform processes, but how often they were consulted by the warring parties.
Future research could also borrow from other sub-disciplines of the political
sciences in order to advance our understanding of the dynamics of civil society
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and political party participation. For instance, studies concerned with Euro-
pean Union politics have demonstrated how quantitative text analysis can be a
promising tool in studying interest group influence on policy outcomes (Klüver,
2009). One future research project could try to measure civil society influence
in post-conflict decision-making by comparing civil society positions with final
legislation outcomes, subject to the availability of written statements. Last but
not least, also my qualitative finding on the interaction between unarmed actor
participation and a history of democracy was not supported by my quantitative
analysis. This could not only be due to inefficient measures of participation,
but also due to the measure of democracy employed here. Future research could
make use of new advances in data collections on political regimes – such as the
Varieties of Democracy project (Coppedge et al., 2016) – and disaggregate the
democracy measure in order to tease out more subtle causal mechanisms.
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I used a number of software applications to conduct my statistical analysis. All
data was prepared and models were computed using the software environment
R (R Core Team, 2013). Some additional packages for the R environment
deserve a special mention: I relied on the survival package by Therneau (2015) to
estimate Cox PH models in Chapter 4. All graphs were plotted using the ggplot2
package by Wickham (2009), often after organizing data with dplyr (Wickham
and Francois, 2015). To plot the trends of interim government research in
political science journals in Figure 2.2, I relied on the updated GScholarScraper
function by Haass (2015). Generating maps was greatly aided by the ggmap
package by Kahle and Wickham (2016). Matching for case selection in Chapter
5 was done using the caseMatch package by Nielsen (2014). I exported all tables
from R to Latex using the stargazer package by Hlavac (2015).
A.2 Constructing the Sample
The table below lists my sample of cases for the statistical analysis that includes
all cases of interim government that followed at least one year of intrastate
conflict since 1989 and that terminated by December 2012 (cf. section 4.1).
Table A.1: List of Interim Governments, 1989-2012
Country Period Interim Government
Afghanistan 2001-04 Afghan Interim Administration & Afghan In-
terim Authority following the Bonn Agreement
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Country Period Interim Government
Algeria 1991-95 Conseil Consultatif National & Conseil Na-
tional de Transition after cancelled elections
Angola 1991-92 MPLA-run caretaker interim government fol-
lowing the 1991 Bicesse Peace Agreement
Angola 2002-08 Power-sharing interim government following
the Luena Memorandum of Understanding
Azerbaijan 1993 Aliev-run interim government following a coup
Bangladesh 1997-99 Chittagong Hills Tract Interim Regional Coun-
cil following the 1997 CHT Peace Accord
Bosnia 1995-96 Peace Implementation Council interim admin-
istration following the Dayton Agreement
Burundi 1992-93 Caretaker interim government under Buyoya
Burundi 2000-05 Power-sharing interim government following
the 2000 Arusha Peace Agreement
Cambodia 1991-93 UNTAC administration & power-sharing SNC
following the Paris Peace Agreement
CAR 2003-05 Interim government under Bozizé
CAR 2008-11 Power-Sharing Interim Consensus Government
following the Bisao Peace Agreement
Chad 1990-96 Conseil Supérieur de la Transition (CST)
Comoros 2001-02 Interim government following Famboni II
Comoros 2003-04 Interim government after the Agreement on the
Transitional Arrangements in the Comoros
Congo 1999-02 Transitional Assembly following the Accord de
Cessez-le-Feu et de Cessation des Hostilités
Croatia 1995-98 UNTAES administration in Eastern Slavonia
Djibouti 1994-97 Power-sharing interim rule after the Accord de
Paix & de la Reconciliation Nationale
DRC 2003-06 Power-sharing interim government following
the Intercongolese Political Negotiations
El Salvador 1992-94 Caretaker interim government following the
1992 Chapultepec Peace Agreement
Ethiopia 1991-95 EPRDF revolutionary interim rule following
the victory over the Dergue military junta
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Country Period Interim Government
Georgia 1992 Revolutionary Interim Military Council and
State Council under Shevardnadze
Guatemala 1996-97 Caretaker IG following the Agreement on the
Implementation, Compliance and Verification
Timetable for the Peace Agreements
Guinea-Bissau 1998-99 Interim Government of National Unity
Haiti 1990-91 Interim government after Avril’s exile
Haiti 1991-95 Interim government after coup against Aristide
Haiti 2004-06 Alexandre & Latortue’s interim government
East Timor 1999-01 UNTAET administration until independence
Indonesia 2005-06 Transitional National Assembly in Banda Aceh
Iraq 2003-05 Coalition Provisional Authority & Iraqi Gov-
erning Council following the ousting of Hussein
Ivory Coast 2003-10 Power-sharing interim government under Guil-
laume Kigbafori Soro & Laurent Gbagbo
Kosovo 1999-01 International administration by UNMIK
Lebanon 1989-92 Power-sharing interim government following
the Taif Accord
Lesotho 1998-02 Interim Political Authority under Raditapole
Liberia 1990-97 Power-sharing interim rule under Sawyer
Liberia 2003-05 NTGL following the Accra Peace Agreement
Libya 2011-12 Revolutionary National Transitional Council
following the death of Muammar Gaddafi
Macedonia 2001-02 Power-sharing interim period following the
Ohrid Agreement
Mali 1992-97 Interim government after the Pacte National
Mozambique 1992-94 FRELIMO-led caretaker interim government
following the Acordo Geral de Paz
Namibia 1989 International administration by UNTAG
Nepal 2006-08 Power-sharing interim rule after the CPA
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Country Period Interim Government
Niger 1991-93 Interim government under Cheiffou and the
legislative High Council of the Republic
Niger 1996 Interim Council of National Salvation following
a military coup
Niger 1999 Transitional National Reconsilation Council
following the assassination of Mainassara
Niger 2010-11 Interim government following Tandja’s ousting
Pakistan 1990 Caretaker interim government under Jatoi
Palestine 1993-96 Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority
following the 1993 Oslo Agreement
PNG 2001-05 Bougainville Interim Provincial Government
Paraguay 1989 Interim government under Rodríguez
Peru 2000-01 Interim government under Paniagua
Philippines 1996-01 Transitional Southern Philippines Council for
Peace and Development following the Min-
danao Final Agreement
Romania 1989-90 Interim government under Iliescu
Rwanda 1993-03 Interim government under Kagame
Sierra Leone 1996 Military interim government under Bio
Sierra Leone 1999-02 Power-sharing interim government following
the Lomé Peace Accord
Somalia 2004-12 Power-sharing interim government under Yusuf
South Africa 1993-94 Power-sharing Interim Gov. of National Unity
Sudan 2005-11 Power-sharing Interim Gov. of National Unity
Tajikistan 1997-00 Power-sharing interim government following
the 1997 Moscow Declaration
Venezuela 1993 Interim government under Velásquez
Yemen 2011-12 Power-sharing interim government under Hadi
A.3 Codebook
The table below offers an overview of the definitions and sources of all variables
that underlie my statistical analysis in Chapter 4. For a detailed description
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of the universe of cases, the procedures of how I delineated a sample, and the
coding rationale behind all main independent variables, see section 4.1.
Table A.2: Codebook for the Statistical Analysis
Variable Variable Description, Coding, and/or Source
igname Factor variable of name of the country or territory that
the interim government convened in (e.g. “Liberia”)
ig_startdate Variable in POSIXct class of the calendar date that
the interim government convened (e.g. “2003-08-18”)
ig_enddate Variable in POSIXct class of the calendar date that the
interim government terminated (e.g. “2005-11-08”)
obs_enddate Variable in POSIXct class of the calendar date that
an observation drops from the sample (thus either the
date conflict recurred or the censoring date 2014-12-31
year Numeric variable of the calendar year (e.g. “2006”)
days_interval Numeric variable of the precise count of days a case is
at peace at the start of a yearly peace spell
dur_interval Numeric variable of the precise count of days a case is
at peace at the end of a yearly peace spell
recur_interval Dichotomous variable (0/1) measuring whether or not
a peace spell ended with conflict or censoring
ig_survobject A survival object as returned by the Surv function
powersharing Dichotomous variable (0/1) measuring whether or not
rebels are offered guaranteed positions in interim gov.
inter_lenient Dichotomous variable (0/1) measuring whether or the
international community assumes authority during in-
terim rule (including monitoring missions)
inter_strict Dichotomous variable (0/1) measuring whether or not
the international community assumes authority during
interim rule (excluding monitoring missions)
inter_cont Numeric variable measuring total number of UN peace-
keeping personnel present in final year of an interim
government; from International Peace Institute (2015)
parallel Ordinal variable measuring whether warring parties in-
tegrated both parallel political and military institu-
tions (2); integrated either one of the two (1); or did
not integrate any into the interim government (0).
Continued on next page
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page
Variable Variable Description, Coding, and/or Source
parallel_pol Dichotomous variable (0/1) measuring whether or not
parallel political institutions are integrated
parallel_mil Dichotomous variable (0/1) measuring whether or not
parallel military institutions are integrated
participation Ordinal variable measuring whether an interim gov-
ernment allows for institutional (2), ad hoc (1), or no
participation of unarmed actors (0)
participation_01 Dichotomous variable (0/1) measuring whether or not
unarmed actors participated in interim government
igdur Numeric variable measuring interim government du-
ration in days, created using the difftime function
between ig_startdate and ig_enddate
igdurweeks Numeric variable, interim gov. duration in weeks
igviolence Dichotomous variable (0/1) measuring whether or not
armed conflict occurred during the interim period
agreement Dichotomous variable (0/1) measuring whether or not
interim government was negotiated in a peace accord
national Dichotomous variable (0/1) measuring whether or not
the interim government convened at the national level
coup Dichotomous variable (0/1) measuring whether or not
interim government convened following a coup d’état,
information from Powell and Thyne (2011)
ethnic Dichotomous variable (0/1) measuring whether or not
the interim government convened following ethnic con-
flict, data from Walter (2004) and Kreutz (2010)
incompatibility Dichotomous variable (0/1) measuring whether or not
interim government convened following a conflict over
territory or government, data from the UCDP/PRIO
Armed Conflict Dataset
intensity Dichotomous variable (0/1) measuring whether or not
the interim government convened following a civil war,
data from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset
(Gleditsch, Wallensteen, et al., 2002; Pettersson and
Wallensteen, 2015)
Continued on next page
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page
Variable Variable Description, Coding, and/or Source
condur Numeric variable measuring conflict duration in days,
created using the difftime function between UCDP
conflict start date and ig_startdate
condurweeks Numeric variable measuring conflict duration in weeks
rebelstrength Ordinal variable measuring rebel strength, from Cun-
ningham et al. (2013)
rebelcohesion Binary variable measuring whether or not at least one
rebel group in the intrastate armed conflict had a cen-
tral command structure, based on the centcontrol cod-
ing by Cunningham et al. (2013)
rebelnumber Number of rebel groups in intrastate conflict from
UCDP/PRIO (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, et al., 2002;
Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015)
demo_strict Dichotomous variable (0/1) measuring whether or not
a country country sustained democracy for at least five
consecutive years in the past, data from Ulfelder (2012)
demo_lenient Dichotomous variable (0/1) measuring whether or not
a country saw at least one episode of democracy, data
from (Ulfelder, 2012)
gdpcap Numeric variable measuring GDP per capita in each
year of the post-interim period, data from the World
Bank (2014)’s World Development Indicators
gdpgrowth Numeric variable measuring annual GDP per capita
growth (in percentage) in each year of the post-interim
period, data from the World Bank (2014)’s World De-
velopment Indicators
infantmortality Numeric variable measuring infant mortality rates (per
1,000 live births) in each year of the post-interim pe-
riod, data from the World Bank (2014)’s World Devel-
opment Indicators
population Numeric variable measuring population size in each
year of the post-interim period, data from the World
Bank (2014)’s World Development Indicators
Continued on next page
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page
Variable Variable Description, Coding, and/or Source
resources Numeric variable measuring natural resource rents (%
of GDP) in each year of the post-interim period, data
from the World Bank (2014)’s World Dev. Indicators
gwnoa Country codes from Gleditsch and Ward (1999)
iso2c ISO2 character country code
ucdp_region Region identification code from UCDP/PRIO Armed
Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, et al., 2002;
Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015)
ucdp_id Conflict identifier from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Con-
flict Dataset (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, et al., 2002; Pet-
tersson and Wallensteen, 2015)
A.4 Additional Tables and Figures
Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics (2)
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
International IG (strict) 522 0.255 0.436 0.000 1.000
International IG (cont.) 522 1,517.247 3,245.186 0.000 18,296
Parallel Political Inst. 522 0.738 0.440 0.000 1.000
Parallel Military Inst. 522 0.573 0.495 0.000 1.000
Participation (binary) 522 0.852 0.355 0.000 1.000
Conflict Duration (weeks) 522 861.053 724.572 0.429 3,323.286
Rebel Strength 522 2.837 1.045 1.000 5.000
Democracy (strict) 522 0.496 0.500 0.000 1.000
Democracy (lenient) 522 0.705 0.456 0.000 1.000
IG Duration (weeks) 522 107.535 94.582 10.429 524.714
Peace Agreement 522 0.636 0.482 0.000 1.000
IG Violence 522 0.402 0.491 0.000 1.000


































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.4: Correlation Matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1: Power-Sharing IG 1
2: International IG 0:193 1
3: Parallel Institutions -0:094 0:308 1
4: Participation -0:092 0:033 0:024 1
5: Ethnic Conflict 0:387 0:065 -0:125 -0:056 1
6: Incompatibility -0:230 -0:215 -0:296 0:309 -0:284 1
7: Conflict Intensity 0:039 0:539 0:536 -0:032 -0:060 -0:201 1
8: GDP per Capita 0:038 0:073 0:148 0:327 0:022 -0:119 0:113 1
9: Population Size 0:030 -0:074 0:128 -0:127 -0:071 -0:320 0:101 0:004 1
Table A.5: Robustness Check VI: Recoding Variables (2)
Stability of Post-Interim Peace
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Power-Sharing IG 0.0002 0.423 0.099 0.292
(0.346) (0.379) (0.388) (0.428)
International IG  0.467  0.502  0.722  0.907
(0.358) (0.387) (0.461) (0.447)
Parallel Institutions (1)  2.206  1.533
(0.492) (0.520)
Parallel Institutions (2)  3.018  2.793
(0.693) (0.778)
Participation (ad hoc)  0.303  1.518
(0.460) (0.637)
Participation (institut.)  1.532  2.494
(0.444) (0.594)




Conflict Intensity 0.686 1.606
(0.433) (0.517)
ln. GDP/Capita  0.123  0.037
(0.175) (0.203)
ln. Population 0.049  0.032
(0.165) (0.179)
Observations 522 522 506 506
Number of interim gov. 62 62 62 62
Log Likelihood  129.320  105.041  107.631  85.771
This table replicates Table 4.3 by fitting parallel institutions and participation in factor data
format (cf. section 4.1.3). *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent
confidence level. Standard errors clustered on country level reported in parentheses.
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Table A.6: Hazard Ratios (2)
exp(beta) Effect on the Hazard Ratio
Power-Sharing IG 1:339 34% increase, but no significance
International IG 0:404 60 % decrease, but not very robust
Parallel Institutions (1) 0:216 79 % decrease of conflict hazard
Parallel Institutions (2) 0:061 94 % decrease of conflict hazard
Participation (ad hoc) 0:219 78 % decrease of conflict hazard
Participation (institution.) 0:083 92 % decrease of conflict hazard
Ethnic Conflict 2:688 168 % increase of conflict hazard
Incompatibility 6:544 554 % increase of conflict hazard
Conflict Intensity 4:980 398 % increase of conflict hazard
GDP per Capita 0:964 4 % decrease, but no significance
Population Size 0:968 4 % increase, but no significance
This table reports hazard ratios for Model 4 in Table A.5.





1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Notes: illustration based on the data presented in Chapter 4. The y-axis displays the number
of events (i.e. armed conflict recurrence) per calendar year.
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Table A.7: Robustness Check VII: Additional Control Variables (2)
Stability of Post-Interim Peace
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Power-Sharing IG 0.175 0.345 0.289 0.226
(0.495) (0.411) (0.423) (0.427)
International IG  0.895  1.095  0.827  0.593
(0.468) (0.484) (0.447) (0.449)
Parallel Institutions  1.512  1.480  1.473  1.466
(0.364) (0.361) (0.374) (0.373)
Participation  1.244  1.231  1.208  1.189
(0.306) (0.298) (0.311) (0.305)
Ethnic Conflict 0.899 0.659 0.918 1.114
(0.449) (0.504) (0.445) (0.499)
Incompatibility 1.890 1.745 1.753 1.538
(0.804) (0.713) (0.722) (0.796)
Conflict Intensity 1.503 1.307 1.514 1.512
(0.444) (0.457) (0.509) (0.497)
ln. GDP/Capita  0.033 0.034  0.016  0.190
(0.198) (0.205) (0.206) (0.230)
ln. Population 0.014  0.022 0.005 0.058









Observations 506 506 506 472
Number of interim gov. 62 62 62 62
Log Likelihood  85.880  85.077  85.951  74.985
Note that *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence level, re-
spectively. Standard errors clustered on country level are reported in parentheses. Coefficient
sizes instead of hazard ratios are reported.
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Table A.8: Robustness Check VIII: Frailty Models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Power-Sharing IG 0:00 0:10 0:24 0:28
(0:35) (0:39) (0:36) (0:40)
International IG  0:47  0:72  0:39  0:82
(0:36) (0:46) (0:37) (0:42)








Conflict Intensity 0:69 1:53
(0:43) (0:44)
ln. GDP/Capita  0:12  0:02
(0:17) (0:19)
ln. Population 0:05 0:00
(0:16) (0:17)
AIC 262.64 229.26 221.58 189.90
Num. events 35 32 35 32
Observations 522 506 522 506
Number of interim gov. 62 62 62 62
Note that *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence level.
Coefficient sizes instead of hazard ratios are reported.
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Table A.9: Robustness Check IX: Interaction Models (1)
Stability of Post-Interim Peace
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Power-Sharing IG 0.614 0.485 0.267 0.268
(0.436) (0.489) (0.365) (0.403)
* Parallel Institutions  0.892  0.481
(0.619) (0.666)
International IG  0.441  0.787  0.578  0.638
(0.371) (0.420) (0.460) (0.532)
* Parallel Institutions 0.430  0.385
(0.626) (0.695)
Parallel Institutions  1.272  1.311  1.880  1.318
(0.393) (0.407) (0.476) (0.447)
Participation  0.747  1.221  0.749  1.179
(0.209) (0.293) (0.220) (0.298)




Conflict Intensity 1.528 1.602
(0.444) (0.460)
ln. GDP/Capita  0.002  0.021
(0.196) (0.193)
ln. Population  0.035  0.040
(0.173) (0.181)
Observations 522 506 522 506
Number of interim gov. 62 62 62 62
Log Likelihood  105.770  85.690  106.577  85.797
Note that *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence level, re-
spectively. Standard errors clustered on country level are reported in parentheses. Coefficient
sizes instead of hazard ratios are reported.
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Table A.10: Robustness Check X: Interaction Models (2)
Stability of Post-Interim Peace
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Power-Sharing IG  0.017 0.002 0.368 0.265
(0.501) (0.421) (0.411) (0.395)
* International IG (lenient) 0.949
(0.911)
* International IG (strict) 0.804
(1.131)
International IG (lenient)  1.413  0.804  0.726
(0.742) (0.420) (0.429)
International IG (strict)  1.977
(0.914)
Parallel Institutions  1.550  1.631  1.509  1.576
(0.368) (0.376) (0.359) (0.359)
Participation  1.269  1.467  1.106  1.276
(0.298) (0.318) (0.409) (0.353)
* Democratic History (lenient)  0.148
(0.476)
* Democratic History (strict) 0.126
(0.495)
Ethnic Conflict 0.855 0.808 0.825 0.776
(0.447) (0.447) (0.455) (0.440)
Incompatibility 1.753 1.801 1.569 1.611
(0.722) (0.706) (0.758) (0.740)
Conflict Intensity 1.437 1.591 1.444 1.465
(0.440) (0.454) (0.449) (0.445)
ln. GDP/Capita 0.009  0.009  0.014 0.040
(0.194) (0.204) (0.191) (0.188)
ln. Population 0.003  0.044  0.013 0.019
(0.165) (0.164) (0.165) (0.172)
Democratic History (lenient)  0.265
(0.622)
Democratic History (strict)  0.831
(0.607)
Observations 506 506 506 506
Number of interim gov. 62 62 62 62
Log Likelihood  85.376  83.485  85.456  84.385
Note that *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence level, re-
spectively. Standard errors clustered on country level are reported in parentheses. Coefficient
sizes instead of hazard ratios are reported.
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Table A.11: Robustness Check XI: Other Types of Violence
One-Sided Violence Non-State Conflict
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Power-Sharing IG 0.009  0.336  0.056 0.022
(0.367) (0.423) (0.404) (0.441)
International IG 0.121 0.141  0.265  0.204
(0.367) (0.441) (0.418) (0.496)
Parallel Institutions  1.163  1.286  0.419  0.141
(0.298) (0.373) (0.282) (0.336)
Participation  0.323  0.455  0.002  0.264
(0.206) (0.261) (0.238) (0.254)




Conflict Intensity 1.089  0.060
(0.457) (0.501)
ln. GDP/Capita  0.352 0.174
(0.238) (0.213)
ln. Population 0.478 0.714
(0.181) (0.204)
Observations 541 523 655 617
Number of interim gov. 62 62 62 62
Log Likelihood  107.514  85.618  98.681  80.200
Note that *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence level, re-
spectively. Standard errors clustered on country level are reported in parentheses. Coefficients
instead of hazard ratios are reported.
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Table A.12: Robustness Check XII: Additional Control Variables (3)
Stability of Post-Interim Peace
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Power-Sharing IG 0.179 0.244 0.211 0.427
(0.402) (0.379) (0.396) (0.482)
International IG  0.622  0.732  0.735  0.873
(0.436) (0.399) (0.417) (0.472)
Parallel Institutions  1.466  1.583  1.524  1.712
(0.347) (0.343) (0.351) (0.421)
Participation  1.184  1.050  1.182  1.488
(0.298) (0.268) (0.321) (0.380)
Ethnic Conflict 1.131 0.701 0.846 0.973
(0.476) (0.415) (0.470) (0.489)
Incompatibility 1.660 1.519 1.651 2.101
(0.700) (0.733) (0.725) (0.872)
Conflict Intensity 1.612 1.441 1.479 2.121





ln. GDP/Capita  0.026  0.141
(0.192) (0.253)
ln. Population 0.030 0.016  0.004  0.150
(0.175) (0.163) (0.171) (0.206)




Observations 514 522 513 475
Number of interim gov. 62 62 62 62
Log Likelihood  84.752  97.342  89.320  65.035
Note that *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence level, re-
spectively. Standard errors clustered on country level are reported in parentheses. Coefficients







1. Express gratitude; briefly present the dissertation project; clarify the rules
(Quote by name? Use recording equipment?)
2. Could you start by explaining your link to / your role in / how you followed
the peace process since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)?
3. What is your general assessment of the peace process? What were great
achievements / positive aspects? What has not been achieved?
Power-Sharing Interim Government and Elections
1. How would you generally assess the role of power-sharing during the in-
terim government? What were the aspects did you think were good; what
were more negative aspects?
2. In your opinion, what was the most important law passed during the rule
of the interim government?
(a) On passing the electoral law: In 2007, the CPN (M) left the cabinet
shortly in protest over provisions concerning the electoral system. In
your opinion, what were their motivations?
(b) Were you ever concerned that the CPN (M) leaving the interim gov-
ernment could mean the party remobilizes for war?
3. Do you think the CPN (M) had demobilized had they not received any
power-sharing guarantees?
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4. Why do you think the CPN (M) won the 2008 elections to the first Con-
stituent Assembly (CA)? Do you think it would have accepted losing these
elections, or would it have remobilized for war?
5. In your opinion, would it have been beneficial to include the RPP in the
power-sharing agreement? Why / why not?
6. How did you perceive the king’s / NA role in the interim period? Why do
you think did the king / NA did not stage a coup?
International Involvement during the Interim Period
1. How would you generally assess the influence of international actors and
particularly United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) in the peace pro-
cess? Where do you think international actors were particularly helpful;
where could they have done better?
2. Would you have wished for more international involvement in some policy
areas right after the CPA? Why / why not? Where? In your opinion, why
did UNMIN not receive a stronger mandate?
3. Had the Maoists wanted to remobilize for war, do you think UNMIN had
been in a position to stop them?
Civil Society Participation in the Interim Government
1. How would you generally assess the inclusion of civil society,
(a) during the negotiations leading up to the CPA?
(b) during the rule of the interim government until the 2008 elections?
2. Can you give me examples for how civil society participated in decision-
making during the interim government? For instance, can you remember
any specific laws or regulations where the interim government consulted
with civil society leaders and asked for advice?
3. Would you have wished for a deeper inclusion of civil society (e.g. more
seats in the interim government offered to civil society leaders) or do you
prefer the “watchdog” role over the political and peace process?
The Integration of Parallel Political and Military Institutions
1. How would you generally assess the disarmament and demobilization pro-
cess? What has been achieved, what has not been achieved?
2. The demobilization of ex-combatants was supposed to be completed by
the time of elections in 2008, but then took much longer. Why / do you
think this affected the election in any way?
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3. The weapons were stored in containers under a double key system and
supervised by UNMIN. If the CPN (M) had wanted to take their weapons
and leave the cantonment sides, would that have been possible?
4. (To commanders, combatants) Can you tell me more about the conditions
in the camps? What was good / what was particularly bad?
5. (To commanders, combatants) Did you follow what was happening in
Kathmandu when you were cantoned?
6. (To commanders, combatants) Are you still in contact with your friends
from the war / your commanders / your recruits?
7. Did ex-combatants in the camps have any contact to local communities?
Do you remember public events involving the civilian population?
8. The CPN (M) also constructed the parallel People’s Governments and
People’s Courts in the areas they controlled. In your opinion, what role
did they serve during the People’s War?
9. What happened to the People’s Governments during the peace process?
(a) In you opinion, were the People’s Governments and Courts com-
pletely dissolved in 2007? Why / why not?
(b) How are People’s Governments and Courts “dissolved?” Did dissolv-
ing the People’s Courts reduce public support for the CPN (M)?
Ending the Interview
1. Is there anything else you think is important for me to know? Can you
recommend any other persons who I should talk?
B.2 Interview Partners in Nepal
Table B.1: List of Interview Partners in Nepal
Code Date Description of Interview Partner
INT-01 22.09.2015 Western diplomat of international community
INT-02 23.09.2015 Western employee of development cooperation agency
INT-03 23.09.2015 Western project leader of development coop. agency
INT-04 23.09.2015 Nepali employee of a development cooperation agency
Continued on next page
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Table B.1 – continued from previous page
Code Date Description of Interview Partner
INT-05 24.09.2015 Technical adviser, Special Committee for Supervision,
Integration and Rehabilitation of Maoist Combatants
INT-06 25.09.2015 Nepali country director of an international NGO
INT-07 25.09.2015 Nepali director of a local Human Rights NGO
INT-08 26.09.2015 Former deputy commander of the Maoist PLA
INT-09 27.09.2015 Former major general of the RNA and member of the
Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee
INT-10 28.09.2015 Former female commander of the Maoist PLA
INT-11 28.09.2015 Nepali director of a local human rights NGO
INT-12 29.09.2015 Former lieutenant general of the RNA and adviser to
the Technical Committee for Supervision, Integration
and Rehabilitation of the Maoist Combatants
INT-13 30.09.2015 CPN (M) Minister in the interim government (1)
INT-14 30.09.2015 CPN (M) Minister in the interim government (2)
INT-15 04.10.2015 Member of the CPN (M) Central Committee, for-
merly Interim Constitution Drafting Committee
INT-16 05.10.2015 Nepali director of a local rule of law NGO
INT-17 06.10.2015 Former deputy commander of the Maoist PLA
INT-18 06.10.2015 Form. CPN (M) Minister for Peace & Reconstruction
INT-19 09.10.2015 Nepali journalist and opinion-maker
INT-20 09.10.2015 Nepali director of a local NGO; election observer
INT-21 10.10.2015 Demobilized ex-combatant of the PLA (1)
INT-22 10.10.2015 Demobilized ex-combatant of the PLA (2)
INT-23 12.10.2015 Member of the NC Central Committee, former min-
ister and negotiator to the 12-Points-Agreement
INT-24 13.10.2015 Nepali program director at UNDP (1)
INT-25 19.10.2015 Member of the CPN-UML Central Committee
INT-26 19.10.2015 Nepali program director at UNDP (2)
INT-27 19.10.2015 Nepali director of a local peacebuilding NGO
Continued on next page
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Table B.1 – continued from previous page
Code Date Description of Interview Partner
INT-28 19.10.2015 Form. NC Minister in the interim government
INT-29 03.11.2015 Western diplomat (phone interview)
INT-30 12.11.2015 Former Western project leader of an international de-
velopment agency (interview in Berlin)
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